De veritate EN 38
38
The word that is predicated metaphorically of God, namely, a creature, which is called His word because it manifests Him, undoubtedly pertains to the entire Trinity. The object of our present inquiry, how ever, is the word in so far as it is predicated properly of God. Viewed superficially, the question seems to be very simple to solve, because the Word implies a certain origin according to which the divine Persons can be distinguished. Considered more profoundly, however, the question is more difficult, since we find in God certain things that imply origin, not in reality, but only according to our manner of thinking. For example, operation undoubtedly implies something proceeding from the one who operates, yet that procession is only according to our manner of thinking. Consequently, operation is predicated essentially of God, not personally, because God’s power and operations do not differ from His essence. Hence, it is not immediately evident whether the Word implies a real procession —as son does— or whether it implies merely a procession according to our way of thinking—as operation does, and so whether the Word is an essential or a personal predicate.
For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception of the intellect—whether the conception can be signified by a simple expression, as is true when the intellect forms the quiddities of things, or whether it can be signified only by a complex expression, as is true when the intellect composes and divides. Now, for us every object of understanding really proceeds from something else. For example, conceptions of conclusions proceed from principles, conceptions of the quiddities of later things proceed from quiddities of things prior, or at least an actual conception proceeds from habitual knowledge. Now, this is universally true of whatever we understand, whether it be understood by its essence or by its likeness; for conception itself is an effect of the act of understanding. Consequently, when the mind understands itself, its conception is not the mind but some thing expressed by the mind’s act of knowledge. Hence, two things pertain to the nature of our intellectual word: it is understood, and it is expressed by an agent distinct from itself.
Therefore, if word is predicated of God because of its resemblance to both of these characteristics, then the name of word implies a real procession—and not merely because of our manner of thinking. On the other hand, if it is predicated of God merely because of its resemblance to one of these characteristics, namely, that it is understood, then word as applied to God does not imply a real procession but one only according to our manner of thinking, such as the understood implies. This, however, would not be taking word in its proper meaning, because it is not taken in its proper meaning if something belonging to its nature is entirely left out. Consequently, if word is taken in its proper meaning when used of God, it can be predicated of Him only personally. However, if it is taken in a broad sense, it can also be predicated essentially. Since, however, we should use words as most people use them, as the Philosopher says, usage should be followed very carefully when it comes to the meanings of words. Moreover, since all the saints commonly use word as a personal predication, this is even a stronger reason for saying that it is predicated personally.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The nature of a word includes not only the property of making something manifest but also a real procession of one thing from an other. Now, although the divine essence manifests itself, the essence does not come from itself in a real procession. Hence, it cannot be called a word unless it is called this because it is identical will that Person, as, for the same reason, the essence is called the Father or the Son.
2. The knowledge that is included in the definition of a word should be understood as knowledge uttered by another. In us, this is actual knowledge. Now, although knowledge or wisdom is predicated essentially of God, generated wisdom is predicated only personally. Similarly, Anselm’s statement, "Speak signifies intuiting by thinking," can be understood if speak be taken, in its proper sense, in its relation to intellectual intuition. In this sense, we can say that something proceeds through speech, namely, the understood.
3. The intellectual conception is a medium between the intellect and the thing known, because through its mediation the intellectual operation attains the thing. Hence, the intellectual conception is not only that which is understood but also that by which the thing is under stood. Consequently, that which is understood can be said to be both the thing itself as well as an intellectual conception. Similarly, that which is spoken interiorly can be said to be both the thing expressed by the word and the word itself, as is also true of the exterior word, because both the word and the thing the word signifies are expressed when the word is spoken. I assert, therefore, that the Father is spoken, not as a word, but as a thing spoken by the Word. The same is true of the Holy Spirit, because the Son manifests the entire Trinity. Consequently, by Uttering His own one W7ord, the Father utters all three Persons.
4. Here Anselm seems to contradict himself, for he says that Word is predicated only personally and belongs only to the Son, while to speak belongs to all three Persons. To speak, however, means nothing else but to send forth a word from oneself. Augustine’s statement also seems to contradict Anselm’s, for he says that not each of the Persons in the Trinity speaks, but only the Father speaks by means of His Word. Consequently, just as the Word, properly speaking, is predicated only personally of God and belongs only to the Son, so also speech belongs only to the Father. Anselm, however, is taking to speak in its general meaning of to understand, and word in its proper sense. If he wished, he could have taken these words the other way around.
