De veritate EN 99
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Likeness brings the character of image to completion. However, for the character of image not every likeness is sufficient, but the fullest likeness, through which something is represented according to its specific nature. For this reason, in bodies we look for the image more in their shapes, which are the proper marks of species, than in colors and other accidents. There is a likeness of the uncreated Trinity in our soul according to any knowledge which it has of itself, not only of the mind, but also of sense, as Augustine clearly shows. But we find the image of God only in that knowledge according to which there arises in the mind the fuller likeness of God.
Therefore, if we distinguish the knowledge of the mind according to objects, we find in our mind a threefold knowledge. There is the knowledge by which the mind knows God, by which it knows itself, and by which it knows temporal things. In the knowledge by which the mind knows temporal things there is no expressed likeness of the uncreated Trinity, either according to adaptation or according to analogy. It is not according to the first, because material things are more unlike God than is the mind itself. Thus, the mind does not be come fully confirmed to God for being informed by knowledge of these material things. Nor yet is it according to analogy, for a temporal thing, which begets knowledge, or even actual understanding of itself in the soul, is not of the same substance as the mind, but some thing extraneous to its nature. Thus, the consubstantiality of the uncreated Trinity cannot be represented through it.
But in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, knowing itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. But in that cognition by which the mind knows God the mind itself becomes confirmed to God, just as every knower, as such, is assimilated to that which is known.
But there is a greater likeness through conformity, as of sight to colour, than through analogy, as of sight to understanding, which is related to its objects in a way similar to that of sight. Consequently, the likeness of the Trinity is clearer in mind, as knowing God, than as knowing itself. Therefore, properly speaking, the image of the Trinity is in the mind primarily and mainly, in so far as the mind knows God, and it is there in a certain manner and secondarily, in so far as the mind knows itself, especially when it considers itself in so far as it is the image of God. As a result, its consideration does not stop will itself, but goes on to God. There is no image in the consideration of temporal things, but a kind of likeness of the Trinity, which can par take more of the character of vestige. Such is the likeness which Augustine attributes to the sensitive powers.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. There is indeed a trinity in the mind, as it applies itself to activity concerned will temporal things. But this trinity is not called the image of the uncreated Trinity, as is clear from what Augustine adds to that passage.
2. The equality of the divine persons is better represented in the knowledge of eternal than of temporal things. For we should not look for equality between object and power, but between one power and another. Moreover, although there is greater inequality between our mind and God than between our mind and a temporal thing, yet between the memory which our mind has of God and actual under standing and love of God there is greater equaiity than between the memory it has of temporal things and the understanding and love of them. For God is knowable and lovable of Himself and is understood and loved by the mind of each to the degree in which He is present to the mind. His presence in the mind is memory of Him in the mind; thus, intelligence is proportioned to the memory of Him, and will or love is proportioned to this intelligence.
However, physical things as such are not intelligible or lovable and so there is not this equality in the mind will reference to them. Neither is there the same order of origin, since these are present to our memory because we have understood them, and so memory arises from understanding rather than conversely. The opposite of this takes place in the created mind will reference to God from whose presence the mind participates in intellectual light so that it can understand.
3. Although the knowledge which we have of physical things is prior in time to that which we have of God, the latter is prior in dignity. And the fact that we know physical reality better than we know God offers no difficulty, because the least knowledge which can he had about God surpasses all knowledge about creatures. The nobility of knowledge depends on the nobility of the thing known, as is clear from The Soul. For this reason, the Philosopher puts the little knowledge which we have of heavenly things before all the knowledge which we have about things here below.
4. Although powers extend to all their objects, their capacity is measured by the highest thing which they can reach, as appears in Heaven and Earth. Therefore, that which belongs to the highest perfection of the powers of the mind, namely, to be in the image of God, is attributed to them will reference to the most noble object, which is God.
5. Although the mind knows itself more perfectly than it knows God, the knowledge which it has of God is more noble, and through it the mind becomes more confirmed to God, as has been said. There fore, it is rather according to this that the mind is in the image of God.
6. Although the equality belongs to the image which is in our mind, it is not necessary to consider the image will respect to everything, will reference to which some equality is found in it, since many other things are needed for an image. Hence, the argument does not follow.
