Denzinger EN 3358
[Condemned in a Decree of the Holy Office, 14th of Dec., 1887]
3201 Dz 1891 1. In the order of created things there is immediately manifested to the human intellect something of the divine in its very self, namely, such as pertains to divine nature.
3202 Dz 1892 2. When we speak of the divine in nature, we do not use that word divine to signify a nondivine effect of a divine cause; nor, is it our mind to speak of a certain thing as divine because it is such through participation.
3203 Dz 1893 3. In the nature of the universe then, that is in the intelligences that are in it, there is something to which the term of divine not in a figurative but in a real sense is fitting.--The actuality is not distinct from the rest of divine actuality.
3204 Dz 1894 4. Indeterminate being, which without doubt is known to all intelligences, is that divine thing which is manifest to man in nature.
3205 Dz 1895 5. Being, which man observes, must be something of the necessary and eternal being, the creating cause, the determining and final cause of all contingent beings; and this is God.
3206 Dz 1896 6. In the being which prescinds from creatures and from God, which is indeterminate being, and in God, not indeterminate but absolute being, the essence is the same.
3207 Dz 1897 7. The indeterminate being of intuition, initial being, is something of the Word, which the mind of the Father distinguishes, not really, but according to reason from the Word.
3208 Dz 1898 8. Finite beings, of which the world is composed, result from two elements, that is, from the real finite terminus and from the initial being' which contributes the form of being to the same terminus.
3209 Dz 1899 9. Being, the object of intuition, is the initial act of all beings. Initial being is the beginning both of the knowable and the subsisting; it is likewise the beginning of God, according as He is conceived by us, and of creatures.
3210 Dz 1900 10. Virtual and limitless being is the first and most simple of all entities, so that any other entity is composite, and among its components is always and necessarily virtual being.--It is the essential part of absolutely all entities, according as they are divided by reason.
3211 Dz 1901 11. The quiddity (that which a thing is) of a finite being does not consist of that which it has of the positive, but of its limits. The quiddity of an infinite being consists of its entity, and is positive; but the quiddity of a finite being consists of the limits of its entity, and is negative.
3212 Dz 1902 12. There is no finite reality, but God causes it to exist by adding limitation to infinite reality.--Initial being becomes the essence of every real being.-- Being which actuates finite natures, and is joined with them, is cut off by God.
3213 Dz 1903 13. The difference between absolute being and relative being is not that which intervenes between substance and substance, but something much greater; for one is being absolutely, the other nonbeing absolutely, and this other is being relatively. But when relative being is posited, being absolutely is not multiplied; hence, absolute and relative (being) absolutely are not one substance, but one being; and in this sense no diversity is being, rather oneness is held as being.
3214 Dz 1904 14. By divine abstraction initial being is produced, the first element of finite beings; but by divine imagination the finite real (being) or all realities are produced, of which the world consists.
3215 Dz 1905 15. The third operation of absolute being creating the world is divine synthesis, that is the union of two elements, which are initial being, the common beginning of all finite beings, and finite reality, or rather different finite realities, the different ends of the same initial being. By this union finite beings are created.
3216 Dz 1906 16. Initial being through divine synthesis referred by intelligence, not as an intelligible but merely as essence, to the real finite ends, causes the finite beings to exist subjectively and really.
3217 Dz 1907 17. This alone God effects by creating, that He posits the entire act wholly as the being of creatures; this act then is properly not made but posited.
3218 Dz 1908 18. The love, by which God loves Himself even in creatures, and which is the reason why He determines Himself to create, constitutes a moral necessity, which in the most perfect being always induces the effect; for such necessity in many imperfect beings only leaves the whole freedom bilateral.
3219 Dz 1909 19 The Word is that unseen material, from which, as it is said in (Sg 11,18), all things of the universe were created.
3220 Dz 1910 20. It is not inconsistent that the human soul, in order that it may be multiplied by human generation, may thus be conceived, proceed from the imperfect, namely from the sensitive grade, to the perfect, namely to the intellectual grade.
3221 Dz 1911 21. When being is capable of being intued by the sensitive principle, by this influence alone, by this union with itself, only sensing this first, but now, at the same time understanding, it is brought to a more noble state, it changes its nature, and becomes understanding, subsisting, and immortal.
