De veritate EN 91
An agent acts according to its manner of existing. Hence, things that are material and circumscribed by place have actions that are material and circumscribed by place; and things that are spiritual act in a spiritual manner only. Consequently, because an angel as a knower is in no way circumscribed by place, the action of his intellect has no relation to place. Hence, since his speech is an operation of his intellect, local distance or proximity does not affect it. Therefore, one angel can understand the speech of another, whether that other be in a near or distant place—in the sense in which we say that angels are in place.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. That arrival and departure should be understood, not according to place, but according to the angels turning w one another.
2. The statement that an angel is where he operates is to be under stood as referring to an operation which he carries out on some body; and this operation gets its place from that in which it terminates. Angelic speech, however, is not an operation of this kind. Hence, the argument does not follow.
3. The cries which the Seraphim are said to have made signify rather the magnitude of the things they spoke about, namely, the unity of God’s essence and the trinity of the persons; for they said: "Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of hosts..."(Is 6,3).
4. As already stated, the angel addressed does not receive anything from the one speaking; but, through species within himself, he knows the other angel as well as what he is saying. Consequently, there is no need of positing a medium by which something could be carried from one angel to another.
5. Augustine is speaking about the natural knowledge souls have. Through this, not even the saints can know what takes place here on earth. They can know these events, however, by means of the glory they have received. Gregory states this explicitly when commenting on that verse in Job (14:21): "Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand." But angels have a natural knowledge that is more perfect than that of the separated soul. Hence, no parallel can be drawn between a soul and an angel.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107, 5.
It seems not, for
For angelic speech, all that is required is an intelligible species and a turning to another angel. But, if that species and turning are known by one angel, so they are also known by another. Therefore, what an angel says is equally perceived by all.
2. Using the same "nods," one angel can speak to all the angels. Consequently, if an angel knows the speech by which another angel ad dresses him, he will also know the speech by which he addresses others.
3. Whoever sees an angel perceives the species by which that angel understands and speaks. But angels always see one another. Therefore, one angel always knows what another is speaking, whether that angel is speaking to him or to some other angel.
4. If a man speaks, he is heard equally by all those standing at the same distance from him, unless there is some defect in one of the hearers, that is, if he is hard of hearing. Now, sometimes another angel is by nature or locally closer to the angel speaking than is the angel is being addressed. Therefore, the angel speaking is heard by others than those whom he addresses.
To the Contrary:
It seems inconsistent to assert that the angels cannot do something which we can do. But a man can confide to another what he has conceived in his heart in such a way that it remains hidden from others. Consequently, an angel is also able to speak to another without letting others know what he is saying.
As is clear from what was said previously, the thought of one an- gel comes to the knowledge of another after the manner of spiritual speech from the fact that the latter angel is actuated by a species not only subjectively but also will reference to the former; and this occurs by the will of the speaker.
Now, it is not necessary that things subject to the will should be related to all in the same way, but only as the will determines. Hence, spiritual speech is not related to all angels equally, but only as the will of the angel who is speaking shah determine. Consequently, if, by his own will, an angel is actualized will respect co some intellectual species which he has directed to only one other angel, his speech will be known by that angel only; and, if his species has an order to several, several angels will know it.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. In angelic speech the turning or direction required is not one that is known but one that makes known. Hence, when one angel turns to another, his turning makes the other know his thought.
2. In general, there is one "nod" by which an angel speaks to all angels; but, in particular, there are as many "nods" as there are turnings to the different angels. Consequently, every angel knows according to the "nod" made to him.
3. Even though one angel sees another, he does not necessarily see the species by which the other angel is actually thinking, unless that other angel turns to him.
4. Human speech makes another person hear by an action physically necessary, namely, by driving air to the ear of the listener. But, as explained previously, this does not take place in angelic speech. Here, everything depends on the will of the angel speaking.
Parallel readings: I Sentences 3,4, Summa Theol., 1,54, 3; 79, 1; 93,7; Q. D. de spir. creat., n; Q. D. de anima, 12.
It seems that it is the essence of the soul, for
1. Augustine says: "The terms mind and spirit are not taken relatively," but denote the essence, and nothing but the essence, of the soul. Therefore, the mind is the essence of the soul.