7. Although charity, which brings the image to completion, looks to the neighbour, it does not do so as to its principal object, since only God is its principal object. For charity loves nothing in one’s neighbour except God.
8. The powers of the image, even in so far as they are related to God, are made perfect through certain habits, as faith, hope, charity, wisdom, and others like these. For, although in these eternal things there is no error on their part, there still can be error on the part of our understanding in its knowledge of these. The difficulty in knowing them comes not from them, but from us, as is said in the Metaphysics.
9. There is no identity of substance between sense and the sensible thing, because the sensible thing is outside the essence of the senses. Nor is there equality, for sometimes the visible thing is not always seen to the full extent of its visibility.
10. With reference to the effectiveness of their causality, certain irrational creatures can in some way become more like God than even rational creatures. This appears in the sun’s rays, by which everything in lower bodies is caused and renewed. In this way, it is like the divine goodness which causes all things, as Dionysius says, still, according to properties inhering in it, the rational creature is more like God than any irrational creature.
That metaphorical expressions are more frequently taken from irrational creatures and applied to God is due to their dissimilarity. This is done because, as Dionysius says, what belongs to less noble creatures is more frequently transferred to God to remove all occasion for error. For the transfer made from noble creatures could bring about the belief that those things which are applied metaphorically were to be understood properly. No one can think this about less noble things.
11. Boethius makes material forms images, not of God, but of immaterial forms, that is, of the ideal natures existing in the divine mind, from which material forms arise will a perfect likeness.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 8, 6; Contra Gentiles II, 75; III, 46; Summa Theol., I, 14, 2, ad 87, I; Q. D. de anima, i6, ad 8; II de anima, 6, nn. 304-308; III de anima, 9, flfl. 72l, 724-726.
Difficulties:
It seems that it knows itself through some species, for
1. As the Philosopher says: "Our intellect understands nothing will out a phantasm." But it cannot receive a phantasm of the very essence of the soul. Therefore, our mind must understand itself through some other species abstracted from phantasms.
2. Those things which are seen through their essence are most certainly apprehended without error. But many err about the human mind, for some say it is air, others fire, and hold many other foolish opinions about it. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
3. It was said that through its essence the mind sees that it exists, but can err in the investigation of its nature.—On the contrary, to know something through its essence is to know what it is, for the essence of a thing is the same as its quiddity. Therefore, if the soul saw itself through its essence, everyone would unerringly know the essence of his soul, which is obviously false.
4. Our soul is a form joined to matter. But every form of this kind is known through abstraction of the species from matter and from material conditions. Therefore, the soul is known through an abstracted species.
5. Understanding is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite, as is said in The Soul. But every such act is common to soul and body. Therefore, there must always be something from the body in understanding. But this would not be if the mind saw itself through its essence without any species abstracted from the bodily senses. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
6. The Philosopher says that the intellect understands itself just as it understands other things. But it does not understand other things through its essence, but through species. Therefore, it does not under stand itself through its essence.
7. Powers are known through their acts, and acts through their objects. But the essence of the soul can be known only when its powers are known, for what a thing can do manifests the nature of the thing. Therefore, it has to know its essence through its acts and through the species of its objects.
8. As sense is related to what is sensible, so understanding is related to what is intelligible. But there has to be some distance between sense and the sensible. For this reason, the eye cannot see itself. Therefore, there also has to be some distance in intellectual vision, will the result that mind can never understand itself through its essence.
9. According to the Philosopher, in a demonstration we should not proceed in a circle, because it would follow that a thing would become known through itself. Thus, it would follow that it would exist before itself and be better known than itself, which is impossible. But, if the mind sees itself through its essence, that which is known and that through which it is known will be the same. Therefore, the same un- tenable conclusion would follow, for something would exist before itself and be better known than itself.
10. Dionysius says that the soul knows the truth of existing things in a sort of circle. However, a circular movement is from the same thing to the same thing. Therefore, it seems that the soul goes out from itself in its understanding, and through things outside returns to knowledge of itself. Thus, it does not understand itself through its essence.
11. While the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, if the mind saw itself through its essence because its essence is present to it, it would always see it, for it is always present to it. Therefore, since it is impossible to understand many things at once, the mind would never understand anything else.
