De veritate EN 234

234

REPLY:

It must simply be granted that no creature can effectively create grace, though a creature can make use of a ministry ordained to the reception of grace. There are three reasons for this.

The first reason is taken from the nature of grace itself. For grace is a perfection raising the soul to a supernatural existence, as has been said. But no supernatural effect can be caused by a creature, for two reasons: (1) Because advancing a thing beyond the state of its nature is the work of him alone whose business it is to establish the degrees of nature and set their limits. But it is obvious that only God can do that. (2) Because no created power acts without presupposing the potentiality of matter or of something taking the place of matter. But the natural potentiality of a creature does not go beyond natural perfections. Hence a creature cannot perform any supernatural action. It is for this reason that miracles are worked only by the agency of divine power, even though a creature may cooperate in the accomplishment of a miracle either by praying or by making use of a ministry in any other way whatsoever. Consequently no creature can effectively cause grace.

The second reason is taken from the working of grace. For the will of man is changed by grace, since it is grace which prepares the will of man to will good, according to Augustine. But it is the work of God alone to change the will, even though a person can in some way change another’s intellect. This is due to the fact that, since the principle of any act is the power and the object together, the act of any power can be changed in two ways: (1) From the point of view of the power, when someone works upon the power itself. Now in regard to the powers which are not attached to organs, namely, the intellect and the will, that belongs to God alone. Upon the other powers someone else can work indirectly, inasmuch as he acts upon their organs. (2) From the point of view of the object, by making use of an object that will move the power.

Now no object moves the will with necessity except one which is naturally willed, such as happiness or the like, which is presented to the will only by God. The other objects do not necessarily move the will. But the intellect is moved will necessity not only by naturally known first principles but also by conclusions, which are not naturally known, because of their necessary relationship to principles. This necessary relationship is not found on the part of the will with regard to the good naturally desired when it is willing other goods, since it is possible to arrive at that good naturally desired in many different ways, at least in one’s own opinion. A creature can therefore sufficiently move the intellect from the point of view of its object, but not the will. But from the point of view of the power neither the intellect nor the will can be so moved. Because, then, no creature can change the will, neither can any creature confer grace, by which the will is changed.

The third reason is taken from the end of grace. For the end is proportioned to the principle which is acting, seeing that the end and principle of the whole universe are one. Consequently, just as the first action by means of which things come into being, creation, is from God alone, who is the first principle and last end of creatures; in the same way the conferring of grace, by means of which a rational mind is immediately joined to the last end, is from God alone.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Only God forgives sins by reason of authority, as is made clear in Isaias (43:25): "I am he that blot out thy iniquities by my own power." Men are said to forgive sins by their ministry.

2. Dionysius is speaking of the outpouring of divine light through teaching, for it is in this way that the lower angels are enlightened by the higher. That is his meaning in the passage.

3. It is not from any lack of goodness in grace that the one who has it cannot impart it to another; but it is from its surpassing nobility as well as from the deficiency of the one who has it, because it transcends the state of created nature and the one who has it does not share it to such n degree of perfection that he can communicate it.

4. The case of the will is not the same as that of the intellect, for the reason already explained.

5. Christ as God imparts grace effectively, but as man by His ministry. Thus it is written in the Epistle to the Romans (15:8): "For I say that Christ Jesus was minister..."

6. The reason why Christ in His human nature is called the head of the Church in preference to all the other ministers is that He had a higher ministry than the others inasmuch as we are justified by faith in Him, we undergo the influence of the sacraments by calling upon His name, and by His passion the whole of human nature is cleansed of the sin of our first parent; and there are many other such marks of pre-eminence that are peculiar to Christ.

7. As Damascene says, Christ’s humanity was like an "instrument of His divinity." For this reason the works of His humanity, such as the resurrection, the passion, etc., are instrumental will regard to the effect of His divinity. Christ’s resurrection, accordingly, does not cause spiritual resurrection in us as the principal agent but as the instrumental cause.—Or it can be said that it is the cause of our spiritual resurrection in so far as we are justified by faith in Him.—Or again the answer could be that it is the exemplary cause of spiritual resurrection inasmuch as there 15 in Christ’s resurrection n pattern of our spiritual resurrection.

8. Like other natural forms, the sentient and vegetative soul does not go beyond the state of created nature. And therefore, given the potentiality which there is in nature as regards such forms, a natural agent has some influence upon their education. But the case is not the same will grace, as is evident from what has been said.

