De veritate EN 25
25
On this question there have been several erroneous opinions. Some, wishing to pronounce upon divine knowledge from the viewpoint of our own way of knowing, have said that God does not know future contingents. This opinion cannot stand, for it would eliminate providence over human affairs, which are contingent. Consequently, others have said that God has knowledge of all futures, but that all take place necessarily, otherwise His knowledge of them would be subject to error. But neither can this opinion stand, for it would destroy free choice and there would be no need to ask advice. Moreover, it would be unjust to punish or to give rewards in proportion to merit when everything takes place necessarily.
Hence, it must be said that God knows all futures; nevertheless, this does not prevent things from taking place contingently. As evidence of this, it should be noted that we have certain powers and cognitive habits in which there can never be falsity; for example, sense, science, and the understanding of principles. On the other hand, we have others in which there can be falsity; for example, imagination, opinion, and judgment. Now, falsity occurs in a cognitive act because something is not in reality as it is apprehended. Hence, if there is any knowing power such that there is never any falsity in it, then the thing to be known by it never falls short of what the knower apprehends about it.
Now, what is necessary cannot be prevented from happening even before it happens, in view of the fact that its causes are unchangeably ordained to its production. Hence, by means of habits that are always true, what is necessary can be known even when it will happen in the future, just as we know a coming eclipse or the rising of the sun by means of true science. But a contingent can be impeded before it is brought into being; for at that stage it exists only in its causes, which may be prevented from producing their effect. After a contingent has been brought into existence, however, it can no longer be prevented. Hence, such a power or habit can make about a present contingent a judgment in which falsity is never found, as sense does when it judges that Socrates is sitting when he sits.
From this it is clear that a contingent can be known as future by no cognition that excludes all falsity and the possibility of falsity; and since there is no falsity or possibility of falsity in the divine knowledge, it would be impossible for God to have knowledge of future contingents if He knew them as future. Now, something is known as future when an order of past and future stands between the event and the knowledge. This order, however, cannot be found between the divine knowledge and any contingent thing whatsoever; but the relation of the divine knowledge to anything whatsoever is like that of present to present. This may be understood by the following example.
If someone were to see many people walking successively down a road during a given period of time, in each part of that time he would see as present some of those who walk past, so that in the whole period of his watching he would see as present all of those who walked past him. Yet he would not simultaneously see them all as present, because the time of his seeing is not completely simultaneous. However, if all his seeing could exist at once, he would simultaneously see all the passers-by as present, even though they themselves would not all pass as simultaneously present. Therefore, since the vision of divine knowledge is measured by eternity, which is all simultaneous and yet includes the whole of time without being absent from any part of it, it follows that God sees whatever happens in time, not as future, but as present. For what is seen by God is, indeed, future to some other thing which it follows in time; to the divine vision, however, which is not in time but outside time, it is not future but present. Therefore, we see what is future as future because it is future will respect to our seeing, since our seeing is itself measured by time; but to the divine vision, which is outside of time, there is no future. For example, what one would see who is within the ranks of passers-by and sees only those who are in line ahead of him is quite different from what he would see were he outside their ranks and saw all of them simultaneously. Therefore, the fact that our sense of sight is never deceived when it sees contingents when they are present does not prevent the Contingents themselves from happening contingently. In like mariner, God infallibly knows all the contingents, whether they are present, past, or future to us; for they are not future to Him, but He knows that they are when they are; and the fact of His knowing them does not prevent them from happening contingently.
The difficulty in this matter arises from the fact that we can describe the divine knowledge only after the manner of our own, at the same time pointing out the temporal differences. For example, if we were to describe God’s knowledge as it is, we should have to say that God knows that this is, rather than that it will be; for to Him every thing is present and nothing is future. For this reason, Boethius says that His knowledge of future things "is more properly called providence than foresight," since He sees them all, as it were, from a great distance, in the mirror of eternity. However, it might also be called fore sight because of its relation to other things in whose regard what He knows is future.
