Damascus Orthodox faith 225
226 Of events240 , some are in our hands, others are not. Those then are in our hands which we are free to do or not to do at our will, that is all actions that are done voluntarily (for those actions are not called voluntary the doing of which is not in our hands), and in a word, all that are followed by blame or praise and depend on motive and law. Strictly all mental241 and deliberative acts are in our hands. Now deliberation is concerned with equal possibilities: and an ‘equal possibility’ is an action that is itself within our power and its opposite, and our mind makes choice of the alternatives, and this is the origin of action. The actions, therefore, that are in our hands are these equal possibilities: e.g. to be moved or not to be moved, to hasten or not to hasten, to long for unnecessaries or not to do so, to tell lies or not to tell lies, to give or not to give, to rejoice or not to rejoice as fits the occasion, and all such actions as imply virtue or vice in their performance, for we are free to do or not to do these at our pleasure. Amongst equal possibilities also are included the arts, for we have it in our power to cultivate these or not as we please.
Note, however, that while the choice of what is to be done is ever in our power, the action itself often is prevented by some dispensation of the divine Providence242 .
227 We hold, therefore, that free-will243 comes on the scene at the same moment as reason, and that change and alteration are congenital to all that is produced. For all that is produced is also subject to change244 . For those things must be subject to change whose production has its origin in change. And change consists in being brought into being out of nothing, and in transforming a substratum of matter into something different. Inanimate things, then, and things without reason undergo the aforementioned bodily changes, while the changes of things endowed with reason depend on choice. For reason consists of a speculative and a practical part. The speculative part is the contemplation of the nature of things, and the practical consists in deliberation and defines the true reason for what is to be done. The speculative side is called mind or wisdom, and the practical side is called reason or prudence. Every one, then, who deliberates does so in the belief that the choice of what is to be done lies in his hands, that he may choose what seems best as the result of his deliberation, and having chosen may act upon it. And if this is so, free-will must necessarily be very closely related to reason. For either man is an irrational being, or, if he is rational, he is master of his acts and endowed with free-will. Hence also creatures without reason do not enjoy free-will: for nature leads them rather than they nature, and so they do not oppose the natural appetite, but as soon as their appetite longs after anything they rush headlong after it. But man, being rational, leads nature rather than nature him, and so when he desires aught he has the power to curb his appetite or to indulge it as he pleases. Hence also creatures devoid of reason are the subjects neither of praise nor blame, while man is the subject of both praise and blame245 .
Note also that the angels, being rational, are endowed with free-will, and, inasmuch as they are created, are liable to change. This in fact is made plain by the devil who, although made good by the Creator, became of his own free-will the inventor of evil, and by the powers who revolted with him246 , that is the demons, and by the other troops of angels who abode in goodness.
228 Of things that are not in our hands some have their beginning or cause in those that are in our power, that is to say, the recompenses of our actions both in the present and in the age to come, but all the rest are dependent on the divine will. For the origin of all things is from God, but their destruction has been introduced by our wickedness for our punishment or benefit. For God did not create death, neither does He take delight in the destruction of living things247 . But death is the work rather of man, that is, its origin is in Adam’s transgression, in like manner as all other punishments. But all other things must be referred to God. For our birth is to be referred to His creative power; and our continuance to His conservative power; and our government and safety to His providential power; and the eternal enjoyment of good things by those who preserve the laws of nature in which we are formed is to be ascribed to His goodness. But since some deny the existence of Providence, let us further devote a few words to the discussion of Providence.
229 Providence, then, is the care that God takes over existing things. And again: Providence is the will of God through which all existing things receive their fitting issue248 . But if Providence is God’s will, according to true reasoning all things that come into being through Providence must necessarily be both most fair and most excellent, and such that they cannot be surpassed. For the same person must of necessity be creator of and provider for what exists: for it is not meet nor fitting that the creator of what exists and the provider should be separate persons. For in that case they would both assuredly be deficient, the one in creating, the other in providing249 . God therefore is both Creator and Provider, and His creative and preserving and providing power is simply His good-will. For whatsoever the Lord pleased that did He in heaven and in earth250 , and no one resisted His will251 . He willed that all things should be and they were. He wills the universe to be framed and it is framed, and all that He wills comes to pass.