9. The reason given in answer is not sufficient in every respect. To be created properly applies to subsistent beings, to which it properly belongs to be and to become; but forms that are not subsistent, whether accidental or substantial forms, are properly not created but co-created, just as they do not have being of themselves but in an other. Even though they do not have as one of their constituents any matter from which they come, yet they do have matter in which they are, upon which they depend and by whose change they are brought forth into existence. Consequently their becoming is properly the transformation of their subjects. Hence by reason of the matter in which they are, creation is not properly ascribed to them. The case is different, however, for a rational soul, winch is a subsistent form; and so being created properly applies to it.

But granting the reason given, we must answer the argument of the rejoinder, which comes to a false conclusion and in n false manner. It must be said in answer that there are three different cases as regards the distance between two things: (1) It is infinite on both sides, as, for instance, if one man would have infinite whiteness and another would have infinite blackness. The distance between the divine existence and absolute non-existence is infinite in this way. (2) It is finite on both sides, as when one man would have finite whiteness and the other finite blackness. In tins way created existence is distant from non-existence under a certain aspect. (3) It is finite on the one side and infinite on the other, as, for example, if one man would have finite whiteness and the other infinite blackness. The distance between created existence and absolute non-existence is of this kind; for created existence is finite, and absolute non-existence is infinite in the sense that it exceeds every lack that can be thought of. This distance, then, can be traversed from its finite side, inasmuch as finite existence is either acquired or lost, but not from its infinite side.

10. The ability to cause grace belongs to a power that is absolutely infinite, seeing that it belongs to the power which establishes nature, which is infinite. To be able to give grace and to be unable to create other things are therefore incompatible.

11. The power of his soldiers is a part of the glory of a king if it is of such a kind and of such a degree that it does not withdraw them from their subjection to him, but not if by their power they are re moved from that subjection. Now by the power of conferring grace a creature would be made equal to God, as having infinite power. It would therefore derogate from the divine glory if a creature had such power.

12. Hearing is not the adequate cause of faith, as is evident from the fact that many hear who do not believe. But he who makes the believer assent to what is said is the cause of faith. The believer is not, however, forced to assent by any necessity of reason but by his will. Consequently it is not the man who announces the truths externally that causes faith, but God, who alone can change the will. He causes faith in the believer by inclining his will and enlightening his intellect will the light of faith so that he does not fight against the truths pro posed by the preacher. The preacher meanwhile does the work of exteriorly disposing him for the faith.

13. I can give what is mine as a possession, but not what is mine as an inherent form. I cannot, for instance, give my colour or my quantity. Now grace belongs to a man in this way, and not in the first.

14. Even though a prelate cannot give grace to his subject, still by admonishing and rebuking he can cooperate in giving grace to some one or in keeping him from losing the grace already given. In virtue of such a responsibility he is held to give an account of the souls of his subjects.

15. The ministers of a king do not bestow the king’s grace upon anyone except by way of intercession. God’s ministers too can in the same way bestow grace upon a sinner by obtaining it will their prayers, but not by effectively causing the grace.

6. The imposition of hands does not cause the coming of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit comes simultaneously will the imposition of hands. It is accordingly not said in the text that the Apostles, imposing their hands, gave the Holy Spirit, but that they imposed their hands and the people received the Holy Spirit, i.e., from God.

Yet if the imposition of hands is in some sense called the cause of the reception of the Holy Spirit (in the manner in which the sacraments are the cause of grace, as will be explained later the imposition of hands will have this power, not as being from man, but from its divine institution.

17. The opinion of the Master is not commonly held on this point, namely, that the power of creating and justifying can be conferred upon a creature, though even the Master did not say that the power of justifying by authority could be conferred upon a creature, but only of doing so by ministry.

Yet even if it is communicable to a creature, it still does not follow that it was in fact communicated. For when it is said that everything that is communicable to creatures has been communicated to them, this must be understood of the things that their nature requires, not of the things that can be superadded to their natural attributes by the divine liberality alone. Concerning these no jealousy is apparent even if they are not conferred. There is consequently no parallel will the Son. For it is essential to sonship that the son have the nature of his begetter. Hence, if God the Father did not communicate to His Son the fullness of His nature, that would seem to be due either to impotency or to jealousy; and particularly if one follows the opinion of those who said that the Father begot the Son by His will.

18. The statement of Dionysius is not to be taken to mean that the lowest things are joined to the last end by means of the intermediate causes, but that the intermediate causes dispose them for that union either by enlightenment or by any other sort of ministry.