3222 Dz 1912 22. It is not impossible to think that it can become a divine power, so that the intellectual soul is separated from the animate body, and it itself (being) still remains soulful; surely there would remain in it, as the basis of the purely soulful, the soulful principle, which before was in it as an appendage.
3223 Dz 1913 23. The soul of the deceased exists in a natural state, as if it did not exist; since it cannot exercise any reflection upon itself, or have any consciousness of itself, its condition can be said to be like the state of the perpetual shades and eternal sleep.
3224 Dz 1914 24. The substantial form of the body is rather the effect of the soul and the interior terminus of the operation itself; therefore, the substantial form of the body is not the soul itself.--The union of the soul and the body properly consists in immanent perception, by which the subject viewing the idea, affirms the sensible, after it has viewed its essence in this (idea).
3225 Dz 1915 25. When the mystery of the Most Blessed Trinity has been revealed, its existence can be demonstrated by merely speculative arguments, negative indeed, and indirect; yet such that through them the truth is brought to philosophic studies, and the proposition becomes scientific like the rest; for if it were denied, the theosophic doctrine of pure reason would not only remain incomplete, but would also be annihilated, teeming with absurdities on every side.
3226 Dz 1916 26. If the three highest forms of being, namely, subjectivity, objec- tivity, sanctity; or, reality, ideality, and morality, are transferred to absolute being, they cannot be conceived otherwise than as subsisting and living persons.--The Word, insofar as it is the loved object, and insofar as it is the Word, that is the object subsisting in itself, known by itself, is the person of the Holy Spirit.
3227 Dz 1917 27. In the humanity of Christ the human will was so taken up by the Holy Spirit in order to cling to objective Being, that is to the Word, that it (the will) gave over the rule of man wholly to Him, and assumed the Word personally, thus uniting with itself human nature. Hence, the human will ceased to be personal in man, and, although person is in other men, it remained nature in Christ.
3228 Dz 1918 28. In Christian doctrine, the Word, the sign and configuration of God, is impressed on the souls of those who receive the baptism of Christ with faith.--The Word, that is the sign, impressed on the soul in Christian doctrine, is real Being (infinite) manifest by itself, which we thereupon recognize to be the second person of the Most Blessed Trinity.
3229 Dz 1919 29. We think that the following conjecture is by no means at variance with Catholic doctrine, which alone is truth: In the Eucharistic sacrament the substance of bread and wine becomes the true flesh and true blood of Christ, when Christ makes it the terminus of His sentient principle, and vivifies it with His life; almost in that way by which bread and wine truly are transubstantiated into our flesh and blood, because they become the terminus of our sentient principle.
3230 Dz 1920 30. When transubstantiation has been accomplished, it can be understood that to the glorious body of Christ some part is added, incorporated in it, undivided, and equally glorious.
3231 Dz 1921 31. In the sacrament of the Eucharist by the power of words the body and blood of Christ are present only in that measure which corresponds (a quel tanto) to the substance of the bread and wine, which are transubstantiated; the rest of the body of Christ is there through concomitance.
3232 Dz 1922 32. Since he who does not eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink of His blood, does not have life in him (cf. Jn 6,54), and nevertheless those who die with the baptism of water, of blood, or of desire, certainly attain eternal life, it must be said that these who have not eaten of the body and blood of Christ, are administered this heavenly food in the future life, at the very moment of death.--Hence, also to the saints of the Old Testament Christ was able by descending into hell to communicate Himself under the appearances of bread and wine, in order to make them ready for the vision of God.
3233 Dz 1923 33. Since the demons possessed the fruit, they thought that they would enter into man, if he should eat of it; for, when the food was turned into the animated body of man, they themselves were able freely to enter the animality, i.e., into the subjective life of this being, and so to dispose of it as they had proposed.
3234 Dz 1924 34. To preserve the Blessed Virgin Mary from the taint of origin, it was enough for the slightest seed in man to remain uncorrupted, neglected perchance by the demon himself, from which uncorrupted seed transfused from generation to generation the Virgin Mary might arise in her time.
3235 Dz 1925 35. The more the order of justification in man is considered, the more appropriate appears the Scriptural way of saying that God covers and does not reckon certain sins. -- According to the Psalmist (cf. Ps 31,1) there is a difference between iniquities which are forgiven, and sins which arc covered; the former, as it seems, are actual and willing faults; but the latter are willing sins on the part of those who pertain to the people of God; to whom on this account they bring no harm.
