De veritate EN


THE 29 QUESTIONS ON TRUTH

ST THOMAS AQUINAS


1
Translated from the definitive Leonine text

By Robert W. Mulligan S.J

1952




QUESTION ONE: Truth





ARTICLE 1: WHAT IS TRUTH?



Difficulties:

It seems that the true is exactly the same as being, for

1. Augustine says: "The true is that which is." But that which is, is simply being. The true, therefore, means exactly the same as being.

2. It was said in reply that the true and being are the same materially but differ formally.—On the contrary the nature of a thing is signified by its definition; and the definition of the true, according to Augustine, is "that which is" He rejects all other definitions. Now, since the true and being are materially the same, it seems that they are also formally the same.

3. Things which differ conceptually are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other. For this reason, Boethius says that the existence of God can be understood if for a moment we mentally separate His goodness from His existence. Being, however, can in no way be understood apart from the true, for being is known only in so far as it is true. Therefore, the true and being do not differ conceptually.

4. If the true is not the same as being, it must be a state of being. But it cannot be a state of being. It is not a state that entirely corrupts— otherwise, this would follow: "It is true. Therefore, it is non-being"— as it follows when we say: "This man is dead. Therefore, this is not a man."

Similarly, the true is not a state that limits. If it were, one could not say: "It is true. Therefore it is." For one cannot say that a thing is white simply because it has white teeth. Finally, the true is not a state which contracts or specifies being, for it is convertible will being. It follows, therefore, that the true and being are entirely the same.

5. Things in the same state are the same. But the true and being are in the same state. Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle writes: "The state of a thing in its act of existence is the same as its state in truth." Therefore, the true and being are entirely the same.

6. Things not the same differ in some respect. But the true and being differ in no respect. They do not differ essentially, for every being is true by its very essence. And they do not differ in any other ways, for they must belong to some common genus. Therefore, they are entirely the same.

7. If they were not entirely the same, the true would add something to being. But the true adds nothing to being, even though it has greater extension than being. This is borne out by the statement of the Philosopher that we define the true as: "That which affirms the existence of what is, and denies the existence of what is not." Consequently, the true includes both being and non-being; since it does not add anything to being, it seems to be entirely the same as being.

To the Contrary:

1'. Useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless; so, if the true were the same as being, it would be meaningless to say: "Being is true." This, however, is hardly correct. Therefore, they are not the same.

2’. Being and the good are convertible. The true and the good, however, are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are true but not good. The true, therefore, and being are not interchangeable. And so they are not the same.

3’. In all creatures, as Boethius has pointed out, "to be is other than that which is." Now, the true signifies the existence of things. Consequently, in creatures it is different from that which is. But that which is, is the same as being. Therefore, in creatures the true is different from being.

4’. Things related as before and after must differ. But the true and being are related in the aforesaid manner; for, as is said in The Causes: "The first of all created things is the act of existence. In a study of this work, a commentator writes as follows: "Everything else is predicated as a specification of being." Consequently, everything else comes after being. Therefore, the true and being are not the same.

5'. What are predicated of a cause and of the effects of the cause are more united in the cause than in its effects—and more so in God than in creatures. But in God four predicates—being, the one, the true, and the good—are appropriated as follows: being, to the essence; the one, to the Father; the true, to the Son; and the good, to the Holy Spirit.

Since the divine Persons are really and not merely conceptually distinct, these notions cannot be predicated of each other; if really distinct when verified of the divine Persons, the four notions in question are much more so when verified of creatures.

2

REPLY:

When investigating the nature of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles. Otherwise, both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regress, and science and our knowledge of things will perish.

Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term being. This happens in two ways.

First, the mode expressed is a certain special manner of being; for there are different grades of being according to which we speak when we speak of different levels of existence, and according to these grades different things are classified. Consequently, substance does not add a difference to being by signifying some reality added to it, but sub stance simply expresses a special manner of existing, namely, as a being in itself. The same is true of the other classes of existents.

Second, some are said to add to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being. This mode can be taken in two ways: first, in so far as it follows upon every being considered absolutely; second, in so far as it follows upon every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, will the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term thing is used; for, according to Avicenna," thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being. There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by one. For the one is simply undivided being.

