Code of Canon Law
1 The canons of this Code regard only the Latin Church.
2 For the most part the Code does not define the rites which must be observed in celebrating liturgical actions. Therefore, liturgical laws in force until now retain their force unless one of them is contrary to the canons of the Code.
3 The canons of the Code neither abrogate nor derogate from the agreements entered into by the Apostolic See with nations or other political societies. These agreements therefore continue in force exactly as at present, notwithstanding contrary prescripts of this Code.
4 Acquired rights and privileges granted to physical or juridic persons up to this time by the Apostolic See remain intact if they are in use and have not been revoked, unless the canons of this Code expressly revoke them.
5 §1. Universal or particular customs presently in force which are contrary to the prescripts of these canons and are reprobated by the canons of this Code are absolutely suppressed and are not permitted to revive in the future. Other contrary customs are also considered suppressed unless the Code expressly provides otherwise or unless they are centenary or immemorial customs which can be tolerated if, in the judgment of the ordinary, they cannot be removed due to the circumstances of places and persons.
§2. Universal or particular customs beyond the law (praeter ius) which are in force until now are preserved.
6 §1. When this Code takes force, the following are abrogated:
+1/ the Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1917;
+2/ other universal or particular laws contrary to the prescripts of this Code unless other provision is expressly made for particular laws;
+3/ any universal or particular penal laws whatsoever issued by the Apostolic See unless they are contained in this Code;
+4/ other universal disciplinary laws regarding matter which this Code completely reorders.
§2. Insofar as they repeat former law, the canons of this Code must be assessed also in accord with canonical tradition.
7 A law is established when it is promulgated.
8 §1. Universal ecclesiastical laws are promulgated by publication in the official commentary, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, unless another manner of promulgation has been prescribed in particular cases. They take force only after three months have elapsed from the date of that issue of the Acta unless they bind immediately from the very nature of the matter, or the law itself has specifically and expressly established a shorter or longer suspensive period (vacatio).
§2. Particular laws are promulgated in the manner determined by the legislator and begin to oblige a month after the day of promulgation unless the law itself establishes another time period.
9 Laws regard the future, not the past, unless they expressly provide for the past.
10 Only those laws must be considered invalidating or disqualifying which expressly establish that an act is null or that a person is effected.
11 Merely ecclesiastical laws bind those who have been baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it, possess the efficient use of reason, and, unless the law expressly provides otherwise, have completed seven years of age.
12 §1. Universal laws bind everywhere all those for whom they were issued.
§2. All who are actually present in a certain territory, however, are exempted from universal laws which are not in force in that territory.
§3. Laws established for a particular territory bind those for whom they were issued as well as those who have a domicile or quasi-domicile there and who at the same time are actually residing there, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 13.
13 §1. Particular laws are not presumed to be personal but territorial unless it is otherwise evident.
§2. Travelers are not bound:
1/ by the particular laws of their own territory as long as they are absent from it unless either the transgression of those laws causes harm in their own territory or the laws are personal;
2/ by the laws of the territory in which they are present, with the exception of those laws which provide for public order, which determine the formalities of acts, or which regard immovable goods located in the territory.
§3. Transients are bound by both universal and particular laws which are in force in the place where they are present.
14 Laws, even invalidating and disqualifying ones, do not oblige when there is a doubt about the law. When there is a doubt about a fact, however, ordinaries can dispense from laws provided that, if it concerns a reserved dispensation, the authority to whom it is reserved usually grants it.
15 §1. Ignorance or error about invalidating or disqualifying laws does not impede their effect unless it is expressly established otherwise.
§2. Ignorance or error about a law, a penalty, a fact concerning oneself, or a notorious fact concerning another is not presumed; it is presumed about a fact concerning another which is not notorious until the contrary is proven.
16 §1. The legislator authentically interprets laws as does the one to whom the same legislator has entrusted the power of authentically interpreting.
§2. An authentic interpretation put forth in the form of law has the same force as the law itself and must be promulgated. If it only declares the words of the law which are certain in themselves, it is retroactive; if it restricts or extends the law, or if it explains a doubtful law, it is not retroactive.
§3. An interpretation in the form of a judicial sentence or of an administrative act in a particular matter, however, does not have the force of law and only binds the persons for whom and affects the matters for which it was given.
17 Ecclesiastical laws must be understood in accord with the proper meaning of the words considered in their text and context. If the meaning remains doubtful and obscure, recourse must be made to parallel places, if there are such, to the purpose and circumstances of the law, and to the mind of the legislator.