That He provides, and that He provides excellently252 , one can most readily perceive thus. God alone is good and wise by nature. Since then He is good, He provides: for he who does not provide is not good. For even men and creatures without reason provide for their own offspring according to their nature, and he who does not provide is blamed. Again, since He is wise, He takes the best care over what exists.
When, therefore, we give heed to these things we ought to be filled with wonder at all the works of Providence, and praise them all253 , and accept them all without enquiry, even though they are in the eyes of many unjust, because the Providence of God is beyond our ken and comprehension, while our reasonings and actions and the future are revealed to His eyes alone. And by “all” I mean those that are not in our hands: for those that are in our power are outside the sphere of Providence and within that of our Free-will.
Now the works of Providence are partly according to the good-will254 (of God) and partly according to permission255 . Works of good-will include alL those that are undeniably good, while works of permission are ......256 . For Providence often permits the just man to encounter misfortune in order that he may reveal to otHers the virtue that lies concealed within him257 , as was the case with Job258 . At other times it allows something strange to be done in order that something great and marvellous might be accomplished through the seemingly-strange act, as when the salvation of men was brought about through the Cross. In another way it allows the pious man to suffer sore trials in order that he may not depart from a right conscience nor lapse into pride on account of the power and grace granted to him, as was the case with Paul259 .
One man is forsaken for a season with a view to another’s restoration, in order that others when they see his state may be taught a lesson260 , as in the case of Lazarus and the rich man261 . For it belongs to our nature to be east down when we see persons in distress. Another is deserted by Providence in order that another may be glorified, and not for his own sin or that of his parents, just as the man who was blind from his birth ministered to the glory of the Son of Man262 . Again another is permitted to suffer in order to stir up emulation in the breasts of others, so that others by magnifying the glory of the sufferer may resolutely welcome suffering in the hope of future glory and the desire for future blessings, as in the case of the martyrs. Another is allowed to fall at times into some act of baseness in order that another worse fault may be thus corrected, as for instance when God allows a man who takes pride in his virtue and righteousness to fall away into fornication in order that he may be brought through this fall into the perception of his own weakness and be humbled and approach and make confession to the Lord.
127 Moreover, it is to be observed263 that the choice of what is to be done is in our own hands264 : but the final issue depends, in the one case when our actions are good, on the cooperation of God, Who in His justice brings help according to His foreknowledge to such as choose the good with a right conscience, and, in the other case when our actions are to evil, on the desertion by God, Who again in His justice stands aloof in accordance with His foreknowledge265 .
Now there are two forms of desertion: for there is desertion in the matters of guidance and training, and there is complete and hopeless desertion. The former has in view the restoration and safety and glory of the sufferer, or the rousing of feelings of emulation and imitation in others, or the glory of God: but the latter is when man, after God has done all that was possible to save him, remains of his own set purpose blind and uncured, or rather incurable, and then he is handed over to utter destruction, as was Judas266 . May God be gracious to us, and deliver us from such desertion.
Observe further that the ways of God’s providence are many, and they cannot be explained in words nor conceived by the mind.
And remember that all the assaults of dark and evil fortune contribute to the salvation of those who receive them with thankfulness, and are assuredly ambassadors of help.
Also one must bear in mind267 that God’s original wish was that all should be saved and come to His Kingdom268 . For it was not for punishment that He formed us but to share in His goodness, inasmuch as He is a good God. But inasmuch as He is a just God, His will is that sinners should suffer punishment.
The first then is called God’s antecedent will and pleasure, and springs from Himself, while the second is called God’s consequent will and permission, and has its origin in us. And the latter is two-fold; one part dealing with matters of guidance and training, and having in view our salvation, and the other being hopeless and leading to our utter punishment, as we said above. And this is the case with actions that are not left in our hands269 .