5. As used of us, speaking signifies not merely understanding but understanding plus the expression from within oneself of some conception; and we cannot understand in any way other than by forming a conception of this sort. Therefore, properly speaking, every act of understanding is, in our case, an act of uttering. God, however, can understand without something really proceeding from Him, because in Him the one understanding, the understood, and intellection itself are all identical. This is not true of us, however. Consequently, properly speaking, not all understanding in God is said to be uttering.
6. Just as the Word is said to be the Father’s knowledge only in the sense that it is knowledge generated by the Father, so also it is called the operative power of the Father because it is a power proceeding from Him. Now, a power that proceeds is predicated personally, and an operative power proceeding from the Father is predicated in this manner.
7. One thing may proceed from another thing in two ways; First, it may proceed from it as action proceeds from an agent or as an operation proceeds from one operating. Second, it may proceed as a term of an operation from one operating. Now, the procession of an operation from the one operating does not distinguish a thing that is substantially existing from another substantially existing thing; it merely distinguishes a perfection from what is perfected, because an operation is a perfection of the one operating. On the other hand, the procession of the term of an operation distinguishes one thing from another. Now, in God the distinction between a perfection and what is perfected cannot be a real distinction. There are, however, distinct things in God, namely, the three Persons. Hence, a procession signified as existing in God as an operation from the one operating is a procession merely according to our manner of thinking. But a procession signified as that of a thing proceeding from a principle can really be found in God.
Moreover, there is this difference between the intellect and the will: an operation of the will terminates in things, in which good and evil are found; but an operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which the true and the false are found, as is said in the Metaphysics. Consequently, the will does not have anything proceeding from it except in the manner of an operation. The intellect, however, has some thing in itself that proceeds from it, not only in the mariner of an operation, but also in the manner of a thing that is the term of an operation. Consequently, the word is signified as a thing that proceeds, but love, as an operation that proceeds. Hence, love is not such as to be predicated personally in the same way in which word is.
8. If one does not consider the distinction of Persons, he will not say that God utters Himself, properly speaking; and those who do not admit that there are distinct Persons in God do not understand this uttering in its proper sense.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
One could easily answer the objections proposed here if he wished to support the opposite opinion.
1’. To the difficulty drawn from the words of Augustine one could say that Augustine understands word in so far as it implies a real origin.
2’. One could reply to this by pointing out that, even if the preposition will implies a distinction, this distinction is not implied in word. Hence, from the fact that the 'Word is said to be will the Father, one cannot conclude that it is predicated personally, because the Word is also said to be "God of God" and "God will God."
3’. One could answer by saying that this relation is merely conceptual.
4'. This may be answered as the first difficulty is answered.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 2; I Sentences 27, 2, 2, sol. 2; Contra errores graec., c. 12; in Hebr., c. I, lectura 2 (P. 13:672b).
Difficulties:
It seems that it is, for
1. Basil says: "The Holy Spirit is related to the Son in the same way in which the Son is related to the Father; and, for this reason, the Son is the word of God, and the Spirit is the word of the Son." Therefore, the Holy Spirit can be called a word.
2. In the Epistle to the Hebrews (1:3) the following is said of the Son: "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power...
Hence, the Son has a word proceeding from Himself by which He upholds all things. But in God no one proceeds from the Son except the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Holy Spirit can be called the Word.
3. As Augustine says: "The Word is loving knowledge." But, just as knowledge is appropriated to the Son, so love is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Consequently, the Word is a proper name for the Holy Spirit, as well as for the Son.
4. The Gloss on "upholding all things by the word of his power" (He 1,3) says that word should be taken as meaning a command. But a command is classified as a sign of the will. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will, it seems that He can be called Word.
5. The notion of word implies a making manifest. Now, the Holy Spirit manifests the Father and the Son, just as the Son manifests the Father; for, as we read in the Gospel of St. John (i6: 13): "the Holy Spirit teaches all truth." Therefore, the Holy Spirit should be called Word.
