De veritate EN 177
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All things, not only those which have knowledge but also those which are without it, tend to good. To understand this it will help to bear in mind that some of the ancient philosophers taught that well suited effects in nature come about from the necessity of their prior Causes, though the natural causes themselves have not been disposed in that particular way will a view to the suitability of the effects.
With this opinion the Philosopher finds fault, because according to it, unless such suitabilities and aptnesses were in some sense in tended, they would come about by chance and so would not happen most of the time but only rarely, like other things which we say hap pen by chance. Hence we must say that all natural things are ordained and disposed to their well adapted effects.
There are two ways in which a thing may be ordained or directed to something else as its end: (t) by itself, as a man directs himself to the place where he is going; and (2) by something else, as an arrow is aimed at a definite spot by the archer. Nothing can direct itself to an end unless it knows the end, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But even things which do not know the end can be directed to a definite end, as is evident from the arrow.
This can come about in two ways. (1) Sometimes what is directed to an end is merely driven or moved by the one directing it without acquiring from the director any form by which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination, like that by which the arrow is aimed by the archer at a definite target, is violent. (2) Some times what is directed or inclined to an end acquires from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination belongs to it. In that case the inclination will be natural, having a natural principle. Thus He who gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne down ward naturally. In this way the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher.
It is after this fashion that all natural things are inclined to what is suitable for them, having within themselves some principle of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is natural, so that in a way they go themselves and are not merely led to their due ends. Things moved by violence are only led, because they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural things go to their ends inasmuch as they cooperate will the one inclining and directing them through a principle implanted in them.
What is directed or inclined to something by another is inclined to that which is intended by the one inclining or directing it. The arrow, for example, is directed to the same target at which the archer aims. Consequently, since all natural things have been inclined by a certain natural inclination toward their ends by the prime mover, God, that to which everything is naturally inclined must be what is willed or intended by God. But since God can have no end for His will other than Himself and He is the very essence of goodness, all other things must be naturally inclined to good. To desire or have appetency (appetere) is nothing else but to strive for something (ad aliquid Petere), stretching, as it were, toward something which is destined for oneself.
Accordingly since all things are destined and directed by God to good, and this is done in such a way that in each one is a principle by which it tends of itself to good as if seeking good itself, it is necessary to say that all things naturally tend good. If all things were inclined to good without having within themselves any principle of inclination, they could be said to be led to good, but not to be tending toward it. But in virtue of an innate principle all things are said to tend to good as if reaching for it of their own accord. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (8:1) that divine wisdom "ordered all things sweetly" because each one by its own motion tends to that for which it has been divinely destined.
Answers to Difficulty
1. The true and good are somewhat similarly related to being, and also somewhat dissimilarly. From the viewpoint of predicative inter changeability they are similarly related, for every being is good just as it is true. But as Perfecting causes they are dissimilarly related; for the true, unlike good, does not stand as a perfecting cause to all beings, because the perfection of the true is considered from the point of view of the specific character only. Only immaterial beings, then, can be perfected by the true, because only they can receive the specific character without its material act of existing. But good, being perfective both in regard to the specific character and in regard to the act of existing, can perfect material beings as well as immaterial. All things can accordingly tend to good, but not all can know the true.
2. Some say that there is natural cognition in all things just as there is a natural appetitive tendency. But this cannot be true because, in view of the fact that cognition is by assimilation likeness in real existence does not bring about cognition but rather hinders it. It is for this reason that the sense organs must be devoid of sensible species in order to be able to receive them by way of the spiritual existence Which causes knowledge Hence those things which in no way receive anything except according to material existence can in no way know. Yet they can tend inasmuch as they are directed to something having real existence Appetitive tendency does not necessarily look to a spiritual existence as does cognition. Hence there can be a natural appetite but not a natural Cognition This still does not prevent appetite from following cognition in animals, because even in the things of nature it follows apprehension or cognition—not that of the things which have the appetite but that of Him who directs them to their end.