But of actions that are in our hands the good ones depend on His antecedent goodwill and pleasure, while the wicked ones depend neither on His antecedent nor on His consequent will, but are a concession to free-will For that which is the result of compulsion has neither reason nor virtue in it. God270 makes provision for all creation and makes all creation the instrument of His help and training, yea often even the demons themselves, as for example in the cases of Jb and the swine271 .
230 We ought to understand272 that while God knows all things beforehand, yet He does not predetermine all things273 . For He knows beforehand those things that are in our power, but He does not predetermine them. For it is not His will that there should be wickedness nor does He choose to compel virtue. So that predetermination is the work of the divine command based on fore-knowledge274 . But on the other hand God predetermines those things which are not within our power in accordance with His prescience. For already God in His prescience has prejudged all things in accordance with His goodness and justice.
Bear in mind, too275 , that virtue is a gift from God implanted in our nature, and that He Himself is the source and cause of all good, and without His co-operation276 and help we cannot will or do any good thing, But we have it in our power either to abide in virtue and follow God, Who calls us into ways of virtue, or to stray from paths of virtue, which is to dwell in wickedness, and to follow the devil who summons but cannot compel us. For wickedness is nothing else than the withdrawal of goodness, just as darkness is nothing else than the withdrawal of light While then we abide in the natural state we abide in virtue, but when we deviate from the natural state, that is from virtue, we come into an unnatural state and dwell in wickedness277 .
Repentance is the returning from the unnatural into the natural state, from the devil to God, through discipline and effort.
Man then the Creator made male, giving him to share in His own divine grace, and bringing him thus into communion with Himself: and thus it was that he gave in the manner of a prophet the names to living flyings, with authority as though they were given to be his slaves. For having been endowed with reason and mind, and free-will after the image of God, he was filly entrusted with dominion over earthly things by the common Creator and Master of all.
But since God in His prescience278 knew that man would transgress and become liable to destruction, He made from him a female to be a help to him like himself; a help, indeed, for the conservation of the race after the transgression from age to age by generation. For the earliest formation is called ‘making’ and not ‘generation.’ For ‘making’ is the original formation at God’s hands, while ‘generation’ is the succession from each Other made necessary by the sentence of death imposed on us on account of the transgression.
This man He279 placed in Paradise, a home that was alike spiritual and sensible. For he lived in the body on the earth in the realm of sense, while he dwelt in the spirit among the angels, cultivating divine thoughts, and being supported by them: living in naked simplicity a life free from artificiality, and being led up through His creations to the one and only Creator, in Whose contemplation he found joy and gladness280 .
When therefore He had furnished his nature with free-will, He imposed a law on him, not to taste of the tree of knowledge. Concerning this tree, we have said as much as is necessary in the chapter about Paradise, at least as much as it was in our power to say. And with this command He gave the promise that, if he should preserve the dignity of the soul by giving the victory to reason, and acknowledging his Creator and observing His command, he should share eternal blessedness and live to all eternity, proving mightier than death: but if forsooth he should subject the soul to the body, and prefer the delights of the body, comparing himself in ignorance of his true dignity to the senseless beasts281 , and shaking off Iris Creator’s yoke, and neglecting His divine injunction, he will be liable to death and corruption, and will be compelled to labour throughout a miserable life. For it was no profit to man to obtain incorruption while still untried and unproved, lest he should fall into pride and under the judgment of the devil. For through his incorruption the devil, when he had fallen as the result of his own free choice, was firmly established in wickedness, so that there was no room for repentance and no hope of change: just as, moreover, the angels also, when they had made free choice of virtue became through grace immoveably rooted in goodness.