3236 Dz 1926 36. The supernatural order is established by the manifestation of being in the fullness of its real form; the effect of this communication or manifestation is a deiform sense, which begun in this life establishes the light of faith and of grace; completed in the other life establishes the light of glory.
3237 Dz 1927 37. The first light rendering the soul intelligent is ideal being; the other first light is also being, not merely ideal, but subsisting and living; that concealing its personality shows only its objectivity; but he who sees the other (which is the Word), even through a reflection or in enigma, sees God.
3238 Dz 1928 38. God is the object of the beatific vision, insofar as He is the author of works outwardly.
3239 Dz 1929 39. The traces of wisdom and goodness which shine out in creatures are necessary for possessors (of God); for they are collected in the eternal exemplar as that part of Him which can be seen by them (creatures), and they furnish material for the praises which the Blessed sing forever to God.
3240 Dz 1930 40. Since God cannot, not even by the light of glory, communicate Himself wholly to finite beings, He was not able to reveal and communicate His essence to possessors (of God), except in that way which is accommodated to finite intelligences; that is, God manifests Himself to them, insofar as He has relations with them, as their creator, provider, redeemer, sanctifier.
3241 1930a The judgment: The Holy Office "has decided that these propositions, in the author's own sense, are to be disproved and proscribed, according as it does disprove, condemn, and proscribe by this general decree. . . . His Holiness has approved, confirmed, and ordered that the decree of the Most Eminent Fathers be observed by all."
[From the Encyclical, "Libertas, praestantissimum," 20th of June, 1888]
Dz 1931 [Finally] many do not approve the separation of Church and state but yet think that the Church ought to yield to the times, and adapt and accommodate herself to what the prudence of the day in administering governments demands. The opinion of these is good, if this is understood of some equitable plan which can be consistent with truth and justice, namely, such that the Church, exploring the hope of some great good, would show herself indulgent and bestow upon the times that which she can, while preserving the sanctity of her office.--But this is not so in matters and doctrines which a change of morals and a fallacious judgment have unlawfully introduced . . .
3252 Dz 1932 And so from what has been said it follows that it is by no means lawful to demand, to defend, and to grant indiscriminate freedom of thought, writing, teaching, and likewise of belief, as if so many rights which nature has given to man. For if nature had truly given these, it would be right to reject God's power, and human liberty could be restrained by no law.--Similarly it follows that these kinds of freedom can indeed be tolerated, if there are just reasons, yet with definite moderation, lest they degenerate into caprice and indulgence.
3253 Dz 1933 Whenever domination presses or impends such as to hold the state in subjection by an unjust force, or to force the Church to lack due freedom, it is right to seek some tempering of the government in which it is permitted to act with freedom; for in this case that immoderate and vicious freedom is not demanded, but some relief is sought for the good of all, and this only is a concern, that, where license for evil deeds is granted, there opportunity for doing right be not impeded.
3254 Dz 1934 And furthermore it is not of itself contrary to one's duty to prefer a form of government regulated by the popular class, provided Catholic doctrine as to the origin and administration of public power be maintained. Of the various kinds of government, the Church indeed rejects none, provided they are suited of themselves to care for the welfare of citizens; but she wishes, what nature clearly demands likewise, that each be constituted without injury to anyone, and especially with the preservation of the rights of the Church.
Dz 1935 To engage in the affairs of public administration is honorable, unless somewhere because of a special condition of circumstances and the times it be deemed best otherwise; the Church by all means approves of every one contributing his services to the common interest, and, insofar as everyone can, guarding, preserving, and advancing the state.
3255 Dz 1936 Nor does the Church condemn this: to seek to free one's people from serving a foreign or despotic power, provided it can be done while preserving justice. Finally she does not censure those who wish to have their government live according to its own laws; and their fellow citizens enjoy all possible means for increasing prosperity. The Church has always been a supporter of civic liberties without intemperance, and to this the Italian states especially attest; witness the prosperity, wealth, and glory of their name obtained by municipal law, at a time when the salutary power of the Church had spread to all parts of the state without any opposition.