2. Different classes of powers of the soul are found only in its essence. But the appetitive and intellective are different classes of powers of the soul. For The Soul gives five most general classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellective. But the mind includes within it appetitive and intellective powers, for Augustine puts understanding and will in the mind. It seems, then, that the mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.
3. Augustine says: "We are in the image of God by the fact that we exist, that we know that we exist, and that we love this knowledge and this existence." He also bases the attribution of the likeness of God in us upon knowledge, mind, and love. Since, then, loving is the act of love, and knowing is the act of knowledge, it seems that existence is the act of the mind. But existence is the act of essence. There fore, the mind is the very essence of the soul.
4. Mind has the same nature in angels and in us. But the very essence of an angel is its mind. For this reason Dionysius frequently calls angels divine or intellectual minds. Therefore, our mind, also, is the very essence of our soul.
5. Augustine says: "Memory, understanding, and will are one mind, one essence, one life." Therefore, as life belongs to the essence of the soul, so does mind.
6. An accident cannot be the source of a substantial distinction. But, by his possession of mind, man is substantially distinguished from brute animals. So, mind is not an accident. But a power of the soul is a property of the soul, according to Avicenna, and so it belongs to the class of accident. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.
7. Acts specifically different do not come from one power. But, as is clear from Augustine, acts specifically different—namely: remembering, understanding, and willing come from the mind. Therefore, mind is not a power of the soul, but its very essence.
8. One power is not the subject of another power. But mind is the subject of the image of the Trinity, which is constituted by the three powers. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the essence of the soul.
9. No power contains in itself other powers. But the mind includes understanding and will. Therefore, it is not a power, but the essence.
To the Contrary:
1'. Powers of the soul are its only parts. But mind is the higher part of the soul, as Augustine says. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul.
2’. The essence of the soul is common to all the powers, because all are rooted in it. But mind is not common to all the powers, because it is distinguished from sense. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.
3’. We cannot speak of highest and lowest in the essence of the soul. But there are highest and lowest in mind. For Augustine divides mind into higher and lower reason. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul and not its essence.
4'. The essence of the soul is the principle of life. But mind is not the
principle of life, but of understanding. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers.
5'. A subject is not predicated of an accident. But mind is predicated of memory, understanding, and will, which are in the soul as in a subject. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.
6’. According to Augustine, the relation of the soul to the image does not arise from the whole soul, but only from part of it, namely, the mind. Therefore, the mind does not denote the whole soul, but a part of it.
7’. The name mind (mens) seems to have been attributed [to the soul] from the fact that it remembers (memini). But memory refers to a power of the soul. Therefore, mind also denotes a power and not the essence.
The term mind (mens) is taken from the verb measure (mensurare). For a thing of any genus is measured by that which is least and first in its genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics. So, the word mind is applied to the soul in the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its own principles. But, since it signifies reference to act, under standing designates a faculty of the soul. But a power or faculty lies between essence and activity, as Dionysius says.
Since, however, the essehees of things are not known to us, and their powers reveal themselves to us through their acts, we often use the names of the faculties and powers to denote the essences. But, since knowledge of a thing comes only from that which is proper to it, when an essence takes its name from one of its powers, it must be named according to a power proper to it. It is commonly true of powers that that which can do more can do less, but not conversely. So, a man who can carry a thousand pounds can carry a hundred, as is said in Heaven and Earth. Hence, if a thing is to be classified by its power, it must be classified according to the utmost of its power.
Now, among souls, the soul in plants has only the lowest level of power, and so is classified according to this when it is called nutritive or vegetative. The soul of a brute animal, however, reaches a higher level, that of sense, and so its soul is called sensitive, or, sometimes, even simply sense. But the human soul reaches the highest level which there is among powers of soul and takes its name from this, being called intellective or, sometimes, also understanding and mind, inasmuch as from the intellective soul such power naturally arises, as is proper to the human soul above other souls.