19. That power was given to the Apostles in order to expel demons from bodies, and obviously that is less than to expel sin from the soul. And furthermore it was not given to them to expel the demons by their own power but by calling upon the name of Christ, obtaining it through prayer. This appears from what is said in Mark (16: 17): "In my name they shah cast out devils."

20. The priests of the Law did not do anything to confer grace even by way of ministry except remotely, by their exhortation and doc trine. For the sacraments of the Old Law, of which they were the ministers, did not confer grace, as do the sacraments of the New Law, whose ministers are the priests of the gospel. The new priesthood is therefore nobler than the old, as the Apostle proves in the Epistle to the Hebrews (chs. 7—10).

21. The soul has a different relation to natural life than it has to the life of grace. It stands to the life of grace as that which lives by some thing else, but to the life of nature as that by which something else lives. Consequently it cannot communicate the life of grace, but receives it when communicated It does, however, communicate the life of nature; but it does this only as being formally united to the body. Now it is not possible for the soul to be formally united to another soul capable of living by the life of grace. Hence there is no parallel.

22. It is not impossible for an agent to act according to its own species or even beneath it; but nothing can act above its own species. Now grace is above the nature of the soul, whereas guilt is either on the level of nature as regards the animal part or beneath it as regards reason. There is accordingly no parallel between guilt and grace.

23. Even in the microcosm, man, a spiritual accident which does not surpass nature is to some extent caused by a created power; that is, knowledge is caused by a teacher in his pupil. This is not true of grace, however, because it surpasses nature. But the sentient and vegetative soul is contained within the order of natural beings.

24. The perfection of grace is superior to the perfection of nature from the standpoint of the perfecting form, not from that of the thing perfected. For in a way what is natural is more perfectly possessed than what is above nature, inasmuch as it is proportioned to a natural active power which does not measure up to a supernatural gift. It therefore cannot transmit a supernatural gift by its own power, though it can make something like itself in nature.

This is, however, not universally true, because the more perfect creatures cannot make anything like themselves. The sun, for example, cannot produce another sun, nor an angel another angel. It is true only among corruptible creatures, which have been divinely provided will a generative power in order that what cannot perdure as an individual may perdure in the species.

25. The act of a form is of two kinds. There is one which is an operation, such as to heat. This is a second act. And such an act of the form is attributed to the supposite. Another act of the form is the information of the matter, as to give life to the body is the act of the soul. This is the first act. Such an act is not attributed to the supposite of the form. Now it is in this sense that the act of justice or of grace is to justify.



ARTICLE IV: ARE THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW THE CAUSE OF GRACE?



Parallel readings: IV Sentences I, I, 4 sol. i & 2; i8, I, 3 sol. i ad I; In Gal., c. 2, lectura (P 13: 397 Contra Gentiles IV, 56 & g7; De art. fidei et eccl. sac. Sum. Theol. , I-II 112,1 ad 2; III 62,1 III 62,6; Quodibet XII, (10), 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. Bernard says: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crosier, and a bishop by means of a ring, so the different classes of grace are bestowed by the different sacraments." But the book is not the cause of the canonry; nor the crosier, of the abbacy; nor the ring, of the episcopacy. Then neither are the sacraments the cause of grace.

2. If a sacrament is the cause of grace, it is either the principal or the instrumental cause. Now it is not the principal cause, because only God is the cause of grace in this way, as has been said. Nor again is it the instrumental cause, because every instrument has some natural action upon the thing on which it works instrumentally. But since a sacrament is something corporeal, it cannot have any natural action upon the soul, which is the recipient of grace. And so it cannot be the instrumental cause of grace.

3. Every active cause is either perfective or dispositive, as can be gathered from the words of Avicenna. But a sacrament is not a perfective cause of grace, because in that case it would be its principal cause. Nor is it a dispositive cause, because the disposition for grace is in the same subject that grace is in, the soul, which is not affected by anything corporeal. A sacrament is therefore in no way the cause of grace.

4. If it is the cause of grace, it is so either by its own power or by some power added to it. It is not so by its own power, because in that case any water would sanctify just as well as the water of baptism. Likewise it is not so by any power added to it, because whatever is received into another is received after the manner of the recipient. Thus, since a sacrament is "a material element," as Hugh of St. Victor says, it will not receive anything but a material power, which does not suffice for the production of a spiritual form. A sacrament is there fore in no will the cause of grace.

5. The power received into this "material element" will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it is incorporeal, since it is an accident and its subject is a body, it will be nobler than its subject; for some thing incorporeal is nobler than a body. If, on the other hand, it is a corporeal power and causes grace, which is a spiritual form and in corporeal, the effect will as a consequence be nobler than its cause. But that again is impossible. It is therefore also impossible for a sacra- merit to cause grace.

