De veritate EN 168
For a clear understanding of this question we must grasp what it means to see something in the Word. Therefore, we must remember that a thing can be seen in something only in the way in which it exists in that thing. However, there are two ways in which a number of things can come to exist in one thing. In one way, they exist there in separation and multiplicity, as for instance, will many forms, each is reflected separately in a mirror, and as many men are in one house. In the other way, they are there according to one simple form, as many effects exist virtually in a cause, as conclusions in a principle, and as bodily members in seed.
Accordingly, whoever sees anything must, as a consequence, also see those things which exist in it in multiplicity and division. For each one of them presents itself to him in the same way as that single thing in which they are contained presents itself. To this extent, one who sees a mirror sees the forms reflected by the mirror. But one who sees some one thing does not have to see all the things which exist in it as united in one form, except when he comprehends the total power of that one thing. Thus, one who sees some principle does not have to see all the conclusions which exist virtually in it, unless he comprehends the principle.
But created things are not in God in multiplicity, but in unity, as Dionysius says. Hence, when we say that a thing is in God, this is more like the manner in which effects are in a cause and conclusions in a principle, than like the manner in which forms are in a mirror. Therefore, one who sees the Word does not have to see everything which the Word sees in Himself, as some have said, using the example of forms which are seen in a mirror when one sees the mirror. For the Word has comprehensive knowledge of Himself, so that, seeing Him self, He knows all the things which are in Him virtually and in unity.
But created intellects, which do not have a comprehensive grasp of the Word, do not necessarily see all that is in the Word when they see the Word. But, even in this, the soul of Christ enjoyed a greater privilege than any [other] created intellect. For in the Word it sees all things, present, past, and future.
The reason for this is that there is a double relation of God to creatures, since He is the principle and end of all things. We have one of these in so far as all things proceed from God into being, and the other in so far as they are ordained to God as to their end. Some, as the ir rational creatures, are thus ordained only by assimilation; others, how ever, are thus ordained both by assimilation and also by attaining the divine essence itself. For it is innate in every creature proceeding from God to strive for the good by its activity. But a creature is assimilated to God in attaining any good whatsoever. But, beyond this, rational creatures by their activity can attain to knowledge and love of God. Consequently, they, beyond other creatures, have a capacity for beatitude.
The Creator, however, surpasses creatures in both of these relations. In the first, because over and above everything which God has made He can still make other different things, new species, new genera, and other worlds. And that which has been made can never exhaust the power of the Maker. And He surpasses creatures in the second relation because, no matter how much a creature shares the good, it can never reach the point where it is equal to Godís goodness. Also, no matter how much a rational creature knows and loves God, it can never know and love Him as perfectly as He can be known and loved.
And, just as creatures would be imperfect if they proceeded from God and were not ordained to return to God, so, too, their procession from God would be imperfect unless the return to God were equal to the procession. Therefore, every creature participates in goodness to the extent to which it participates in being. Thus, it is necessary for the most excellent created intellects to know God, so that their knowledge be equal to the procession of creatures from God. But things proceed from God naturally and according to the order of grace. Hence, the created intellects, that is, the angels, who in the natural order are set at the peak of creation, receive knowledge of all natural things in God and from God. But Christ stands above every creature also according to the gifts of grace, since "of his fullless we all have received, and grace for grace" (Jn 1,16). Therefore, He received in God knowledge of all things which proceed from God at any time, not only according to the order of nature, but also according to the order of grace.
Therefore, the soul of Christ knows all creatures not only according to their natural properties, as the angels also do, but even in so far as they are subject to divine providence and are ordered to the end of human salvation and the gifts of grace. Therefore, He knows all individual things and every single act of all things, even the secret thoughts of menís hearts. This can be said of no other creature. Nevertheless, because this does not reach the point where it includes comprehensive grasp of Godís infinity, God still has the power to do many other things than those which the soul of Christ knows.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The common answer to this objection is that God knows some things will the knowledge of vision, namely, present, past, and future things. And granted that the world has a beginning and an end, these are not infinite. We say that God sees only these because vision concerns things which exist in themselves outside the understanding of the one who sees them. However, He knows some things will the knowledge of simple intelligence, namely, those which He can make, but which will never exist. These things are infinite. And we say that God understands these things by means of the representation which His understanding can use to form quiddities of things which do not exist outside of Him. Accordingly, the soul of Christ sees all things, present, past, and future, in the Word; nevertheless, it does not see everything which God can make, and thus it does not follow that it knows an infinite multitude of things.