18 Laws which establish a penalty, restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law are subject to strict interpretation.
19 If a custom or an express prescript of universal or particular law is lacking in a certain matter, a case, unless it is penal, must be resolved in light of laws issued in similar matters, general principles of law applied with canonical equity, the jurisprudence and practice of the Roman Curia, and the common and constant opinion of learned persons.
20 A later law abrogates, or derogates from, an earlier law if it states so expressly, is directly contrary to it, or completely reorders the entire matter of the earlier law. A universal law, however, in no way derogates from a particular or special law unless the law expressly provides otherwise.
21 In a case of doubt, the revocation of a pre-existing law is not presumed, but later laws must be related to the earlier ones and, insofar as possible, must be harmonized with them.
22 Civil laws to which the law of the Church yields are to be observed in canon law with the same effects, insofar as they are not contrary to divine law and unless canon law provides otherwise.
23 Only that custom introduced by a community of the faithful and approved by the legislator according to the norm of the following canons has the force of law.
24 §1. No custom which is contrary to divine law can obtain the force of law.
§2. A custom contrary to or beyond canon law (praeter ius canonicum) cannot obtain the force of law unless it is reasonable; a custom which is expressly reprobated in the law, however, is not reasonable.
25 No custom obtains the force of law unless it has been observed with the intention of introducing a law by a community capable at least of receiving law.
26 Unless the competent legislator has specifically approved it, a custom contrary to the canon law now in force or one beyond a canonical law (praeter legem canonicam) obtains the force of law only if it has been legitimately observed for thirty continuous and complete years. Only a centenary or immemorial custom, however, can prevail against a canonical law which contains a clause prohibiting future customs.
27 Custom is the best interpreter of laws.
28 Without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 5, a contrary custom or law revokes a custom which is contrary to or beyond the law (praeter legem). Unless it makes express mention of them, however, a law does not revoke centenary or immemorial customs, nor does a universal law revoke particular customs.
29 General decrees, by which a competent legislator issues common prescripts for a community capable of receiving law, are laws properly speaking and are governed by the prescripts of the canons on laws.
30 A person who possesses only executive power is not able to issue the general decree mentioned in CIC 29 unless, in particular cases, it has been expressly granted to that person by a competent legislator according to the norm of law and the conditions stated in the act of the grant have been observed.
31 §1. Those who possess executive power are able to issue, within the limits of their competence, general executory decrees, namely, those which more precisely determine the methods to be observed in applying the law or which urge the observance of laws.
§2. With respect to the promulgation and suspensive period (vacatio) of the decrees mentioned in §1, the prescripts of CIC 8 are to be observed.
32 General executory decrees oblige those who are bound by the laws whose methods of application the same decrees determine or whose observance they urge.
33 §1. General executory decrees, even if they are issued in directories or in documents of another name, do not derogate from laws, and their prescripts which are contrary to laws lack all force.
§2. Such decrees cease to have force by explicit or implicit revocation made by competent authority as well as by cessation of the law for whose execution they were given. They do not, however, cease when the authority of the one who established them expires unless the contrary is expressly provided.
34 §1. Instructions clarify the prescripts of laws and elaborate on and determine the methods to be observed in fulfilling them. They are given for the use of those whose duty it is to see that laws are executed and oblige them in the execution of the laws. Those who possess executive power legitimately issue such instructions within the limits of their competence.
§2. The ordinances of instructions do not derogate from laws. If these ordinances cannot be reconciled with the prescripts of laws, they lack all force.
§3. Instructions cease to have force not only by explicit or implicit revocation of the competent authority who issued them or of the superior of that authority but also by the cessation of the law for whose clarification or execution they were given.
35 A singular administrative act, whether it is a decree, a precept, or a rescript, can be issued by one who possesses executive power within the limits of that person’s competence, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 76, §1.
36 §1. An administrative act must be understood according to the proper meaning of the words and the common manner of speaking. In a case of doubt, those which refer to litigation, pertain to threatening or inflicting penalties, restrict the rights of a person, injure the acquired rights of others, or are contrary to a law which benefits private persons are subject to a strict interpretation; all others are subject to a broad interpretation.
§2. An administrative act must not be extended to other cases besides those expressed.
37 An administrative act which regards the external forum must be put in writing.
Furthermore, if it is given in commissariat form, the act of its execution must be put in writing.