6. It was said in answer that this added power is not something complete in a species but something incomplete. On the contrary, what is incomplete cannot be the cause of what is complete. But grace is something complete, whereas this power is something incomplete. Such an incomplete power therefore cannot be the cause of grace.

7. A perfect agent should have a perfect instrument. But the sacraments act as the instruments of God, who is the most perfect agent. They should therefore be perfect, and so have perfect power.

8. According to Dionysius it is a law of divinity to conduct the intermediate things by means of the first, and the last thing by means of the intermediate. It is therefore against the law of divinity for inter mediate or first things to be led back to God by means of the last things. But in the hierarchy of creatures corporeal ones are the last, and spiritual substances are first. It is consequently out of keeping for grace, by which the human mind is led back to God, to be conferred upon it by means of corporeal elements.

9. Augustine distinguishes a twofold action on the part of God: one which He performs "by means of a creature which stands for Him," and another which I-Je immediately performs "by Himself." "To enlighten souls" is of this latter kind. But to confer grace upon a soul is to enlighten it. God therefore does not make use of a sacra- merit as an intermediate instrument to confer grace.

10. If any power is conferred upon a material element by which it might cause grace, when the sacrament is finished that power either remains or not. If it remains, then in the case of baptismal water after it has been sanctified by the word of life, if a person were to be baptized after another’s baptism without the pronouncing of any words, he would be baptized. But that is false. If, on the other hand, it does not remain, since no contrary cause of its perishing can be assigned, it will wear out of itself. But since it is something spiritual and one of the greatest goods, being the cause of grace, it seems incongruous for it to disappear so quickly.

11. An agent is superior to its patient. Thus Augustine proves that a body does not imprint upon the soul the likenesses by which the soul knows. But that a body not joined to the soul should cause in it the supernatural form of grace is even more to be rejected than that the body united to it should cause in it a natural effect. It therefore seems by no means possible that such bodily elements, which are found in the sacraments, should be the cause of grace.

12. The soul disposes itself to have grace more effectively than it is disposed by the sacraments, because the disposition which the soul produces in itself leads to grace even without any sacrament, but not vice versa. Now even though the soul disposes itself for grace, it is not called the cause of grace. Consequently, even if the sacraments in some way dispose for grace, they should not be called the cause of grace.

13. No will craftsman uses a tool except in accordance will its fit ness, as a carpenter does not use a saw for hewing. But God is a most will craftsman. He therefore does not make use of a corporeal instrument for a spiritual effect, which is beyond the competence of a corporeal nature.

14. A will physician uses more powerful remedies for more virulent diseases. But the disease of sin is most virulent. Consequently for its cure through the conferring of grace God should have used powerful remedies and not corporeal elements.

15. The re-creation of the soul ought to be similar to its creation. But God created the soul without the intervention of any creature. Then in like manner He should re-create it by means of grace will out the intervention of a sacrament.

16. It is a sign of the impotence of the agent to have helps. But instruments help toward producing the effect of the principal agent. Then it does not befit God, who is the most powerful agent, to confer grace by means of the sacraments as His instruments.

17. In every instrument its natural action, which contributes some thing to the effect intended by the principal agent, is required. But the natural action of a material element does not seem to have any thing to do will the effect of grace which God intends to produce in the soul. In baptism, for instance, the washing does not have any closer bearing upon the soul than the water itself. Such sacraments therefore do not work toward the conferring of grace as instruments.

18. Sacraments are not conferred without a minister. Now if sacraments are in any way the cause of grace, man will in some way be the cause of grace. But that is contrary to the teaching of Augustine, who says that the power of justifying has not been conferred upon the minister, lest hope be placed in a man.

19. In grace Holy Spirit is given. If, then, the sacraments are the cause of grace, they will cause the giving of the Holy Spirit. But that is contrary to Augustine, who says that no creature "can give the Holy Spirit." Sacraments are therefore by no means the cause of grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. Defining a sacrament of the New Law, the Master says: "A sacra- merit is the visible form of an invisible grace, in the sense that it bears the image and becomes the cause of the grace."

2’. Ambrose says that grace is stronger than guilt. And this is evident also from the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans (5: 15-19). But guilt is caused in the soul through the infection of the body. Then grace too can be caused in the soul through the sanctification of a bodily element.