But that answer does not meet the force of the difficulty. For, if we grant that generation might continue to infinity in the future, as God could so make it, it is evident that there would be an infinite multitude of men, and God would know them all by knowledge of vision. Hence, if the soul of Christ knew everything that God knows will the knowledge of vision, it would follow that it would know an infinite multitude of things, although it would not know everything which God can do. For, besides an infinite multitude of individuals of these finite species, God can make an infinite multitude of different species and an infinite multitude of individuals in each species, as is clear especially in the ratios of numbers.
For, if we take the individuals in one species of ratio, they will be multiplied to infinity. Thus, in the species of doubling there is the ratio of two to one, four to two, six to three, and so on to infinity. And again, besides the ratio of doubling, there is another species, that of triple, and also of quadruple, and quintuple, and so on to infinity. Yet each of these contains potentially an infinite multitude of individuals. Consequently, if generation were to continue to infinity according to these species which are now finite, God could still make more, because He could make new species, and this to infinity. It is clear from this that it does not mean the same thing to say that the soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things and that it knows all that God can make.
Furthermore, in knowing all creatures will the knowledge of vision, God has a comprehensive grasp of them, so He knows whatever is in the potency of creatures. But there is an infinity in the potency of creatures, as is evident in the division of the continuum and in the addition of numbers. Hence, since the soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge of creatures, it knows the infinite number of things which are in creatures potentially.
Besides, if the souls of the damned exist forever, and their thoughts, all of which God knows, will be changing, God now knows an infinite multitude of future things will the knowledge of vision. Hence, if the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows will the knowledge of the vision, we must say that it knows an infinite multitude of things.
Hence, we have to give a different answer, and say that in reality we find something which is simply and in every way infinite, namely, God. And there is something finite in every way, namely, material things. Moreover, there is something which is finite in some sense and infinite in some sense, for any immaterial substance is finite in so far as it has existence limited to its own nature, since no created substance, although immaterial, is its own existence, but participates in existence. Nevertheless, it is infinite by reason of the removal of that limitation by which a form is limited by the very fact of its reception into matter. For everything received exists in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient.
Therefore, in so far as a thing is infinite, it is related to the infinite by its activity. For that which is infinite both because of its existence and its immateriality, namely God, is related to infinity through its operation by reason both of its matter, or quantity, and of its specific or generic nature. Consequently, God can know an infinite multitude of individuals and an infinite multitude of species because He knows all that He can do, and He can make new species to infinity. Besides this, since a thing acts in so far as it is in act, just as Godís being is infinite, so also His activity is infinitely efficacious.
But a material thing is not related to an infinite multitude of things either as infinite according to quantity or matter, or as infinite according to species. This is evident in sight, which is a material power and, accordingly, cannot know any species whatever, but a determined species, colour. Nor can it know an infinite number of things except successively. For, since it is material, its activity is material, and attains to things which are numerically infinite according to continuous or discrete quantity, and this is material infinity. It does this in the way in which they are infinite, that is to say, materially, numbering part after part. Therefore, it can never arrive at knowledge of an infinite number of individuals. And since our understanding in the present state receives from sense, neither can it know an infinite number of things in this way.
But immaterial substances, which are in some sense infinite and in some sense finite, have limited existence, and because of this their ac tivity has finite efficacy and is ordained to finite natures. But, because they are immaterial, their activity extends to things materially infinite. Hence, as the Commentator says, our understanding appears to be infinite in some respect, in so far as it knows the universal, in which an infinite number of singulars are known. But it is deficient in this, that the universal species which understanding perceives, that of man, for example, is not a perfect representation for knowledge of any individual in its individuality.
However, if that were the case, then our understanding, granted that there were an infinite number of men, would still know these materially infinite things through one finite nature, human nature. For, although in an infinite multitude of men human nature would be in finite quantitatively or materially, it would not be infinite specifically. This is clear from the fact that there can be other species outside of the infinite multitude of men. And the proper object of understanding is the specific nature, not matter. The case would be similar will one who, by means of the nature of animal, would know all species of animals in their specific qualities. For if there were an actually infinite number of species of animals, he would indeed know an infinite species but only a finite nature, since, besides the nature of animal, there is still the nature of stone.
