Summa - Supplement 1904
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, "One is my dove," says: "One is the Church among men and angels." But the Church is the bride, wherefore it is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore the angels have the dowries.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Lc 12,36, "And you yourselves like to men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding," says: "Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new Man espoused to Himself the angelic host." Therefore the angelic hosts are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they should have the dowries.
Objection 3: Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem that they are becoming to the angels.
Objection 4: Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than between men and Christ.
Objection 5: Further, a greater conformity is required between the head and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be called their bridegroom.
On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely "the bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the bridegroom": and he says that "the angels are the companions of the bridegroom." Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion: wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Ex 4,25), "A bloody spouse thou art to me." Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse. Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species. Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature. Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are included in the unity of the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not properly fitting for them to have the dowries.
Reply to Objection 2: Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a broad sense.
Reply to Objection 3: In the spiritual marriage although there is no other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does not properly befit the angels.
Reply to Objection 4: The conformity between the angels and Christ as God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an infinite distance between them.
Reply to Objection 5: Not even is Christ properly called the Head of the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence, speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required among them is one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and one serve another. Consequently the conformity between God and the angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of bridegroom.
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three dowries, namely, "vision," "love" and "fruition." For the soul is united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but the will.
Objection 2: Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith, hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to charity.
Objection 3: Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since "we are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.
Objection 4: Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of beatitude: "So run that you may comprehend" (1Co 9,24). Therefore we should reckon a fourth dowry
Objection 5: Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following pertain to the soul's beatitude: "wisdom, friendship, concord, power, honor, security, joy": and consequently the aforesaid dowries are reckoned unsuitably.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that "in that beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised untiringly." Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.
Objection 7: Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers, security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers. Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather than the aforesaid.
I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision, comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said (Article ) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision, and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful; secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary, namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry, which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards the affections---and in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part of the visible object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than to have God present and to hold Him within ourself [*Cf. FS, Question , Article ]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours while on the way, but of possession [*Literally "of the reality: non spei . . . sed rei"] which is in heaven.
Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues, namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one, and some for the other.
Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.
Reply to Objection 1: Memory and understanding have but one act: either because understanding is itself an act of memory, or---if understanding denote a power---because memory does not proceed to act save through the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not remain in heaven [Cf. SS, Question , Article ] but will be succeeded by comprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Fruition as including comprehension is distinct from vision and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by making it capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result in our being pilgrims from the Lord.
Reply to Objection 4:is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to Whom "wisdom" alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also in relation to others. They may be either one's equals, to whom "friendship" refers as regards the union of affections, and "concord" as regards consent in actions, or one's inferiors, to whom "power" refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and "honor" as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again (they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to this "security" refers as regards the removal of evil, and "joy" as regards the attainment of good.
Reply to Objection 6: Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact of the soul's union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the necessary conditions of a dowry.
Reply to Objection 7: The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude or to its act, because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly Boethius shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as "security," to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the suitable good, as "joy," or of the perfect good, as "sufficiency," or to the manifestation of good, as "celebrity," inasmuch as the good of one is made known to others, or as "reverence," as indicating that good or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.
In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?
(2) Whether they differ from the fruit?
(3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?
(4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?
(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins?
(6) Whether it is due to martyrs?
(7) Whether it is due to doctors?
(8) Whether it is due to Christ?
(9) Whether to the angels?
(10) Whether it is due to the human body?
(11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?
(12) Whether the virgin's aureole is the greatest?
(13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the essential reward which is called the "aurea." For the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), beatitude is "a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods." Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven; so that the aureole is included in the "aurea."
Objection 2: Further, "more" and "less" do not change a species. But those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would seem that it does not signify something distinct from the "aurea."
Objection 3: Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the root of all merit. Since then the "aurea" corresponds to charity, it would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the "aurea."
Objection 4: Further, "All the blessed are taken into the angelic orders" as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Now as regards the angels, "though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree, nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly than others with gifts which, however, they all possess," as Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the aureole is not a distinct reward from the "aurea."
Objection 5: Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then, the "aurea" is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the "aurea," and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive [*"Aureola," i.e. a little "aurea"]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not a distinct reward from the "aurea."
On the contrary, A gloss [*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on Ex 25,24-25, "Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown [coronam aureolam]," says: "This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins alone sing in the presence of the Lamb." Wherefore apparently the aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas the aurea is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is distinct from the "aurea."
Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" (2Tm 2,5). Hence where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an aureole.
Further, the Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: "I saw the Holy City," etc. (Ap 21,2). Now in the Church militant special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the same should obtain in the Church triumphant.
I answer that, Man's essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a "crown" or "aurea" metaphorically, both with reference to merit which is gained by a kind of conflict---since "the life of man upon earth is a warfare" (Jb 7,1)---and with reference to the reward whereby in a way man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed with regal power: "Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom," etc. (Ap 5,10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.
