Code of Canon Law 1674
1674 The following are qualified to challenge a marriage:
1/ the spouses;
2/ the promoter of justice when nullity has already become public, if the convalidation of the marriage is not possible or expedient.
1675 §1. A marriage which was not accused while both spouses were living cannot be accused after the death of either one or both of the spouses unless the question of validity is prejudicial to the resolution of another controversy either in the canonical forum or in the civil forum.
§2. If a spouse dies while the case is pending, however, CIC 1518 is to be observed.
1676 Before accepting a case and whenever there is hope of a favorable outcome, a judge is to use pastoral means to induce the spouses if possible to convalidate the marriage and restore conjugal living.
1677 §1. When the libellus has been accepted, the presiding judge or the ponens is to proceed to the communication of the decree of citation according to the norm of CIC 1508.
§2. When fifteen days have passed from the communication and unless either party has requested a session for the joinder of the issue, the presiding judge or the ponens is to establish the formula of the doubt or doubts within ten days by ex officio decree and is to notify the parties.
§3. The formula of the doubt not only is to ask whether the nullity of the marriage is established in the case but also must determine on what ground or grounds the validity of the marriage is to be challenged.
§4. Ten days after the communication of the decree, the presiding judge or the ponens is to arrange for the instruction of the case by a new decree if the parties have lodged no objection.
1678 §1. The defender of the bond, the legal representatives of the parties, and also the promoter of justice, if involved in the trial, have the following rights:
1/ to be present at the examination of the parties, the witnesses, and the experts, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 1559;
2/ to inspect the judicial acts, even those not yet published, and to review the documents presented by the parties.
§2. The parties cannot be present at the examination mentioned in §1, n. 1.
1679 Unless there are full proofs from elsewhere, in order to evaluate the depositions of the parties according to the norm of CIC 1536, the judge, if possible, is to use witnesses to the credibility of those parties in addition to other indications and supporting factors.
1680 In cases of impotence or defect of consent because of mental illness, the judge is to use the services of one or more experts unless it is clear from the circumstances that it would be useless to do so; in other cases the prescript of CIC 1574 is to be observed.
1681 Whenever, during the instruction of a case, a very probable doubt emerges that consummation of the marriage did not occur, after suspending the case of nullity with the consent of the parties, the tribunal can complete the instruction for a dispensation super rato and then transmit the acts to the Apostolic See together with a petition for a dispensation from either one or both of the spouses and the votum of the tribunal and the bishop.
1682 §1. The sentence which first declared the nullity of the marriage is to be transmitted ex officio to the appellate tribunal within twenty days from the publication of the sentence, together with the appeals, if there are any, and the other acts of the trial.
§2. If a sentence in favor of the nullity of a marriage was given in the first grade of a trial, the appellate tribunal is either to confirm the decision at once by decree or to admit the case to an ordinary examination in a new grade, after having weighed carefully the observations of the defender of the bond and those of the parties if there are any.
1683 If a new ground of nullity of the marriage is alleged at the appellate grade, the tribunal can admit it and judge it as if in first instance.
1684 §1. After the sentence which first declared the nullity of the marriage has been confirmed at the appellate grade either by a decree or by a second sentence, the persons whose marriage has been declared null can contract a new marriage as soon as the decree or second sentence has been communicated to them unless a prohibition attached to the sentence or decree or established by the local ordinary has forbidden this.
§2. The prescripts of CIC 1644 must be observed even if the sentence which declared the nullity of the marriage was confirmed not by a second sentence but by a decree.
1685 As soon as the sentence is executed, the judicial vicar must notify the local ordinary of the place in which the marriage was celebrated. The local ordinary must take care that the declaration of the nullity of the marriage and any possible prohibitions are noted as soon as possible in the marriage and baptismal registers.
1686 After receiving a petition proposed according to the norm of CIC 1677, the judicial vicar or a judge designated by him can declare the nullity of a marriage by sentence if a document subject to no contradiction or exception clearly establishes the existence of a diriment impediment or a defect of legitimate form, provided that it is equally certain that no dispensation was given, or establishes the lack of a valid mandate of a proxy. In these cases, the formalities of the ordinary process are omitted except for the citation of the parties and the intervention of the defender of the bond.