It is clear, then, that in us mind designates the highest power of our soul. And since the image of God is in us according to that which is highest in us, that image will belong to the essence of the soul only in
far as mind is its highest power. Thus, mind, as containing the image of God, designates a power of the soul and not its essence. Or, if we take mind to mean essence, it means it only inasmuch as such a power flows from the essence.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Mind is not taken to mean essence, as essence is contrasted will power, but as absolute essence is distinguished from that which is relatively so called. Thus, mind is distinguished from knowledge of itself in this, that through knowledge mind is referred to itself, but mind itself is an absolute term. Or we can say that mind is taken by Augustine to mean the essence of the soul along will this power.
2. There are two ways of classifying powers of the soul: first, ac cording to their objects; and second, according to their subjects, or, what comes to the same thing, according to their manner of acting. If we classify them according to their objects, we have the five classes of powers of the soul mentioned above. However, if we classify them according to their subjects or manner of acting, there are three classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. For the activity of the soul can be related to matter in three ways.
In the first of these, the relation is such that the activity is performed as a natural activity. The source of this kind of activity is the nutritive power, and the exercise of the acts of this power takes place through active and passive qualities, just as other material activity does. In the second way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul does not reach matter itself, but only the conditions of matter, as in the activity of the sensitive power. For, in sense, the species is received without matter, but will the conditions of matter. In the third way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul is beyond both matter and the conditions of matter. The intellective part of the soul acts in this way. According to these different divisions of powers of the soul, two powers of the soul can belong to the same or different classes when compared will each other. For, if sensible appetite and intellectual appetite, which is will, are considered will reference to their object, both belong to the same class, because the good is the object of both.
But, if we view them will reference w their manner of acting, they belong to different classes, for we classify the lower appetite as sensitive, and the higher as intellective. For, just as the sense grasps its object under the material conditions it has here and now, so, too, the sense appetite tends toward its object in the same way, and thus to a particular good. But the higher appetite is directed to its object after the manner in which the understanding perceives. So, will reference to manner of acting, will belongs to the intellective class.
The manner of acting follows the state of the agent, for, as the agent is more perfect, so its activity is more perfect. Therefore, if we consider powers of this kind as they issue from the essence of the soul, which is, as it were, their subject, we find that will is on an equal footing will understanding, whereas the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, is not. Therefore, mind can include both understanding and will without thereby being the essence of the soul. Thus, mind denotes a certain class of powers of the soul, the group in which we include all the powers which withdraw entirely from matter and the conditions of matter in their activity.
3. According to Augustine and other saints, the image of the Trinity is attributed to man under diverse formulae, and there is no need that the members of one formula correspond to those of another. This is clearly the case when Augustine makes the image of the Trinity follow mind, cognition, and love, and also memory, understanding, and will. Now, although will and love are parallel, as are understanding and cognition, it is not necessary that mind parallel memory, for mind includes all three which are given in the other way of attributing this likeness. Similarly, the attribution of Augustine referred to in the objection differs from the two we have just mentioned. So, there is no need for existence to relate as proper act to mind, in so far as it is mind, although loving so relates to love and knowing so relates to knowledge.
4. Angels are called minds not because the mind or understanding of an angel, in so far as it designates a power, is its essence, but because they have no other powers of the soul except those which are included in the mind, and, so, are completely mind. Our soul, however, since it is the act of the body, has other powers which are not included in the mind, namely, sensitive and nutritive powers. So, soul cannot be called mind as an angel can.
5. Living adds something to existing, and understanding something to living. But, for something to have the image of God in it, it must reach the highest kind of perfection to which a creature can aspire.
So, if a thing has existence only, as stones, or existence and life, as plants and beasts, these are not enough to preserve the character of image. To have the complete character of image the creature must exist, live, and understand. For in this it has most perfectly the generic likeness to the essential attributes.
Therefore, since in applying the image mind takes the place of the divine essence, and memory, intellect, and will take the place of the three Persons, Augustine attributes to mind those things which are needed for the image in creatures when he says: "Memory, under standing, and will are one life, one mind, and one essence." Still, it is not necessary to conclude from this that in the soul mind and life mean the same as essence, for to be, to live, and to understand are not the same thing in us as they are in God. Nevertheless, these three are called one essence since they flow from the one essence of the mind, one life because they belong to one kind of life, and one mind because they are included in one mind as parts in the whole, just as sight and hearing are included in the sensitive part of the soul.