3’. Through the institution of the sacraments there is added to the natural instruments either something or nothing. If nothing, then nothing has been conferred upon the world in the institution of the sacraments. But that is unacceptable. If, on the other hand, something is added, since it is not added in vain, the natural instrument will be capable of effecting something that it was previously unable to effect. But this can be only grace, since sacraments were instituted to this end. The sacraments are therefore capable of effecting grace.

4’. It was said that only a certain ordination to grace is added.— On the contrary, an ordination is a relation. But a relation is always founded upon something absolute, on which account there is motion in the category of relation indirectly. Consequently, if an ordination is added, something absolute must be added.

5'. What is absolute is not caused by what is relative, because what is relative has a very weak act of being. Now if nothing but a relation is added to the sacraments by their institution, they will not be able to sanctify by reason of their institution. But this is contrary to Hugh of St. Victor.

6’. It was said that the cause of the sanctification is not that relation but the divine power attached to the sacraments.—On the contrary, the divine power, which is God Himself, is connected will the sacraments after their institution either in a different way than before or not. If not in a different way, they will not have any different effect after their institution than they did before. If, however, in a different way, since God is said to be in a creature in a new way only because He causes a new effect in it, something new will have to be added to the sacraments themselves. And so the conclusion is the same as before.

7’. In certain sacraments consecrated matter is required, as in extreme unction and confirmation. But that consecration is not without purpose. By it, then, some spiritual power is conferred upon the sacraments by reason of which they can be in some measure the cause of grace, since that power is directed to this end.

235

REPLY:

It is necessary to hold that the sacraments of the New Law are in some sense the cause of grace. For the Old Law was said to kill and to increase the transgressions because it gave knowledge of sin but did not confer any grace as a help against sin. Now if the New Law did not confer grace, it would likewise be said to kill and to increase the transgressions. But the teachings of the apostles proclaim the contrary. It does not, however, confer grace merely by instruction (because even the Old Law had this feature), but by causing grace in some sense through its sacraments. The Church is accordingly not content will the catechizing by which it instructs a convert; but it adds the sacraments that he may have grace, which the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer but merely signified. But signification pertains to instruction. Thus, because the Old Law merely instructed, its sacraments were only signs of grace; whereas, because the New Law both instructs and justifies, its sacraments are both the sign and the cause of grace. But how they are the cause of grace not all explain in the same way.

Some say that they are the cause of grace, not because they them selves by any power vested in them do anything effective for bringing about grace, but because in their reception grace is given by God, who upholds the sacraments. As a result they are called the cause of grace in the manner of an indispensable (sine qua non) cause. They give as an example of this the case of a man who hands over a lead nickel and receives a hundred dollars in exchange, not because the lead nickel is the cause which brings on the reception of the hundred dollars, but because one who is able to give it has decreed that whoever brings in such a nickel should receive so much money. It has similarly been decreed by God that whoever sincerely receives the sacraments should receive grace, not indeed from the sacraments but from God Himself. And they say that the Master was of this opinion when he said that one receiving a sacrament seeks salvation in things beneath himself, though not from them.

Now this opinion does not seem sufficiently to safeguard the dignity of the sacraments of the New Law. For if the example proposed by them and similar cases are rightly considered, we find that what they call an indispensable cause is related to the effect only as a sign. For the lead nickel is nothing but a sign of the reception of the money, like the staff of authority which is conferred upon an abbot.

Consequently, if the sacraments of the New Law are so related to grace, it will follow that they are only signs of grace; and thus they will have nothing to set them above the sacraments of the Old Law— unless perhaps one were to say that the sacraments of the New Law are signs of a grace given simultaneously will them, whereas those of the Old Law are signs of a grace that is promised. But this refers more to a difference of time than to the dignity of the sacraments, be cause at that time grace was promised, but now is the time of the full ness of grace on account of the restoration of human nature already accomplished. According to this opinion, then, if these same sacraments of the New Law had existed then will everything which they now have, they would not have effected anything more than those of the Old Law, nor would the ancient sacraments now effect anything less than the present ones even if nothing were added to them.

We must therefore solve the problem differently and say that the sacraments of the New Law have some effect upon our having grace. Now a thing works for the production of an effect in two ways: (1) By acting of itself. And something is said to act of itself if it acts by means of a form inherent to it after the manner of a complete nature, whether it has that form of itself or from another, and whether naturally or violently. In this way the sun and the moon are said to light things, and fire and red-hot iron and heated water to heat things. (2) A thing is said to work toward the production of an effect instrumentally if it does not do so by means of a form inherent to it but only in so far as it is moved by an agent that acts of itself.