It was necessary, therefore, that man should first be put to the test (for man untried and unproved282 would be worth nothing283 ), and being made perfect by the trial through the observance of the command should thus receive incorruption as the prize of his virtue. For being intermediate between God and matter he was destined, if he kept the command, to be delivered from his natural relation to existing things and to be made one with God’s estate, and to be immoveably established in goodness, but, if he transgressed and inclined the rather to what was material, and tore his mind from the Author of his being, I mean God, his fate was to be corruption, and he was to become subject to passion instead of passionless, and mortal instead of immortal, and dependent on connection and unsettled generation. And in his desire for life he would cling to pleasures as though they were necessary to maintain it, and would fearlessly abhor those who sought to deprive him of these, and transfer his desire from God to matter, and his anger from the real enemy of his salvation to his own brethren. The envy of the284 devil then was the reason of man’s fall. For that same demon, so full of envy and with such a hatred of good, would not suffer us to enjoy the pleasures of heaven, when he himself was kept below on account of his arrogance, and hence the false one tempts miserable man with the hope of Godhead, and leading him up to as great a height of arrogance as himself, he hurls him down into a pit of destruction just as deep.
1 (Ps 90,2 Ps 90,
2 Hebr. 1,2.
3 Arist., De Coelo, bk. 1,text 100.
4 St. Mt 12,32; St. Lc 7,34.
5 Greg Naz., Orat. 44.
6 Basil, De Struct., hom. 2; Greg. Naz., Orat. 44.
7 Greg. Naz., Orat. 44.
8 aijwvnio", ‘eternal0’. but also ‘secular,0’ ‘aeonian,0’ ‘age-long.0’
9 Variant, kai; ajpevranton dhloi`. In Regg). aijw`no" is absent.
10 See his Contr. Cels., iv. Cf. Justin Martyr. Apol. i; Basil, Hex., hom. 3; Greg. Nyss., Orat. Catech. 26, &c
11 Greg., Naz., Orat. 38, 42; Dionys., De Qo Hier., ch. 4.
12 (Ps 104,4 Ps 104,
13 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38.
14 Nemes., ch. I.
15 Text, cavriti. R. 2930, kata; carin.
16 a[neu lojgou proforikou: without word of utterance.
17 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38.
18 Ibid. 34.
19 Text, ajxivoi". R. 2930, ajgivoi".
20 Theodoret, Epist. de div. decr., ch. 8.
21 ejn nohtoi`" kai; tovpoi". Cf. 1,17.
22 See Greg. Naz., Orat. 34. And cf). Cyril, Thesaur. 31, p. 266; Epiph., Haeres. 64.
23 Dionys., De Coel. Hier., ch. 3; Greg. Naz., Orat. 34.
24 Dionys., De Coel. Hier., ch. 9; Greg., Orat. 34.
25 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38.
26 Text, trofhn. Variant, trnfhvn, cf). Dionys., De Coel. Hier., ch. 7.
27 Dionys., De Coel. Hier., ch. 6.
28 But cf). August., Enchir., ch. 8; Greg. Naz., Orat. 34; Greg. Nyss, Contra Eunom., Orat. I; Chrysost., De incomprehens., hom. 3, &c.
29 See Epiph., Haeres. 6, n. 4 and 5; Basil, Hex. i; Chrysost., 2 Hom. in Gen.; Theodor., Qaest. 3 in Gen.
30 Greg. Naz., Orat. 2.
31 prwtostavth". Cf). Chrysost., Epist. ad Ephes., hom. 4, &c.
32 Text, ejdwrhvsato. R. 1986, ejcarivsato
33 See Iren., bk. 4,c. 48, &c.
34 Greg. Nyss., Orat. Catech., cp. 6.
35 (Gn 1,31 Gn 1,
36 See Greg. Naz., Orat. 19, 38; Chrysost., In S. Babyl. Or. 2; Basil, in Jesaiam, ch. I, &c.
37 Quaest. ad Antioch. 10.
38 (Jb 1,12 Jb 1,
39 St. Mc 5,13.
40 Vide lambl., De Myst., ch. II, sect. 4.
41 St. Mt 25,41.
42 Nemes., De Nat. Hom., ch. I.
43 (Ps 146,6 Ps 146,
44 Cf). Chrysost., In Genes., hom. 4; Basil, Hex. hom. 3, &c.
45 (Ps 115,16 Ps 115,
46 Ib. 148,4.
47 (2Co 12,2
48 (Gn 1,8 Gn 1,
49 Basil, Hom. I in Hexaemeron.
50 The Peripatetics. See Nemes., ch. 5.
51 Basil, Hom. 3, in Hexaemeron.
52 (Ps 104,2 Ps 104,
53 (Is 40,22 Is 40,
54 Chrysost., Hom.14 and 17, ad Hebr.
55 (Ps 148,5, 6.