6. Since, according to the Philosopher, we do not know the substantial differences of things, those who make definitions sometimes use accidental differences because they indicate or afford knowledge of the essence as the proper effects afford knowledge of a cause. There fore, when sensible is given as the constitutive difference of animal, it is not derived from the sense power, but the essence of the soul from which that power comes. The same is true of rational, or of that which has mind.
7. Just as we do not understand that the sensitive part of the soul is a single power over and above the particular powers contained in it, but, rather, a kind of potential whole, including all those powers as parts, so, too, mind is not a single power over and above memory, understanding, and will, but a kind of potential whole including these three. In the same way, we see that the power of house building embraces those of cutting the stones and building the wail. The same holds true for the other powers.
8. Mi, when taken for the power itself, is not related to under standing and will as subject, but as whole to parts. But, if it is taken for the essence of the soul, in so far as such a power naturally flows from it, mind does denote the subject of the powers.
9. A single particular power does not contain many powers, but there is nothing to prevent a general power from embracing many powers as parts, just as one part of the body includes many organic parts, as the hand includes the fingers.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 19, r; I Sentences 3, 4, 1; III Sentences 26, I, 5, ad IV Sentences 3,, sol. 2, ad 4; 50, 1, 2 Quodibet III, 9, 21; XII, 9, 1 Contra Gentiles II, 74 I Cor., c. 13, lectura 3; Summa Theol., I, 6; I-II, 67, 2; De memor. et re 2.
It seems that there is not, for
1. According to Augustine, that which we share will brute animals does not belong to the mind. But memory is common to us and to brute animals, as is also clear from Augustine. Therefore, memory is not in the mind.
2. The Philosopher says that memory does not belong to the intellective but to the primary sensitive faculty. Therefore, since mind is the same as understanding, as is clear from what has been said above, memory does not seem to be part of the mind.
3. Understanding and all that belong to understanding abstract from space and time. Memory, however, does not so abstract, for it deals will a definite time, the past. For memory concerns things past, as Cicero says. Therefore, memory does not pertain to mind or under standing.
4. Since in memory we retain things that are not being actually apprehended, it follows that, wherever there is memory, there must be a difference between apprehension and retention. But it is in sense only, and not in understanding, that we find this difference. The two can differ in sense because sense makes use of a bodily organ. But not everything that is retained in the body is apprehended. But under standing does not make use of a bodily organ, and so retains things only according to the mode of understanding. So, these things have to be actually understood. Therefore, memory is not part of under standing or mind.
5. The soul does not remember until it has retained something. But before it receives from the senses, which are the source of all our knowledge, any species which it can retain, it already has the character of image [of the Trinity]. Since memory is part of that image, it does not seem possible for memory to be in the mind.
6. I so far as mind has the character of image of God, it is directed toward God. But memory is not directed toward God, since it deals will things that belong to time. But God is entirely beyond time. Therefore, memory is not in the mind.
7. If memory were part of the mind, the intelligible species would be maintained in the mind as they are in the angelic mind. But the angels can understand by turning their attention to the species which they have within them. Therefore, the human mind should be able to understand by turning its attention to the species it retains, without referring to phantasms. But this is obviously false. For, no matter to what degree one has scientific knowledge as a habit, if the organ of the power of imagination or memory is injured, this knowledge cannot be made actual. This would not result if the mind could actually understand without referring to powers which use organs. So, memory is not part of the mind.
To the Contrary:
1'. The Philosopher says that the intellective soul, not the whole soul, is the place of the species. But it belongs to place to preserve what is kept in it. Therefore, since the preservation of the species belongs to memory, memory seems to be part of understanding.
2'. That which has a uniform relation to all time is not concerned will any particular time. But memory, even in its proper acceptation, has a uniform relation to all time, as Augustine says and proves will the words of Virgil, who used the names memory and forgetfulness in their proper sense. Therefore, memory is not concerned will any particular time, but will all time. So it belongs to understanding.