If the mode of being is taken in the second way—according to the relation of one being to another—we find a twofold use. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinct-, ness is expressed by the word something, which implies, as it were, some other thing. For, just as a being is said to be one in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be something in so far as it is divided from others. The second division is based on the correspondence one being has will another. This is possible only if there is some thing which is such that it agrees will every being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is said in The Soul, "in some way is all things." The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. Good expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, the good is "that which all desire." True expresses die correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said w be the cause of knowledge. Similarly, the sense of sight knows a colour by being informed will a species of the colour.

The first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement will the intellect. This agreement is called "the conformity of thing and intellect." In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of the true, and this is what the true adds to being, namely, the conformity or equation of thing and intellect. As we said, the knowledge of a thing is a consequence of this conformity; therefore, it is an effect of truth, even though the fact that the thing is a being is prior to its truth.

Consequently, truth or die true has been defined in three ways. First of all, it is defined according to that which precedes truth and is the basis of truth. This is why Augustine writes: "The true is that which is"; and Avicenna: "The truth of each thing is a property of the act of being which has been established for it." Still others say: "The true is the undividedness of the act of existence from that which " Truth is also defined in another way—according to that in which its intelligible determination is formally completed. Thus, Isaac writes: "Truth is the conformity of thing and intellect"; and Anselm: "Truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind." This rectitude, of course, is said to be based on some conformity. The Philosopher says that in defining truth we say that truth is had when one affirms that "to be which is, and that not to be which is not."

The third way of defining truth is according to the effect following upon it. Thus, Hilary says that the true is that which manifests and proclaims existence. And Augustine says: "Truth is that by which that which is, is shown"; and also: "Truth is that according to which we judge about inferior things."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That definition of Augustine is given for the true as it has its foundation in reality and not as its formal nature is given complete expression by conformity of thing and intellect. An alternative answer would be that in the statement, "The true is that which is," the word is is not here understood as referring to the act of existing, but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying, that is, the affirmation of a proposition. The meaning would then be this: "The true is that which is—it is had when the existence of what is, is affirmed." If this is its meaning, then Augustine’s definition agrees will that of the Philosopher mentioned above.

2. The answer is clear from what has been said.

3. "Something can be understood without another" can be taken in two ways. It can mean that something can be known while another remains unknown. Taken in this way, it is true that things which differ conceptually are such that one can be understood without the other. But there is another way that a thing can be understood without an other: when it is known even though the other does not exist. Taken in this sense, being cannot be known without the true, for it cannot be known unless it agrees will or confirms to intellect. It is not necessary however, that everyone who understands the formal notion of being should also understand the formal notion of the true—just as not everyone who understands being understands the agent intellect, even though nothing can be known without the agent intellect.

4. The true is a state of being even though it does not add any reality to being or express any special mode of existence. It is rather something that is generally found in every being, although it is not expressed by the word being. Consequently, it is not a state that corrupts, limits, or Contracts.

5. In this objection, condition should not be understood as belonging to the genus of quality. It implies, rather, a certain order; for those which are the cause of the existence of other things are themselves beings most completely, and those which are the cause of the truth of other things are themselves true most completely. It is for this reason that the Philosopher concludes that the rank of a thing in its existence corresponds to its rank in truth, so that when one finds that which is most fully being, he finds there also that which is most fully true. But this does not mean that being and the true are the same in concept. It means simply that in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of being proportioned to intellect. Consequently, the true is dependent upon the formal character of being.

6. There is a conceptual difference between the true and being since there is something in the notion of the true that is not in the concept of the existing—not in such a way, however, that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept of the true. They do not differ essentially nor are they distinguished from one another by opposing differences.

7. The true does not have a wider extension than being. Being is, in some way, predicated of non-being in so far as non-being is apprehended by the intellect. For, as the Philosopher says, the negation or the privation of being may, in a sense, be called being. Avicenna supports this by pointing out that one can form propositions only of beings, for that about which a proposition is formed must be apprehended by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear that everything true is being in some way.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. The reason why it is not tautological to call a being true is that something is expressed by the word true that is not expressed by the word being, and not that the two differ in reality.