3. Whatever tends to anything tends to it in so far as that thing has some likeness to itself. And a likeness in spiritual existence does not suffice; otherwise an animal would have to tend to whatever it knows. The likeness must be one in real existence. Now this likeness may be taken in two ways: (1) in so far as the form of one thing is in another will perfect actuality; and in this case there does not follow from likeness to the end a tendency to the end, but repose in it; and (2) in so far as the form of one is in another incompletely, i.e., potentially; and so, by reason of the potential possession of the form of the end and of good, the thing tends to good or its end and desires it. It is in this sense, as having form within it potentially, that matter is said to desire form. The more, then, that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to actuality, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. This is why any natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.
4. When we say that all things tend to good, good is not to be restricted to this or that but to be taken in its generality, because each being naturally tends to a good suitable to itself. If, notwithstanding, the term good is limited to some single good, that will be the act of being. Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have the act of being, because whatever has being desires its continuance and what actually has being in one way has it only potentially in another. Thus air is actually air and potentially fire. And so what actually has being desires to be actually.
5. The one and the true do not have the character of an end as does good; and so they do not have the character of the appetible either.
6. Even those who act contrary to reason are seeking good directly. A man who fornicates, fér instance, is interested in something good and pleasurable to sense. That the act is bad from the viewpoint of reason is beyond his intention. Good is accordingly desired directly; evil, indirectly.
7. A thing is appetible in the same way as it is good. It was said above that in its substantial act of being a thing is not called good simply and absolutely unless other due perfections are added. The substantial act of being is accordingly not appetible in an absolute sense if its due perfections are not joined to it. Hence the Philosopher says: "To be is delightful to all things." But we are not to under stand an evil and corrupt life or a sorrowful one, for this is evil simply and is simply to be shunned, though it is appetible in a certain respect. In the matter of seeking and shunning, it is all of a piece for a thing to be good and to be destructive of evil, or again to be evil and to be destructive of good. Hence we call the very lack of evil a good, as the Philosopher points out. Non-existence therefore assumes the aspect of a good inasmuch as it takes away being in a state of sorrow or wickedness, which is simply evil, although it is good in some respect. In this sense non-existence can be desired under the aspect of good.
8. Concerning apprehensive powers it is not always true that the power is altogether devoid of the species of its object. It is false in regard to those powers which have a universal object, as in the case of the intellect, whose object is the what although it has whatness it self. Yet it must be devoid of the forms which it receives It is false also in regard to touch, because, although it has special objects, they nevertheless necessarily belong to an animal. Thus its organ cannot be wholly without warmth and cold; and yet it is somehow independent of heat and cold, being of an intermediate make-up. But what is intermediate is neither of the extremes. Now appetitive tendency has a common object, good. Hence it is not altogether devoid of good, but just of that good to which it tends. It nevertheless has that good potentially and in this respect is like it, just as an apprehensive power is in potency to the species of ifs object.
9. As is clear from what has been said, knowledge of the end is required in everyone directing anything to an end. Nature, however, does not direct to an end but is directed. But God and also any purposeful agent direct to an end, and so they must have knowledge of the end, but not a thing of nature.
10. That argument is correct in regard to a being that tends to an end by directing itself towards it, because if has to know when it has reached the end. But there is no such necessity in a thing which is merely being directed to its end.
11. By the same nature by which a thing tends to an end which it does not yet have, it delights in an end which it already has. Thus by the same nature the element earth moves downward and rests there. Now it is not Consonant will the last end to tend to an end, but it is consonant will it to take pleasure in itself as an end. Though this cannot properly be called an appetite, still it is something belonging to the genus of appetite, and from it all appetite is derived. For from the fact that God takes pleasure in himself, He directs other things to Himself.