Therefore, since the soul of Christ knows the Word, which is a sufficient representation for knowledge of all individuals in their individuality, and all species in their specific qualities, nothing prevents the soul of Christ from knowing an infinite multitude of things, even though its being is finite. Nevertheless, it cannot have a comprehensive grasp of infinite nature.
2. The soul of Christ is not elevated above the limits of creature hood by its union will the Word. Therefore, it does not become in finite, does not have infinite power, and its activity is not intrinsically infinite, although it does know an infinite multitude of things. For it knows an infinite multitude of things will a finite power. As a result, it remains infinite only materially.
3. The solution to the third difficulty is clear from the second response.
4. Comprehensive grasp of the infinite can come only through an activity which has infinite efficacy. For God Himself is known comprehensively by an intellect when it has as much efficacy to understand as God has to be understood. Consequently, He can be known comprehensively only by an uncreated intellect. But knowledge of an infinite multitude of things does not demand infinite efficacy in intellectual activity, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.
5-6. The solution to the fifth and sixth difficulties is clear from what has been said.
7. The soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things through an uncreated species in the way we have described, that is, thro the divine essence itself. And, since this is infinite, nothing prevents it from containing the intelligibility of an infinite multitude of things.
8. The solution to the eighth difficulty is clear from what has been said. The man assumed [by the Word] was not made equal to the Word in the number of things known, although he knew an infinite multitude of things. For it still does not follow that he knows every thing which God can make as is clear from what has been said. And, granting that he knew all that the Word knows, even though the number were equal in both, he is not made equal in the number of things known will reference to the manner of knowing.
10. Essentially, any dimension belongs to measurable quantity. Therefore, one body can be said to be equal to another according to any dimension in which it is equal to the other. But quantity of knowledge, which is considered according to the number of things known, belongs to it accidentally and materially, especially when in the many objects of knowledge there is a single intelligible aspect by which they are known. It would be different if they were known according to different intelligible aspects. But the quantity which comes from efficacy of knowledge belongs essentially to knowledge, since such quantity is considered according to the procession of intellectual activity from the intellectual power. Therefore, the situation is not the same.
11. The Son of God did not assume all the defects which could have existed in Him without interfering will the redemption of men. But it is true that He assumed those whose assumption aided in the redemption of the human race. Nevertheless, any lack of knowledge whatever would have been a defect which hindered the redemption of the human race. For the Redeemer, through whom grace and truth were to be diffused throughout the whole human race, needed the full ness of grace and truth. And any defect of knowledge could have been prejudicial to this.
12. Through His bodily weakness Christ came to heal the weakness of soul which consists in a lack of grace and knowledge. Therefore, although He did assume bodily defects, He should not in any way have assumed any defect of knowledge or grace.
13. The solution to this thirteenth difficulty is clear from what has been said.
14. Extensive quantity, as is clear from what has been said, is accidental to knowledge. But intensive quantity is essential to it, as is also clear from our explanation. Therefore, the situation is not the same.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 8, 4; III Sentences 14, 2, sol. 2; Comp. Theol., 216; Summa Theol., III, 10, 2.
It seems that it does, for
1. Whoever knows the greater can know the less. But God is greater than anything which He can make, for whatever He can make is created. Therefore, since the soul of Christ knows God, it can will much greater reason know whatever God can make.
2. It was said that, although God is greater, the soul of Christ has an ordination to the knowledge of God but not to the knowledge of everything which God can make.óOn the contrary, although God in Himself is more knowable than any creature, yet, for us, creatures are more knowable than God. But whatever God can make is a creature. Therefore, it is more natural for the soul to know anything God can make than to know God Himself.
3. Just as the soul of Christ sees the divine essence, so, also, it sees the divine power. However, it is said to see the whole divine essence, but does not see it totally. Therefore it sees the whole divine power, although it does not see it totally. But the whole power cannot be seen unless whatever it can extend w is seen. Therefore, the soul of Christ know everything which God can make.
4. Whatever God can make He can disclose. But whatever can be disclosed to any creature was disclosed to Christ. Therefore, whatever God can make was disclosed to Christ.
