De veritate EN 246

246

REPLY:

On this matter there are three opinions.

Some say that the motion of free choice naturally precedes will out qualification the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. For they say that that motion of free choice is not contrition but attrition, and that it is an act not of formed but of unformed faith. But this does not seem to be to the point. For all sorrow for sin in one who has grace is contrition; and similarly every act of faith joined to grace is an act of formed faith. Accordingly the act of unformed faith and the attrition of which these men speak precede in time the infusion of grace of such motions of free choice we are not at present speaking, but rather of those which are accompanied by the in fusion of grace and without which there cannot be any justification in adults; for it can take place without any preceding acts, as is clear from what was said above.

For this reason others say that those motions are meritorious and informed by grace, and hence naturally follow grace; but they naturally precede the forgiveness of guilt, because through those acts grace brings about that forgiveness. Now this cannot be true. For any thing that causes an effect by its operation causes it as an efficient cause. If, then, grace causes the forgiveness of guilt through an act of contrition and of faith that is formed, it will cause it as an efficient cause. But that is impossible; for a cause which effectively destroys something is placed in existence before the thing destroyed is reduced to non-existence, because it would not work for the destruction of something which already does not exist. It would accordingly follow that grace would be in the soul before guilt is forgiven. But that is impossible. It is therefore clear that grace is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin through any operation, but through the information of its subject implied in the infusion of grace. Nothing intervenes, then, between the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.

We must therefore hold, as another opinion has it, that the motions in question are so related in the same order to both forgiveness and grace that in one sense they precede and in another they follow by the order of nature. For if we view the order of nature in the line of material causality, the motion of free choice naturally precedes the infusion of grace as a material disposition precedes the form. If, on the other hand, we view them in the line of formal causality, the sequence is reversed. The same situation obtains in natural things as regards a disposition that is an exigency for a form, which in some sense precedes the substantial form, namely, in the line of material causality; for a material disposition attaches to the matter. In the other line of causality-formal-however, the substantial form is prior inasmuch as it perfects both the matter and the material accidents.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Contrition is the cause of the forgiveness of guilt in so far as it is a disposition for grace.

2. The sacrament of penance has the ability to confer grace from the power of the keys, to which the penitent submits. If contrition is considered in itself, then, it is related to grace only as a material disposition; but if it is considered in so far as it has the power of the keys in desire, then it works sacramentally in virtue of the sacra- merit of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as is clear in the case of an adult who has the sacrament of baptism only in desire. We do not conclude from this, then, that contrition is itself directly the efficient cause of the forgiveness of guilt, but rather that the power of the keys or baptism is.

Or the answer may be given that will reference to the debt of temporal punishment contrition stands as an efficient cause, but will reference to the stain and the debt of eternal punishment it stands only as a disposition.

3. Contrition does not differ from previous attrition merely in the intensity of the sorrow but also in information by grace. Thus contrition has a certain relation of posteriority to grace which attrition does not have.

4. That preparation is by way of a material disposition.

5. Contrition is a motion to the forgiveness of guilt, not as if the contrition were distant from the forgiveness but as joined to it. Hence it is considered as being in the condition of having been moved rather than in that of being moved. And yet the motion precedes the term in the lime of material causality, because motion is the act of a being that is in potency.

6. The words "He will not justify you without you" are to be understood as meaning "not without you in some way disposing your self for grace." So the motion of free choice does not have to precede except as a disposition.

7. Consent is the efficient cause of carnal marriage; but the motion of free choice is not the efficient cause of the infusion of grace; and so there is no parallel.

8. In the justification of sinners man is mot God’s helper in the sense of producing grace along will Him, but only in the sense that he prepares himself for grace.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Contrition is from grace as from that which informs it. It accordingly follows that in the line of formal causality grace is prior.

2’. The meritorious act of man does not precede grace in the lime of meriting so that grace becomes subordinate to the meritorious act. Yet the human act can precede grace as a material disposition.

3’. Contrition is from free choice and from grace. Inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice it is a disposition for grace that arrives simultaneously will grace, just as a disposition that is an exigency exists simultaneously will die form; but inasmuch as it is from grace it is related to grace as a second act.

4’. Just as a habit perfects a power formally, in the same way the remnant of the habit left in the act is formal as regards the substance of the act which the power furnishes. Thus the habit is a formal principle of the formed act, although in regard to the formation it has the character of an efficient cause.

5’. A disposition does not have any influence upon the form effectively but only materially, inasmuch as through the disposition the matter is made suitable for the reception of the form. Contrition accordingly has an influence upon the infusion of grace in one who has guilt, though it is not required in an innocent person. For there are more dispositive requisites for the removal of a contrary form and the simultaneous introduction of a form than for the introduction of a form alone.

6’. The contribution of the giver is prior formally, but that of the receiver is prior materially.

7'. It does not follow from that argument that the removal of guilt precedes contrition, because guilt is in some sense forgiven through contrition itself, just as the form of water is driven out by means of heat in the highest degree and therefore the two forms are not simultaneous. In the same way, neither are guilt and contrition.



ARTICLE IX: IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS INSTANTANEOUS?



Parallel readings: De veritate, 28, 2 ad 'o; IV Sentences 17, I, 5 sol. 2 & 3; Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 7.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

It is impossible for the same power to have several motions at one and the same time, just as a single matter is not under different distinct forms at one and the same time. But in the justification of sinners two different motions of free choice are required, as is clear from what has been said. The justification of sinners therefore cannot be instantaneous.