[From the Encyclical, "Sapientiae christianae," January 10, 1890]
1936a It cannot be doubted that in daily life the duties of Catholics are more numerous and more serious than those of such as are either little aware of the Catholic faith or entirely inexperienced in it. . . . The man who has embraced the Christian faith as he ought, by that very fact is subject to the Church as if born of her, and becomes a participant in her worldwide and most holy society, which it is the proper duty of the Roman Pontiff to rule with supreme power, under the invisible head, Jesus Christ.--Now indeed, if we are bidden by the law of nature especially to love and protect the land in which we were brought forth and raised into this light, so that the good citizen does not hesitate even to encounter death for the fatherland, it is a far greater duty for Christians ever to be affected in similar wise toward the Church. For the Church is the holy land of the living God, born of God himself, and established by the same Author, who indeed is on a pilgrimage in the land; calling men, and training and leading them to eternal happiness in heaven. Therefore, the fatherland must be loved, from which we receive the enjoyment of mortal life; but we must love the Church more to whom we owe the love of the soul which will last forever, because it is right to hold the blessings of the spirit above the blessings of the body, and the duties toward God are much more sacred than those toward man.
1936b But, if we wish to judge rightly, the supernatural love of the Church and the natural love of the fatherland are twin loves coming from the same eternal principle, since God himself is the author and the cause of both; therefore, it follows that one duty cannot be in conflict with the other. . . . Nevertheless, the order of these duties, either because of the troubles of the times or the more perverse will of men, is sometimes destroyed. Instances, to be sure, occur when the state seems to demand one thing from men as citizens, and religion another from men as Christians; and this, clearly, for no other reason than that the rulers of the state either hold the sacred power of the Church as of no account, or wish it to be subject to them. . . . If the laws of the state are openly at variance with divine right, if they impose any injury upon the Church, or oppose those duties which are of religion, or violate the authority of Jesus Christ in the Supreme Pontiff, then indeed to resist is a duty, to obey a crime; and this is bound with injury to the state itself, since whatever is an offense in religion is a sin against the state.
[From the same Encyclical]
1936c And there is no reason for anyone to object that Jesus Christ, the guardian and champion of the Church, by no means needs the help of men. For, not because of any lack of strength, but because of the magnitude of His goodness does He wish that some effort be contributed by us toward obtaining and acquiring the fruits of the salvation which He Himself has procured.
The most important features of this duty are: to profess Catholic doctrine openly and firmly, and to propagate it as much as each one can. . . . Surely the duty of preaching, that is of teaching, belongs by divine right to the masters whom "the Holy Ghost hath placed as bishops to rule the Church of God" (cf. Ac 20,28), and especially to the Roman Pontiff, vicar of Jesus Christ, placed with supreme power over the whole Church, the master of all that is to be believed and to be practiced. Nevertheless, let no one think that private persons are prohibited from taking any active part in teaching, especially those to whom God has granted the ability of mind with a zeal for meritorious service. These, as often as circumstances demand, can well take upon themselves the role not indeed of teacher, but they can impart to others what they themselves have received, resounding like an echo with the voice of their masters. Indeed, this work of the private person has seemed to the Fathers of the Vatican Council to be so opportune and fruitful that they have decided furthermore to invite it: "Let all the faithful of Christ contribute their efforts" [See n. 1819].--Moreover, let everyone remember that he can and ought to sow the Catholic faith by the authority of his example, and to preach it by continual profession.--In the duties, then, that bind us to God and to the Church, this especially-should be numbered, that the industry of everyone should be exercised, insofar as possible, in propagating Christian truth and in repelling errors.
[From the Response of the Holy Office, May 8th, 1887; and July 30, 1890]
3198 Dz 1937 Two remedies are proposed by the Bishop of Carcassum to guard against the danger of the spoiling of wine:
1. Let a small quantity of eau de vie be added to the natural wine.
2. Let the wine be boiled to the extent of sixty-five degrees.
To the question whether these remedies are lawful in the case of wine: for the sacrifice of the Mass, and which is to be preferred,
The answer is:
The wine is to be preferred as is set forth in the second place.
3264 Dz 1938 The Bishop of Marseilles explains and asks:
In many parts of France, especially in those located toward the south, the white wine which does service at the bloodless sacrifice of the Mass is so weak and impotent that it cannot be kept for long, unless a quantity of the spirit of wine (spirits of alcohol) is mixed with the same.