12. If appetite terminates in good and peace and the beautiful, this does not mean that it terminates in different goals. By the very fact of tending w good a thing at the same time tends to the beautiful and to peace. It tends w the beautiful inasmuch as it is proportioned and specified in itself. These notes are included in the essential character of good, but good adds a relationship of what is perfective in regard w other things. Whoever tends to good, then, by that very fact tends to the beautiful. Peace, moreover, implies the removal of disturbances or obstacles to the obtaining of good. By the very fact that something is desired, the removal of obstacles to it is also desired. Consequently, at the same time and by the same appetitive tendency good, the beautiful, and peace are sought.
13. Pleasure includes in its notion knowledge of the good which gives pleasure. For this reason only things winch know the end can take pleasure in an end. But appetitive tendency does not entail knowledge in the being which tends, as is evident from what has been said. Nevertheless, using pleasure broadly and improperly, Dionysius says that what is beautiful and good is found by all to be pleasurable and lovable.
Parallel readings: II Sentences 1, 2, 1; CE., III, 17 & 18; Sum. Theol., I, 6, i c & ad 2 44, Comp. Theol., I, 100 & 101.
Difficulties:
It seems that they do not, for
2. Things are oriented to God as knowable and appetible. But not all things oriented to God as knowable know Him, for not all cognitive beings know God. Therefore, neither do all things oriented in Him as appetible tend to Him.
2. The good which is desired by all things is, in the opinion of the Philosopher, existence, as the Commentator maintains. But God is not the existence of all. Then God is not the good which is desired by all.
3. No one seeks what he flees from. But some people flee from God, as is had in the Psalms (73:23): "The pride of them that hate thee ascended continually." And Job (21:14) says: "[They] have said to God: Depart from us." Hence not all things seek God.
4. No one seeks what he has. But some, the blessed who enjoy the possession of Him, have God. Then not all things seek Him.
5. There is a natural appetite only for what can be had. But only a rational creature can have God, since it alone is made to the image of God and "is the image of God by the very fact of having a capacity for Him," as Augustine says. Not all things, then, naturally seek God.
To the Contrary:
1’. There is the statement of Augustine: 'Whatever can love loves God." But all things can love because all seek good. Then all seek God.
2’. Everything naturally tends to the end for which it exists. But all things are ordained to God as their end; for as is written in Proverbs (16:4): "The Lord bath made all things for himself." all things, therefore, naturally tend to God.
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All things naturally tend in God implicitly, but not explicitly. That this may appear clearly it should be observed that a secondary cause can influence its effect only in so far as it receives the power of the first cause. The influence of an efficient cause is to act; that of a final cause is to be sought or desired. A secondary agent acts only by the efficacy of the first agent existing in it; similarly a secondary end is sought only by reason of the worth of the principal end existing in it inasmuch as it is subordinated to the principal end or has its likeness.
Accordingly, because God is the last end, He is sought in every end, just as, because He is the first efficient cause, He acts in every agent. But this is what tending to God implicitly, means. For the efficacy of the first cause is in the second as the principles of reason mg are in the conclusions. But to reduce conclusions w their principles or secondary causes to their first causes belongs only to the
Power of reasoning. Hence only a rational nature can trace secondary ends back to God by a sort of analytic procedure so as to seek God H explicitly. In demonstrative sciences a conclusion is correctly drawn only by a reduction to first principles. In the same way the appetite of a rational creature is correctly directed only by an explicit appetitive tendency to God, either actual or habitual.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. All cognitive beings also know God implicitly in any object of knowledge. Just as nothing has the note of appetibility except by a likeness to the first goodness, so nothing is knowable except by a like ness to the first truth.
2. Created existence is itself a likeness to the divine goodness. So in desiring to be, things implicitly desire a likeness to God and God Himself.
. God can be viewed in two ways, in Himself and in His effects. Viewed in Himself He cannot but be loved since He is the very essence of goodness. Hence He is loved in His essence by all who see Him; and to the extent that each one knows Him each loves Him. But viewed in some of His effects, e.g., punishment or commands that seem onerous, seeing that they are contrary to our will, God is shunned and, in a sense, hated. And yet those who hate Him in some of His effects necessarily love Him in others. Thus even the devils, as Dionysius teaches, naturally desire to be and to live, and in this respect seek and love God Himself.