It is the nature of an instrument as instrument to move something else when moved itself. The motion by which the instrument is moved by the principal agent is therefore related to the instrument as a complete form is related to an agent acting of itself. It is in this way, for instance, that a saw works upon a bench. Now although the saw has an action which attaches to it in accordance will its own form, that is, to divide, nevertheless it has an effect which does not attach to it except in so far as it is moved by a craftsman, namely, to make a straight cut agreeing will the pattern. Thus an instrument has two operations, one which belongs to it according to its own form, and another which belongs to it in so far as it is moved by the principal agent and which rises above the ability of its own form.

We must therefore say that neither a sacrament nor any other creature can give grace as a principal agent, because this is proper to the divine power exclusively, as is evident from the preceding article. But the sacraments work instrumentally toward the production of grace. This is explained as follows.

Damascene says that in Christ His human nature was like a tool of His divinity, and thus His human nature shared somewhat in the working of the divine power. By touching a leper, for instance, Christ made him clean. The very touch of Christ thus caused the health of the leper instrumentally.

It was not merely in corporeal effects that Christ’s human nature shared instrumentally in the effect of the divine power but also in spiritual effects. Thus Christ’s blood poured out for us had the ability to wash away sins, as is said in the Apocalypse (1:5): "Christ] washed us from our sins in his own blood," and in the Epistle to the Romans (3: 24): "Being justified...in his blood."

Thus the humanity of Christ is the instrumental cause of justification. This cause is applied to us spiritually through faith and bodily through the sacraments, because Christ’s humanity is both spirit and body. This is done to the end that we may receive within ourselves the effect of sanctification, which is had through Christ. As a consequence the most perfect sacrament is that in which the body of Christ is really contained, the Eucharist; and it is the consummation of all the others, as Dionysius says. But the other sacraments also share some of the efficacy by which Christ’s humanity works instrumentally for our justification. By reason of it a person sanctified by baptism is said by the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10: 10—22) to be sanctified by the blood of Christ. Christ’s passion is accordingly said to work in the sacraments of the New Law. Thus the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace working in some sense instrumentally w produce it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Bernard does not deal adequately will the nature of the sacraments of the New Law, for he speaks of them inasmuch as they are signs and not inasmuch as they are causes.

2. The sacraments of the New Law are not the principal cause of grace as agents acting of themselves, but the instrumental cause; and after the manner of other instruments they have a twofold action: one which surpasses its own form, being from the power of the form of the principal agent, God; and this is to justify; and another which they exercise according to their own form, as to wash or to anoint. This latter action affects in a bodily manner the man who is justified in his body directly and in his soul, which senses the bodily action, in directly. But it affects in a spiritual manner the soul itself inasmuch as by means of the intellect the soul perceives it as a sign of a spiritual Cleansing.

3. Because the last end corresponds to the first agent as principal to principal, for this reason not the last end but a disposition for the last end is attributed to instrumental agents. And so the sacraments are said to be the cause of grace as disposing instruments.

4. The sacraments do not work for the production of grace by the power of their own form, for in that case they would work as principal agents; but they work by the power of the principal agent, God, existing in them. That power does not have a complete act of being in nature, but is something incomplete in the lime of being. That is shown from the fact that an instrument moves in so far as it is moved. But motion is "an imperfect act" according to the Philosopher. Consequently, things which cause motion as being at the term of the motion and already assimilated to the agent, move by means of a perfect form; but things which cause motion as being in the midst of motion, move by means of an incomplete power. It is this sort of power which is in the air to move sight in so far as it is changed by the colour of a wall, in the sense of being in process and not in that of already being in the completed state. The species of the colour is accordingly in the air after the manner of an intention, and not after the manner of a complete being as it is in the wall.

In the same way the sacraments have an effect upon grace inasmuch as they are, as it were, moved by God to this effect. And that motion can be considered on the basis of their institution, their sanctification, and their application to the one who goes to the sacraments. They consequently do not have their efficacy after the manner of a complete being, but in a sense incompletely. Thus it is not out of keeping for a spiritual power to be in a material being, just as the species of colour are spiritually in the air.

5. That power cannot, properly speaking, be called either corporeal or incorporeal; for corporeal and incorporeal are differences of complete being. Properly it is called a power for something incorporeal, just as motion is rather said to be to a being than a being. But the difficulty argues as if that power were a complete form.

6. Something incomplete cannot be the cause of something complete as a principal agent; yet something incomplete can in a sense be directed after the manner of a cause to something complete, as we say that the motion of the instrument is the cause of the form introduced by the principal agent.