To the Contrary:
Augustine says: "The Son is called Word for the same reason that He is called Son." Now, the Son is called Son because He is generated. Therefore, He is called Word, also, because He is generated. The Holy Spirit, however, is not generated; hence, He is not a word.
39
Word and image are used differently by us and our holy men than they were used by the ancient Greek doctors, who used these names to signify everything that proceeds from the Godhead, and indifferently called the Son and the Holy Spirit Word and Image. Our saints and ourselves, however, have followed the custom of canonical Scripture in the use of these words; and Scripture seldom if ever uses Word or Image for any one except the Son. We are not now concerned will image, but that our use of word is reasonable enough will appear from the following.
Word implies a making manifest, and manifestation is found essentially only in the intellect. If something outside the intellect is said to "manifest" this is true only to the extent that something of it remains in the intellect. Hence, what proximately manifests is within the intellect, even though what remotely manifests can be outside of it. Consequently, word is used properly of that which proceeds from the intellect of that which does not proceed from the intellect it can be used only metaphorically; that is, it can be used of such a thing only in so far as it manifests in some way or other. I say, therefore, that in God only the Son proceeds from the intellect, because He proceeds from one Person; the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from two Persons, proceeds from the will. Consequently, the Holy Spirit can be called Word only metaphorically, that is, only in so far as whatever manifests can be called a word. The quotation from Basil should be under stood in this sense.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The reply is clear from our discussion.
2. According to Basil, the "word" referred to in this passage is the Holy Spirit. If this is true, our reply is the same as we gave to the first difficulty. Or, if we follow the Gloss, the "word" referred to is the command of the Son. This is called the word metaphorically, since we ordinarily command by means of a word.
3. Knowledge belongs to the notion of word since it implies, as it were, the very essence of word; but love belongs to the notion of word, not as something pertaining to its essence, but as something that accompanies a word. The passage cited shows this. Hence, one cannot conclude that the Holy Spirit is a word, but, rather, that He proceeds from the Word.
4. A word manifests not only what is in the intellect but also what is in the will, in so far as the will itself is also understood. Hence, even though a command is a sign of the will, it can be called a word and it pertains to the intellect.
5. The reply is clear from our discussion.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 37, 2, ad 3; III, 3, 8; I Sentences 27, 2, 3; Quodibet IV, 4, 6.
Difficulties:
It seems not, for
1. When we say that the Father utters Himself, all that is signified is one uttering and something uttered, and the Father alone is signified by both. Now, since the Father does not produce the Word from Himself except as He utters Himself, it seems that creatures are not uttered by the Word which proceeds from the Father.
2. The word by which each thing is expressed is its likeness. "The Word cannot be called a likeness of creatures," as Anselm proves, be cause either it would resemble creatures perfectly—and then it would be changeable and without its sublime immutability—or it would not resemble them perfectly and then it would lose its sublime truth, be cause the truth of a likeness is in direct proportion to its conformity will that whose likeness it is. Hence, the Son is not the Word by which creatures are uttered.
3. The word of creatures is said to be in God as the word of his products is in a craftsman. Now, the word of his products in a crafts man is merely the plan he has will respect to them. Therefore, the word of creatures in God is merely the plan He has made will respect to creatures. But God’s plans for His creatures are predicated of the essence, not of a person. Hence, the word by which creatures are uttered is not the Word that is a personal predicate.
4. Every word is related as an archetype or image to that which is uttered by it. When a word causes a thing, as happens in the practical intellect, then that word is an archetype. When, however, a thing causes a word, as happens in our speculative intellect, then that word is an image. Now, in God there cannot be the word of a creature that is the image of a creature. Hence, the word of creatures that is in God must be an archetype of creatures. But the divine archetype of creatures is an idea. Therefore, the divine word of creatures is simply an idea. An idea, however, is predicated of God, not personally, but essentially. Consequently, the Word which is predicated personally of God, and by which the Father utters Himself, is not the word by which creatures are uttered.
5. The distance separating creatures from God is greater than that which separates them from other creatures. Now, in God there are many ideas of different creatures; hence, the Father does not utter Himself and creatures in the same word.