4. The blessed who already enjoy the possession of God desire the continuance of their enjoyment. Furthermore, the enjoyment itself is a sort of appetite perfected by its object, although the name appetite implies imperfection.
5. Only a rational creature has the capacity for God because only it can know and love Him explicitly. But other creatures too participate in a likeness to God and so tend to Him.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 27, I, 2; Sum. Theol., I, 80, 1.
Difficulties:
It seems that it is not, for
1. The powers of the soul are ordained only to vital operations. Now those operations are called vital by which animate things are distinguished from inanimate. But it is not as regards tending that animate things are distinguished from inanimate, because even the inanimate tend to good. Appetite is therefore not a special power of the soul.
2. Appetite is nothing, it seems, but a sort of direction to an end. But natural appetite suffices for a thing to be directed to an end. So there is no necessity of adding an animal appetite which would be a special power of the soul.
3. Operations and powers are differentiated as to their terms. But there is the same term, good, for both natural and animal appetite. It is therefore the same power or operation. But natural appetite is not a power of the soul. Then neither is animal appetite.
4. Appetite is for what is not had, according to Augustine.1 But in the case of animals the good is already had by knowledge. Therefore there does not follow upon knowledge among animals any appetite which would call for a special power.
5. A special power is destined for a special act, not for an act common to all the powers of the soul. But to tend to good is common to all the powers of the soul. This is apparent from the fact that every power tends to its object and takes pleasure in it. Therefore appetite is not a special power of the soul.
6. If the appetitive power tends to good, it tends either to good in general or to what is good for itself. Now if it should tend to good in general, since every other power tends to some particular good, the appetitive power will not be a special power but a universal one. But if it tends to what is good for itself, since every other power also tends to what is good for itself, every other power can for the same reason be called an appetite. There will therefore not be any power of the soul which can be called appetite in a special way.
To the Contrary:
The Philosopher posits the appetitive part as a special power of the soul.
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Appetite is a special power of the soul. In this regard it should be noted that, since the powers of die soul are destined for operations proper to animate beings, an operation has a special power of the soul appointed for it for the reason that it is an operation proper to an animate being. There is found, indeed, a certain operation which from one point of view is common to both animate and inanimate beings but from another is proper to animate beings; for instance, to be moved or generated.
Spiritual things considered in themselves have such a nature as to move but not to be moved. Bodies, however, are moved; and though one can move another, still no one of them can move itself. For things which move themselves are divided into two parts, one of which is the mover, the other, moved, as is shown in the Physics.
But this cannot be realized in purely corporeal beings, because their forms cannot be movers, though they can be the principle of motion in the sense of that by which something is moved. In the movement of the element earth, for instance, heaviness is the principle by which it is moved but yet is not the mover. This is so both because of the simplicity of inanimate bodies, which do not have enough diversity in their parts for one to originate motion and another to be moved, and also because of the baseness and materiality of their forms, which, being far removed from the separated forms to which it belongs to move, do not retain the ability to move but only the function of being principles of motion.
Animate things, however, are composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. There can accordingly be in them a moving part and another moved—both locally and in other ways. And so, inasmuch as to be moved is made an action proper to animate beings in the sense that they move themselves to definite species of movement, there is found in animals a hierarchy of special powers. Thus for locomotion in animals there is a motive power; and in plants and animals alike, a power of growth for the movement of growing, a nutritive power for the movement of alteration, and a generative power for the move merit of generation. To tend, which is in a way common to all things, likewise becomes in a way special for animate beings, or rather animals, inasmuch as there are found in them appetite and what moves the appetite. This latter, according to the Philosopher, is the apprehended good itself. Hence, just as animals more than other things are moved of themselves, so too they tend of themselves. For this reason the appetitive power is a special faculty in the soul in the same way as the motive power.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The solution is clear from what has already been said.