In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential has the character of a crown. For a crown signifies some kind of perfection, on account of its circular shape, so that for this very reason it is becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the additional reward is called an "aureole." Now something may be added in two ways to this essential reward which we call the "aurea." First, in consequence of a condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore this same glory of the body is sometimes called an "aureole." Thus a gloss of Bede on Ex 25,25, "Thou . . . shalt make another little golden crown," says that "finally the aureole is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree of glory is in store for us when our bodies are resumed." But it is not in this sense that we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts, whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit, from its root which is charity, since it is referred to the last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward, namely the attainment of the end, and this is the "aurea." Secondly, from the very genus of the act which derives a certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from the habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an "aureole": and it is in this sense that we regard the aureole now. Accordingly it must be said that an "aureole" denotes something added to the "aurea," a kind of joy, to wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the joy in being united to God, which is called the "aurea." Some, however, affirm that the common reward, which is the "aurea," receives the name of "aureole," according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money receives the name of debt through being due to some one, though the money and the debt are altogether the same. And that nevertheless this does not imply that the essential reward is any greater when it is called an "aureole"; but that it corresponds to a more excellent act, more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting; so that although two persons may have the Divine vision with equal clearness, it is called an "aureole" in one and not in the other in so far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of meriting. But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted above. For if "aurea" and "aureole" were the same, the "aureole" would not be described as added to the "aurea." Moreover, since reward corresponds to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this more excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we call an "aureole." Hence it follows that an "aureole" differs from the "aurea."
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude includes all the goods necessary for man's perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things can be added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as though it were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as stated in Ethic. i, 8: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the happiness of heaven.
Reply to Objection 2: He who keeps the counsels and the commandments always merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we gather the notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works; but not always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part, however, the contrary happens, because the "proof of love is in the performance of deeds," as Gregory says (Hom. xxx in Evang.). Wherefore it is not the more excellent essential reward that is called an aureole, but that which is added to the essential reward without reference to the essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being greater, or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has no aureole.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity is the first principle of merit: but our actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in order to obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition in the first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument. Hence something principal results in the effect with reference to the first mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument. Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity, namely the "aurea," and something on the part of the kind of work, namely the "aureole."
Reply to Objection 4: All the angels merited their beatitude by the same kind of act namely by turning to God: and consequently no particular reward is found in anyone which another has not in some way. But men merit beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the comparison fails.
Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another's good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them in the victory.
Reply to Objection 5: The merit arising from charity is more excellent than that which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to which charity directs us is more excellent than the things directed to that end, and with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by reason of its genus. Hence "aureole" is used as a diminutive in comparison with "aurea."
Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the fruit. For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the aureole and the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss on Mt 13,8, "Some a hundredfold." Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) that the "hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins." Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the aureole also is due to them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.
Objection 3: Further, there are only two rewards in beatitude, namely the essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now that which is added to the essential reward is called an aureole, as evidenced by the statement (Ex 25,25) that the little crown [aureola] is added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for in that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the same as the aureole.
On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same way are not of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same way, since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the same.
Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a fruit is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways, according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the thing from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking, is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is the last thing to which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is that to which husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any other process. Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for that which refreshes as being the last end: and according to this signification we are said to enjoy [frui] God perfectly in heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signification we have fruition which is a dowry: but we are not speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes only, though it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called fruits, inasmuch as "they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness," as Ambrose says [*De Parad. xiii]. In this sense fruit is taken (Ga 6,22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy," etc. Nor again is this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have treated of this already [*Cf. FS, Question , Article , ad 2].
We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from the labor of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man acquires from his labor in this life: and thus every reward which by our labors we shall acquire for the future life is called a "fruit." In this sense fruit is taken (Rm 6,22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting." Yet neither in this sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of fruit as being the product of seed: for it is in this sense that our Lord speaks of fruit (Mt 13,23), where He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold. Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed power is capable of transforming the humors of the soil into its own nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God: wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiritual nature by withdrawing from carnal things, the greater is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of the Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that the "aurea" consists in the joy one has in God, and the "aureole" in the joy one has in the perfection of one's works, whereas the "fruit" consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of God's Word.
Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by saying that the aureole is due to the fighter, according to 2Tm 2,5, "He . . . shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully"; whereas the fruit is due to the laborer, according to the saying of Sg 3,15, "The fruit of good labors is glorious." Others again say that the "aurea" regards conversion to God, while the "aureole" and the "fruit" regard things directed to the end; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and the aureole the body. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same subject and about the same matter, and since the body's reward depends on the soul's, these explanations of the difference between fruit, aurea and aureole would only imply a logical difference: and this cannot be, since fruit is assigned to some to whom no aureole is assigned.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing incongruous if various rewards correspond to the same merit according to the various things contained therein. Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as virginity is kept for God's sake at the command of charity; the aureole, in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity a person acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal things.
Reply to Objection 2: Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as we are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom and virginity, by that which corresponds to the three degrees of continency. This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the reward due to any perfect works whatever.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the aureole is an accidental reward added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward is an aureole, but only that which is assigned to works of perfection, whereby man is most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental reward, which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a carnal life.
Summa - Supplement 1904