5. That which does not entail defect in the one communicating nor in the one to whom it is communicated can be communicated. But to give the soul of Christ the knowledge of everything which God can make does not entail any defect in God, since this would seem to pertain to His supreme liberality, nor in the soul of Christ, since it belongs to its supreme perfection. Therefore, this could be communicated to the soul of Christ; so, it was communicated to it.
6. If the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, granted that God did something, the soul of Christ would not know it, unless it learned it anew. But it is unfitting to say that the soul of Christ is ignorant of any existing thing, or that it learns anything new. There fore, the soul of Christ knows all that God can make.
To the Contrary:
1'. If the soul of Christ knows whatever God can make, everything that God can make is enclosed in the soul of Christ. But the soul of Christ is finite. Therefore, since God can make an infinite multitude of things, it follows that the infinite would be enclosed in the finite. But this is impossible. Therefore the first, that the soul of Christ is able to know whatever God can make, is impossible too.
2í. The divine power is infinite, just as the divine essence is. But the soul of Christ cannot have a comprehensive grasp of the divine essence because of its infinity. Therefore, neither can it have a comprehensive grasp of the divine power. Thus, it cannot know whatever God can make.
3í. The more perfectly a thing is known by someone, the more things are known in it. But God knows Himself more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore, He knows more things in Himself than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. But God knows nothing in Himself but what is, or was, or will be, or can be, could have been, or could be [ the future]. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not know all these things.
There have been different opinions on this matter. For some have said that not only the soul of Christ, but every soul, sees in the Word whatever can be seen there. This includes not only what is, will be, or has been, but whatever God can make. But these people were mistaken in this because they thought the mode of seeing things in the Word was like the mode of seeing things in a material mirror, in which images of things are reflected as many and diverse. But the natures of things exist in God in unity and simplicity, as Dionysius says. How ever, if they existed there as many and diverse, then everything that could be known in God would be known once He was seen. Thus, all who saw God through His essence would see everything that God can make, since all these things could be known in God.
But, since we are told expressly that some who see God through His essence are ignorant of some things, as is evident of the angels, who are illumined by one another, as Dionysius says, some ascribe this perfection of knowledge only to the soul of Christ, and not to all who see God, so that, besides God only the soul of Christ knows all that God can make.
But, since it does not seem fitting to ascribe an infinite activity to a finite creature, and since to see all that God can make requires an infinite activity, others have said that the soul of Christ does not see all the things which God can make in actual knowledge, but still does see them in habitual knowledge. For it knows the Word so perfectly that by turning to the Word it receives in the Word knowledge of whatever it wants to know, although it does not always actually consider everything that it can know in the Word. But this does not seem to be true. For the soul of Christ, and any of the blessed, in so far as they have the beatific vision, by which they see the Word and things in the Word, do not have succession in their acts of understanding. For, according to Augustine: "Thoughts will not come and go in heaven." Hence, we must say that in the Word the soul of Christ sees in actual knowledge all that it sees there in habitual knowledge. This agrees will what the Philosopher says, when he says that happiness is had according to act, and not only according to habit. Furthermore, as it is not fitting to say that there is n created activity which extends to all that God can make, so it is also not fitting to say that there is a created habit will an ordination to these same things.
Therefore, we must say will others that the soul of Christ does not know all that God can make. The reason for this is that two elements must be considered in knowledge: that which is known and the manner in which it is known. It sometimes happens that some agree in one of these who differ in the other, as when one and the same thing is known by different subjects, less by one and more by the other. That which in itself is presented to be known pertains to that which is known; that, however, which is known in something else pertains to the manner of knowing of that in which it is known. Thus, if one knows some principle and in it acquires knowledge of some conclusions, the knowledge of those conclusions depends on the manner of knowing the principle.
For, the more perfectly one knows a principle, the more conclusions he sees in it, but, however weak his knowledge of the principle is, the substance of that principle always remains known to him. Therefore, his knowledge of it does not involve any determinate way of knowing, as the knowledge of conclusions which are known in the principle involves a determinate way of knowing. Hence it is that all who are presented will one principle know the substance of the principle but do not know the same conclusions or an equal number of conclusions. They differ in this, as they do in the manner of knowing the principle.