38 An administrative act, even if it is a rescript given motu proprio, lacks effect insofar as it injures the acquired right of another or is contrary to a law or approved custom, unless the competent authority has expressly added a derogating clause.
39 Conditions in an administrative act are considered added for validity only when they are expressed by the particles if (), unless (nisi), or provided that (dummodo).
40 The executor of any administrative act invalidly carries out his or her function before receiving the relevant letter and verifying its authenticity and integrity, unless previous notice of the letter had been communicated to the executor by authority of the one who issued the act.
41 The executor of an administrative act to whom is entrusted merely the task of execution cannot refuse the execution of this act unless it clearly appears that the act itself is null or cannot be upheld for another grave cause, or the conditions attached to the administrative act itself have not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, if the execution of the administrative act seems inopportune due to the circumstances of person or place, the executor is to suspend the execution. In such cases the executor is to inform immediately the authority who issued the act.
42 The executor of an administrative act must proceed according to the norm of the mandate. If, however, the executor did not fulfill the essential conditions attached to the relevant letter and did not observe the substantial form of proceeding, the execution is invalid.
43 The executor of an administrative act can, according to his or her prudent judgment, substitute another as executor unless substitution has been forbidden, the executor has been chosen for personal qualifications, or a substitute has been predetermined. In these cases, however, the executor may entrust the preparatory acts to another.
44 The executor’s successor in office can also execute an administrative act unless the executor was chosen for personal qualifications.
45 If the executor has erred in any way in the execution of an administrative act, the executor is permitted to execute the same act again.
46 An administrative act does not cease when the authority of the one who established it expires unless the law expressly provides otherwise.
47 The revocation of an administrative act by another administrative act of a competent authority takes effect only from the moment at which the revocation is legitimately made known to the person for whom it has been given.
48 A singular decree is an administrative act issued by a competent executive authority in which a decision is given or a provision is made for a particular case according to the norms of law. Of their nature, these decisions or provisions do not presuppose a petition made by someone.
49 A singular precept is a decree which directly and legitimately enjoins a specific person or persons to do or omit something, especially in order to urge the observance of law.
50 Before issuing a singular decree, an authority is to seek out the necessary information and proofs and, insofar as possible, to hear those whose rights can be injured.
51 A decree is to be issued in writing, with the reasons at least summarily expressed if it is a decision.
52 A singular decree has force only in respect to the matters which it decides and for the persons for whom it was given. It obliges these persons everywhere, however, unless it is otherwise evident.
53 If decrees are contrary to one another, a particular decree prevails over a general in those matters which are specifically expressed. If they are equally particular or equally general, the decree later in time modifies the earlier to the extent that the later one is contrary to it.
54 §1. A singular decree whose application is entrusted to an executor takes effect from the moment of execution; otherwise, from the moment it is made known to the person by the authority of the one who issued it.
§2. To be enforced, a singular decree must be made known by a legitimate document according to the norm of law.
55 Without prejudice to the prescripts of cann. CIC 37 and CIC 51, when a very grave reason prevents the handing over of the written text of a decree, the decree is considered to have been made known if it is read to the person to whom it is destined in the presence of a notary or two witnesses. After a written record of what has occurred has been prepared, all those present must sign it.
56 A decree is considered to have been made known if the one for whom it is destined has been properly summoned to receive or hear the decree but, without a just cause, did not appear or refused to sign.
57 §1. Whenever the law orders a decree to be issued or an interested party legitimately proposes a petition or recourse to obtain a decree, the competent authority is to provide for the matter within three months from the receipt of the petition or recourse unless the law prescribes some other time period.
§2. When this time period has passed, if the decree has not yet been given, the response is presumed to be negative with respect to the presentation of further recourse.
§3. A presumed negative response does not exempt the competent authority from the obligation of issuing the decree and even of repairing the damage possibly incurred, according to the norm of CIC 128.
58 §1. A singular decree ceases to have force through legitimate revocation by competent authority as well as through cessation of the law for whose execution it was given.
§2. A singular precept not imposed by a legitimate document ceases when the authority of the one who issued it expires.
59 §1. A rescript is an administrative act issued in writing by competent executive authority; of its very nature, a rescript grants a privilege, dispensation, or other favor at someone’s request.
§2. The prescripts established for rescripts are valid also for the oral granting of a permission or favors unless it is otherwise evident.
60 Any rescript can be requested by all those who are not expressly prohibited from doing so.
61 Unless it is otherwise evident, a rescript can be requested for another even without the person’s assent and has force before the person’s acceptance, without prejudice to contrary clauses.