1687 §1. If the defender of the bond prudently thinks that either the flaws mentioned in CIC 1686 or the lack of a dispensation are not certain, the defender of the bond must appeal against the declaration of nullity to the judge of second instance; the acts must be sent to the appellate judge who must be advised in writing that a documentary process is involved.
§2. The party who considers himself or herself aggrieved retains the right of appeal.
1688 The judge of second instance, with the intervention of the defender of the bond and after having heard the parties, will decide in the same manner as that mentioned in CIC 1686 whether the sentence must be confirmed or whether the case must rather proceed according to the ordinary method of law; in the latter event the judge remands the case to the tribunal of first instance.
1689 In the sentence the parties are to be reminded of the moral and even civil obligations which may bind them both toward one another and toward their children to furnish support and education.
1690 Cases for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage cannot be treated in an oral contentious process.
1691 In other procedural matters, the canons on trials in general and on the ordinary contentious trial must be applied unless the nature of the matter precludes it; the special norms for cases concerning the status of persons and cases pertaining to the public good are to be observed.
1692 §1. Unless other provision is legitimately made in particular places, a decree of the diocesan bishop or a judicial sentence can decide the personal separation of baptized spouses according to the norm of the following canons.
§2. Where an ecclesiastical decision has no civil effects or if a civil sentence is not contrary to divine law, the bishop of the diocese of the residence of the spouses, after having weighed the special circumstances, can grant permission to approach the civil forum.
§3. If a case concerns only the merely civil effects of marriage, the judge, after having observed the prescript of §2, is to try to defer the case to the civil forum from the start.
1693 §1. Unless a party or the promoter of justice requests the ordinary contentious process, the oral contentious process is to be used.
§2. If the ordinary contentious process has been used and an appeal is proposed, the tribunal of second grade, observing what is required, is to proceed according to the norm of CIC 1682, §2.
1694 The prescripts of CIC 1673 are to be observed in what pertains to the competence of the tribunal.
1695 Before accepting the case and whenever there is hope of a favorable outcome, the judge is to use pastoral means to reconcile the spouses and persuade them to restore conjugal living.
1696 Cases concerning the separation of spouses also pertain to the public good; therefore the promoter of justice must always take part in them according to the norm of CIC 1433.
1697 Only the spouses, or one of them even if the other is unwilling, have the right to petition for the favor of a dispensation from a marriage ratum et non consummatum.
1698 §1. Only the Apostolic See adjudicates the fact of the non-consummation of a marriage and the existence of a just cause to grant a dispensation.
§2. Only the Roman Pontiff, however, grants the dispensation.
1699 §1. The person competent to accept a libellus seeking a dispensation is the diocesan bishop of the domicile or quasi-domicile of the petitioner, who must arrange for the instruction of the process if the petition is well founded.
§2. If the proposed case has special difficulties of the juridical or moral order, however, the diocesan bishop is to consult the Apostolic See.
§3. Recourse to the Apostolic See is available against a decree by which a bishop rejects a libellus.
1700 §1. Without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 1681, the bishop is to entrust the instruction of these processes either in a stable manner or in individual cases to his tribunal, that of another diocese, or a suitable priest.
§2. If a judicial petition to declare the nullity of the same marriage has been introduced, however, the instruction is to be entrusted to the same tribunal.
1701 §1. The defender of the bond must always intervene in these processes.
§2. A legal representative is not admitted, but because of the difficulty of a case, a bishop can permit the petitioner or the respondent to have the assistance of a legal expert.
1702 In the instruction each spouse is to be heard, and the canons on the collection of proofs in the ordinary contentious trial and in cases of the nullity of marriage are to be observed insofar as possible, provided that they can be reconciled with the character of these processes.