2'. Although fornication is evil, it possesses some being and can con form to intellect. Accordingly, the formal character of the true is found here. So it is clear that true is coextensive will being.

3'. In the statement, "To be is other than that which is," the act of being is distinguished from that to which that act belongs. But the name of being is taken from the act of existence, not from that whose act it is. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4'. The true comes after being in this respect, that the notion of the true differs from that of being in the manner we have described.

5'. This argument has three flaws. First, although the Persons are really distinct, the things appropriated to each Person are only conceptually, and not really, distinct. Secondly, although the Persons are really distinct from each other, they are not really distinct from the essence; so, truth appropriated to the Person of the Son is not distinct from the act of existence He possesses through the divine essence. Thirdly, although being, the true, the one, and the good are more united in God than they are in created things, it does not follow from the fact that they are conceptually distinct in God that they are really distinct in created beings. This lime of argument is valid only when it is applied to things which are not by their very nature one in reality, as wisdom and power, which, although one in God, are distinct in creatures. But being, the true, the one, and the good are such that by their very nature they are one in reality. Therefore, no matter where they are found, they are really one. Their unity in God, however, is more perfect than their unity in creatures.

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, i6, aa. I, 3; Ï Sentences 19, 5, 1; Contra Gentiles I, 6o; Ï Perihermen., lectura 3, nU. 3-10; Vi Metaph., lectura, nn. 1230-44.





ARTICLE II: IS TRUTH FOUND PRINCIPALLY IN THE INTELLECT OR IN THINGS?



Difficulties:

It seems that it is found principally in things, for

1. It was pointed out that the true is convertible will being. But being is found more principally in things than in the soul. The true, therefore, is principally outside the soul.

2. Things are not in the soul through their essences but, as pointed out by the Philosopher, through species. If, therefore, truth is found principally in the soul, truth will not be the essence of a thing but merely its likeness or species; arid the true will be the species of a being existing outside the soul. But the species of a thing existing in the soul is not predicated of a thing outside the soul and is not convertible will it; for, if this were so, the true could not be converted will being is false.

3. That which is in something is based upon that in which it is. If truth, then, is principally in the soul, judgments about truth will have as their criterion the soul’s estimation. This would revive that error of the ancient philosophers who said that any opinion a person has in his intellect is true and that two contradictories can be true at the same time. This, of course, is absurd.

4. If truth is principally in the intellect, anything which pertains to the intellect should be included in the definition of truth. Augustine, however, sharply criticizes such definitions, as, for example, "The true is that which is as it is seen." For, according to this definition, something would not be true if it were not seen. This is clearly false of rocks hidden deep in the earth. Augustine similarly criticizes the following definition: "The true is that which is as it appears to the knower, provided he is willing and able to know." For, according to this definition, something would not be true unless the knower wished and were able to know. The same criticism can be leveled against other definitions that include any reference to intellect. Truth, therefore, is not principally in the intellect.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Philosopher says: "The true and the false are not Ifi things but in the mind."

2’. Truth is "the conformity of thing and intellect." But since this conformity can be only in the intellect, truth is only in the intellect.

3

REPLY:

When a predicate is used primarily and secondarily of many things, it is not necessary that that which is the cause of the others receive the primary predication of the common term, but rather that in which the meaning of the common term is first fully verified. For example, healthy is primarily predicated of an animal, for it is in an animal that the nature of health is first found in its fullest sense. But inasmuch as medicine causes health, it is also said to be healthy. Therefore, since truth is predicated of many things in a primary and a secondary sense, it ought to be primarily predicated of that in which its full meaning is primarily found.

Now, the fulfilment of any motion is found in the term of the motion; and, since the term of the motion of a cognitive power is the soul, the known must be in the knower after the manner of the knower. But the motion of an appetitive power terminates in things. For this reason the Philosopher speaks of a sort of circle formed by the acts of the soul: for a thing outside the soul moves the intellect, and the thing known moves the appetite, which tends to reach the things from which the motion originally started. Since good, as mentioned previously, expresses a relation to appetite, and true, a relation to the intellect, the Philosopher says that good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind. A thing is not called true, however, unless it confirms to an intellect. The true, therefore, is found secondarily in things and primarily in intellect.