6. According to Augustine: "The Son is called the Word for the same reason that He is called an image." Now, the Son is not an image of creatures but only of the Father. Hence, He is not the word of creatures.
7. Every word proceeds from that whose word it is. But the Son does not proceed from creatures. Hence, He is not the word by which creatures are uttered.
To the Contrary:
1’. Anselm says that by uttering Himself the Father uttered all creatures. But the Word by which He uttered Himself is the Son. There fore, by the Word, which is the Son, the Father utters all creatures.
2’. Augustine explains the expression, "He spoke and it was made," as meaning: "He begot the Word in which all things were in order to come into existence." Therefore, by the Word which is the Son the Father uttered all creatures.
3'. By the same act, the artist is turned toward his art and his work. But God Himself is the eternal art from which creatures are produced like works of art. Therefore, in the same act, the Father is turned to ward Himself and to all creatures. Hence, by uttering Himself, He utters all creatures.
4'. Whatever is subsequent is reduced to what is first in that class as to its cause. Now, creatures are uttered by God. Therefore, they are reduced to the first which God utters. But God first utters Himself. Hence, by the fact that He utters Himself, He utters all creatures.
40
The Son proceeds from the Father in the manner of nature inasmuch as He proceeds as a Son, and in the manner of intellect inasmuch as He proceeds as the Word. We find both types of processions in ourselves, although not in the same respect. For in our case nothing proceeds from something else both in the manner of nature and in the manner of intellect, because will us the act of understanding and the act of existing are not the same —which they are in God.
Moreover, in both types of procession the difference between pro cession from God and procession from us is similar. For a human son, proceeding in the manner of nature from a human father, receives only a part of his father’s substance, not all of it; but the Son of God, proceeding in the manner of nature from the Father, receives all of His Father’s nature in such a way that both the Father and the Son have absolutely one and the same numerical nature.
This difference is also found will respect to the intellectual processions. The word expressed in us by actual consideration and arising, as it were, from a consideration of a thing known previously, or at least from habitual knowledge, does not receive into itself the whole of that from which it had its origin. For, in the conception of one word, the intellect expresses not all but only part of what it possesses in its habitual knowledge. Similarly, what is contained in one conclusion does not express all that was contained virtually in its principle. However, for the divine Word to be perfect, it must express whatever is contained in that from which it had its origin, especially since God sees all things, not in many intuitions, but in one. Consequently, what ever is contained in the Father’s knowledge is necessarily and entirely expressed by His only Word and in the very same manner in which all things are contained in His knowledge. In this way it is a true word, whose intellectual content corresponds to that of its principle. Through His knowledge, moreover, the Father knows Himself, and, by knowing Himself, He knows all other things. 1-lence, His Word chiefly expresses the Father and, as a result, all other things which the Father knows by knowing Himself. Therefore, because the Son is a word that perfectly expresses the Father, the Son expresses all creatures. This sequence is outlined by the words of Anselm, who said that by uttering Himself the Father uttered all creatures.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. When we say that the Father utters Himself we signify that in this utterance every creature is included, since the Father’s knowledge contains all creatures, being, as it were, their archetype.
2. Anselm is taking likeness in its strict sense, as Dionysius does when he says that, when things are ordered equally to each other, we receive a mutual likeness; that is, one thing can be said to be similar to the other and the other similar to it. But, properly speaking, no such mutual likeness is found between a cause and its effect. We say that a picture of Hercules resembles Hercules, but not that Hercules resembles the picture. Hence, since the divine Word is not, like our word, made in the likeness of a creature, but rather the opposite is true, Anselm means to say simply that the Word is not a likeness of creatures but creatures are a likeness of the Word.
However, if likeness is taken in its broader meaning, then we can say that the Word is a likeness of creatures, not, however, in the sense that it is an image of creatures, but in the sense that it is their archetype. Taking the term in this meaning, Augustine calls ideas likenesses of things.
Finally, it does not follow that the highest truth is not in the Word merely from the fact that the Word remains unchanged while existing creatures change; for the truth of a word does not demand that it be a likeness will the same nature as that of the thing declared by the word; it is enough if it is a true representation of the thing, as we have pointed out previously.