2. It is precisely because animals are capable of participating in divine goodness in a more eminent way than other, inferior things, that they have need of many operations and helps to their perfection. A man who can gain perfect health by much exercise is nearer to health than one who can attain only a little health and needs for this only a little exercise—to use the example given by the Philosopher. Now a natural appetite is determined to a single object and cannot be so diversely oriented that it extends to as many different things as animals have need of. For this reason it was necessary for animals to be supplied in addition will an animal appetite consequent upon apprehension so that among many objects of apprehension the animal would be attracted to different ones.
3. Although good is sought by both natural and animal appetite, nevertheless by its natural appetite a thing does not of itself seek good as it does by its animal appetite. Consequently for the seeking of good by animal appetite there is required a power which is not required for the exercise of natural appetite. Furthermore the good to which a natural appetite tends is definite and always the same; but this is not true of the good sought by an animal appetite. And the same can be applied to the motive power.
4. The being which desires a good does not seek to have the good according to its intentional existence, as it is had by one who knows it, but according to its essential or real existence. Consequently the fact that an animal possesses the good by knowing it does not keep it from being able to desire it.
5. Every power tends to its object by a natural appetite. But animal appetite belongs to a special power. And because natural appetite is determined to a single object whereas animal appetite follows apprehension, individual powers tend to a determined good but the appetitive faculty tends to any good apprehended. Yet it does not follow that it is a universal power, since it tends to good in a special way.
6. The solution to this difficulty is evident from what has just been said.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 25, I; III Sentences 26, I, 2 sol. & ad 2; Contra Gentiles II, 47; In III de an.,, nn. 802-06; 15, fl. 831; Sum. Theol., I, 8o, 2.
Difficulties:
It seems that it is not, for
1. An accidental difference in objects does not distinguish powers. But the objects of the will and of the sense appetite are differentiated only by accidental differences in good, which is essentially the object of appetite. They do not, indeed, seem to differ except inasmuch as the will has as its object the good apprehended by the intellect, and sense appetite, that apprehended by sense. But these differences are accidental to good as such. Therefore the will is not a power distinct from sense appetite.
2. Sensitive and intellectual apprehensive powers differ as particular and universal, for sense apprehends particulars and intellect universals. But the appetite of the sensitive and intellective parts cannot be distinguished in this way, because any appetite is for the good as it exists in reality. This, however, is not universal but singular. The rational appetite will—must therefore not be said to be a power other than sense appetite as intellect is other than sense.
3. The motive power follows the appetitive just as the appetitive follows apprehension. But the motive power is not one thing in rational beings and another in irrational. Then neither is the appetitive. And so the conclusion is the same as before.
4. The Philosopher distinguishes five kinds of powers and operations of the soul. One includes generation, nutrition, and growth; the second is sense; the third, appetite; the fourth, locomotion; and the fifth, intellect. Intellect is here distinguished from sense, but not intellective appetite from sense appetite. It therefore seems that a higher appetitive power is not distinguished from a lower as a higher apprehensive power is distinguished from a lower.
To the Contrary:
1'. The Philosopher distinguishes the will from sense appetite.
2’. All things that stand in a series must be distinct. But intellective appetite is higher than that of sense according to the Philosopher and even moves it "as sphere moves sphere," as he says in the same place. The will is therefore a power other than sense appetite.
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The will is a power distinct from sense appetite. It Should be noted in this connection that rational appetite is distinguished from that of sense in juse the same way as sensitive appetite is distinguished from that of nature because of a more perfect way of tending. The closer a nature is to God, the more pronounced is the likeness of the divine excellence which is found in it. Now it belongs to the divine excellence to move and incline and direct all things while not being moved, inclined, or directed by any other. Hence the nearer a nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another and the more it is capable of inclining itself.
An insensible nature, therefore being by reason of its material the farthest removed from God, is inclined to an end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines, but only a principle of inclination, as was explained above.