Answers to Difficulties:
Although a contingent is not determined as long as it is future, yet, as soon as it is produced in the realm of nature, it has a determinate truth. It is in this way that the gaze of divine knowledge is brought upon it.
2. As was said, a contingent is referred to divine knowledge ac cording to its act of existence in the realm of nature. Moreover, from the moment that it is, it cannot not be when it is; for, "what is must be when it is," as is said in Interpretation. It does not follow, however, that it is necessary without any qualification or that God’s knowledge is defective —just as my sense of sight is not deceived when I see that Socrates is sitting, although this fact is contingent.
3. A contingent is said to be necessary in so far as God knows it, because He knows it, not as something already present. Nevertheless, no necessity arises from the fact that it is going to be, so that one could say that it comes about necessarily; for event applies to something which is to be, because what already is cannot eventuate. But that it has happened is true, and this is necessary.
4. The necessity referred w in the statement, "Whatever is known by God is necessary," can concern either the manner of speaking or the thing spoken about. If the necessity is applied to the manner of speaking, then the proposition is composite and true. Its meaning will be as follows: It is necessary that whatever is known by God exists, since it is not possible that God would know something to be and it would not be. If the necessity is applied to the thing spoken about, then the proposition is divided and false. Its meaning will be as follows: What is known by God must necessarily exist. But, as is clear from what has been said, things do not happen necessarily simply because God knows them.
One might object that this distinction is valid only in regard to forms, such as whiteness and blackness, which can succeed one another in a subject, but that since it is impossible for something once known by God later not to be known by Him, this distinction does not apply here. However, we reply that, although God’s knowledge does not change but always remains the same, the condition according to which a thing is referred to His knowledge does not always remain the same will respect to that knowledge. For a thing is related to God’s knowledge as it is in its own present existence, yet present existence does not always belong to it. Hence, we can consider the thing either together will its condition of being present or without it, and, consequently, we can consider it either in the manner in which it is referred to God’s knowledge or in some other manner. In this way, the afore-mentioned distinction is valid.
5. If this proposition concerns the thing, then it is true that necessity is applied to the thing itself which is known by God; but if it concerns the manner of speaking, then the necessity is not applied to the thing but to the relation of His knowledge to the thing known.
6. Neither our science nor God’s knowledge can be about future contingents. This would be even more true if He knew them as future. He knows them, however, as present to Himself and future to others. Therefore, the objection does not stand.
7. There have been many opinions about this. Some say that the antecedent, "This is known by God," is contingent because, although it refers to something in the past, it nevertheless implies a relation to the future, and therefore is not necessary. For example, when it is said, "This was going to happen," the was does not mark the event as necessary, since what was going to happen could have failed to do so; for, as is said in Generation and Corruption: "He who is about to walk, will not walk." This argument, however, is invalid; for when one says, "This is future" or "This was future," one designates the ordination of the causes of that thing to its production. Now, although it is possible that the causes ordained to a certain effect can be impeded in such a way that the effect will not follow from them, it is not possible to prevent their having been at some time ordained to produce this effect. Hence, even if that which is future should be able not to hap pen in the future, it will never be able at any time not to have been a future.
For this reason, others say that this antecedent is contingent since it is composed of a necessary and a contingent; for God’s knowledge is necessary, but what is known by Him is contingent, and each of these is included in the antecedent mentioned in the difficulty. For example, the following are contingent: "Socrates is a white man," or "Socrates is an animal and he runs." However, this argument, too, is invalid, for the truth of a proposition is not affected by the necessity and contingency of that which is affirmed materially in a proposition. The truth of a proposition is determined only by the principal com position. Hence, the same character of necessity and contingency is found in each of the following: "I think that man is an animal" and "I think that Socrates is running." Consequently, since the principal act signified in the antecedent, "God knows Socrates is running," is necessary, no matter how contingent the thing may be which is affirmed materially, this still does not prevent the afore-mentioned antecedent from being necessary.