3. The divine plan for creatures is called a word, properly speaking, only if this plan proceeds from another—and is therefore a begotten plan. This, however, like begotten wisdom, is a personal predication. Taken simply, the divine plan is an essential predication.
4. A word differs from an idea, for the latter means an exemplary cause and nothing else, but the word in God of a creature means an exemplary form that is drawn from something else. Hence, a divine idea pertains to the essence, but a word, to a person.
5. Even though the greatest possible distance separates God from a creature because of what is proper to each, God is the model in whose likeness creatures are created. There is no creature that is a model for another creature. Hence, in that Word by which God is expressed every creature is expressed; but the idea by which one creature is expressed does not express another. Thus, this is another difference between the Word and an idea. The reason for this is that an idea is directly related to a creature; hence, for many creatures there are many ideas. On the other hand, the Word is directly related to God, whom the Word expresses first, and then, as a consequence, expresses creatures. Because all creatures are one as they exist in God there is only one Word for all of them.
6. When Augustine says that the Son "is called a Word for the same reason that He is called an Image," he is referring to the distinguishing personal characteristic of the Son, which remains the same whether He is called, because of it, the Son, the Word, or the Image of the Father. But in the manner of signifying, these three predicates are not of the same type, for word implies not only the notion of origin and imitation but also that of manifestation. Consequently, the Word is, in a fashion, the word of creatures, because creatures are manifested by means of the Word.
7. A word can belong to something in different ways. First, it can belong to one who is speaking. Taken in this sense, it proceeds from him whose word it is. Second, it can belong to that which is made manifest by the word. In this sense, the word does not necessarily proceed from that whose word it is, unless the knowledge from which the word proceeds has been caused by things. However, this is not true of God’s knowledge. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.
Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.
Difficulties:
It seems not, for
1. Every name that implies a relation to creatures is predicated of God only from the beginning of time, for example. Creator and Lord. But Word is predicated of God from all eternity. Therefore, it does not imply a relation to creatures.
2. All relatives are relative in being or in predication. Now, the Word is not related to creatures in being, because then it would depend on creatures. Nor is it related to them merely in predication, because then it would have to be related to creatures in one of the grammatical cases. And since in this type of relation one thing is usually referred to another by means of the genitive case, we would have to say: "The Word is of creatures." This statement, however, Anselm denies. Therefore, the 'Word does not imply any relation to creatures.
3. Any name implying a relation to creatures cannot be understood unless the actual or potential existence of creatures is also understood, because, if one understands one of two relatives, he also understands the other. But, even if some creature is not understood as existing now or in the future, the divine Word, by which the Father utters Himself, is understood. Therefore, the Word does not imply any relation to creatures.
4. The relation of God to creatures can be only that of a cause to an effect. But, as Dionysius says, any name that implies an effect in creatures is common to the entire Trinity. However, Word is not this kind of a name. Hence, it does not imply any relation to creatures.
5. God is not understood as having a relation to creatures unless it be by His wisdom, goodness, and power. But these attributes are predicated of the Word merely by appropriation; and since Word is not merely an appropriated but a proper name, it seems that Word does not imply a relation to creatures.
6. Even though man arranges things, the word man does not imply a relation to the things he has arranged. Therefore, even though all things are arranged by the Word, Word does not imply a relation to them.
7. Like son, word is a relative predication. Now, the entire relation of the son terminates in the father, for he is not the son of any one but the father. Therefore, the entire relation of the Word terminates similarly. Hence, Word does not imply a relation to creatures.
8. According to the Philosopher, every relative is said to be such only will relation to one other thing. Otherwise, the relative would have two essences, since the essence of a relative lies simply in its being related to another. Now, the Word is predicated as relative to the Father; therefore, it is not predicated as relative to creatures.
9. If the same word is applied to specifically different things, it is used of them equivocally, as dog is used of hounds and fish. Now, superiority and inferiority are specifically different types of relations. If, therefore, one word implies both relations, then that word is used equivocally. But the relation of the 'Word to creatures is simply one of superiority, and the relation of the Word to the Father is, in a way, one of inferiority—not because of any unequal dignity, but because of the authority which a principle has. Hence, the Word which implies a relation to the Father does not imply a relation to creatures, unless it is taken equivocally.