7. It does not pertain to the perfection of an instrument to act by a complete power, but to act in so far as it is moved, and thus by an incomplete power. It therefore does not follow that the sacraments are imperfect instruments even though their power is not a complete being.

8. An instrument is related to an action more like that by which it is done than like that which does it; for the principal agent acts by means of the instrument. Accordingly, although the lowest beings do not lead the intermediate or highest beings back to God, they can still serve as the means by which the intermediate and higher beings are led back to God. Consequently Dionysius also says that it is con natural for us to be led to God by means of sensible things, and he gives this as the reason for the necessity of visible sacraments.

9. It is suitable for God to enlighten the soul without the intervention of any creature which would act in this work as a principal agent acting of itself. There can nevertheless be a means acting instrumentally and dispositively.

10. There are some sacraments in which consecrated matter is required, e.g., extreme unction and confirmation; but there are others in which this is not required as necessary for the sacrament. It is there fore true in the case of all that the power of the sacrament docs not consist in the matter alone, but in the matter and form together, both of which constitute a single sacrament. Consequently, however much the matter of the sacrament is applied to a man, if the due form of the words and the other requisites are missing, the effect of the sacrament does not follow.

But in the case of the sacraments which need consecrated matter, the power of the sacrament remains partially though not completely in the matter of the sacrament after its use. But in the case of the sacraments which do not need consecrated matter, nothing remains after the use of the sacrament. Thus the water will which baptism has been conferred has nothing more than any other water, unless it be because of the mingling of the chrism, which is mot, however, necessary for the sacrament. Nor is there anything incongruous in the fact that the power ceases immediately, because that power is like a thing in the process of becoming and moving, as has been said. Such things cease to exist when the motion of the mover ceases; for as soon as the mover ceases to move, the mobile ceases to be moved.

11. Although a bodily element is inferior to the soul, and for this reason cannot effect anything in the soul by virtue of its own nature, it can nonetheless effect something in the soul inasmuch as it is an instrument acting by the divine power.

12. In disposing itself for grace the soul acts by virtue of its own nature, whereas a sacrament acts by the divine virtue as God’s instrument. And so the case is not the same.

13. In keeping will its own form a sacrament signifies or is such as to signify the effect to which it is divinely ordained. In this respect it is a suitable instrument, because the sacraments cause by signifying.

14. The sacraments of the New Law are not weak remedies, but powerful, seeing that the passion of Christ works in them. The sacraments of the Old Law, however, which preceded the passion of Christ, are called weak, as appears in the Epistle to the Galatians (4:9): "You have turned to the weak and needy elements."

15. Creation does not presuppose anything in which the action of an instrumental agent could terminate, but re-creation does. There is accordingly no parallel.

16. It is not because of His own need but for the meet ness of the effects that God uses instruments or intervening causes in His action. For it is meet that the divine remedies should be presented to us conformably to our condition, that is, through sensible things, as Dionysius says.

17. The natural action of a material instrument helps toward the effect of the sacrament in so far as the sacrament is applied by it to the recipient and in so far as the signification of the sacrament is completed by the said action, as the signification of baptism by washing.

18. There are some sacraments in which a definite minister is not required, as in baptism. In these the power of the sacrament is not situated in the minister at all. But there are some sacraments in which a definite minister is required. The power of these is partially situated in the minister as well as in the matter and the form. And yet the minister is not said to justify except by way of the ministry, inasmuch as he cooperates in justification by conferring a sacrament.

19. The Holy Spirit is given only by him who causes grace as the principal agent; and this is the business of God alone. Thus only God gives the Holy Spirit.



ARTICLE V: IN ONE MAN IS THERE ONLY ONE INGRATIATORY GRACE?



Parallel readings: II Sentences 26, a. 6; IV Sentences 1, 2, 4 sol. 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. Nothing is distinguished from itself. But grace is distinguished into operating and cooperating grace. Operating and cooperating grace are therefore different kinds, and in one man there is not just one ingratiatory grace.

2. It was said in answer that operating and cooperating grace are one and the same from the viewpoint of the habit, but the distinction is made from the viewpoint of the distinct acts.—On the contrary, habits are distinguished by their acts. If, then, the acts are distinct, the two kinds of grace cannot be a single habit.

3. No one has to ask for what he already has. But a person who has antecedent grace has to ask for subsequent grace, according to Augustine. Antecedent grace and subsequent grace are therefore not one and the same.