Hence, others simply concede that the antecedent is necessary. Yet, they add, from the fact that an antecedent is absolutely necessary, it need not follow that the consequent is absolutely necessary, unless the antecedent is the proximate cause of the consequent. If it is the remote cause, the necessity of the effect can be impeded by the contingency of the proximate cause. For example, even though the sun is a necessary cause, the flowering of a tree, its effect, is contingent; for its proximate cause, the tree’s germinating power, is not constant. This argument, however, does not seem to be sufficient; for it is not due to the nature of the cause and effect that a necessary con sequence follows from a necessary antecedent, but rather to the relation that the consequent has to its antecedent. For the contrary of the consequent can by no means stand will the antecedent. And this would happen if a contingent consequent followed from a necessary antecedent. This relationship must be found in any true conditional, whether the antecedent is the effect, the proximate cause, or the re mote cause. Moreover, if this relationship is not found in the conditional, the proposition is not true at all. Therefore, this conditional is also false: "If the sun moves, the tree will flower."
Hence, the difficulty must be solved differently: the antecedent is necessary without any qualification, and the consequent is absolutely necessary in the way in which it follows from the antecedent. For what is attributed to a thing in itself is quite different from what is attributed to a thing in so far as it is known. What is attributed to it in itself belongs to it according to its own manner; but what is attributed to a thing or follows upon it in so far as it is known is ac cording to the manner of the knower. Hence, if, in the antecedent, something is signified which pertains to knowledge, the consequent must be taken according to the manner of the knower, not according to the manner of the thing known. For example, were I to say, "If I understand something, that thing is without matter," what is under stood need be immaterial only in so far as it is understood. Similarly, when I say, "If God knows something, it will be," the consequent should not be taken according to the mode of being of the thing in itself but according to the mode of the knower. For, although a thing in itself is future, it is present according to the mode of the knower. Consequently, we should rather say, "If God knows something, it is," than say, "it will be." We must, therefore, judge in the same way the proposition, "If God knows something, it will be," and this one, "If I see Socrates running, Socrates is running"; for both are necessary as long as the action is going on.
8. [There is no solution given for the eighth difficulty.]
9. Although a contingent does not exercise an act of existence as long as it is a future, as soon as it is present it has both existence and truth, and in this condition stands under the divine vision. God, how ever, also knows the relation of one thing to another, and in this way He knows that a thing is future in regard to another thing. Consequently, there is no difficulty in affirming that God knows something as future which will not take place, inasmuch as He knows that certain causes are inclined toward a certain effect winch will not be produced. But when we talk in this way we are not speaking of that knowledge of the future by which God sees things in their causes, but of that by which He sees a thing in itself. In this latter type of knowledge a thing is known as present.
10. The future, in so far as it is known by God, is present; hence, it is determined to one or the other member of a contradiction. But as long as it is future it remains open to either.
11. It is true that God knows nothing outside Himself, if the word outside refers to that by which He knows. However, God does some thing outside Himself if this refers to what He knows. Tins point was discussed above.
12. There are two types of mediums for knowledge. One, the medium of demonstration, must be proportionate to the conclusion, so that, when it has been posited, its conclusion is posited. God is not such a medium for the knowledge of contingents. The other medium of knowledge is that winch is a likeness of the thing known; and the divine essence is a medium of this sort. However, it is not equated will anything, even though it is a proper medium for singulars, as was said above.’
Parallel readings: De veritate, I, 5, ad II; 1, 7; Summa Theol., I, 14, 15; I Sentences 38, 1, aa. 2—3; 39, 1,aa. 1-2; 41, a. 5; Contra Gentiles I, cc. 58-59.
Difficulties:
It seems that it does, for
1. Knowledge is an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. Now, God’s knowledge is perfect. Hence, He will be perfectly assimilated to the things He knows. However, the things God knows change. Therefore, His knowledge changes.
2. Any knowledge which is open to error can change. Now, God’s knowledge is open to error since it is about contingent things, which are able not to be. Should they not be, then His knowledge is erroneous and, consequently, can change.
