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Everybody agrees that faith is a virtue. Fora proof of this we should note that virtue by its very name means the completion of an active power. Now, there are two kinds of active powers, one whose action terminates in something performed outside the agent, as the action of the power of building terminates in the edifice; and the other, whose action does not terminate outside of the agent, but remains within him, as sight remains within one who sees, as the Philosopher says. In these two kinds of powers completion is taken in different senses. Since acts of the first type of power are not in the maker, but in what is made, as the Philosopher says, the completion of the power is to be considered in reference to that which is done. Thus, the power of one who carries burdens is said to consist in this, that he carries a very heavy burden, as is evident from Heaven and Earth; and the power of one who builds consists in this, that he makes a very good house. However, since the act of the other type of power remains in the agent and not in anything produced, the completion of that type of power is conceived according to its mode of acting, namely, that it act well and fit tingly. And it is because of this that its act is called good. And so it is that in this type of power we call virtue that which makes the work good.
But the philosopher considers one thing as final good and the theologian another. For the philosopher considers as final good that which has a proportion to the human powers and exists in the act of himself. Thus, he says that happiness is an activity. Therefore, according to the philosopher, a good act, whose principle is called a virtue, is said to be good without qualification in so far as it is in conformity will the potency as that which perfects it. Consequently, when the philosopher finds any habit which eicits such an act, he calls it a virtue, whether it be in the intellective part, as science, understanding of principles, and intellectual virtues of this sort, whose acts are the good of the power itself, namely, to consider the true; or whether it be in the affective part, as temperance, bravery, and the other moral virtues.
But the theologian considers as the final good that which is beyond the capacity of nature, namely, everlasting life, as has been said. Thus, he does not consider the good in human acts without qualification, because he puts the end not in the acts themselves, but in the disposition to that good which he makes the end. He says that only that act is completely good which has a proximate relation to the final good, that is, an act which merits eternal life. He says that every such act is an act of virtue, and every habit properly eliciting such an act he calls a virtue.
However, an act can be called meritorious only if it lies within the power of the agent. For it is necessary for one who merits to present something. Nor can he present something unless it is in some way his own, that is, from himself. Now, an act lies within our power, in so far as it belongs to our will, whether as elicited by the will, as to love and to will, or as commanded by the will, as to walk and to talk. Hence, will reference to any such act, we can posit as a virtue that which elicits perfect acts of this type.
As has been said above, there is assent in belief only by reason of the command of the will. Therefore, it depends on the will according to its very nature. It is for this reason that to believe can be meritorious, and that faith, which is the habit eliciting the act of believing, is a virtue for the theologian.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Knowledge and science are not distinguished from virtue taken simply, but from moral virtue, which is more commonly called virtue.
2. Although the fact that something is caused by a virtue or a vice is not enough to put virtue or vice in its definition, the fact that it can be commanded by a virtue or a vice is enough to make an act be the act of a vice or virtue.
3. The good toward which a virtue gives an ordination should not be taken as the object of some act; rather, that good is the perfect act itself, which the virtue clicks. And, although the true differs from the good in its intelligible content, the act of considering the true is a good of the understanding, and to give assent to first truth on its own ac count is a good worthy of merit. Consequently, faith, which is ordained to this act, is called a virtue.
4. The answer to the fourth difficulty is clear from the third response.
5. Neither scientific knowledge nor opinion, but only faith, can be called a virtue in the sense in which we are now speaking of virtue. For faith is not a mean between science and opinion will reference to that which concerns the will, and it is according to this that it is classified as a virtue in the way we have mentioned. For in science and opinion there is no inclination because of the will, but only be cause of reason. If, however, we are talking about them will reference only to knowledge, neither opinion nor faith would be a virtue, since they do not have perfect knowledge. Only science has this.
6. Finst tnuth is the proper object of faith only unden the character of non appeaning, as is clean from the definition of the Apostle, where it is said that the proper object of faith is that which does not appear. Consequently, when first truth is present, it loses its character of object.
7. Faith is said to be the fullest development of a power in so far as it adds to the power that which is needed to elicit a good and meritorious act. For a virtue really to be a virtue, however, it does not have to elicit the best act possible from that power, for in the same power there may be several virtues, one of which elicits an act more noble than another, as magnificence over liberality.