1. Is a mixture of this kind lawful?
2. And if so, what quantity of such extraneous matter may be added to the wine?
3. In case of an affirmative answer, is it required to extract the spirit of wine from pure wine or from the fruit of the vine?
The answer is:
Provided that the spirit (alcohol) has been extracted from the fruit of the vine, and the quantity of alcohol added to that which the wine in question naturally contains does not exceed a proportion of twelve percent, and the mixture is made when the wine is very new, there is no objection to this wine being used in the sacrifice of the Mass.*
[From the Encyclical, "Rerum novarum," May 15, 1891]
1938a The right to possess private property as one's own is granted man by nature. . . . Nor is there any reason why the providence of the state should be introduced; for man is older than the state, and therefore he should have had by nature, before any state had come into existence, the right to care for life and body. . . . For those things which are required to preserve life, and especially to make life complete, the earth, to be sure, pours forth in great abundance; but it could not pour it from itself with out its cultivation and care by man. Now, when a man applies the activity of his mind and the strength of his body to procuring the goods of nature, by this very act he attaches to himself that part of corporeal nature which he has cultivated, on which he leaves impressed a kind of form as it were, of his personality; so that it should by all means be right for him to possess this part as his own; and by no means should anyone be permitted to violate this right of his.--So obvious is the force of these arguments that it seems amazing that certain ones who would restore obsolete opinions should disagree with them; these, to be sure, concede to the private person the use of the soil and the various fruits of estates, but they deny openly that it is right that either the soil on which he has built, or the estate which he has cultivated be owned by him. . . .
Indeed, rights of this kind which belong to men individually are understood to be much stronger, if they are looked upon as appropriate to and connected with his duties in domestic and social life. . . . This right of property, then, which we have demonstrated to have been assigned to an individual person by nature, through which he is the head of the family, ought to be transferred to man; rather, that right is so much the stronger, as the human person embraces more responsibilities in domestic and social society. The most holy law of nature is that the father of a family provide with training and livelihood all whom he has begotten; and, likewise, it is deduced from nature herself that he seek to acquire and prepare for his children, who bear and continue in a way the father's personality, that by which they can honorably protect themselves from a wretched fate in this uncertain course of life. But this he cannot effect in any way other than by the possession of lucrative property to transmit by inheritance to his children. . . . To wish, therefore, that the civil government at its own option penetrate even to the intimate affairs of the home is a great and pernicious error. . . . The power of the father is such that it can neither be destroyed nor absorbed by the state. . . . Therefore, when the alleviation of the masses is sought, let this be enduring, that it must be held as fundamental that private property is to be inviolable.
1938b The just possession of money is distinguished from the just use of money. To possess goods privately, as we have seen above, is a natural right of man; and to exercise this right, especially in the society of life, is not only lawful but clearly necessary. . . . But, if indeed this is asked, of what nature must the use of goods be, the Church answers without hesitation: As far as this is concerned, man ought not to hold his exterior possessions as his own, but as common, so that one may easily share them in the need of others. Therefore, the Apostle says: "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate" (1Tm 6,17 f.). * No one, certainly, is ordered to give assistance to others from that which pertains to his own use and that of the members of his family; nor also to give over to others what he himself needs to preserve what befits his person, and what is proper. . . . But when sufficient care has been given to necessity and decorum, it is a duty to assist the indigent from what remains: "That which remaineth, give alms," (Lc 11,41). These are not duties of justice, except in extreme cases, but of Christian charity, which of course it is not right to seek by legal action. But the law and judgment of Christ are above the laws and judgments of men, and He in many ways urges the practice of almsgiving . . . and He will judge a kindness conferred upon or denied to the poor as conferred upon or denied to Himself (cf. Mt 25,34 f.).