3. Our knowledge, which is had by receiving from things, follows the mode of the knower. Therefore, God’s knowledge, which takes place by reason of the fact that He confers something upon things, follows the mode of the things known. But things which God knows can change. Therefore, His knowledge can change.
4. When one of two terms in a relation is taken away, the remaining one is also taken away. Hence, when one term changes, the other also changes. Now, what God knows changes. Hence, His knowledge of things changes.
5. Any knowledge that can be increased or diminished is subject to change. But God’s knowledge can be increased or diminished. There fore.—Proof of the minor is as follows: If a knower at times knows more things, at other times fewer, his knowledge changes. Therefore, a knower who can know more or fewer things than he now knows possesses knowledge subject to change. Now, God can know more than He knows: He knows that there are, or were, or will be things made by Him; however, He could make more which He is never going to make. Consequently, He could know more things than He does. Similarly, He can know fewer than He does, since He could do away will a part of what He is going to make. Therefore, His knowledge can be increased and diminished.
6. The answer was given that even though more or fewer things could fall under God’s knowledge, His knowledge itself could not change.—On the contrary, just as the possibles are subject to divine power, so are knowable things subject to divine knowledge. Now, if God could make more than He could previously, His power would be increased; and it would be diminished if He could make fewer. For the same reason, if He could know more than He knew previously, His knowledge would be increased.
7. At one time God knew that Christ would be born. Now, how ever, He does not know that Christ will be born but that He has been born. Therefore, God knows something which He previously did not know, and He has known something which now He does not know. Hence, His knowledge is changed.
8. A manner of knowing, as well as an object of knowledge, is required for knowledge. Now, if the manner in which God knows were changed, His knowledge would be changed. For the same reason, therefore, when the objects of God’s knowledge change, His knowledge will be changed.
9. There is said to be a knowledge of approval in God by which He knows only good people. However, God could approve those whom He has not approved. Hence, He could know what He previously did not know; so, it seems that His knowledge is changeable.
10. Just as God’s knowledge is God Himself, so God’s power is God Himself. But we say that by the power of God things are brought into being through a change. For the same reason, therefore, things are known by God’s knowledge through a change, without any detriment to the divine perfection.
11. Any knowledge changes if it goes from one thing to another. But God’s knowledge is of this kind because He knows things through His essence. Hence, His knowledge changes.
To the Contrary:
1'. The Epistle of St. James (1: 17) says of God: "With whom there is no change..."
2’. Whatever is moved is reduced to the first unmovable being. But the first cause of all things that change is God’s knowledge, just as art is the cause of products. Hence, God’s knowledge cannot change.
3’. As is said in The Soul, motion is the act of an imperfect thing. But in divine knowledge there is no imperfection. Hence, it cannot change.
26
Since knowledge is intermediate between the knower and the known, it can vary in two ways: first, on the part of the knower; second, on the part of the thing known. On the part of the knower, we can consider three things: his knowledge, his act, and the manner of his act. According to these three, changes can take place in knowledge on the part of the knower.
On the part of knowledge itself, a change takes place when knowledge which was not had previously is newly acquired or when knowledge of what was known previously is lost. Accordingly, we can speak of a generation or corruption, or of an increase or decrease, in knowledge. Such a change, however, cannot take place in God’s knowledge, since, as we have shown, its object is not only beings but also non beings, and there cannot be anything beyond being and non-being because between affirmation and negation there is no middle ground.
It is true that in a certain respect the objects of God’s knowledge are only things existing in the present, past, or future, namely, in so far as His knowledge is ordained to the work which His will carries out. However, even if He would know something by this kind of knowledge that He did not know previously, there would be no change in His knowledge, because on its part it pertains equally to beings and non If there were any change in God, it would be in His will, which would be determining His knowledge to some thing to which it had not previously determined it.