12. Things that follow have more composition than those which come earlier. But understanding follows existing. Therefore, there is more composition in the understanding of the soul than in its existence. But, in the soul, that which exists is not the same as that by which it exists. Therefore, that in the soul by which it understands will not be the same as that which is understood. Thus, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
13. The same thing under the same aspect cannot be form and that which is informed. But, since the understanding is a power of the soul, it is a kind of form of its essence. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot be the form of the understanding. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
14. The soul is a subsistent substance. However, intelligible forms are not of themselves subsistent. Otherwise, knowledge, which is made up of these intelligible forms, would not be classified as an accident. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot have the character of intelligible form by which the mind sees itself.
15. Since acts and movements are distinguished in their terms, intelligible things which belong to the same species are understood ac cording to their species in the same way. But the soul of Peter belongs to the same species as that of Paul. Therefore, the soul of Peter under stands itself just as it understands Paul’s soul. But it does not under stand Paul’s soul through its essence, for it is not present to it. There fore, it does not understand itself through its essence.
16. Form is simpler than that which is informed through the form. But the mind is not simpler than itself. Therefore, it is not informed by itself. Consequently, since it is informed by that through which it knows, it will not know itself through itself.
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says: "Mind knows itself through itself because it is incorporeal. For, if it does not know itself, it does not love itself."
2’. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 2) reads: "By that sight which is called intellectual, those things are known which are not bodies and do not have any forms like bodies, as mind itself and every disposition of the soul." The same Gloss adds: "Intellectual sight contains those things which have no likenesses not identical will themselves." Therefore, the mind does not know it self through something not identical will it.
3’. In The Soul we read: "In things separated from matter, that which understands and that by which it is understood are the same." But the mind is an immaterial thing. Therefore, it is understood through its essence.
4’. Everything which, as intelligible, is present to the understanding is understood by the understanding. But the essence of the soul is present to understanding in an intelligible manner, for it is present to it through its truth. Truth, however, is the reason for understanding as goodness is the reason for loving. Therefore, the mind understands itself through its essence.
5’. The species through which something is understood is simpler than that which we understand through it. But the soul does not have any species simpler than itself to be abstracted from it. Therefore, the soul does not understand itself through a species, but through its essence.
6’. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But there is nothing else more like the soul than essence. Therefore, it understands itself through nothing else but its essence.
7’. That which is a cause by which other things are made knowable is not known through anything other than itself. But the soul is a cause which makes other physical things knowable, for they are intelligible inasmuch as we make them intelligible, as the Commentator says. Therefore, the soul is understood only through itself.
8’. According to the Philosopher, knowledge about the soul is most certain. But that which is more certain is not known through that which is less certain. Therefore, we do not have knowledge of the soul through something other than itself.
9’. Every species through which our soul understands is abstracted from sensible things. But there is no sensible thing from which the soul can abstract its own quiddity. Therefore, the soul does not know itself through any likeness.
10’. As physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul through its light makes all material things actually intelligible, as is clear from The Soul. But physical light is seen through itself and not through any likeness of itself. Therefore, the soul, too, is under stood through its essence and not through any likeness.
11'. As the Philosopher says, the agent intellect "does not at one time understand and at another not understand, but always understands." But it is only itself which it understands at all times. This would not be possible if it understood itself through a species abstracted from the senses, for thus it would not understand itself before the abstraction. Therefore, our mind understands itself through its essence.
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When we ask if something is known through its essence, we can understand the question in two ways. In the first, "through its essence" is taken to refer to the thing known, so that we understand that a thing is known through its essence when its essence is known, and that it is not known through its essence when not its essence but only certain of its accidents are known. In the second way, it is taken to refer to that by which something is known, so that we thus understand that something is known through its essence because the essence itself is that by which it is known. It is in this sense that we ask here if the soul understands itself through its essence.
For a clear understanding of this question we should observe that each person can have a twofold knowledge of the soul, as Augustine says. One of these is the knowledge by which the soul of each man knows itself only will reference w that which is proper to it. The other is that by which the soul is known will reference to that which is common to all souls. This latter, which concerns all souls without distinction, is that by which the nature of the soul is known. However, the knowledge which each has of his soul, in so far as it is proper to himself, is the knowledge of the soul as it exists in this individual. Thus, it is through this knowledge that one knows whether the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a soul. Through the other type of knowledge, however, one knows what the soul is and what its proper accidents are.