8. In any two things which are ordained to each other the perfection of the lower is for it w be subject to the higher, as the concupiscible which is subject to reason. Because of this, the habit of a virtue is said to make it easy for the concupiscible power to act, not in the sense so that it makes it pursue concupiscible objects without restraint, but because it brings it perfectly under the dominion of reason. Similarly, the good of understanding itself is to be subject w the will which adheres to God. Thus, faith is said to help the under standing in so far as it makes it captive under such a will.
9. Faith is not an intellectual or moral virtue, but a theological virtue. And, although the theological virtues have the same subject as moral and intellectual virtues, they have a different object. For the object of the theological virtues is the last end itself, whereas the object of the other virtues is the means to the end. Therefore, the theologians propose certain virtues which concern the end itself. But the philosophers do not do this, because the end of human life which the philosophers study does not transcend the power of nature. Hence, man’s pursuit of that end is the result of a natural inclination, and to pursue that end he does not need to be elevated by any habits, as he does to pursue the end considered by the theologians, which transcends the power of nature.
10. Faith is in the intellect only in so far as it is commanded by the will, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, although that which comes from the will can be said to be accidental to the intellect, it is still essential to faith. The same holds for the rational element, which is accidental to the concupiscible, but essential to temperance.
11. Prophecy does not depend on the will of the prophet, as is said in the second Epistle of St. Peter (1: 21). Faith, however, is to some extent dependent on the will of the belever. Therefore, prophecy cannot be called a virtue as faith can.
Parallel readings: lii Sentences 23, 2, 3, sol. 1; Summa Theol., II-II, 4, 2.
Difficulties:
It seems to be not the cognitive, but the affective, part, for
1. All virtue seems to exist in the affective part, since virtue is a kind of "well-ordered love," as Augustine says. But faith is a virtue. There fore, it exists in the affective part.
2. Virtue implies some perfection, since it is "the disposition of something perfect to that which is best," as is said in the Physics. But, since faith has some perfection and some imperfection, the imperfection derives from the cognitive element and the perfection derives from the volitional element, namely, that it hold firmly to things in visible. Therefore, in so far as it is a virtue, it is in the affective part.
3. Augustine says: "Although a child does not have the faith which is in the will of those who believe, he has the sacrament of faith." From this we clearly see that faith is in the will.
4. Augustine says: "The Apostle’s words, 'Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? (1Co 4,7), refer to the faith which is in the wills of those who believe." We conclude as before.
5. A disposition and its perfection seem to belong to the same thing. But faith is a disposition for glory, which is in the affective part. Therefore, faith, also, is in the affective part.
6. Merit resides in the will, because only the will is master of its acts. But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore, it is an act of the will, and so it would seem that faith resides in the will.
7. It was said that faith is in both the affective and the cognitive parts. On the contrary, one habit cannot belong to two powers. Faith, however, is one habit. Therefore, it cannot be in the affective and cognitive parts, which are two powers.
To the Contrary:
1'. A habit which perfects a power has the same object as the power. Otherwise, the act of the power and of the habit could not be one. But faith has the same object, not as the affective part, but as the cognitive part, since the object of both is the true. Therefore, faith is in the cognitive part.
2’. Augustine says that faith is the "enlightening" of the mind for the first truth. But to be enlightened pertains to the cognitive part. Therefore, faith is in the cognitive part.
3’. If faith is said to be in the will, it is so only because we believe willingly. But, in like manner, all the activities of the virtues take place in us knowledge, as is clear from the Ethics. Therefore, for the same all the virtues would be in the cognitive part, which is obviously false.
4’. Through grace, which is in the virtues, the image which is in the three powers of memory, intelligence, and will is refashioned. But the three virtues which primarily have reference to grace are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, one of these is in the intelligence. It is evident, however, that neither hope nor charity is there. So, faith is there.