56 Greg. Nyss. de opif. Hom.
57 (Gn 1,8 Gn 1,
58 (2Co 12,2 2Co 12,
59 (Ps 148,4 Ps 148,
60 Plato, Tim.
61 Basil Hom. I and 3, in Hexaemeron.
62 Just., quaest. 93.
63 (Ps 102,26 Ps 102,
64 Apoc, xxi I.
65 Cf). August., Retract. 2,2.
66 Basil, Hom. 13, in Hexaemeron.
67 (Ps xcvi. II.
68 Text, wj" tov. N). kai; to; ajnapalin.
69 (Ps 114,3 Ps 114,
70 Ibid. 5.
71 Ibid. 19,I.
72 Basil, Hom. I and 3, in Hexaemeron.
73 (Gn 1,3 Gn 1,
74 Text, ujper. Variant, ujpo, but this does not agree with the view of the author or the ancients.
75 (Gn 1,5 Gn 1,
76 Basil, Hom. 2, in Hexaemeron.
77 (Gn 1,5 Gn 1,
78 Basil, Hom. 2, in Hexaemeron.
79 Text, ejxousivan: variant). ejxousiva".
80 Variant here also, ejxousiva".
81 Basil, Hom. 6, in Hexaemeron.
82 Text, oj Dhmiourgov". Variant, oj dhmiorghvsa".
83 (Ps 8,3 Ps 8,
84 Basil, Hom. 6, in Hexaemeron.
85 Text, sugkrouvsew". Variants, sugkravsew" and sugkrivsew".
86 Basil, Hom. 6, in Hexaemeron.
87 Nemes., de Nat. Hom., ch. 34.
88 Text, poioumevnh. Variant, poiouvmenon.
89 Basil, Hom. 6, in Hexaemeron.
90 Text, qavnaton dhlou`nta basivlewn. Variant, qanavtwv basiv lewn: also qanaton, h] ajnavdeixin shmaivnousi basivlewi.
91 Basil, Christi Nativit.
92 (Rm 1,25 Rm 1,
93 Text, dianadoqh`nai: variants, diadoqh`nai and doqh`nai.
94 Sever. Gabal., De opif. mundi, III.
95 Ibid. De opif. mundi, III.
96 Nemes., ch. 5.
97 Vide Porph., de antro Nymph.
98 Text, div". R. 4 has deuvteron.
99 (Gn 1,2 Gn 1,
100 Sever. Gabal., Hom. I in Hexaem.
101 Nemes., De Nat. Hom. i., ch. 5.
102 These are absent in edit. Veron.
103 This paragraph is absent i almost all the copies.
104 (Gn 1 Gn 2
105 See Easil, Hexaem., Hom. 3.
106 Text, ujfhvplwtai. Variant, ejfhvplwtai.
107 Basil, Hom. 2 in Hexaem.; Sever. gaval., Orat. de opific. mundi.
108 (Gn 1 Gn 9
109 (Gn 1,10 Gn 1,
110 Test, sunhvcqhsan. R. 2927 has dievsthsan : Edit. Veron. Reg. 3362 has o[qen sunevsthsan : Colb. iI has ovqen sunevsth.
111 (Gn 2,10 Gn 2,
112 For potamo;" de; oj gluku; u[dwr e[cwn ejstiv, reading povtimon kai; gluku; u[dwr e[cwn.
113 Basil, Hom. 4 in Hexaem.
114 (Gn 1,2 Gn 1,
115 Sever. Gabal., Orat. 4, De opific. mundi: Basil, Hom. 8.
116 This chapter is wanting in certain copies, Reg. 7, Colb. I, R. 2930. In Cod. Hil. it is given after the chapter On Creation.