All who see God through His essence are said to see the whole essence of God. For there is nothing of the essence which any of them does not see, since the divine essence has no parts. Nevertheless, all do not see it totally, but only God sees Himself totally, in this sense, that the mode of the knower is equal to the mode of the thing known. For the efficacy of the divine intellect in knowing is as great as the know ability of the divine essence.
But this cannot be said of any created intellect; hence, no created intellect reaches the point where it sees the divine essence as perfectly as it can be seen. For this reason, no created intellect can have comprehensive knowledge of it, but one created intellect sees the divine essence more perfectly than another. Therefore, it is evident that knowledge of something in the Word depends on the mode of knowing the Word. Thus, as it is impossible for a created intellect to arrive at the perfect mode of knowing the Word as it can be known, so, too, it is impossible for a created intellect to know everything which can be known in the Word, that is to say, everything which God can make.
Consequently, it is impossible for the soul of Christ to know every thing which God can make, just as it is impossible for it to have comprehensive knowledge of the divine power. For each thing is known comprehensively when its definition is known. For the definition is the power comprehending the thing. But the definition of any power is taken from the things to which the power of God extends. Hence, if the soul of Christ knew everything to which the power of God extended, it would completely comprehend the power of God. But this is altogether impossible.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Whatever God can do is less than God Himself. And it could be known more easily by the soul of Christ if whatever God can make were in itself presented to the soul of Christ, as God Himself is thus presented to it. But, in the present state of things, what God can do, or what He did, are not presented to the soul of Christ in themselves, but in the Word. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.
2. That through which another thing is known is always more evident. Therefore although according to a certain mode of knowing creatures are more evident to us than God, still, in the mode of knowledge in which things are seen in the Word, the Word itself is more evident than the things seen in the Word. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.
3. Power can be considered in two ways, either according to its sub stance, and thus the soul of Christ sees the whole divine power, as it sees the whole essence, or according to the things to which the power extends, and it is from these that the quantity of power is calculated. In this way, the soul of Christ does not see the whole power, because this would be completely to grasp the power, as has been said.
4. It is impossible that God has made everything which He can make, for thus God would have made so many things that He could not make any more, and thus His power would be limited to the creatures actually in existence. Similarly, it is impossible to hold that what ever God can disclose has been disclosed to any creature.
5. To hold that the soul of Christ knows everything which God can make implies a defect in God Himself. For God would be grasped completely by the soul of Christ, and this would derogate from His infinity.
6. We have to answer this difficulty in the way in which we answered the difficulties about predestination. For, although it is possible for one who is predestined to be damned, still, as soon as we say he is damned, we say that he was not predestined, since these two, to be predestined and to be damned, cannot stand together. Similarly, I say that when the soul of Christ knows everything which God foresees that He will do, as soon as it is true that God does something else, it is true that God foresaw that He would do it, and the soul of Christ knew it. Thus, it is not necessary to say that there is ignorance of anything in the soul of Christ, or that He learned anything anew.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, sol. 1; Comp. Theol., 216; S. T, III, 11, 1; 12, 1.
It seems that it does, for
1. The capacity of the soul is not limited to a certain number of objects of knowledge. Accordingly, if the capacity of Christís soul is adequately filled will the knowledge of things in their proper genus, we must say that it knows all things according to this knowledge.
2. Everything which is in potency is imperfect before it is reduced to act. But the possible intellect, which was not missing from the soul of Christ, is "that by which one becomes all things," as is said in The Soul. Therefore, since Christís understanding was not imperfect, it seems that it had knowledge of all intelligible things.
3. Not to be able to advance in scientific knowledge pertains to the perfection of knowledge only when all things are known scientifically. But, according to the common opinion, the soul of Christ could not advance in the habit of science. Therefore, it know all things according to the knowledge will which it know things in their proper genus.
To the Contrary:
The soul of Christ knew created things by a created habit of science. But a created habit of science cannot be the likeness of all things. Therefore, the soul of Christ could not know all things according to that mode of science.
We ascribe that scientific knowledge of things in their proper genus to the soul of Christ so that no natural perfection may be lacking to it, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, through this knowledge He knew as much as the natural knowledge of the soul can reach, not only in this life, but after death. This is so because in His soul Christ was at once a wayfarer and one who possessed the term.