3’. Strictly speaking, memory refers to things past. But understanding deals not only will what is present, but also will what is past. For the understanding judges about any time, understanding man to have existed, to exist in the future, and to exist now, as is clear from The Soul. Therefore, memory, properly speaking, can belong to understanding.
4’. As memory concerns what is past, so foresight concerns what is in the future, according to Cicero. But foresight, properly speaking, belongs to the intellectual part. For the same reason memory does, too.
According to the common usage, memory means a knowledge of things past. But to know the past as past belongs to that which has the power of knowing the now as now. Sense is this power. For under standing does not know the singular as singular, but according to some common character, as it is man or white or even particular, but not in so far as it is this man or this particular thing. In a similar way, under standing does not know a present and a past thing as this present and this past thing.
Since memory, taken strictly, looks to what is past will reference to the present, it is clear that memory, properly speaking, does not be long to the intellectual part, but only to the sensitive, as the Philosopher shows." But, since intellect not only understands the intelligible thing, but also understands that it understands such an intelligible thing, the term memory can be broadened to include the knowledge by which one knows the object previously known in so far as he knows he knew it earlier, although he does not know the object as in the past in the manner earlier explained. In this way all knowledge not received for the first time can be called memory.
This can take place in two ways, either when there is continuous study based on acquired knowledge without interruption, or when the study is interrupted. The latter has more of the character of past, and so it more properly participates in the nature of memory. 'We have an example of this when we say that we remember a thing which previously we knew habitually but not actually. Thus, memory belongs to the intellective part of our soul. It is in this sense that Augustine seems to understand memory, when he makes it part of the image of the Trinity. For he intends to assign to memory everything in the mind which is stored there habitually without passing into act.
There are various explanations of the manner in which this can take place. Avicenna holds that the fact that the soul has habitual knowledge of anything which it does not actually consider does not come from this, that certain species are retained in the intellectual part. Rather, he understands that it is impossible for the species not actually considered to be kept anywhere except in the sensitive part, either in the imagination, which is the storehouse of forms received by the senses, or in the memory, for particular apprehensions not received from the senses. The species stays in the understanding only when it is actually being considered. But, after the consideration, it ceases to be there. Thus, when one wants actually to consider something again, it is necessary for new intelligible species to flow from the agent intelligence into the possible intellect.
However, it does not follow, according to Avicenna, that the new consideration of what was known previously necessarily entails learning or discovering all over again, for one retains a certain aptitude through which he turns more easily to the agent intellect to receive the species flowing from it than he did before. In us, this aptitude is the habit of scientific knowledge. According to this opinion, memory is not part of the mind because it preserves certain species, but because it has an aptitude for receiving them anew.
But this does not seem to be a reasonable explanation. In the first place, since the possible intellect has a more stable nature than sense, it must receive its species more securely. Thus, the species can be better preserved in it than in the sensitive part. In the second place, the agent intelligence is equally disposed to communicate species suitable for all the sciences. As a consequence, if some species were not con served in the possible intellect, but there were in it only the aptitude of turning to the agent intellect, man would have an equal aptitude for any intelligible thing. Therefore, from the fact that a man had learned one science he would not know it better than other sciences. Besides, this seems openly opposed to the opinion of the Philosopher, who commends the ancients for holding that the intellective part of the soul is the place of the species.
Therefore, others say that the intelligible species remain in the possible intellect after actual consideration, and that the ordered arrangement of these is the habit of knowledge. In this classification the power by which our minds retain these intelligible species after actual consideration will be called memory. This comes closer to the proper meaning of memory.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The memory which we have in common will brute animals is that in which particular intentions are preserved. This is not in the mind; only the memory in which intelligible species are kept is there.
2. The Philosopher is speaking of the memory which deals will the past as related to a particular present in so far as particular. This is not in the mind.
3. The answer to the third difficulty is clear from what has just been said.
4. Actual apprehension and retention differ in the possible intellect, not because the species are there somehow in a bodily manner, but only in an intelligible way. However, it does not follow that one understands according to that species all the time, but only when the possible intellect becomes that species perfectly in act. Sometimes it has the act of this species incompletely, that is, in some way between pure potency and pure act. This is habitual knowledge. The reduction from this to complete act takes place through the will, which, according to Anselm, is the mover of all the powers.