With reference to the first type of cognition we must make a distinction, because one can know something habitually or actually. Concerning the actual cognition by which one actually considers that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists, because he perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "We sense that we sense, and we understand that we understand, and because we sense this, we understand that we exist." But one perceives that he under stands only from the fact that he understands something. For to under stand something is prior to understanding that one understands. There fore, through that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at actual perception of the fact that it exists.
Concerning habitual knowledge I say this, that the soul sees itself through its essence, that is, the soul has the power to enter upon actual cognition of itself from the very fact that its essence is present to it. This is like the case of one who, because he has the habit of some knowledge, can by reason of the presence of the habit perceive those things which fall under that habit. But no habit is required for the soul’s perception of its existence and its advertence to the activity within it. The essence alone of the soul, which is present w the mind, is enough for this, for the acts in which it is actually perceived proceed from it.
But, if we speak of the knowledge of the soul when the human mind is limited to specific or generic knowledge, we must make another distinction. For the concurrence of two elements, apprehension and judgment about the thing apprehended, is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge by which the nature of the soul is known can be considered will reference to apprehension and will reference to judgment.
If, then, we consider this knowledge will reference to apprehension, I say that we know the nature of the soul through species which we abstract from the senses. For our soul holds the last place among intellectual things, just as first matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator shows. For, as first matter is in potency to all sensible forms, so our possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms. Thus, it is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality. Therefore, as matter is sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it.
Hence, our mind cannot so understand itself that it immediately apprehends itself. Rather, it comes to a knowledge of itself through apprehension of other things, just as the nature of first matter is known from its receptivity for forms of a certain kind. This becomes apparent when we look at the manner in which philosophers have investigated the nature of the soul.
For, from the fact that the human soul knows the universal natures of things, they have perceived that the species by which we under stand is immaterial. Otherwise, it would be individuated and so would not lead to knowledge of the universal. From the immateriality of the species by which we understand, philosophers have understood that the intellect is a thing independent of matter. And from this they have proceeded to a knowledge of the other properties of the intellective soul. Thus, the Philosopher says: "The intellect is intelligible just as other intelligible things are." The Commentator also affirms this in his explanation: "Intellect is understood through an intention in it, just as other intelligible things." This intention is nothing but the intelligible species. But this intention is in the intellect as actually intelligible. In other things, however, it is not actually but only potentially intelligible.
But, if we consider the knowledge which we have of the nature of the soul in the judgment by which we decide that it exists in such a way, as we had apprehended from the deduction mentioned above, we have knowledge of the soul inasmuch as "we contemplate inviolable truth. This is the truth from which we define to the best of our power not the kind of mind each man has, but the kind of mind it ought to be according to eternal norms," as Augustine says. We see this inviolable truth in its likeness which is impressed on our mind to the extent that we naturally know some things as self-evident. We examine all other things will reference to these, judging of them according to these.
Thus it is clear that our mind knows itself in some way through its essence, as Augustine says, and in some way through an intention or species, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say; and, more over, in some way in the contemplation of inviolable truth, as Augustine says. In this way, then, one must answer both sets of reasons.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Our understanding can actually understand nothing before it abstracts from phantasms. Nor can it have habitual knowledge of things other than itself, which are not within it, before the abstraction just mentioned, because species of other intelligible things are not innate in it. However, its essence is innate in it, so that it does not have to obtain it from phantasms, just as it is not the essence of matter which is received from the natural agent, but only its form, which is related to physical matter as intelligible form is related to sensible matter, as the Commentator says. Therefore, before the mind abstracts from phantasms, it has habitual knowledge of itself, by which it can perceive that it exists.
2. No one has ever made the mistake of not perceiving that he was alive, a fact which belongs to the knowledge by which one knows in its singularity what goes on in his soul. It is according to this knowledge that the soul is said to be habitually known through its essence. Many, however, do fall into error regarding knowledge of the specific nature of the soul, and on this point the conclusion of the objection is true.