5’. The cognitive power has the same relation to that which can or cannot be proved, as the affective power has to that which can or can not be approved. But the virtue by reason of which we approve that which, according to human reason, should not be approved is in the affective part. This virtue is charity, by which we love our enemies, a thing which naturally seems something not to be approved. There fore, faith, by which we prove or assert that which to reason seems incapable of proof, is in the cognitive part.
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There are many different opinions about this question. For some have said that faith is in both the affective and cognitive powers. But this cannot be true at all if it means that it is in both equally. For each habit must have one act, and one act cannot belong equally to two powers. Seeing this, some of these people say that faith is principally in the affective power. But this does not seem to be true, since to be lieve implies some "thought," as is clear from Augustine. Thought, however, is an act of the cognitive part. Faith is also in some sense called scientific knowledge and sight, as was said above. And all of these belong to the cognitive power.
Others say that faith is in the understanding, but the practical understanding, because they say the practical understanding is that to which desire tends, or which desire follows, or which inclines to a work. And these three are found in faith. It is because of desire that one is inclined to faith, for we believe what we will. Desire itself also follows faith, inasmuch as the act of faith in some sense produces the act of charity. It also leads to a work, for "faith...worketh by charity" (Ga 5,6).
But these people do not seem to understand what the practical understanding is. For the practical understanding is the same as the operative understanding. Hence, only extension to a work makes an understanding practical. Reference to desire, however, either antecedent or consequent, does not withdraw the understanding from the category of speculative understanding. For, unless one were attracted to speculating about the truth, there would never be any pleasure in the act of speculative understanding. And this is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that the purest pleasure is in the act of speculative understanding.
Nor does every reference to a work make the understanding practical, because simple speculation can be for someone the remote occasion of doing something. Thus, a philosopher contemplates the immortality of the soul, and from this, as from a remote cause, he takes occasion to do something. But, to be practical, the understanding must be the proximate rule of action, as that by which one studies the thing to be done, the methods of operation, and the causes of the work. It is evident, however, that the object of faith is not a truth which can be produced, but the uncreated truth, which can be an object only of speculative understanding. Consequently, faith is in the speculative understanding, although it is the remote occasion of doing something. For this reason, also, activity is attributed toit only through the mediation of charity.
We must bear in mind, nevertheless, that it is not in the speculative understanding absolutely, but only in so far as it is subject to the will. Similarly, temperance is in the concupiscible power only in so far as it participates to some extent in reason. For, since the good of the act of a power requires its subjection to a higher power by following its command, it is necessary not only that the higher have the perfection to command or direct correctly, but that the lower have the perfection to obey promptly. Hence, he who has right reason, but an uncontrolled concupiscible appetite, does not have the virtue of temperance, because he is harassed by his passions, even though he is not led astray by them. Consequently, he does not perform the act of virtue will the case and pleasure which are needed for virtue. But, to have temperance, the concupiscible appetite itself must be perfected by a habit so that it is subject to the will without any difficulty. It is in this way that the habit of temperance is said to be in the concupiscible appetite. Similarly, for the understanding promptly to follow the command of the will, there must be a habit in the speculative understanding itself. This is the divinely infused habit of faith.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. That passage of Augustine should be understood of the moral virtues, about which he is there speaking. Or it can be said that we are speaking of the virtues will reference to their form, which is charity.
2. The cognitive part has some perfection in so far as it obeys a will which clings to God.
3. Augustine is talking about the act of faith, which, indeed, is said to be in the will not as in a subject, but as in a cause, in so far as it is commanded by the will.
4. The same holds for the fourth difficulty.
ç. It is not necessary for disposition and habit to be in the same subject except when the disposition itself becomes the habit. This is evident in members of the body, in which an effect results in one member because of the disposition in another member. Something similar hap pens in the powers of the soul, for the perfection of knowledge in the understanding follows from a good disposition of the imagination.
6. Not only the act which the will elicits, but also that which it commands, is called an act of the vil1. Therefore, there can be merit in both, as is clear from what has been said.
7. There cannot be one habit belonging equally to two powers, but there can be a habit of one power in so far as it has an ordination to another. And this is the case will faith.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 3, 1,sol. 1;Summa Theol., II—11, 4, 3; 23, 8; Q. D. de car., 3.