117 Vide Strab. bk. ii.
118 (Gn 1,I.
119 (Ps cxxxvi. 6.
120 (Jb 26,7 Jb 26,
121 (Ps lxxxv. 3.
122 Ibid. 24,2.
123 (Gn 1,2 Gn 1,
124 In this Jn does not follow Basil in his De Paradiso.
125 Basil, Hom. de Parad.
126 (Gn 3,I.
127 (Ps 49,12 Ps 49,
128 Basil, Hom. de Parad.
129 (Gn 1,22 Gn 1,
130 St. Mt 5,5.
131 Method, Cont. Orig. apud Epiph. Haeres. 64.
132 Only Cod. Reg. 3451 has this paragraph.
133 Greg. Nyss., De opif. Hom., ch. 2.
134 See the treatise of Anastas. II. Antiochen., on the Hexaemeron, bk. 7,
135 AEEdem, Edem, in the text). Basil, Hom de Parad.
136 See 2R 19,12; Isai. xxxvii. 12; Ez 27,23.
137 See Chrysost., In Gen). Hom. 16, Theodor., Quaest. 27, &c.
138 (Gn 2,9 Gn 2,
139 Text, rh;n e[fesin licnote;roi". Variant rh;n ai[sqhsin, &c.
140 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42: Method., ap Epiph). Haeres. 64.
141 (Gn 2,25 Gn 2,
142 (Ps lv. 22.
143 St. Mt 6,25.
144 Ibid. 33.
145 St. Lc 10,41, 42.
146 Nemes., de Nat. Hom., ch. I.
147 (Gn 2,16 Gn 2,
148 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42.
149 (Rm 1,20 Rm 1,
150 (Ps 139,6 Ps 139,
151 eqaumastwvqh hj gnw`siv" sou ejx ejmo`, toutejstin, ejk th`" ejmh`" katoskeuh`". Basil, Gregory Naz., Anastasius II., Antiochenus and ohters render it so , following the LXX. version, and not the Hebrew text.
152 Maxim., in Script. p. 10.
153 (Gn 2,16 Gn 2,
154 Ibid. 17.
155 th;n nohth;n oujsivan rational being
156 thn aisqhthvn; material being, being perceptible by sense.
157 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42.
158 (Rm 9,21 Rm 9,
159 Yuch;n logikhvn.
160 Cf). Chrysostom, Hom. in Gn 9; Anastasius, Hom. in Hex. 7; Clem. Alex., Strom. II.; Basil, Hom. de hom. Struct. I; Greg. Nyss., De opif. hom., ch. 16; Iren., Haer. 5,8, &c.
161 Cf). Greg. Naz., Orat. 31; Jerome, Epist. 82; August., De Genesi, 10,28, &c.
162 ejn mikrw` mevgan, is read in Nazianz. Hom. 38 and 42: so also in Nicetas, who says that ‘the world is small in comparison with man, for whose sake all was made.0’ But Combefis emended it.
163 The text read, tw` megevqei filotimouvmenosAE to; de; i[na pavscwn ujpomimnhvskhtai, kai; paideuvhtai zw`on. On the basis of varios manuscripts and the works of Gregory of Nazianzum, it is corrected so—i[na pavsch, kai; pavscwn, ujpommimnhvskhtai, kai; paideuvh tai tw` megevqei filotimouvmenon.
164 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42.
165 Reading, oujc wj" enj th` fuvsei, for ajllj oujk ejn th fuvsei.
166 Athan. llib. de inob. contr. Apoll.
167 The Fathers objected to Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the ejntelevceia prwvth swvmato" fusikou` ojrganikou` taking it to imply that the soul had no independent existence but was dissolved with the body. Cicero explains it otherwise, Tusc. Quaest., bk. I.
168 Maxim., opus de Anima.
169 Supplying the words, tw` u[dati, yucro;n ga;r kai; ujgrovnAE ai|ma, ajnalogou`.
170 tomh;, kai; pjeu`si". kai; metabolhv.