62 A rescript in which no executor is given has effect at the moment the letter is given; other rescripts, at the moment of execution.
63 §1. Subreption, or concealment of the truth, prevents the validity of a rescript if in the request those things were not expressed which according to law, style, and canonical practice must be expressed for validity, unless it is a rescript of favor which is given motu proprio.
§2. Obreption, or a statement of falsehood, also prevents the validity of a rescript if not even one proposed motivating reason is true.
§3. The motivating reason in rescripts for which there is no executor must be true at the time when the rescript is given; in others, at the time of execution.
64 Without prejudice to the authority of the Penitentiary for the internal forum, a favor denied by any dicastery of the Roman Curia cannot be granted validly by any other dicastery of the same Curia or by another competent authority below the Roman Pontiff without the assent of the dicastery before which the matter was initiated.
65 §1. Without prejudice to the prescripts of §§2 and 3, no one is to petition from another ordinary a favor denied by one’s own ordinary unless mention of the denial has been made. When this mention has been made, however, the ordinary is not to grant the favor unless he has obtained the reasons for the denial from the prior ordinary.
§2. A favor denied by a vicar general or by an episcopal vicar cannot be granted validly by another vicar of the same bishop even if the reasons for the denial have been obtained from the vicar who denied it.
§3. A favor denied by a vicar general or by an episcopal vicar and afterwards obtained from the diocesan bishop without any mention made of this denial is invalid. A favor denied by a diocesan bishop, however, even if mention is made of the denial, cannot be obtained validly from his vicar general or episcopal vicar without the consent of the bishop.
66 A rescript does not become invalid due to an error in the name of the person to whom it is given or by whom it is issued, or of the place where the person resides, or in the matter concerned, provided that, in the judgment of the ordinary, there is no doubt about the person or the matter.
67 §1. If it happens that two contrary rescripts are obtained for one and the same thing, the particular prevails over the general in those matters which are particularly expressed.
§2. If they are equally particular or equally general, the earlier in time prevails over the later unless there is express mention of the earlier one in the later one or unless the person who obtained the earlier one has not used the rescript out of malice or notable negligence.
§3. In a case of doubt whether a rescript is invalid or not, recourse is to be made to the one who issued it.
68 A rescript of the Apostolic See in which no executor is given must be presented to the ordinary of the one who obtained it only when it is prescribed in the same letter, or it concerns public matters, or it is necessary that conditions be verified.
69 A rescript for whose presentation no time is specified can be shown to the executor at any time, provided that there is neither fraud nor malice.
70 If in a rescript the granting of a favor is entrusted to an executor, it is up to the prudent judgment and conscience of the executor to grant or deny the favor.
71 No one is bound to use a rescript given only in his or her favor unless bound to do so by a canonical obligation from another source.
72 Rescripts granted by the Apostolic See which have expired can be extended once by the diocesan bishop for a just cause, but not beyond three months.
73 Rescripts are not revoked by a contrary law unless the law itself provides otherwise.
74 Although one can use in the internal forum a favor granted orally, the person is bound to prove the favor in the external forum whenever someone legitimately requests it.
75 If a rescript contains a privilege or dispensation, the prescripts of the following canons are also to be observed.
76 §1. A privilege is a favor given through a particular act to the benefit of certain physical or juridic persons; it can be granted by the legislator as well as by an executive authority to whom the legislator has granted this power.
§2. Centenary or immemorial possession induces the presumption that a privilege has been granted.
77 A privilege must be interpreted according to the norm of CIC 36, §1, but that interpretation must always be used by which the beneficiaries of a privilege actually obtain some favor.
78 §1. A privilege is presumed to be perpetual unless the contrary is proved.
§2. A personal privilege, namely one which follows the person, is extinguished with that person’s death.
§3. A real privilege ceases through the complete destruction of the thing or place; a local privilege, however, revives if the place is restored within fifty years.
79 A privilege ceases through revocation by the competent authority according to the norm of CIC 47, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 81.
80 §1. No privilege ceases through renunciation unless the competent authority has accepted the renunciation.
§2. Any physical person can renounce a privilege granted only in that person’s favor.
§3. Individual persons cannot renounce a privilege granted to some juridic person or granted in consideration of the dignity of a place or of a thing, nor is a juridic person free to renounce a privilege granted to it if the renunciation brings disadvantage to the Church or to others.