But there are some things which natural knowledge can in no way reach. Such are the divine essence, future contingents, the secret A thoughts of menís hearts, and other things of this sort. And the soul of Christ did not have knowledge of these things through that mode of knowledge, but knew them in the Word. It did not know them by the knowledge of prophecy, since prophecy is an imperfect participation of that sight by which things are seen in the Word. And, since this knowledge was perfect in Christ, the imperfection of prophecy had no place there.
It is also clear that Christ had this knowledge more fully than Adam, since through this knowledge Adam did not know created separated substances, and the soul of Christ did. For the natural knowledge of the separated soul extends to this, although the knowledge of the soul joined to a corruptible body does not.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The capacity of the human soul extends to a determined class of knowable things, but not to a definite number in that class.
2. The possible intellect is in potency to receive all intelligible things which can become such through the agent intellect of this the Philosopher says that the agent intellect is that "by which one makes all things [."But these are the things which are abstracted from phantasms and which we can come to know through naturally known principles. Therefore, the possible intellect is in natural potency only to these things. But Christ knew all these through this knowledge. Hence, there was no imperfection in His understanding.
3. For that matter, even in this knowledge Christ could not advance insofar as the habit is concerned, since such knowledge by the nature of its genus cannot extend to more things than Christ knew through it. But in the Gospel it is said that He "advanced in wisdom" will reference to experience of those things which He knew in the habit.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 1, i c; I Sentences 8, 1, 3; 19, 5, 1 ad 2 & 3; De potentia 9, 7 ad 6; Sum.Theol., I 5,1 I 5,4.
It seems that it does, for
1. Everything is a being essentially. But a creature is good not essentially but by participation. Good, therefore, really adds something to being.
2. Since good includes being in its very notion, and yet good is rationally distinct from being, the formal character of good must add something to that of being. But it cannot be said to add a negation to being, as does the one, which adds undividedness, because the whole character of good consists in something positive. Hence it adds some thing to being positively, and thus it seems to add to being in reality.
3. The answer was given that it adds a relation to an end.óOn the contrary, in this case good would be nothing but related being. But related being pertains to a definite category of being, which is called "relation" or "to something." Good would therefore be in a definite category. But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says, placing good in all the categories.
4. As can be gathered from the words of Dionysius, good tends to pour out itself and existence. A thing is good, therefore, by the fact that it is diffusive. But to pour out or diffuse implies an action, and an action proceeds from the essence through the mediation of a power. A thing is therefore said to be good by reason of a power added to the essence, and so good really adds something to being.
5. The farther we get from the first being, which is one and simple, the more we find difference in things. But in God being and good are really one, being distinguished only conceptually. In creatures, therefore, they are distinguished more than conceptually; and so, since there is no distinction beyond the conceptual except the real, they are distinguished really.
6. Accidentals really add something to the essence. But goodness is accidental to the creature; otherwise it could not be lost. Good there fore really adds something to being.
7. Whatever is predicated as informing something else really adds something to it, since nothing is informed by itself. Good, however, is predicated as informing, as is said in The Causes. It therefore adds something to being.
8. Nothing is determined by itself. But good determines being. It therefore adds something to being.
9. The answer was given that good determines being in concept. On the contrary, corresponding to that concept there is either some thing in reality or nothing. If nothing, it follows that the concept is void and useless; but if there is something corresponding in reality, the point is established: good really adds something to being.
10. A relation is specified according to the term in respect to which it is predicated. But good implies a relation to a definite sort of being, an end. Good therefore implies a specified relation. Every specified being, however, really adds something to being in general. Hence good really adds something to being.
Good and being are interchangeable, like man and "capable of laughter." But though "capable of laughter" is interchangeable will man, it nevertheless really adds something to man, namely, a property. But a property is classed as an accident. Similarly, therefore, good really adds something to being.
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says: "Inasmuch as God is good, we are; but inasmuch as we are, we are good." It therefore seems that good does not add anything to being.
2í. Whenever things are so related that one adds something to the other either really or conceptually, one can be understood without the other. But being cannot be understood without good. Hence good does not add anything to being either really or conceptually. Proof of the minor: God can make more than man can understand. But God cannot make a being that is not good, because by the very fact of its being from good it is good, as Boethius makes clear. Therefore neither can the intellect understand it.
De veritate EN 168