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says: "'In the beginning was the Word. (John I:
The Word is called Logos in Greek, and in Latin it means an intelligible character and word. In this passage, however, word is better interpreted as meaning a relation, not only to the Father, but also to those things which are made by His power, acting through the Word." This statement clearly supports our position.
2’. Explaining the words of the Psalmist, "God hath spoken once" (Ps 61,12), the Gloss says: 'Once, that is, God has eternally begotten the Word in which He disposes all things." Now, disposition implies a relation to the things disposed. Therefore, Word is predicated relatively.
3’. Every word implies a relation to what is signified by it. But, as Anselm says, by uttering Himself God utters all creatures. Therefore, the Word implies a relation, not only to the Father, but also to creatures.
4’. From the very fact of His being the Son, the Son perfectly represents the Father in that which is intrinsic to the Father. Now, the Word, by its very name, adds the notion of making manifest. But there can be no manifestation other than that in which the Father is manifested through creatures— a manifestation, as it were, to the exterior. Therefore, the Word implies a relation to creatures.
5’. Dionysius says that God is praised as being a word or principle of intelligibility because "He is the giver of wisdom and reason." From this it is clear that the Word as predicated of God implies the notion of cause. Now, a cause is predicated relatively to its effect. Therefore, the Word implies a relation to creatures.
6’. The practical intellect is related to the things carried out through its instrumentality. Now, the divine Word is the word of an intellect that is practical, because, as Damascene says, the Word is an operative word. Therefore, it implies a relation to creatures.
41
Whenever two things are related to each other in such a way that one depends upon the other but the other does not depend upon it, there is a real relation in the dependent member, but in the independent member the relation is merely one of reason—simply because one thing cannot be understood as being related to another without that other being understood as being related to it. The notion of such a relation becomes clear if we consider knowledge, which depends on what is known, although the latter does not depend on it.
Consequently, since all creatures depend on God but He does not depend on them, there are real relations in creatures, referring them to God. The opposite relations in God to creatures, however, are merely conceptual relations; but, because names are signs of concepts, certain names we use for God imply a relation to creatures, even though, as we have said, this relation is merely conceptual. The only real relations in God are those by which the divine persons are distinguished from each other.
Among relative terms, we find that some are used to signify the relations themselves, for example, the word likeness. Others are used to signify something upon which a relation follows. For example, knowledge is used to signify a certain quality upon which a particular relation follows. We find this difference also in the relative names used of God, both in the names used of Him as from all eternity, as well as in those used of Him as from the beginning of time. For Father is used of Him as from all eternity, and Lord as from the beginning of lime; and each of these words is used to signify the relations themselves. But Creator, used of God as from the beginning of lime, is employed to signify a divine action upon which a certain relation follows. The same is true of Word; it is used to signify something absolute to which something relative is joined; for, as Augustine says, the Word is simply "begotten Wisdom."
This, however, does not prevent Word from being a personal predication, because God begetting or God begotten is, like Father, predicated personally. It may happen, however, that an absolute thing is able to have a relation to many other things. This is why a name that is used to signify something absolute upon which a relation follows can be spoken of as being relative to many things, and it is in this manner that knowledge is used. Inasmuch as it is knowledge, it is relative to what is known, but inasmuch as it is a particular accident or form, it is related to the knower. In the same way, word is related to the one who utters it and to that which is uttered by the word. In the latter relation, it can be taken in two ways: first, according as the two are interchangeable, and in this sense we speak of a word as being related to what is spoken; second, according as the word is related to a thing to which the character of being uttered belongs. And since the Father principally utters Himself by begetting His Word, and, as a consequence of this, utters creatures, the Word is principally, and, as it were, essentially referred to the Father, but consequently, and, as it were, accidentally, to creatures; for it is only accidental to the 'Word that creatures are uttered through it.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. That argument is true of those names which imply an actual relation to creatures, but not of those which imply a habitual relation. A habitual relation is one that does not require the actual existence of a creature. All the relations that follow upon an act of the soul are of this kind, because the will and the intellect can be related to a thing that does not actually exist. Now, the Word implies an intellectual procession. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
2. The Word is spoken of as being related to creatures, but this is not a real relation in the sense that this relation to creatures really exists in God. It is rather a relation merely according to predication. More over, there is no reason why this relation should not be expressed by some grammatical case; for I can say that He is the Word of creatures in the sense that the Word is about creatures, although not from them. It is this last sense that Anselm denies. Besides, even if the 'Word were not referred to creatures by means of some grammatical case, it would be enough if it is referred to them in any manner whatsoever; for ex- ample, if it were referred to them by a preposition joined will some case. Then one would say that the Word "is for creatures," that is, for constituting them.