5. Mind has the character of image [of the Trinity] especially in so far as it is directed to God and to itself. It is present to itself and God is present to it before any species are received from sensible things. Furthermore, mind is not said to have the power of memory because it actually preserves something, but because it has the power to preserve something.
6. The answer to the sixth difficulty is clear from what has been said.’
7. No power can know anything without turning to its object, as sight knows nothing unless it turns to colour. Now, since phantasms are related to the possible intellect in the way that sensible things are related to sense, as the Philosopher points out, no matter to what extent an intelligible species is present to the understanding, understanding does not actually consider anything according to that species without referring to a phantasm. Therefore, just as our understanding in its present state needs phantasms actually to consider anything before it acquires a habit, so it needs them, too, after it has acquired a habit. The situation is different will angels, for phantasms are not the object of their understanding.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
1'. The authority cited can prove only that memory is in the mind in the way we have mentioned, not that it is there properly.
2'. We must understand Augustine’s statement to mean that memory can deal will present objects. However, it can never be called memory unless something past is considered, at least past will reference to cognition itself. It is in this way that we say someone, who is present to himself, forgets or remembers himself because he retains or does not retain the past knowledge about himself.
3’. In so far as understanding knows temporal differences through common characters, it can thus make judgments according to any difference of time.
4’. Foresight is in the understanding only according to general considerations about the future. It is applied to particular things through the mediation of particular reason which must act as the medium between general reason, which is the source of movement, and the move merit which follows in particular things, as is clear from what the Philosopher says.
Parallel readings: I Sentence 3,4, I; Contra Gentiles 11, 74; Summa Theol., I, 7; 93, 7, ad 3.
It seems that it is not, for
1. Different acts belong to different powers. But the possible intellect and memory, as part of the mind, are said to have the same act, to preserve the species. For Augustine assigns this function to memory and the Philosopher assigns it to the possible intellect. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding as one power from another.
2. To receive something without paying attention to any difference of time belongs properly to understanding, which abstracts from the here and now. But memory pays no attention to difference of time, for, according to Augustine, memory deals indifferently will things present, past, and future. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding.
3. According to Augustine, intelligence can be taken in two ways. According to the first, we are said to understand that which we actually think. According to the second, we are said w understand that which we do not actually consider. But intelligence, in the meaning of understanding only that which we actually think, is understanding in act. This is not a power, but the activity of a power; hence, it is not distinguished from memory as a power from a power. But, in so far as we understand those things which we do not actually consider, under standing is not in any way distinguished from memory, but belongs to it. This is clear from Augustine: "If we look to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always together, whether they are thought about or not, we will see that the image of the Trinity belongs only to the memory." Therefore, understanding is in no way distinguished from memory as a power from a power.
4. Someone may say that intelligence is a power through which the soul is able actually to think, and so, also, that the intelligence through which we are said to understand only when we are thinking is distinguished from memory as one power from another the contrary, it belongs to the same power to have a habit and to use that habit. But to understand when not thinking is to understand habitually, whereas to understand when thinking is to use the habit. Therefore, to understand when not thinking and to understand when thinking belong to the same power. And so, for this reason, understanding does not differ from memory as one power from another.
5. In the intellective part of the soul there are only the cognoscitive and motive, or affective, powers. But the will is the affective or motive; understanding, the cognoscitive. Therefore, memory is not a different power from understanding.
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says that "the soul partakes of the image of God in this, that it can use reason and understanding to know and see God." But the soul can see through its powers. Therefore, the image in the soul is considered according to its powers. But the image in the soul is considered according to the presence of memory, understanding, and will in the soul. Therefore, these three are three distinct powers.
2’. If these are not three powers, there must be one of them which is act or activity. But act is not always in the soul, for one does not always actually understand or will. Therefore, these three will not al ways be in the soul, and consequently the soul will not always be in the image of God, contrary to Augustine.
3’. There is a certain equality among these three which portrays the equality of the divine Persons. But there is no equality among act, habit, and power, because power embraces more than habit and habit more than act. For many habits belong w one power, and many acts can come from one habit. Therefore, one of these cannot be habit and another act.
De veritate EN 91