1703 §1. There is no publication of the acts. If the judge perceives that the proofs brought forward seriously hinder the request of the petitioner or the exception of the respondent, however, he is prudently to inform the interested party.
§2. The judge can show a document introduced or a testimony received to a party who requests it and set a time to present observations.
1704 §1. When the instruction has been completed, the instructor is to give all the acts along with a suitable report to the bishop, who is to prepare a votum on the veracity of the fact of the non-consummation, the just cause for the dispensation, and the suitability of the favor.
§2. If the instruction of the process has been entrusted to another tribunal according to the norm of CIC 1700, the observations in favor of the bond are to be made in the same forum; the votum mentioned in §1, however, pertains to the entrusting bishop, to whom the instructor is to hand over a suitable report together with the acts.
1705 §1. The bishop is to transmit to the Apostolic See all the acts together with his votum and the observations of the defender of the bond.
§2. If supplemental instruction is required in the judgment of the Apostolic See, this requirement will be communicated to the bishop with an indication of the points on which the instruction must be completed.
§3. If the Apostolic See replies that non-consummation has not been established from the materials presented, then the legal expert mentioned in CIC 1701, §2 can inspect the acts of the process, though not the votum of the bishop, at the tribunal to consider whether any grave reason can be brought forth in order to resubmit the petition.
1706 The Apostolic See transmits the rescript of the dispensation to the bishop who will notify the parties about the rescript and also as soon as possible will order the pastor both of the place where the marriage was contracted and of the place of baptism to note the granting of the dispensation in the marriage and baptismal registers.
1707 §1. Whenever the death of a spouse cannot be proven by an authentic ecclesiastical or civil document, the other spouse is not considered free from the bond of marriage until after the diocesan bishop has issued a declaration of presumed death.
§2. The diocesan bishop is able to issue the declaration mentioned in §1 only if, after having carried out appropriate investigations, he attains moral certitude of the death of the spouse from the depositions of witnesses, from rumor, or from evidence. The absence of a spouse alone, even for a long time, is not sufficient.
§3. The bishop is to consult the Apostolic See in uncertain and complicated cases.
1708 The cleric himself, the ordinary to whom the cleric is subject, or the ordinary in whose diocese the cleric was ordained has the right to challenge the validity of sacred ordination.
1709 §1. The libellus must be sent to the competent congregation which will decide whether the congregation of the Roman Curia itself or a tribunal designated by it must handle the case.
§2. Once the libellus has been sent, the cleric is forbidden to exercise orders by the law itself.
1710 If the congregation refers the case to a tribunal, the canons on trials in general and on the ordinary contentious trial are to be observed unless the nature of the matter precludes it and without prejudice to the prescripts of this title.
1711 In these cases the defender of the bond possesses the same rights and is bound by the same duties as the defender of the marriage bond.
1712 After a second sentence has confirmed the nullity of sacred ordination, the cleric loses all rights proper to the clerical state and is freed from all obligations.
1713 In order to avoid judicial contentions an agreement or reconciliation is employed usefully, or the controversy can be committed to the judgment of one or more arbitrators.
1714 For an agreement, a compromise, and an arbitrated judgment, the norms selected by the parties or, if the parties have selected none, the law laid down by the conference of bishops, if there is such a law, or the civil law in force in the place where the agreement is entered into is to be observed.
1715 §1. An agreement or compromise cannot be made validly concerning matters which pertain to the public good and other matters about which the parties cannot make disposition freely.
§2. For temporal ecclesiastical goods, the formalities established by law for the alienation of ecclesiastical goods are to be observed whenever the matter demands it.
1716 §1. If the civil law does not recognize the force of an arbitrated sentence unless a judge confirms it, an arbitrated sentence in an ecclesiastical controversy, in order to have force in the canonical forum, needs the confirmation of an ecclesiastical judge of the place where it was rendered.
§2. If civil law permits the challenge of an arbitrated judgment before a civil judge, however, the same challenge can be proposed in the canonical forum before an ecclesiastical judge competent to judge the controversy in the first grade.