Difficulties:
And it seems that it is not, for
1. One of two things which are distinguished from each other as opposites cannot be the form of the other. But faith and charity are distinguished from each other as opposites. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith.
2. ft was said that they are distinguished from each other as Opposites in so far as they are considered in themselves, but that charity is the form of faith in so far as they are directed to the one end which they merit by their acts.—On the contrary, two of the causes are extrinsic, namely, agent and end; and two are intrinsic, form and matter. Now, two diverse things can have one common extrinsic principle, but they do not on this account have one common intrinsic principle. There fore, we cannot conclude from the ordination of faith and charity to one end that charity is the form of faith.
3. It was said that charity is not an intrinsic but an extrinsic form, a kind of exemplary form.—On the contrary: The facsimile takes its species from the exemplar. Hence, Hilary says: "The image is not of a different species from the thing which is represented." But faith does not take its species from charity. Therefore, charity cannot be the exemplary form of faith.
4. Every form is either substantial, or accidental, or exemplary. But charity is not the substantial form of faith, for, if it were, it would be an integral part of faith. Nor is it an accidental form, for faith thus would be more noble than charity, since the subject is more noble than the accident. Nor is it the exemplary form, because charity then would be able to exist without faith, since the exemplar can exist will out the facsimile. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith.
ç. Reward is proportionate w merit. But our reward consists principally in three gifts: vision, which takes the place of faith; possession, which takes the place of hope; and enjoyment, which corresponds to charity. However, our reward consists mainly in vision, and, so, Augustine says: "Vision is the whole reward." Therefore, merit and reward should both be attributed to faith. Therefore, in so far as they are ordained to acquiring merit, faith seems rather to be the form of charity, rather than charity that of faith.
6. For every subject of perfectibility there is one corresponding perfection. But the form of faith is grace. Therefore, charity is not its form, since charity is not the same as grace.
7. The Gloss on "Abraham begot Isaac" (Matt. I: 2) says: "Faith begot hope, and hope, charity." This is taken as referring to acts, not to habits. Therefore, the act of charity depends on the act of faith. Now, a form does not depend on that of which it is the form, but the opposite. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith in so far as faith is ordained to a meritorious act.
8. Habits are distinguished through their objects. But the objects of faith and charity are diverse, namely, the good and the true. Therefore, the habits are formally distinct, too. But every act is from a form. Therefore, the acts of those habits are diverse. Consequently, charity cannot be the form of faith even in its ordination to act.
9. Charity is the form of faith in so far as it forms faith; therefore, if it forms faith only through an ordination to its act, charity will not be the form of faith, but its act.
10. The Apostle says: "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three" (2 Cor. I 3:13). Here, faith, hope, and charity are distinguished as opposed to each other. But he seems to be talking about formed faith, for formless faith is not considered to be a virtue, as will be said later. Therefore, formed faith is distinguished from charity, and, so, charity cannot be the form of faith.
11. For an act to be an act of virtue it must be morally good and voluntary. But reason is the principle of a morally good action, just as the will is the principle of a voluntary action. Therefore, something from reason is needed for an act of virtue, just as something from the will is needed. Therefore, just as charity, which is in the will, is the form of the virtues, so faith, which is in the reason, is also their form. Therefore, one should not be called the form of the other.
12. The same source gives a thing both life and its form. But spiritual life is attributed to faith, as is clear in Habacuc (2:4): "But my just man liveth by faith." Therefore faith, rather than charity, should be said to form the virtues.
i3. The act of faith is formed in one who has grace. But it is possible for the act of faith of such a man to have no relation to charity. There fore, the act of faith can be formed without charity. So, charity does not seem to be the form of faith even will reference to its act.
To the Contrary:
1'. That without which faith is formless is the form of faith. But without charity faith is formless. Therefore, charity is the form of faith.
2'. Ambrose says: "Charity is the mother of all the virtues and forms all of them."
3'. A virtue is said to be formed in so far as it is able to elicit a meritorious act. But no act can be meritorious and acceptable to God unless it proceeds from love. Therefore, charity is the form of all the virtues.
4’. The form of a thing is that from which it gets its power to act. But faith gets its power to act from charity, for "faith...worketh by charity" (Ga 5,6). Therefore, charity is the form of faith.