A sensitive nature, however being closer to God, has within itself something which inclines, i.e., the apprehended object of appetite. Yet this inclination is not within the control of the animal which is inclined but is determine by something else. An animal is notable at the sight of something attractive not to crave it, because animals do not themselves have the mastery over their Own inclination. Hence "they do not act but are rather acted Upon," as Damascene says. This is because the sensuous appetitive power has a bodily organ and so is nearly in the condition of matter and of corporeal things so as rather to be moved than to move.
But a rational nature, being closest to God, not merely, like manu ate things, has an inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover of this inclination determined as it were extrinsically but fureher so ha ks inclination within its own power that it does not necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, but can incline or not incline And so its inclination is not determined for je by anything else but by itself. This belongs to it inasmuch as it does not use a bodily organ; and so, getting farther away from the nature of what is moved it approaches that of what moves and aces. It can come about that something determines for irself its inclination to an end only if it knows the end and the beaiing of the end upon the means to it. But this belongs to reason alone. Thus such an appetite, which is not determined of necessity by something else, follows the apprehension of reason. Hence, rational appetite, called will, is a power distinct from sense appetite.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The will is not distinguished from sense appetite directly on the basis of the apprehension which it follows but on that of determining one’s inclination for oneself or having it determined by another. These two sorts of inclination require different kinds of powers. And such a diversity further demands a difference in the apprehensions, as appears from what has been said. Hence the distinction of the appetitive powers is more or less resultantly based upon the distinction of the apprehensive, not principally.
2. Although appetite always looks to something existing in reality as a particular and not as a universal, nevertheless it is sometimes moved to tend by the apprehension of some universal condition. We tend to this particular good, for instance, from the consideration of the fact that we look upon good as simply to be sought. At other times we tend as a result of the apprehension of a particular thing in its particularity. Thus appetite is distinguished into universal and particular in a secondary sense, just as it is distinguished in a secondary sense according to the difference in the apprehension which it follows.
3. Motion and operations are found in singulars. But there can be descent from a universal proposition to a particular conclusion only through the mediation of a particular assumption. Now in matters of operating the choice of a deed is a sort of conclusion, as is said in the Ethics. A universal conception of the intellect, accordingly, can be applied to the choice of a deed only by means of a particular apprehension. Consequently the motion which follows upon a universal apprehension of the intellect by means of a particular sense apprehension does not require one motive power corresponding to intellect and another corresponding to sense, as is true of the appetite which follows apprehension immediately. Moreover, the motive power in question in the difficulty, that which is commanded, is a power attached to the muscles and nerves. Hence it cannot pertain to the intellective part, which uses no organ.
4. Because sense and the intellect differ according to the formal aspects of the apprehensible in so far as it is apprehensible, they there fore belong to different genera of powers. Sense is concerned will apprehending the particular; the intellect, will apprehending the universal. But higher and lower appetite are not differentiated by differences in the appetible as such, since either appetite sometimes tends to the same good. They differ rather in their different ways of tending, as is evident from what has been said. Hence they are indeed distinct powers but not distinct kinds of powers.
Parallel readings: II Sent, 25, a. 2; Sum. Theol., 1, 8 1; 1-11, 10, 2; De malo, 6.
Difficulties
It seems that it does, for
1. According to Augustine all seek happiness "will a single will." But what is sought by all in common is sought of necessity; for if it were not of necessity, it might chance not to be sought by someone. The will therefore wills something necessarily.
2. Every cause of motion having perfect efficacy moves its object of necessity. But according to the Philosopher good as apprehended is the cause of the motion of the will. Therefore, since something is a perfect good, viz., God and beatitude, as is said in the Ethics, there will be something which will move the witch will necessity. And so something is desired by the will necessarily.
3. Immateriality is the reason why a given power cannot be forced; for powers connected will organs are forced, as appears especially in regard to the motive power. But the intellect is a more immaterial power than the will. This is clear from the fact that it has a more immaterial object, the universal, whereas the object of the will is the good existing in particular things. Since, then, the intellect is forced to hold something of necessity, as is said in the Metaphysics, it seems that the will also tends to something of necessity.