1717 §1. Whenever an ordinary has knowledge, which at least seems true, of a delict, he is carefully to inquire personally or through another suitable person about the facts, circumstances, and imputability, unless such an inquiry seems entirely superfluous.
§2. Care must be taken so that the good name of anyone is not endangered from this investigation.
§3. The person who conducts the investigation has the same powers and obligations as an auditor in the process; the same person cannot act as a judge in the matter if a judicial process is initiated later.
1718 §1. When it seems that sufficient evidence has been collected, the ordinary is to decide:
1/ whether a process to inflict or declare a penalty can be initiated;
2/ whether, attentive to CIC 1341, this is expedient;
3/ whether a judicial process must be used or, unless the law forbids it, whether the matter must proceed by way of extrajudicial decree.
§2. The ordinary is to revoke or change the decree mentioned in §1 whenever new evidence indicates to him that another decision is necessary.
§3. In issuing the decrees mentioned in §§1 and 2, the ordinary is to hear two judges or other experts of the law if he considers it prudent.
§4. Before he makes a decision according to the norm of §1 and in order to avoid useless trials, the ordinary is to examine carefully whether it is expedient for him or the investigator, with the consent of the parties, to resolve equitably the question of damages.
1719 The acts of the investigation, the decrees of the ordinary which initiated and concluded the investigation, and everything which preceded the investigation are to be kept in the secret archive of the curia if they are not necessary for the penal process.
1720 If the ordinary thinks that the matter must proceed by way of extrajudicial decree:
1/ he is to inform the accused of the accusation and the proofs, giving an opportunity for self-defense, unless the accused neglected to appear after being properly summoned;
2/ he is to weigh carefully all the proofs and arguments with two assessors;
3/ if the delict is certainly established and a criminal action is not extinguished, he is to issue a decree according to the norm of CIC 1342-1350, setting forth the reasons in law and in fact at least briefly.
1721 §1. If the ordinary has decreed that a judicial penal process must be initiated, he is to hand over the acts of the investigation to the promoter of justice who is to present a libellus of accusation to the judge according to the norm of cann. CIC 1502 and CIC 1504.
§2. The promoter of justice appointed to the higher tribunal acts as the petitioner before that tribunal.
1722 To prevent scandals, to protect the freedom of witnesses, and to guard the course of justice, the ordinary, after having heard the promoter of justice and cited the accused, at any stage of the process can exclude the accused from the sacred ministry or from some office and ecclesiastical function, can impose or forbid residence in some place or territory, or even can prohibit public participation in the Most Holy Eucharist. Once the cause ceases, all these measures must be revoked; they also end by the law itself when the penal process ceases.
1723 §1. The judge who cites the accused must invite the accused to appoint an advocate according to the norm of CIC 1481, §1 within the time limit set by the judge.
§2. If the accused does not make provision, the judge is to appoint an advocate before the joinder of the issue; this advocate will remain in this function as long as the accused does not appoint an advocate personally.
1724 §1. At any grade of the trial the promoter of justice can renounce the trial at the command of or with the consent of the ordinary whose deliberation initiated the process.
§2. For validity the accused must accept the renunciation unless the accused was declared absent from the trial.
1725 In the discussion of the case, whether done in written or oral form, the accused, either personally or through the advocate or procurator, always has the right to write or speak last.
1726 If at any grade and stage of the penal trial it is evidently established that the accused did not commit the delict, the judge must declare this in a sentence and absolve the accused even if it is also established that criminal action has been extinguished.
1727 §1. The accused can propose an appeal even if the sentence dismissed the accused only because the penalty was facultative or because the judge used the power mentioned in cann. CIC 1344 and CIC 1345.
§2. The promoter of justice can appeal whenever the promoter judges that the repair of scandal or the restoration of justice has not been provided for sufficiently.
1728 §1. Without prejudice to the prescripts of the canons of this title and unless the nature of the matter precludes it, the canons on trials in general and on the ordinary contentious trial must be applied in a penal trial; the special norms for cases which pertain to the public good are also to be observed.