This, however, could not cause any change in Fus will, either; for to produce its act freely belongs to the nature of the will, because, of its very nature, the will is equallyable to go out to either of two op posites. For example, it can will or not will to make or not to make a thing. However, the will cannot make itself simultaneously will and not will; nor can the divine will, which is immutable, first will some thing and later not will the same thing at the same time, because then God’s will would be circumscribed by time and would not be entirely simultaneous. If we are speaking of absolute necessity, therefore, it is not necessary for Him to will what He wishes. Therefore, absolutely speaking, it is possible for Him not to will it. On the other hand, if we are speaking of the necessity following a supposition, then it is neces sary that He will it if He wishes or has wished it. On this supposition, then, namely, if He wishes or has wished, it is not possible for Him not to will.
Now, since a change requires two terms, it always views the final term in its relation to the first. Consequently, only this would follow, that it would be possible for His will to change if it were possible for Him not to will what He wishes, if He had previously wished. It is clear, therefore, that no change is affirmed of His knowledge or will by the fact that more or fewer things could be known by God through this kind of knowledge; for to say that He is able to know more means simply that He can by His will determine His knowledge to make more things.
On the part of the act, there are three ways a change takes place in knowledge. The first occurs when knowledge actually considers what it previously did not consider. For example, we say that a person changes who passes from habit to act. Now, this kind of change can not be found in God’s knowledge, because He does not know habitually but only actually, since in Him there is no potentiality such as there is in a habit. Change is found in a second way in the act of knowing when it considers now one thing, now another. But neither can this be found in God’s knowledge, since He sees all through the one species of His essence, and consequently looks upon all things in the same intuition. A third kind of change occurs when, in his contemplation, a person passes from one thing to another. But this, too, cannot be found in God, for discursive reasoning is a passage between two members, and there is no discursive reasoning in knowledge that sees two things if it sees both in one intuition. This is what actually takes place in the divine knowledge, since God sees all things by one intuition.
From the point of view of the manner of knowing, there can also be changes in knowledge by reason of the fact that one can now know something more clearly and perfectly than he did before. This can arise from two sources. First, it can arise from a difference in the medium by which the cognition takes place. For example, one may first know something through a probable middle term, and later through a middle term that is necessary. This, however, cannot take place in God because His essence, which for Him is the medium of knowing, never changes. Secondly, it can come from the intellectual power which causes a man of greater acumen to know something more penetratingly, even through the same medium, than another man does. This, too, however, cannot take place in God, since the power by which He knows is His own essence, and this does not change. Hence, it remains that God’s knowledge does not change in any way what so ever from the point of view of the knower.
But from the point of view of the thing known, knowledge can also change in its truth and falsity-, because, if a thing is changed while the judgment of it remains the same, the judgment which was previously true is 110w false. This, however, cannot take place in God either, since the intuition of God’s cognition is directed w a thing as it is in its presentness, that is, in so far as it has already received this rather than that determination; and in this respect it can change no more. Even if that thing should receive another state, that state will again f all under the divine vision in the same way; hence, God’s knowledge changes in no way whatsoever.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The assimilation of the knower to the thing known does not take place through a conformity of nature but through a representation. So, it is not necessary for the knowledge of changing things to change.
2. Although the thing known by God may be other than it is if considered in itself, it f ails under God’s cognition inasmuch as it cannot be other than it is, as we have already shown.
3. All knowledge, whether had by receiving from things or by an impression upon the things themselves, takes place according to the manner of the knower, since both take place in so far as a likeness of the thing known is in the knower. Moreover, what exists in someone is in him according to the manner of him in whom it exists.
4. That to which God’s knowledge is related is changeless in so far as it fails under His knowledge. Therefore, His knowledge does not change, either, will respect to its truth, which could be changed by a change of the afore-mentioned relation.
5. When it is said, "God can know what He does not know," one can understand this in two ways—even if we are speaking of His knowledge of vision. First, we can understand it in its composite sense, that is, on the supposition that God has not known what He is said to be able to know. In this sense it is false; for the following two things cannot be true simultaneously, namely, that God should have been ignorant of something, and later know that thing. The proposition can also be taken in a divided sense. In this sense, no supposition or condition of His power is included, and in this sense it is true, as is clear from our discussion.