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On this question there are different opinions. Some have said that grace itself is the form of faith and of the other virtues, but no other virtue is a form except in so far as, in their opinion, grace is essentially identified will virtue. But this cannot be. For, whether grace and virtue differ essentially or only conceptually, grace refers to the essence of the soul and virtue to a power. And, although the essence is the root of all the powers, all the powers do not proceed from the essence in the same way. For some powers are naturally prior to others and move them. Consequently, it is necessary for habits in the lower powers to be formed through the habits which are in the higher powers. Thus, the formation of the lower virtues should come from some higher virtue and not immediately from grace.
Hence, it is commonly admitted that charity, as a sort of pre eminent virtue, is the form of the other virtues, not only in so far as it is the same as grace or is inseparably connected will it, but also from the very fact that it is charity. And in this way, also, it is said to be the form of faith.
We should understand the manner in which faith is formed by charity in the following way. For, whenever there are two principles of motion or action will an ordination to each other, that in the effect which is due to the higher agent is, as it were, formal, and that which is from the lower agent is, as it were, material. This is clear in both physical things and moral matters.
For in the act of the nutritive power the power of the soul acts as first agent, and fiery heat acts as an instrumental agent, as is said in The Soul. And in flesh, which is produced by nutrition, the assembling of the parts, or dryness, or something of this sort, which comes from fiery heat, is material will reference to the species of flesh, which comes from the power of the soul. Similarly, when reason commands the lower powers, such as the irascible and concupiscible appetites, that in the habit of the concupiscible appetite which is from that appetite, namely, a certain inclination to some use of desirable things, is, as it were, material in temperance; whereas the order, which is of reason, and the rectitude, are formal. And the same holds in the other moral virtues. For this reason some philosophers have called all virtues, sciences, as is said in the Ethics.
Since, therefore, faith is in the understanding in so far as the under standing is moved and commanded by the will, that which is from knowledge is material in faith, but its formation must be received from the will. Accordingly, since charity is a perfection of the will, faith is formed by charity. And for the same reason so are all the other virtues, in so far as they are studied by the theologian, that is, in so far as they are principles of meritorious acts. Now, no act can be meritorious unless it is voluntary, as has been said." And, so, it is evident that all the virtues will which the theologian is concerned are in the powers of the soul in so far as they are moved by the will.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Charity is not called the form of faith in the way in which a form is part of an essence. For in that way it could not be distinguished from faith. It is called form in so far as faith acquires some perfection from charity. This is also the manner in which the higher elements in the universe are said to be the form of the lower elements, as air of water and water of earth, as is said in the Physics.
2. The answer to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.
3. The manner in which charity is called form approximates the manner in which we call an exemplar a form. For what there is of perfection in faith is derived from charity, so that charity has essentially what faith and the other virtues have by participation.
4. Since the habit of charity is not intrinsic to faith, it cannot be called either its substantial or its accidental form. But it can in a certain way be called an exemplary form. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that charity be able to exist without faith. For faith is not patterned on charity in so far as that which constitutes it faith is concerned, for in this way faith precedes charity in regard to the merely cognitional clement of faith; rather, it is patterned on charity only in so far as faith is perfect. Hence, nothing prevents faith from being prior to charity in this regard, and charity from being unable to exist will out it, while in some other respect charity may be the exemplar of faith which it always informs, in so far as faith is always present to it. But that which results in faith from charity is intrinsic to faith. We shah say later in what way this is accidental or substantial to faith.
5. Will and understanding precede each other in different ways. For the understanding precedes the will in the process of reception, since, if something is to move the will, it must first be received into the under standing, as is clear in The Soul. But, in causing motion or in acting, the will is prior, for every action or motion comes from a striving for a good. It is for this reason that the will, whose proper object is the good in its character as good, is said to move all the lower powers.
Reward, however, expresses the idea of reception, but merit expresses the idea of action. Hence it is that the whole reward is attributed mainly to the understanding, and vision is called the whole reward, because the reward begins in the understanding and is brought to completion in the affections. Merit, however, is attributed to charity, because the will, which charity perfects, is the first mover in the performance of meritorious works.