4. It was said that a person having antecedent grace does not ask for subsequent grace as a distinct grace but as the preservation of the same one.—On the contrary, grace is stronger than nature. But man in the state of uncorrupted nature was able by himself to remain in possession of what he had received, as is said in the Sentences. Consequently one who has received antecedent grace is able to remain lii it, and so he does not have to ask for this.

5. Form is distinguished in the same way as the things to be perfected. But grace is the form of virtues. Since there are many virtues, grace therefore cannot be one.

6. Antecedent grace refers to tins present life, but subsequent grace refers to glory. Thus Augustine says: "It precedes in order that we may live piously, and it follows in order that we may always live will God; it precedes that we may be called, and it follows that we may be glorified." Now the grace of this present life is different from that of our heavenly home, since nature as created and nature as glorified do not have the same perfection, as the Master says. Antecedent grace and subsequent grace are therefore not the same.

7. Operating grace pertains to the internal act, whereas cooperating grace pertains to the external act. Augustine thus says: "It pre cedes in order that we may will, and it follows lest we will in vain." But the principle of the internal act and that of the external act are not the same. In regard to the virtues, for instance, it is evident that charity is given for the internal act, but fortitude, justice, and the like for external acts. Consequently operating and cooperating grace or antecedent and subsequent grace are not the same.

8. Ignorance is a defect in the soul on the part of the intellect hike guilt on the part of the will. But no one habit drives all ignorance out of the intellect. Consequently there cannot be a single habit which would drive all guilt out of the will. But grace drives out all guilt. Then grace is not a single habit.

9. Grace and guilt are contraries. But a single guilt does not infect all the powers of the soul. Then neither can a single grace perfect all.

10. On the words of Exodus (33:13): "If therefore I have found favour..."the Gloss comments: "A single grace is not sufficient for the saints; there is one which precedes in order that they may know and love God; and there is another which follows in order that they may keep themselves clean and inviolate and make progress." There is accordingly not merely one grace in one man.

11. A different manner of acting having a special difficulty requires different habit. In regard to the granting of large gifts, for example, which cause difficulty because of their magnitude, there is required a special virtue, magnificence, over and above liberality, which is concerned will ordinary gifts. But to persevere in willing rightly has a special difficulty over and above that of simply willing. But simply to will rightly is a matter of antecedent grace, whereas perseverance in willing rightly is a matter of subsequent grace. Thus Augustine says that grace precedes in order that man may will, and follows in order that he may fulfil and persist. Subsequent grace is therefore n different habit from antecedent grace.

12. The sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace, as has been said. But different sacraments are not ordained to the same effect. Consequently there are different graces in man which are conferred by the different sacraments.

13. It was answered that later sacraments are not conferred in order to introduce grace but to increase it.—On the contrary, the in crease of grace does not change its species. If, then, causes are pro portioned to their effects, it will follow from the answer given that the sacraments do not differ in species.

14. It was said that the sacraments differ specifically in accordance will the different gratuitous graces which are conferred in the different sacraments and are the distinctive effects of the sacraments.— On the contrary, gratuitous grace is not opposed to guilt. Now since the sacraments are especially directed against guilt, it therefore seems that the distinctive effects of the sacraments, in accordance will which the sacraments are distinguished, are not gratuitous graces.

15. Different wounds are inflicted upon the soul by different sins, but all are healed by grace. Since different medicines correspond to different wounds, because (in the words of Jerome) "what heals a heel will not heal an eye," it therefore seems that there are distinct graces.

16. The same thing cannot at the same time be had and not had by the same thing. But some people who do not have cooperating grace do have operating grace—baptized infants, for instance. Operating grace and cooperating grace are therefore not the same.

17. Grace is proportioned to nature as a perfection to a perfectible thing. But in human nature it so happens that being and operation are not immediately from the same principle; for the soul is the principle of being on the basis of its essence, but that of operation on the basis of its power. Now since on the supernatural plane operating or antecedent grace is the principle from which spiritual existence is had, but cooperating grace is the principle of spiritual operation, it there fore seems that operating and cooperating grace are not the same.

i8. One habit cannot produce two acts at one and the same time. But the act of operating grace, which is to justify or heal the soul, and the act of cooperating or subsequent grace, which is to act justly, are in the soul at the same time. Operating grace and cooperating grace are therefore not identical; and so there is not just one grace in man.

To the Contrary:

1'. Where one thing suffices it is superfluous to posit many. But one grace suffices for man’s salvation, as is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee." Then there is only one grace in man.

2’. A relation does not multiply the essence of a thing. But co operating grace does not add anything to operating grace except a relation. Cooperating grace is therefore essentially the same as operating grace.


De veritate EN 234