Note, however, that a thing is referred differently to the practical intellect than it is to the speculative intellect. Since the practical intellect causes things, it is a measure of what it causes. But, since the speculative intellect is receptive in regard to things, it is, in a certain sense, moved by things and consequently measured by them. It is clear, therefore, that, as is said in the Metaphysics, natural things from which our intellect gets its scientific knowledge measure our intellect. Yet these things are themselves measured by the divine intellect, in which are all created things—just as all works of art find their origin in the intellect of an artist. The divine intellect, therefore, measures and is not measured; a natural thing both measures and is measured; but our intellect is measured, and measures only artifacts, not natural things.

A natural thing, therefore, being placed between two intellects is called true in so far as it confirms to either. It is said to be true will respect to its conformity will the divine intellect in so far as it fulfils the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect. This is clear from the writings of Anselm and Augustine, as well as from the definition of Avicenna, previously cited: "The truth of anything is a property of the act of being which has been established for it." With respect to its conformity will a human intellect, a thing is said to be true in so far as it is such as to cause a true estimate about itself; and a thing is said to be false if, as Aristotle says, "by nature it is such that it seems to be what it is not, or seems to possess qualities which it does not possess."

In a natural thing, truth is found especially in the first, rather than in the second, sense; for its reference to the divine intellect comes before its reference to a human intellect. Even if there were no human intellects, things could be said to be true because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the essentials of truth would in no way remain.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As is clear from the discussion, true is predicated primarily of a true intellect and secondarily of a thing confirmed will intellect. True taken in either sense, however, is interchangeable will being, but in different ways. Used of things, it can be interchanged will being through a judgment asserting merely material identity, for every being is confirmed will the divine intellect and can be confirmed will a human intellect. The converse of this is also true.

But if true is understood as used of the intellect, then it can be converted will being outside the soul—not as denominating the same subject, but as expressing conformity. For every true act of understanding is referred to a being, and every being corresponds to a true act of understanding.

2. The solution of the second argument is clear from the solution of the first.

3. What is in another does not depend on that other unless it is caused by the principles of that other. For example, even though light is in the air, it is caused by something extrinsic, the sun; and it is based on the motion of the sun rather than on air. In the same way, truth which is in the soul but caused by things does not depend on what one thinks but on the existence of things. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement or an intellect is said to be true or false.

4. Augustine is speaking of a thing’s being seen by the human intellect. Truth, of course, does not depend on this, for many things exist that are not known by our intellects. There is nothing, however, that the divine intellect does not actually know, and nothing that the human intellect does not know potentially, for the agent intellect is said to be that "by which we make all things knowable," and the possible intellect, as that "by which we become all things." For this reason, one can place in the definition of a true thing its actually being seen by the divine intellect, but not its being seen by a human intellect— except potentially, as is clear from our earlier discussion.

Parallel readings: Contra Gentiles I, 59; III De anima, lectura II, nn. 746-51, 760-64; Summa Theol., I, 16, 2. See also readings given for preceding article.







ARTICLE III: IS TRUTH ONLY IN THE INTELLECT JOINING AND SEPARATING?



Parallel readings: De veritate, I, Summa Theol., I, i6, 2; I Sentences 19, g, 1, ad Contra Gentiles I, lii De anima, lectura ii, flfl. 746-51, 760-64; I Perihermen., lectura, nn. 3-b; Vl Metaph., lectura 4, flfl. 1233-44; IX Metaph., lectura ii, n. 1896 seq.



Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. The true is predicated from the relation of being to intellect. But the first operation by which an intellect is related to things is that in which the intellect forms the quiddities of things by conceiving their definitions. Truth, therefore, is principally and more properly found in that operation of the intellect.

2. The true is a "conformity of thing and intellect." Now, although the intellect, in joining and separating, can be confirmed will things, it can also be confirmed will things in understanding their quiddities. Truth, therefore, is not merely in the intellect joining and separating.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Metaphysics we read: "The true and the false are not in things but in the mind. In regard to simple natures and quiddities, how ever, it is not in the mind."