171 Nemes., ae Nat. Hom., ch. I.
172 Or, breath, pneu`ma.
173 Nemes., ae Nat. Hom., ch. I.
174 paqhtiko;n kai; ojrektikovn.
175 hj kaqAE ojrmh;n kivnhsi".
176 The following three paragraphs, as found in manuscripts and the old translation, are placed at the end of ch. 32, “Concerning Anger,” but do not suit the context there.
177 Supplying the word futikovn from Nemesius.
178 Nemes., ch. 23.
179 Reading, oujk a]n eu[roi ti" ijdiva" hjdonav".
180 Nemes., ch. 18: Chrys., Hom. in Joan., 74.
181 See Chrysostom, Hom. in Joannem, 74; Cicero, De fin. bon. et mal., I.
182 kalav", honourable, good.
183 Text, cwrouvsa". Variant, paracwrouvsa".
186 o[kno", dread.
188 Nemesius and certain manuscripts give these species of fear in a different order, viz., dread, consternation, panic, anxiety, shame, disgrace.
189 zevdi", boiling.
190 tou` peri; kardivan ai[mato", the blood about the heart.
191 Nemes., ch. 21.
193 Or, presented.
194 See Aristotle, De anima, III. c.7.
195 Nemes., ch. 71.
196 Nemes., ch. 9.
197 Ibid., ch. 8.
198 xhrovn is added in some mss. but wrongly: for it is what is percived by touch alone that is here spoken of, whereas, below, we are told that dryness is recognised also by sight; so also in Nemesius.
199 Nemes., ch. II.
200 Greg. Nyss., De opif. Hom., ch. 13.
201 Text, ai[tion. R. 2930, ajggei`on.
203 kai; nohvsew" is wanting in some mss., nor is it found in Nemesius, who borrowed his description from Origen.
204 Text, swthriva. Variant, swreiva, a heaping up, “coacervatio.” Faber has “confirmatio,” which is nearer swthriva, conservatio, which is found in Nemesius, &c.
205 Nemes., ch. 13.
206 to; fantastikovn, the faculty of fantasy.
207 Cf. 1Co 1,10.
208 Max. ad Marin. et ad Incert. p.98.
209 to; boulhtovn.
210 Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. I ad Marin.
211 Thomas Aquinas (I—2, Quaest. 4, a. I and 2) lays down the position in accordance with Jn of Damascus, that there is no “counsel” in God quatenus est appetitus inquisitivus, but that there is quantum ad certitudinem judicii. Basil (Hexaem. Hom. I), arguing against the ancient philosophers who taught that the world was made ajproairevtw", affirms “counsel” in God in the latter sense.
212 Max., Epist. I ad Marin.
213 Text, oJ de; Qeo;" pavnta eijdw;" aJplw`", ouj bouleuvetai. Various reading is, oJ de; Qeo;" pavnta aiJdw;" aJplw`" bouvletai.
214 Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.
215 dio; oujde; gnwmiko;n ei\ce qe;lhma.
217 u. infr., lib. 3,ch. 14.
218 Or, personalities.
219 Text, qelhtovn, as given by Faber. Variant, qelhtikovn.
220 to; gnwmiko;n qevlhma, the will of individual opinion, or, the dispositional will.
221 Or, acting by opinion, or disposition.
222 Anast. Sin. in Odhg., from Greg. Nyss., p. 44; Clem. Alex. ap. Max., p. 151
223 The Greek ejnergeiva being a term with a large connotation is explained as meaning in different cases operation (operatio), action (actio), and act (actus). Nemesius defines actio a operatio rationalis, actus as perfectio potentiae.
224 Cf). Anast. Sin. in [Odhgov", p 43; (Jn of Dam., Dialect. c. 30; Greg. Nyss., in Maximus, II., p. 155.
225 pravxei". So pra`xi" is defined as ejnergeia logikhv in the following chapter.
226 ta; pavqh. Cf). Instit. Elem., c. 9; Greg. Nyss., Cont. Eunom., 5, p. 170.
227 Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.