4. Necessity is removed from the will only by reason of freedom, to which necessity seems to be opposed. But not every sort of necessity prevents freedom. Hence Augustine says: "If necessity is defined to be that according to which we say: 'it is necessary for something to be or to become thus and so, I do not know why we should fear that it will take away the freedom of the will." The will therefore of necessity wills something.
5. Necessary means unable not to be. But God is unable not to will good juse as He is unable not to be good. He therefore necessarily wills good; and so some will wills something necessarily.
6. According to Gregory "a sin which is not wiped out by repentance, by its own weight soon draws a person to another." But a sin is not committed unless it is done voluntarily, as Augustine teaches. Since drawing is a violent motion, as is made clear in the Physics, one can accordingly be violently forced to will something of necessity.
7. Following Augustine, the Master says: "In the second state (the state of guilt) man cannot avoid sinning even mortally before reparation and at least venially after reparation." But both mortal and venial sin are voluntary. There is therefore a state of man in which he is unable not to will something which constitutes a sin. And so the will of necessity wills something.
8. The more a thing is disposed by nature to cause motion, the more it is disposed to impose necessity. But good can cause motion more than what is true, since good is in things but what is true is only in thought, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, since what is true forces the intellect, will all the more reason does good force the will.
9. Good makes a stronger impression than truth. This is evident from the fact that love, which is the imprint left by the impact of good, is more conducive to unity than knowledge, which is the imprint left by the impact of truth. For according to Augustine, love is a sort of life uniting the lover to the beloved. Good can therefore impose necessity upon the will more than truth can upon the intellect. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
10. The more power a faculty has over its objects, the less it can be forced by them. But reason has more power over its objects than will; for according to Augustine reason forms within itself the species of things, and the will does not, but is moved by appetible things. The will can therefore be forced by its objects more than reason can by- its own. And so the same conclusion is reached as before.
11. What is in something essentially is in it of necessity. But to will something is in the will essentially. Therefore the will wills something of necessity. Proof of the minor: The highest good is willed essentially. Therefore whenever the will is directed to it, it wills essentially. But then it is always directed to it because it is so naturally. Therefore the will always essentially wills the highest good.
2. In scientific knowledge necessity is found. Now just as all men naturally want to know, as the Philosopher says, so too do they naturally will good. In willing good necessity is therefore found.
13. The Gloss says that the will "naturally wills good." But things which are in something by nature are necessary. Therefore the will necessarily wills good.
14. Whatever is increased or diminished can also be taken away entirely. But the freedom of the will is increased or diminished, for be fore the fall man had freer choice than after the fall, according to Augustine. The freedom of the will can therefore be taken away entirely. And so the will can be forced will necessity.
To the Contrary:
1’. According to Augustine, if anything is voluntary, it is not necessary. But whatever we will is voluntary. The will therefore does not will anything necessarily.
2’. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing under God. But such a thing cannot be forced by anyone. The will there fore cannot be forced to will something of necessity.
3’. Freedom is opposed to necessity. But the will is free. Therefore it does not will anything of necessity.
4’. Bernard says that our choice, which is free because of our innate will, is moved by no necessity. But the dignity- of the will cannot be taken away. The will therefore cannot will anything of necessity.
5’. Rational faculties are open to Opposites according to the Philosopher. But the will is a rational faculty, for it is in reason, as is said in The Soul. It is therefore open to opposites, and so it is not determined to anything necessarily.
6’. Whatever is determined to something of necessity is naturally determined to it. But the will is distinguished from natural appetite. It therefore does not will any of necessity.
7’. From the fact that something is voluntary it is said to be in us in such a way that we are masters of it. But we can will or not will any thing within us of which we are masters. Therefore, whatever the will wills it call will or not will. Thus it does not will anything necessarily.
De veritate EN 177