§2. The accused is not bound to confess the delict nor can an oath be administered to the accused.
1729 §1. In the penal trial itself an injured party can bring a contentious action to repair damages incurred personally from the delict, according to the norm of CIC 1596.
§2. The intervention of the injured party mentioned in §1 is not admitted later if it was not made in the first grade of the penal trial.
§3. The appeal in a case for damages is made according to the norm of CIC 1628-1640 even if an appeal cannot be made in the penal trial; if both appeals are proposed, although by different parties, there is to be a single appellate trial, without prejudice to the prescript of CIC 1730.
1730 §1. To avoid excessive delays in the penal trial the judge can defer the judgment for damages until he has rendered the definitive sentence in the penal trial.
§2. After rendering the sentence in the penal trial, the judge who does this must adjudicate for damages even if the penal trial still is pending because of a proposed challenge or the accused has been absolved for a cause which does not remove the obligation to repair damages.
1731 Even if the sentence rendered in a penal trial has become a res iudicata, it in no way establishes the right of the injured party unless this party has intervened according to the norm of CIC 1729.
1732 What is established in the canons of this section concerning decrees must be applied to all singular administrative acts which are given in the external forum outside a trial excepting those which have been issued by the Roman Pontiff or an ecumenical council.
1733 §1. Whenever a person considers himself or herself aggrieved by a decree, it is particularly desirable that the person and the author of the decree avoid any contention and take care to seek an equitable solution by common counsel, possibly using the mediation and effort of wise persons to avoid or settle the controversy in a suitable way.
§2. The conference of bishops can determine that each diocese establish in a stable manner an office or council whose function is to seek and suggest equitable solutions according to the norms determined by the conference. If the conference has not ordered this, however, the bishop can establish a council or office of this kind.
§3. The office or council mentioned in §2 is especially to be of assistance when the revocation of a decree has been requested according to the norm of CIC 1734 and the time limits for making recourse have not elapsed. If recourse has been proposed against a decree, however, the superior who deals with the recourse is to urge the person making recourse and the author of the decree to seek a solution of this kind whenever he sees hope of a favorable outcome.
1734 §1. Before proposing recourse a person must seek the revocation or emendation of the decree in writing from its author. When this petition is proposed, by that very fact suspension of the execution of the decree is also understood to be requested.
§2. The petition must be made within the peremptory period of ten useful days from the legitimate notification of the decree.
§3. The norms of §§1 and 2 are not valid:
1/ for recourse proposed to a bishop against decrees issued by authorities subject to him;
2/ for recourse proposed against a decree which decides a hierarchical recourse unless the bishop gave the decision;
3/ for recourse proposed according to the norm of cann. CIC 57 and CIC 1735.
1735 If within thirty days after receiving the petition mentioned in CIC 1734 the author of the decree communicates a new decree by which he either emends the earlier one or decides that the petition must be rejected, the time limits for making recourse run from the notification of the new decree. If the author makes no decision within the thirty days, however, the time limits run from the thirtieth day.
1736 §1. In those matters in which hierarchical recourse suspends the execution of a decree, the petition mentioned in CIC 1734 also has the same effect.
§2. In other cases, if the author of the decree has not decreed the suspension of execution within ten days after receiving the petition mentioned in CIC 1734, an interim suspension can be sought from his hierarchical superior who can decree a suspension only for grave reasons and always cautiously so that the salvation of souls suffers no harm.
§3. If the execution of the decree has been suspended according to the norm of §2 and recourse is proposed afterwards, the person who must deal with the recourse according to the norm of CIC 1737, §3 is to decide whether the suspension must be confirmed or revoked.
§4. If no recourse is proposed against the decree within the established time limit, the interim suspension of the execution given according to the norm of §§1 or 2 ceases by that very fact.
1737 §1. A person who claims to have been aggrieved by a decree can make recourse for any just reason to the hierarchical superior of the one who issued the decree. The recourse can be proposed before the author of the decree who must transmit it immediately to the competent hierarchical superior.