3. From this the answer to the third difficulty is clear.
4. Although the soul is joined to matter as its form, it is not so dominated by matter that it becomes material, and thus not actually intelligible, but only potentially intelligible by abstraction from matter.
5. The objection holds for actual knowledge, according to which the soul perceives its existence only by perceiving its act and object, as has been said.
6. The citation from the Philosopher should be taken as referring to the intellect’s understanding of what it is and not to the habitual knowledge which it has of the fact that it exists.
7. The seventh difficulty must be answered in like manner.
8. Sensitive activity is brought to completion through the action of the sensible thing on the sense. This is action which is connected will position and therefore needs a definite distance. Intellectual activity is not limited to any position. Therefore, in this way they are not alike.
9. There are two ways in which we can say a thing is known by means of something else. In the first, from knowledge of another thing one arrives at knowledge of the thing in question. In this way conclusions are said to be known from principles. A thing cannot be known by means of itself in this way. In the second way, a thing is said to be known by means of something else in the sense that it is known in that something. In this case, an act of cognition distinct from that in which the thing is known is not required in order that the medium in which the thing is known might itself be known. So, there is nothing to prevent something from being known by means of itself in this way, as knows Himself by means of Himself. Thus, in some way the soul, too, knows itself through its essence.
10. We do find a circle in the knowledge of the soul, in so far as it seeks the truth of existing things by reasoning. Hence, Dionysius says this in order to show how the knowledge of the soul falls short of the knowledge of an angel. The circularity is observed in this, that reason reaches conclusions from principles by way of discovery, and by way of judgment examines the conclusions which have been found, analyzing them back to the principles. Therefore, this difficulty is not to the point.
11. Just as it is not necessary always actually to understand that of which we have habitual knowledge through species existing in the understanding, so, too, it is not necessary always actually to under stand the mind, knowledge of which is habitually in us because its essence is present to our understanding.
12. "That by which a thing is understood" and "that which is under stood" are not related to each other as "that by which a thing is" and "that which is." For existence is the act of a being, but understanding is not the act of that which is understood but of that which under stands. Hence, "that by which a thing is understood" is related to that which understands as "that which is to that by which it is." And, therefore, just as in the soul "that which is," is different from "that by which it is," so that by which it understands, that is to say, the intellective power, which is the source of the act of understanding, is different from its essence. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that the species by which a thing is understood must be different from that which is understood.
13. The intellective power is a form of the soul will reference to its act of existing, for it has existence in the soul as a property in a subject. But there is nothing to prevent the opposite of this from being true will reference to the act of understanding.
14. The knowledge by which the soul knows itself is not classified as an accident in so far as it is the source of habitual knowledge, but only as an act of cognition which is an accident. Thus, Augustine also says that knowledge is in the mind substantially in so far as the mind knows itself.
15. The objection holds for the knowledge of the soul by which it is known according to the nature of the species in which all souls share.
16. When the mind understands itself, the mind is not itself the form of the mind, because nothing i its own form. But it does follow the manner of form, inasmuch as the action by which it knows itself terminates at itself. Hence, it is not necessary for it to be simpler than itself, unless, perhaps, according to the manner of understanding, in so far as that which is understood is taken as simpler than the intellect itself which understands, and is thus considered as a perfection of the intellect.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
1'. We must understand these words of Augustine to mean that the mind knows itself through itself, since from itself the mind has the power to enter upon the act by which it actually knows itself, by perceiving that it exists. Similarly, from the species habitually retained in the mind, there results in the mind the power actually to consider the thing. But the mind can perceive what its own nature is only from the consideration of its object, as has been said.
2'. The words of the Gloss which read: "Intellectual sight contains those things..." are to be referred to the object of knowledge rather than to that by which it is understood. This is clear from a consideration of what is said about other kinds of sight. For the same Gloss reads: "Through bodily sight bodies are seen; through spiritual sight (that is, sight of imagination) likenesses of bodies are seen; through intellectual sight those things which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies are seen." If this were referred to that by which we under stand, there would be no difference between bodily sight and spiritual sight (that of imagination), because even bodily sight takes place through the likeness of a body. For the stone is not in the eye, but a likeness of the stone.