228 Greg. Nyss. ap. Max., p. 155.
229 Cf). Greg. Nyss., in Maxim.; Nemes., ch. 29.
230 Nemes., ch. 30.
231 Ibid., ch. 31.
232 Ibid., ch. 32.
233 Ibid., ch. 30.
234 Nemes., ch. 33.
235 rou` aujtexousivou. See also III. 34.
236 Nemes., ch. 39.
237 Text, tafron. Variant, ravfon.
238 Text, pravxew"). mss. pravxewn, as in Nemesius.
239 peri; tw`n ginomevnwn.
240 Nemes., ch. 40.
241 ta;yucika; pavnta.
242 Nemes., ch. 37.
243 This is supplied by Combefis from Nemesius.
244 Nemes., ch. 41.
245 This sentence is omitted in Basil and some mss.
246 Nemesius speaks of this at greater length.
247 (Sg 1,13 Sg 1,
248 Nemes., ch. 43.
249 Ibid., ch. 42.
250 (Ps cxxxv. 6.
251 (Rm 9,19 Rm 9,
252 Nemes., ch. 44.
253 The words pavnta ejpainei`n are wanting in Cod. R. 2 and in Nemes., ch. 44.
254 kat J eujdokivan.
255 kata; sugcwvrhsin.
256 There is a hiatus here in Edit. Vernon. and in Cod. R. 2927. Various readings are found in other mss., some with no ssense and ohters evidently supplied by librarians. It is best supplied from Nemesius, ch. 44, th`" de; sugcwrh;sew` polla; ei[dh, “but there are many forms of concession.”
257 Nemes, ch. 44.
258 (Jb 1,II.
259 (2Co 2,7 2Co 2,
260 Nemes., ch. 44.
261 St. Lc 16,19.
262 St. Jn 9,I.
263 Nemes., ch. 37.
264 Cf). Nemes., c. 27; also Cicero’s statement on Providence in the Academ. Quest.
265 See the reference in Migne.
266 St. Mt 26,24.
267 See Chrysostom, Hom. I, in Epist. ad. Ephes., and Hom. 18, in Epist. ad Hebraeos.
268 1Tm 2,4.
269 These words are wanting in two mss.
270 This last sentence is absent in one Codex.
271 St. Mt 8,30 seqq.
272 Chrys., Hom. 12 in Epist. ad. Ephes.
273 Cf). Maximus, Vita, n. 8; Just. Martyr, Apol. I; Tatian, Or. ad. ad Graecos; Prigen, Ep. ad Rom. I; Jerome, on Exek. c. xxiv., &c.
274 Act. S. Max.
275 Cf). Clem. Alex., Strom., bk. vi.; Jerome, on Ep. ad Gal., ch. I; Greg. Naz, Carmen de virt. hum.
276 Cf). Clem. Alex., Quis dives salvetar; Greg. Naz., Orat. 31; Chrysost., Hom. 45 in Joann., Hom. in Ep. ad Hebr. 12,2, Hom. 15 in Ep. ad Rom.; Cyril, De ador. in Spir. et ver., p. 25; Petavius, Dogm., vol. i., bk. 9,c. 4, &c.
277 Cf). ingra,bk. 3,ch. 14.
278 oj prognwvsth" Qeov". See Athanas., in Psalm I; Chrysost. in Hom. 18 in Gen.; Greg. Nyss., De opif. hom.; Athanas., Minor, Quest. 50 ad Antioch.; Thomas Aquinas I., Quaest. 98, Art. 2.
279 Greg. Nyss., De opif., ch. 20.
280 Text, eujfrainovmeno". Variant , semnunovmeno".
281 (Ps 49,12 Ps 49,
282 ajdokimo"; in Cod. R.2 ajdokivmaston.
283 This paranthesis is absent in almost all codices and in the translations of Faber, &c.
284 Cf). Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42; Cyril Alex., Cont. Anthrop., I. 8; Anast. II Antioch., Hexaem. vi; Chrysost., Hom. 10 in Ep. ad Rom., Hom. 5 in Ep. ad Epes., &c.BOOK III.
Damascus Orthodox faith 225