§2. Recourse must be proposed within the peremptory time limit of fifteen useful days which in the cases mentioned in CIC 1734, §3 run from the day on which the decree was communicated; in other cases, however, they run according to the norm of CIC 1735.
§3. Nevertheless, even in cases in which recourse does not suspend the execution of the decree by the law itself and suspension has not been decreed according to the norm of CIC 1736, §2, the superior can order the execution to be suspended for a grave cause, yet cautiously so that the salvation of souls suffers no harm.
1738 The person making recourse always has the right to use an advocate or procurator, but useless delays are to be avoided; indeed, a legal representative is to be appointed ex officio if the person making recourse lacks one and the superior thinks it necessary. Nevertheless, the superior always can order the person making recourse to be present in order to be questioned.
1739 The superior who deals with the recourse, as the case warrants, is permitted not only to confirm the decree or declare it invalid but also to rescind or revoke it or, if it seems more expedient to the superior, to emend, replace, or modify it.
1740 When the ministry of any pastor becomes harmful or at least ineffective for any cause, even through no grave personal negligence, the diocesan bishop can remove him from the parish.
1741 The causes for which a pastor can be removed legitimately from his parish are especially the following:
1/ a manner of acting which brings grave detriment or disturbance to ecclesiastical communion;
2/ ineptitude or a permanent infirmity of mind or body which renders the pastor unable to fulfill his functions usefully;
3/ loss of a good reputation among upright and responsible parishioners or an aversion to the pastor which it appears will not cease in a brief time;
4/ grave neglect or violation of parochial duties which persists after a warning;
5/ poor administration of temporal affairs with grave damage to the Church whenever another remedy to this harm cannot be found.
1742 §1. If the instruction which was carried out has established the existence of one of the causes mentioned in CIC 1740, the bishop is to discuss the matter with two pastors selected from the group established for this purpose in a stable manner by the presbyteral council at the proposal of the bishop. If the bishop then judges that removal must take place, he paternally is to persuade the pastor to resign within fifteen days, after having explained, for validity, the cause and arguments for the removal.
§2. The prescript of CIC 682, §2 is to be observed for pastors who are members of a religious institute or a society of apostolic life.
1743 A pastor can submit a resignation not only purely and simply but also conditionally, provided that the bishop can accept it legitimately and actually does accept it.
1744 §1. If the pastor has not responded within the prescribed days, the bishop is to repeat the invitation and extend the useful time to respond.
§2. If the bishop establishes that the pastor received the second invitation but did not respond even though not prevented by any impediment, or if the pastor refuses to resign without giving any reasons, the bishop is to issue a decree of removal.
1745 If the pastor opposes the cause given and its reasons and alleges reasons which seem insufficient to the bishop, the bishop, in order to act validly, is:
1/ to invite the pastor to organize his objections in a written report after he has inspected the acts, and offer any proofs he has to the contrary;
2/ when any necessary instruction is completed, to consider the matter together with the same pastors mentioned in CIC 1742, §1, unless others must be designated because those pastors are unavailable;
3/ finally, to establish whether the pastor must be removed or not and promptly to issue a decree on the matter.
1746 After the pastor has been removed, the bishop is to make provision either for an assignment to some other office, if he is suitable for this, or for a pension as the case warrants and circumstances permit.
1747 §1. The removed pastor must refrain from exercising the function of pastor, vacate the rectory as soon as possible, and hand over everything belonging to the parish to the person to whom the bishop has entrusted the parish.
§2. If, however, the man is sick and cannot be transferred elsewhere from the rectory without inconvenience, the bishop is to leave him the use, even exclusive use, of the rectory while this necessity lasts.
§3. While recourse against a decree of removal is pending, the bishop cannot appoint a new pastor, but is to provide a parochial administrator in the meantime.
1748 If the good of souls or the necessity or advantage of the Church demands that a pastor be transferred from a parish which he is governing usefully to another parish or another office, the bishop is to propose the transfer to him in writing and persuade him to consent to it out of love of God and souls.
Code of Canon Law 1674