81 A privilege is not extinguished when the authority of the one who granted it expires unless it has been given with the clause, at our good pleasure (ad beneplacitum nostrum), or some other equivalent expression.
82 A privilege which is not burdensome to others does not cease through non-use or contrary use. If it is to the disadvantage of others, however, it is lost if legitimate prescription takes place.
83 §1. A privilege ceases through the lapse of the time period or through the completion of the number of cases for which it had been granted, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 142, §2.
§2. It also ceases if, in the judgment of the competent authority, circumstances are so changed in the course of time that it becomes harmful or its use illicit.
84 One who abuses the power given by a privilege deserves to be deprived of that privilege.
Therefore, when the holder of a privilege has been warned in vain, an ordinary is to deprive the one who gravely abuses it of a privilege which he himself has granted. If the privilege was granted by the Apostolic See, however, an ordinary is bound to notify the Apostolic See.
85 A dispensation, or the relaxation of a merely ecclesiastical law in a particular case, can be granted by those who possess executive power within the limits of their competence, as well as by those who have the power to dispense explicitly or implicitly either by the law itself or by legitimate delegation.
86 Laws are not subject to dispensation to the extent that they define those things which are essentially constitutive of juridic institutes or acts.
87 §1. A diocesan bishop, whenever he judges that it contributes to their spiritual good, is able to dispense the faithful from universal and particular disciplinary laws issued for his territory or his subjects by the supreme authority of the Church. He is not able to dispense, however, from procedural or penal laws nor from those whose dispensation is specially reserved to the Apostolic See or some other authority.
§2. If recourse to the Holy See is difficult and, at the same time, there is danger of grave harm in delay, any ordinary is able to dispense from these same laws even if dispensation is reserved to the Holy See, provided that it concerns a dispensation which the Holy See is accustomed to grant under the same circumstances, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 291.
88 A local ordinary is able to dispense from diocesan laws and, whenever he judges that it contributes to the good of the faithful, from laws issued by a plenary or provincial council or by the conference of bishops.
89 A pastor and other presbyters or deacons are not able to dispense from universal and particular law unless this power has been expressly granted to them.
90 §1. One is not to be dispensed from an ecclesiastical law without a just and reasonable cause, after taking into account the circumstances of the case and the gravity of the law from which dispensation is given; otherwise the dispensation is illicit and, unless it is given by the legislator himself or his superior, also invalid.
§2. In a case of doubt concerning the sufficiency of the cause, a dispensation is granted validly and licitly.
91 Even when outside his territory, one who possesses the power to dispense is able to exercise it with respect to his subjects even though they are absent from the territory, and, unless the contrary is expressly established, also with respect to travelers actually present in the territory, as well as with respect to himself.
92 A dispensation is subject to a strict interpretation according to the norm of CIC 36, §1, as is the very power to dispense granted for a particular case.
93 A dispensation which has successive application ceases in the same ways as a privilege as well as by the certain and total cessation of the motivating cause.
94 §1. Statutes in the proper sense are ordinances which are established according to the norm of law in aggregates of persons (universitates personarum) or of things (universitates rerum) and which define their purpose, constitution, government, and methods of operation.
§2. The statutes of an aggregate of persons (universitas personarum) bind only the persons who are its legitimate members; the statutes of an aggregate of things (universitas rerum), those who direct it.
§3. Those prescripts of statutes established and promulgated by virtue of legislative power are governed by the prescripts of the canons on laws.
95 §1. Rules of order (ordines) are rules or norms, which must be observed in meetings, whether convened by ecclesiastical authority or freely convoked by the Christian faithful, as well as in other celebrations. They define those things which pertain to the constitution, direction, and ways of proceeding.
§2. These rules of order bind those who participate in these assemblies or celebrations.
96 By baptism one is incorporated into the Church of Christ and is constituted a person in it with the duties and rights which are proper to Christians in keeping with their condition, insofar as they are in ecclesiastical communion and unless a legitimately issued sanction stands in the way.
97 §1. A person who has completed the eighteenth year of age has reached majority; below this age, a person is a minor.
§2. A minor before the completion of the seventh year is called an infant and is considered not responsible for oneself (non sui compos). With the completion of the seventh year, however, a minor is presumed to have the use of reason.
98 §1. A person who has reached majority has the full exercise of his or her rights.
§2. A minor, in the exercise of his or her rights, remains subject to the authority of parents or guardians except in those matters in which minors are exempted from their authority by divine law or canon law. In what pertains to the appointment of guardians and their authority, the prescripts of civil law are to be observed unless canon law provides otherwise or unless in certain cases the diocesan bishop, for a just cause, has decided to provide for the matter through the appointment of another guardian.