But between the kinds of sight mentioned there is this difference, that bodily sight terminates at the body itself, whereas the sight of imagination terminates at the image of the body, as at its object. So, also, when it is said that intellectual sight embraces things which have no likenesses not identical will themselves, this does not mean that spiritual sight does not take place through species which are not the same as the things understood, but that intellectual sight does not terminate at the likeness of a thing but at the very essence of the thing. For, as by bodily sight one sees a body itself without seeing a like ness of the body, although he sees through a likeness of the body, so in intellectual sight one sees the very essence of a thing without seeing the similitude of the thing, although sometimes he sees that essence through some likeness, as is clear from experience. For, when we understand the soul, we do not construct a likeness of the soul and look at it, as happens in imagination. Rather, we study the essence of the soul itself. Nevertheless, this does not deny that this sight takes place through a species.
3’. What the Philosopher says should be understood of an intellect which is altogether separated from matter, as the intellects of angels. And this is the way in which the Commentator explains the passage. However, it should not be applied to the human intellect; otherwise, it would follow that speculative science would be the same as the thing known. But this is impossible, as the Commentator also concludes.
4’. The soul is present to itself as intelligible, in the sense that it can be understood, but not in the sense that it is understood through itself, but from its object, as has been said.
5’. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from it, but through the species of its object, which becomes its form in so far as it actually understands. Hence, the reason does not follow.
6’. Although our soul is most like itself, it cannot be the principle of knowing itself in the manner of an intelligible species, just as first matter cannot. The reason for this is that our understanding occupies position in the order of intelligible things similar to that of first matter in the order of sensible things, as the Commentator says.
7’. The soul is the cause why other things are knowable not in so far as it is a means of knowing, but in so far as physical things are made intelligible through the activity of the soul.
8’. Knowledge about the soul is most certain in this, that each one experiences within himself that he has a soul and that acts of the soul are within him. But it is very difficult to know what the soul is. Hence, the Philosopher adds: "It is extremely difficult to get any assurance about it."
9’. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from sensible beings, as though that species were understood to be a likeness of the soul. Rather, from a study of the nature of the species abstracted from sensible things we discover the nature of the soul in which such a species is received, just as matter is known from form.
10’. Physical light is seen through itself only in so far as it is the reason for the visibility of visible things and a kind of form making them actually visible. Now, we see the light which exists in the sun only through its likeness which exists in our sight. For as the specific nature of stone is not in the eye, but its likeness, so the form of light which is in the sun cannot be the same form that is in the eye. Similarly, we understand the light of the agent intellect, in so far as it is the reason for the intelligible species, making them actually intelligible.
11’. What the Philosopher says can be explained in two ways, ac cording to the two opinions about the agent intellect. For some have held that the agent intellect is a separated substance, one of a number of intelligences. According to this it always actually understands, as the other intelligences do.
Others hold that the agent intellect is a power of the soul. According to this it is said that the agent intellect is not a power which some times understands and sometimes does not, because the cause of understanding at some times and not at others does not come from it, but from the possible intellect. For, in every act by which man under stands, the action of the agent intellect and that of the possible intellect concur. Moreover, the agent intellect does not receive anything from outside. Only the possible intellect does so. Hence, will reference to the requirements for our thought, there is nothing on the part of the agent intellect to keep us from always understanding, but there is on the part of the possible intellect, for it is brought to completion only through intelligible species abstracted from the senses.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 1, Quodibet VIII, 2, 4; Summa Theol., I, 87, 2.
Difficulties:
It seems that it knows them through their essence, for
1. The Gloss on this passage, "I know a man..." in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) reads: "W do not see love in one way in the species through which it exists when it is present, and in another way in some image similar to it when it is not present. But it is perceived in so far as it can be discerned by the mind, more by one, less by another." Therefore, love is perceived by the mind through its essence and not through some likeness of it. This is true of every other habit for the same reason.
2. Augustine says: "What is as present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? "2 But habits of the soul are present to the mind through their essence. Therefore, they are known by the mind through their essence.
3. The cause of the perfection of a thing has that perfection in an even higher degree. But habits of the mind are the cause whereby other things which fall under the habits are known. Therefore, habits are known by the mind especially through their essence.