2’. In The Soul the statement is made that the true and the false are not to be found in simple apprehension.

4

REPLY:

Just as the true is found primarily in the intellect rather than in things, so also is it found primarily in an act of the intellect joining and separating, rather than in an act by which it forms the quiddities of things. For the nature of the true consists in a conformity of thing and intellect. Nothing becomes confirmed will itself, but conformity requires distinct terms. Consequently, the nature of truth is first found in the intellect when the intellect begins to possess something proper to itself, not possessed by the thing outside the soul, yet corresponding to it, so that between the two—intellect and thing- a conformity may be found. In forming the quiddities of things, the intellect merely has a likeness of a thing existing outside the soul, as a sense has a like ness when it receives the species of a sensible thing. But when the intellect begins to judge about the thing it has apprehended, then its judgment is something proper to itself—not something found outside in the thing. And the judgment is said to be true when it confirms to the external reality. Moreover, the intellect judges about the thing it has apprehended at the moment when it says that something is or is not. This is the role of "the intellect composing and dividing."

For these reasons, the Philosopher says that composition and division are in the intellect, and not in things. Moreover, this is why truth is found primarily in the joining and separating by the intellect, and only secondarily in its formation of the quiddities of things or definitions, for a definition is called true or false because of a true or false combination. For it may happen that a definition will be applied to something to which it does not belong, as when the definition of a circle is assigned to a triangle. Sometimes, too, the parts of a definition cannot be reconciled, as happens when one defines a thing as "an animal entirely without the power of sensing." The judgment implied in such a definition—"some animal is incapable of sensing" is false. Consequently, a definition is said to be true or false only because of its relation to a judgment, as a thing is said to be true because of its relation to intellect.

From our discussion, then, it is clear that the true is predicated, first of all, of joining and separating by the intellect; second, of the definitions of things in so far as they imply a true or a false judgment. Third, the true may be predicated of things in so far as they are confirmed will the divine intellect or in so far as, by their very nature, they can be confirmed will human intellects. Fourth, true or false may be predicated of man in so far as he chooses to express truth, or in so far as he gives a true or false impression of himself or of others by his words and actions; for truth can be predicated of words in the same way as it can be predicated of the ideas which they convey.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although the formation of a quiddity is the first operation of the intellect, by it the intellect does not yet possess anything that, properly speaking, is its own and can be confirmed to the thing. Truth, accordingly, is not found in it.

2. From this the solution of the second difficulty is clear.



ARTICLE IV: IS THERE ONLY ONE TRUTH BY WHICH ALL THINGS ARE TRUE?



Parallel readings: De veritate, 21,, ad 5; 27, I, ad 7; Summa Theol., I, i6, 6; I-II, 33, r, ad 3; Contra Gentiles III, 47; Quolibet X,, I Sentences 19, g, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that this is so, for

1. Anselm says that the relation of truth to all true things is like that of time to all temporal things. But there is only one time to which all temporal things are related. Therefore, there will be only one truth to which all true things are related.

2. But it was said that truth is used in two ways. In one, it means the entity of a thing, as when Augustine says: "The true is that which is" If truth be understood in this sense, then there should be as many truths as there are essences of things. In the second way in which truth is used, it signifies truth as it is expressed in the intellect. Consequently, Hilary writes: "The true affirms existence." But since nothing can manifest anything to the intellect except in virtue of the first divine truth, all truths are, in some sense, one, inasmuch as they alt move the intellect—just as colors are one in moving the sense of sight, since they all move it because of one thing: light.

On the contrary, however, time, the measure of all temporal things, is numerically one; and if truth is related to true things as time is related to temporal things, the truth of all true things must also be numerically one. It will not be sufficient for all truths to be one in their action of moving the intellect or to be one in their exemplary cause.

3. Anselm argues as follows: If there are as many truths as there are true things, then truths should change as true things change. But truths do not change will the changes of true things, for, even when true and correct things are destroyed, the truth and correctness by which they are true or correct remain. There is, therefore, only one truth. He proves the minor from this: When a sign is destroyed, the correctness of the signification remains, for it remains correct that the sign should signify that which it did signify. For the same reason, rectitude or truth remains even when a true or correct thing has been destroyed.