99 Whoever habitually lacks the use of reason is considered not responsible for oneself (non sui compos) and is equated with infants.
100 A person is said to be: a resident (incola)in the place where the person has a domicile; a temporary resident (advena)in the place where the person has a quasi-domicile; a traveler (peregrinus)if the person is outside the place of a domicile or quasi-domicile which is still retained; a transient (vagus) if the person does not have a domicile or quasi- domicile anywhere.
101 §1. The place of origin of a child, even of a neophyte, is that in which the parents had a domicile or, lacking that, a quasi-domicile when the child was born or, if the parents did not have the same domicile or quasi-domicile, that of the mother.
§2. In the case of a child of transients, the place of origin is the actual place of birth; in the case of an abandoned child, it is the place where the child was found.
102 §1. Domicile is acquired by that residence within the territory of a certain parish or at least of a diocese, which either is joined with the intention of remaining there permanently unless called away or has been protracted for five complete years.
§2. Quasi-domicile is acquired by residence within the territory of a certain parish or at least of a diocese, which either is joined with the intention of remaining there for at least three months unless called away or has in fact been protracted for three months.
§3. A domicile or quasi-domicile within the territory of a parish is called parochial; within the territory of a diocese, even though not within a parish, diocesan.
103 Members of religious institutes and societies of apostolic life acquire a domicile in the place where the house to which they are attached is located; they acquire a quasi-domicile in the house where they are residing, according to the norm of CIC 102, §2.
104 Spouses are to have a common domicile or quasi-domicile; by reason of legitimate separation or some other just cause, both can have their own domicile or quasi-domicile.
105 §1. A minor necessarily retains the domicile and quasi-domicile of the one to whose power the minor is subject. A minor who is no longer an infant can also acquire a quasi-domicile of one’s own; a minor who is legitimately emancipated according to the norm of civil law can also acquire a domicile of one’s own.
§2. Whoever for some other reason than minority has been placed legitimately under the guardianship or care of another has the domicile and quasi-domicile of the guardian or curator.
106 Domicile and quasi-domicile are lost by departure from a place with the intention of not returning, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 105.
107 §1. Through both domicile and quasi-domicile, each person acquires his or her pastor and ordinary.
§2. The proper pastor or ordinary of a transient is the pastor or local ordinary where the transient is actually residing.
§3. The proper pastor of one who has only a diocesan domicile or quasi-domicile is the pastor of the place where the person is actually residing.
108 §1. Consanguinity is computed through lines and degrees.
§2. In the direct line there are as many degrees as there are generations or persons, not counting the common ancestor.
§3. In the collateral line there are as many degrees as there are persons in both the lines together, not counting the common ancestor.
109 §1. Affinity arises from a valid marriage, even if not consummated, and exists between a man and the blood relatives of the woman and between the woman and the blood relatives of the man.
§2. It is so computed that those who are blood relatives of the man are related in the same line and degree by affinity to the woman, and vice versa.
110 Children who have been adopted according to the norm of civil law are considered the children of the person or persons who have adopted them.
111 §1. Through the reception of baptism, the child of parents who belong to the Latin Church is enrolled in it, or, if one or the other does not belong to it, both parents have chosen by mutual agreement to have the offspring baptized in the Latin Church. If there is no mutual agreement, however, the child is enrolled in the ritual Church to which the father belongs.
§2. Anyone to be baptized who has completed the fourteenth year of age can freely choose to be baptized in the Latin Church or in another ritual Church sui iuris; in that case, the person belongs to the Church which he or she has chosen.
112 §1. After the reception of baptism, the following are enrolled in another ritual Church sui iuris:
1/ a person who has obtained permission from the Apostolic See;
2/ a spouse who, at the time of or during marriage, has declared that he or she is transferring to the ritual Church sui iuris of the other spouse; when the marriage has ended, however, the person can freely return to the Latin Church;
3/ before the completion of the fourteenth year of age, the children of those mentioned in nn. 1 and 2 as well as, in a mixed marriage, the children of the Catholic party who has legitimately transferred to another ritual Church; on completion of their fourteenth year, however, they can return to the Latin Church.
§2. The practice, however prolonged, of receiving the sacraments according to the rite of another ritual Church sui iuris does not entail enrollment in that Church.
Code of Canon Law