1938c Labor by nature has, as it were, placed two marks upon man, namely, that it is personal, because the driving force inheres in the person and is entirely his own by whom it is exercised, and comes into being for his advantage; then, that it is necessary, for this reason, because the fruit of labor is needed by man to guard life; moreover, the nature of things bids (us) to guard life, and especially must we obey nature. Now, if labor is considered only from this viewpoint, that it is personal, there is no doubt but that it is sound for the worker to prescribe a smaller rate of pay; for just as he offers his services of his free will, so, too, of his free will he can be content with a slight pay for his services, or even no pay at all. But the case is to be judged much differently, if with the reason of personality is joined the reason of necessity, separable from the former, to be sure, in theory, not in fact. Actually to continue in life is the common duty of every individual, for whom to lack this persistence is a crime. Therefore, the right to discover that by which life is sustained is born of necessity, and the means to obtain this is supplied to all the poor only by the pay for his labor which is in demand. So, granted that the workman and employer freely agree on the contract, as well as specifically on the rate of pay, yet there is always underlying this something from natural justice, and this greater and more ancient than the will of those who make the contract, namely, that the pay must by no means be inadequate to support the worker, who indeed is frugal and of good character. But if the worker, forced by necessity, or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts the harder condition, which, even if he does not wish it, must be accepted because it is imposed by the employer or the contractor, this certainly is to submit to force, against which justice cries out. . . . If the worker obtains sufficient pay, so as by it to be able to sustain himself, wife, and children comfortably, he will without difficulty apply himself to thrift, if he is wise, and he will bring it about, as nature herself seems to urge, that, after expenses are deducted, some be left over whereby he may attain a moderate estate. For we have seen that the case which is being discussed cannot be solved by effective reasoning except by this assumption and principle: that the right to private property must be held sacred. . . Nevertheless, these benefits cannot be attained except by the enormity of contributions and taxes. For, since the right to possess private property is granted not by the laws of man but by nature, the authority of the state cannot abolish it, but only temper its practice, and order it to the common good. Therefore, it would act unjustly and inhumanely, if it should detract from private property more than is just, under the name of taxes. . . .
1938d It is comforting to observe that societies of this kind are being formed generally, either composed entirely of workers, or from both classes; moreover, it is to be desired that they grow in number and in effective influence. . . . For, it is permitted man by the right of nature to enter private societies; moreover, the state is established for the protection of natural right, not for its destruction; and so, if it forbids the formation of associations of citizens, it clearly acts at odds with itself, since it itself, as well as private associations, come into existence from a single principle, that men are by nature social.--Occasions sometimes arise when it is just for laws to forbid such societies, namely, if they deliberately aim at something which is clearly at variance with probity, justice, and the welfare of the state. *
From the Letter, 'Pastoralis Officii," to the Bishops of Germany and Austria, Sept. 12, 1891]
3272 Dz 1939 The two divine laws, that which is promulgated by the light of natural reason, and that by letters written under divine inspiration, strictly forbid the killing or wounding of anyone outside a public cause, unless forced by necessity to defend his own safety. But those who provoke to a private struggle, or accept a challenge do this; they lend their minds and their strength to this, although bound by no necessity, to take the life, or at least to inflict a wound on an adversary. Furthermore, the two divine laws forbid anyone rashly casting aside his own life, subjecting it to grave and manifest danger, when no reason of duty, or of magnanimous charity urges it; but this blind rashness, contemner of life, is clearly in the nature of a duel. Therefore, it can be obscure and doubtful to no one that upon those who engage in individual combat privately, fall both crimes, that of another's destruction, and of voluntarily endangering his own life. Finally, there is scarcely any affliction which is more at variance with the good order of civil life, than the license permitted a citizen to be his own individual defender of the law by private force, and the avenger of honor which he thinks has been violated.
3273 Dz 1940 Nor do those who accept combat when it is offered have fear as a just excuse, because they dread to be held cowards in public if they decline battle. For, if the duties of men were to be measured by the false opinions of the public, there would be no natural and true distinction according to an eternal norm of right and justice between honest actions and shameful deeds. Even the pagan philosophers knew and taught that the false judgments of the public are to be spurned by a strong and stable man. Rather is the fear just and sacred, which turns a man away from unjust slaughter, and makes him sollicitous of his own safety and that of his brothers. Surely, he who spurns the valid judgments of the public, who prefers to undergo the scourges of contumely than to abandon duty in any matter, this man, surely, is of a far greater and higher mind than he who when annoyed by an injury rushes to arms. Yes, indeed, if there is a desire for right judgment, he is the one in whom stout fortitude shines, that fortitude, I say, which is truly called a virtue and whose companion is glory, not counterfeited and not false. For virtue consists in a good in accord with reason, and all glory is foolish except that which depends on the judgment of God who approves.
Denzinger EN 3358