4. With regard to created things, nothing is identical will that whose truth it is. The truth of a man is not the man; the truth of flesh is not the flesh. But every created thing is true. No created thing, therefore, is truth. Consequently, every truth is uncreated, and so there is only one truth.

5. As Augustine says, only God is greater than the human mind. But, as he proves elsewhere, truth is greater than the human mind, for truth certainly cannot be said to be less than the human mind. If this were so, it would be within the competence of the mind to pass judgment on truth. This, of course, is false, for the mind does not judge truth but judges according to the truth, like a magistrate who does not pass judgment upon the law but, as Augustine himself says, judges according to the law. Similarly, the mind of man cannot be said to be equal to truth, for it judges everything according to truth. It does not judge everything according to itself. Truth, therefore, must be God alone, and so there is only one truth.

6. Augustine has proved that truth is not perceived by any bodily sense. His proof is that nothing is perceived by sense unless it is changeable. But truth is unchangeable. Truth, therefore, is not perceived by sense.

One could similarly argue that everything created is changeable. But truth is not changeable. Therefore, it is not a creature but is some thing uncreated. Consequently, there is only one truth.

7. Augustine offers another proof in the same place: "There is no sensible thing that does not have some similarity to what is false, and, as a result, the two cannot be distinguished. To mention only one example: all that we sense through the body. Even when these objects are not present to the senses, we experience their images as though they were present, as when we are asleep or become delirious." Truth, however, has no resemblance to what is false. Therefore, truth is not perceived by a sense.

One could similarly argue that every created thing has some similarity to what is false in so far as it has some defect. Nothing created, therefore, is truth, and so there is only one truth.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine writes: "As likeness is the form of like things, so truth is the form of true things." But for many like things there are many likenesses. Therefore, for many true things there are many truths.

2’. Just as every created truth is derived from the uncreated truth as its model, and has its truth from it, so all intelligible light is derived from the first uncreated light as from its exemplary cause, and from it possesses its power of making things known. But we say that there are many intelligible lights, as is clear from the writings of Dionysius." Therefore, following this analogy, it seems we must likewise simply concede that there are many truths.

3’. Although all colors are able to affect the sense of sight in virtue of light, nevertheless, in themselves colors are distinct and different, and cannot be said to be one, except from a particular point of view. Consequently, even though all created truths manifest themselves in the intellect by virtue of the first truth, we cannot for this reason say that there is one truth, unless considered under this one aspect.

4’. Just as a created truth can manifest itself to the intellect only by virtue of the uncreated truth, so no power in a creature can act except by virtue of the uncreated power. Yet we do not say that somehow or other there is one power for all powers; so, in the same manner, we should not say that in some way there is one truth for all truths.

5'. God as a cause is related to things in three ways: as an efficient, an exemplary, and as a final cause. Consequently, by a kind of appropriation, the entity of things is referred to God as efficient cause, their truth to Him as an exemplary cause, their goodness to Him as a final cause—even though, properly speaking, each single one could be referred to each single cause. But in no manner of speaking do we say that there is one goodness for all good things, or one entity for all beings. Therefore, we should not say that there is one truth for all true things.

6’. Although there is one uncreated truth from which all created truths take their model, these truths are not modeled on it in the same way. For while it is true that the uncreated truth has the same relation to all, all do not have the same relation to it—as pointed out in The Causes. Necessary and contingent truths are modeled on the uncreated truth in quite different ways. But different ways of imitating the divine model cause diversity among created things. Consequently, there are many created truths.

7'. Truth is "the conformity of thing and intellect." But since things differ specifically, there cannot be a single conformity to the intellect. So, since true things are specifically different, there cannot be one truth for all true things.

8’. Augustine writes as follows: "One must believe that the nature of the human mind is so connected will intelligible things that it gazes upon all it knows by means of a unique light." Now, the light by whose means the soul knows all things is truth. Truth, therefore, belongs to the same genus as the soul and must be a created thing. Consequently, in different creatures there are different truths.


De veritate EN