4. Everything which the mind knows through its likeness arises in sense before it arises in the mind. But a habit of the mind never arises in sense. Therefore, these habits are not known by the mind through a likeness.
5. The closer a thing is to the mind, the more it is known by the mind. But habit is closer to the intellective power of the mind than act, and act is closer than object. Therefore, the mind knows habit more than act or object. So, it knows habit through its essence and not through acts or objects.
6. Augustine says that the mind and art are known by the same kind of sight. But the mind is known through its essence by the mind. Therefore, art, also, is known through its essence, and so are the other habits of the mind.
7. The true is related to understanding as the good is related to affection. But the good is not in affection through some likeness of itself. Therefore, neither is the true known by understanding through some likeness. Therefore, whatever understanding knows it knows through essence and not through a likeness.
8. Augustine says: "Faith is not seen by its possessor in the heart in which it is," as the soul of another man is seen from movements of the body; "rather, certain knowledge dings to it, and consciousness proclaims. Therefore, according to this, knowledge of the mind clings to faith in so far as consciousness proclaims it. But consciousness proclaims faith in so far as it is present in it. Therefore, faith is known by the mind in so far as it is present in the mind through its essence.
9. Form is most exactly proportionate to that of which it is the form. But habits exist in the mind as forms of the mind. Therefore, they are most exactly proportionate to the mind. Consequently, our mind knows them immediately through their essence.
10. Understanding knows the intelligible species which is in it, not through another species, but through its essence. Otherwise, there would be an infinite series. But this is so only because these species inform the understanding. Since understanding is informed in a similar way through habits, it seems that the mind knows them through their essence.
11. The mind knows habits only by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision concerns those things which are seen through their essence. Therefore, habits are seen by the mind through their essence.
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says: "Behold in the fields and caves and numberless caverns of my memory, full beyond reckoning, there are innumerable sorts of things, [present] either through images, as those of all bodies, or through actual presence, as that of the arts, or through I know not what notions, as those of affections of the mind which memory retains even when the mind is not acted upon." From this it seems that affections of the mind are not known through their essence, but through some notions of them; and for the same reason neither are habits of the virtues, which group themselves around affections of this kind.
2’. Augustine says: "We have another sense of the interior man which surpasses that sense," the bodily, "and through which we perceive just and unjust things, the former through an intelligible species, the latter through its privation." But he calls just and unjust things the habits of virtues and vices. Therefore, habits of virtues are known through a species and not through their essence.
3’. Understanding knows through its essence only that which is pres ent in the understanding. But habits of virtues are not present in the understanding, but in the affective part. Therefore, they are not known through their essence by the understanding.
4'. Intellectual vision is superior to bodily sight. Therefore, it entails greater distinction. But in bodily sight the species through which something is seen is always different from the thing seen through it. Therefore, habits, which are seen through intellectual vision, are not seen by the mind through their essence, but through some other species.
5’. We desire only what we know, as Augustine proves. But some people who do not have habits of the soul desire them. Therefore, they know those habits, but not through their essence since they do not have them. Therefore, they know them through a species of them.
6’. Hugh of St. Victor says that eye can have three meanings in man. There can be the eye of reason, the eye of intelligence, and the eye of flesh. We see God will the eye of intelligence which, Hugh says, was plucked out after the fail. We see physical things will the eye of flesh, which has remained intact after the fall. We know intelligible created things will the eye of reason, which has become blear since the fail, for we know intelligible things only partially and not entirely. But everything that is seen only partially is not known through its essence. Therefore, since habits of the mind are intelligible, it seems that the mind does not see them through their essence.
7’. God is much more present to the mind through His essence than habits are, for He is innermost in everything. But God’s presence in the mind does not make our mind see God through His essence. Therefore, habits, too, are not seen by the mind through their essence, al though they are present in it.
8’. Intellect, which potentially understands, needs something to reduce it to act, if it is actually to understand. And it is by reason of this that intellect does actually understand. But the essence of a habit, in so far as it is present to the mind, does not reduce intellect from potency to act, for, if it did, things would necessarily be understood as long as they were present in the soul. Therefore, that by which habits are understood is not their essence.
De veritate EN 99