Although it may, in some sense, be conceded that God can know what He did not know previously, we cannot concede in any sense that He can know more than He knows; for, since the word more implies a comparison to what has previously existed, it is always under stood in a composite sense. For the same reason, we can in no way con cede that God’s knowledge can be increased or diminished.
6. We concede the sixth argument.
7. As we said previously, God knows propositions without joining and separating. Just as God knows many different things in the same manner, both when they exist and when they do not, so does He know in the same manner different propositions, both when they are true and when they are false, because He knows each to be true at the time when it is true. For example, He knows this proposition, "Socrates is running," to be true when it is true; similarly, this proposition, "Soc rates will run," and so forth. Hence, although it is not true now that Socrates is running but that he has run, nevertheless, God knows each because He simultaneously intuits each time when each proposition is true. If He knew a proposition by forming it in Himself, however, then He would know a proposition only when it is true, as happens in us. Then His knowledge would change.
8. The manner of knowing is in the knower himself. The thing known, however, is not in the knower according to its own nature. Therefore, a variation in the manner of knowing would make knowledge vary, but changes in the things known would not.
9. The answer to this is already clear.
10. This act of power terminates outside the agent in the thing as it is in its own nature—in which the thing has a changeable act of being. So, if we consider the thing produced, we must concede that it is given its act of existence by means of a change. But knowledge concerns things in so far as they are, in some way, in the knower. So, since the knower is unchanging, He knows things in an unchanging mariner.
11. Although God knows other things through His essence, He does not pass from one thing to another; for in the same intuition He knows both His essence and other things.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 14, 8 I Sentences 38, 1, 1.
Difficulties:
It seems not, for
1. Origen says: "A thing will be, not because God knows that it will be, but, because it will be, it is known by God before it exists." Consequently, it seems that things are the cause of His knowledge rather than conversely.
2. Given the cause, the effect follows. But God’s knowledge has been from eternity. Therefore, if His knowledge is the cause of things, it seems that things have existed from eternity. But this is heretical.
3. A necessary effect follows a necessary cause. Hence, even demonstrations, which are made through a necessary cause, have necessary conclusions. But God’s knowledge is necessary since it is eternal. Therefore, all things which are known by God would be necessary. But this is absurd.
4. If God’s knowledge is the cause of things, then it will be related to things in the way in which things are related to our knowledge. But things determine the type of knowledge we have; for instance, of necessary things we have necessary knowledge. Therefore, if God’s knowledge were the cause of things, it would impose the mode of necessity on all things. But this is false.
5. A first cause has a more powerful influence upon an effect than a second. But, if God’s knowledge is the cause of things, it will be a first cause; and, since necessity follows in the effects of necessary second ary causes, much more will necessity in things follow from God’s knowledge. Thus, the original difficulty stands.
6. Knowledge has a more essential relation to things to which it stands as their cause than to things to which it stands as their effect; for a cause leaves its impression upon an effect, but an effect does not leave its impression upon the cause. Now, our knowledge, which is related to things as their effect, requires necessity in the things known if it is to be necessary itself. Therefore, if God’s knowledge were the cause of things, much more would it demand necessity in the things it knows. Consequently, God would not know contingent beings, and this is contrary to what was said previously.
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says: "Not because they are does God know all creatures, spiritual and corporeal, but they are because He knows them." Therefore, God’s knowledge is the cause of created things.
2’. God’s knowledge is, in a sense, the art of the things that are to be created; hence Augustine says: "The Word is an artistic conception filled will the intelligible characters of living things." But art is the cause of artistic products. Therefore, God’s knowledge is the cause of created things.
3'. The opinion of Anaxagoras, approved by the Philosopher, seems to support this view; for he asserted that the first principle of things was an intellect, which moved and distinguished all things.
De veritate EN 25