6. It is impossible for one thing to have many perfections in the same order. Now, grace is the first [that is, remote] perfection of the virtues, but charity is their proximate perfection.
7. The act of faith which precedes charity is an imperfect act awaiting completion from charity. For faith is prior to charity in one respect and subsequent to it in another, as has been said.
8. This difficulty proceeds correctly for the act of faith as it is in itself, but not as it is perfected by charity.
9. When a higher power is perfect, some of its perfection is found in the lower power. And, so, when charity is in the will, its perfection in some manner flows over into the intellect. So, charity forms not only the act of faith, but faith itself.
10. In those words the Apostle seems to be speaking of these habits without considering the character of virtue in them, but, rather, looking at them in so far as they are certain gifts and perfections. For this reason, in the same context he mentions prophecy and certain other charisms, which are not classified as virtues.
Even if he is speaking of them in so far as they are virtues, the reasoning does not proceed correctly. For division into opposites some times takes place between things, one of which is the cause or perfection of the other. Thus, local motion is distinguished from other types of motion, although it is, nevertheless, the cause of the others. So, charity is distinguished from the other virtues, although it is their form.
11. Reason can be considered in two ways. In one, it is taken in itself; in the other, in so far as it regulates the lower powers. In so far as it regulates the lower powers it is perfected through prudence. Thus it is that all the other moral virtues, by which the lower powers are perfected, are formed through prudence as by a proximate form. But faith perfects reason taken in itself, in so far as it considers the truth. Consequently, it does not belong to faith to form the lower virtues, but itself to be formed by charity, which forms the other virtues, even prudence itself, inasmuch as prudence itself, because of the end which is the object of charity, reasons about means to the end.
12. Something common is especially attributed to a thing in two ways, either because it is most perfectly appropriate to it, as we at tribute knowledge to the understanding; or because it is first found there, as life is attributed to the plant soul, as is clear in The Soul, because life makes its first appearance in its acts. Spiritual life is, there fore, attributed to faith because spiritual life makes its first appearance in the act of faith, although its completion comes from charity, which for this reason is the form of the other virtues.
13. In one who has charity there can be no act of virtue not formed by charity. For, either the act will be directed w the proper end, and this can be only through charity in one who has charity, or the act is not directed to the proper end, and so is not an act of virtue. Consequently, it is not possible for an act of faith to be formed by grace and not by charity, since grace has no ordination to act except through the mediation of charity.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, 3, 1, sol. 2; Summa Theol., II-II, 4, 4-5.
Difficulties:
It seems that it is, for
1. That which faith obtains from charity cannot be essential to faith itself, since faith can exist without it. But a thing is not put in a genus by reason of something accidental to it. Therefore, faith is not put in the genus of virtue by reason of its formation by charity. So, it is a virtue without the form of charity.
2. Only a virtue or a vice is opposed to a vice. But the vice of unbelief is not opposed to formless faith as to a vice. Therefore, it is op posed to it as w a virtue. We conclude as before.
3. It was said that unbelief is opposed only to formed faith.—On the contrary, habits must be opposed whose acts are opposed. But the acts of formless faith and unbeiief, namely, assent and dissent, are opposed. Therefore, formless faith is opposed to unbelief.
4. A virtue seems to be nothing else but a habit which tends to perfect some power. But our understanding is perfected through form less faith. Therefore, it is a virtue.
5. Infused habits are more noble than acquired habits. But acquired habits, such as the habits of life in a society, are called virtues even apart from charity according to their classification by the philosophers. Therefore, the formless habit of faith, since it is an infused habit, is a virtue will much greater reason.
6. Augustine says that all the virtues except charity can exist will— out grace. Therefore, unformed faith, which exists without grace, is a virtue.
To the Contrary:
1'. All the virtues are connected will each other, so that a person who has one of them has all of them, as Augustine says. But formless faith is not connected will the others. Therefore, it is not a virtue.
2’. There are no virtues in the evil spirits. But there is formless faith in the evil spirits, for "the devils also believe" (Jc 2,19). There fore, formless faith is not a virtue.
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