3. That argument holds for those names whose notions imply a relation to creatures. But this name is not that type, as is evident from our discussion in the body of the article. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.
4. Inasmuch as Word implies something absolute, it expresses a relation of causality over creatures; but inasmuch as it implies a relation of real origin, it is a personal name; and under this aspect it expresses no relation to creatures.
5. From our last answer, the answer to the fifth difficulty is evident.
6. The Word is not merely that by which the arrangement of all creatures takes place; it is the arrangement itself which the Father makes of things to be created. Hence, in some way, the Word is related to creatures.
7. The name son implies a relation only to that principle from which He comes, but word implies a relation both to the principle by which the Word was uttered and to that which is, as it were, its term, namely, that which is manifested through the word. What is manifested, of course, is principally the Father; but also, and, as a consequence, creatures are manifested, which, however, can in no way be a principle of a divine Person. Hence, Son implies no relation at all to creatures, such as Word does.
8. That argument is based on those names used to signify relations themselves, for it is impossible for one relation to terminate in many things, unless these are in some way one.
9. The same reply may be given to the ninth difficulty.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
The arguments supporting the opposite opinion conclude that the Word is in some way related to creatures, but not that it implies this relation essentially or, as it were, principally-. In this limited sense, they must be granted.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 18, 4, ad 3; Contra Gentiles IV, x in Evang. Joannis, c. 1, lectura z (P. Io:293a); De diff. verbi div. et hum. (Perr. I:n. 5).
Difficulties:
It seems that things do not exist more truly in the Word, for
1. A thing exists more truly where it exists through its essence than where it exists only through its likeness. But things exist in the Word only through their likeness, and in themselves through their essence. Therefore, they exist more truly in themselves than in the Word.
2. But it was said that they exist more nobly in the Word because in the Word they have a more noble act of existence.—On the contrary, as Augustine says, a material thing has a more noble act of existence in our soul than it has in itself, yet it exists more truly in itself than it does in our soul. For the same reason, a thing exists more truly in itself than it does in the Word.
3. What exists actually exists more truly than what exists potentially. But a thing existing in itself is in act; in the Word, however, it exists only potentially, like a product existing in a craftsman. There fore, a thing exists more truly in itself than it does in the Word.
4. The ultimate perfection of a thing is its operation. Now, things existing in themselves have their own operations—which they do not have as they exist in the Word. Therefore, they exist more truly in themselves than in the Word.
5. Only things of one character can be compared. Now, the act of existence which a thing in itself has is not of the same character as that which it has in the Word. Therefore, at least one cannot say that a thing exists more truly in the Word than in itself.
To the Contrary:
1'. As Anselm says, a creature as it exists in the Creator is a creative essence. But an uncreated act of existence exists more truly than the created act. Therefore, a thing has existence in the Word more truly than it has in itself.
2'. 'We assert that there are ideas in the divine mind, just as Plato asserted that the ideas of things exist outside of it. Now, according to Plato, the "separated man" was more truly man than the material man; hence, he called the separated man "man in himself." For this reason, and, indeed, because of the position of the Faith, things exist more truly in the Word than in themselves.
3'. That which is truest in any class is the measure for the entire class. But the likenesses of things existing in the Word are the measures of the truth of all things, because a thing is said to be true in so far as it imitates that upon which it was modeled, and this archetype exists in the Word. Therefore, things exist more truly in the Word than in themselves.
De veritate EN 38