2. The answer was given that those two motions belong to different powers; for the motion of free choice toward God belongs to the concupiscible power, and that toward sin, being a sort of detestation of sin, is in the irascible. —On the contrary, to detest is the same as to hate. But hatred, like love, is in the concupiscible power, as the Philosopher teaches. To detest is therefore not in the irascible power.

3. According to Damascene the irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sense appetite. But sense appetite extends only to a good suited to it or to the contrary of this. But objects of this kind are not God Himself and sin under the aspect of being detestable. The motions in question therefore do not pertain to the concupiscible and irascible powers but to the will; and so they belong to the same power.

4. It was said in answer that the motion of free choice toward God is the motion of faith, which belongs to the intellect, whereas contrition belongs to the will, whose business it is to sorrow for sin; and thus they are not motions of a single power.—On the contrary, ac cording to Augustine "man cannot believe unless he so wil1s." Consequently, even though an act of the intellect is required in believing, there is nevertheless required in it an act of the will. We are accordingly left will the conclusion that two motions of the same power are required for the justification of sinners.

5. To be moved from one term to another belongs to the same being. But to detest sin is to be moved from a term, and to be moved toward God is to be moved to a term. Consequently contrition, which is detestation for sin, is an act of the same power to which motion to ward God belongs; and so they cannot coexist.

6. Nothing is moved at the same time to distinct and contrary terms. But God and sin are distinct and contrary terms. The soul therefore cannot at the same time be moved toward God and toward S and so we must conclude as before.

7. Grace is given only to one who is worthy. But as long as a person is subjected to guilt he is not worthy of grace. Guilt must there fore be driven out before grace is infused. Then justification, which includes the two, is not instantaneous.

8. A form susceptible of more or less must, it seems, come to be in a subject successively, just as a form not susceptible of more or less comes to be in the subject all at once, as is clear of substantial forms. But grace is intensified in ifs subject. It therefore seems to be introduced successively; and so the infusion of grace is not instantaneous, and consequently neither is the justification of sinners.

9. In the justification of sinners, as in any change, two terms must be set down, a starting point and a finish. But the two terms of any change are incompatible; that is, they cannot coexist. In the justification of sinners, then, two things are included which are related as prior and posterior; and so the justification of sinners is successive and not instantaneous.

10. Nothing which is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become, comes into being instantaneously. But grace is in the process of becoming before if is in the state of having become. The infusion of grace is therefore not instantaneous. Thus the conclusion is the same as above. Proof of the minor: In permanent beings vhat is becoming is not; but when it has become it already is. But race belongs to permanent beings. If, then, it is becoming and has become at the same time, it at the same time is and is not. But that is impossible.

11. All motion is in time. But in the justification of sinners a motion f free choice is required. The justification of sinners therefore takes place in time, and so it is not instantaneous.

12. Contrition for sins is required for the justification of sinners. But when someone has committed many sins, he cannot at the same instant be contrite for all his sins or even think of them. Consequently: he justification of sinners cannot be instantaneous.

11. Whenever there is anything intermediate between the extremes a change, the change is successive and not instantaneous. But between guilt and grace there is something intermediate, the state of created nature. The justification of sinners is therefore a successive change.

14. Guilt and grace are not in the soul simultaneously. Then the instant at which guilt is last in the soul is distinct from the instant at which grace is first there. But between any two instants a time intervenes. Then a time intervenes between the expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace. But justification includes both of these. Therefore justification takes place in time and is not instantaneous.

To the Contrary:

1'. The justification of sinners is a sort of spiritual enlightenment. But corporeal enlightenment takes place instantaneously, not in time. Now since spiritual beings are simpler than corporeal and less subject to time, it therefore seems that the justification of sinners is instantaneous.

2'. The more powerful an agent is, the shorter the time in which it produces its effect. But God, who has infinite power, works justification. Justification is therefore instantaneous.

3’. In The Causes we read that both the substance and the action of a spiritual substance (which is the genus to which the soul belongs) is in a moment of eternity and not in time. But justification pertains to the action of the soul. It is therefore not in time.

4'. At the same instant at which the disposition is complete in the matter, the form also is present. But the motion of free choice which is required in justification is a complete disposition for grace. There fore, at the same instant at which those motions are given, grace is present.

247

REPLY:

The justification of sinners is instantaneous.

For the clarification of this matter it should be noted that, when any change is said to be instantaneous, we do not mean that its two terms exist at the same instant; for this is impossible, since every change is between terms that are, properly speaking, opposed. We mean rather that the passage from one term to the other is instantaneous. That does in fact happen in some opposites, though in others it does not.

Whenever any mean must be recognized between the terms of a motion, the passage from one term to the other must be successive, because the thing which is undergoing continuous motion is first changed to the mean before it is changed to the final term, as the Philosopher makes clear. And by "mean" I refer to any sort of distance from the extremes, whether it be distance in situation, as is had in local motion; or distance in the line of quantity, as is had in increase and decrease; or in the line of form, as in alteration; and this whether the mean is of another species, as gray is between white and black, or of the same species, as the less warm is between the more warm and cold.

Whenever, on the other hand, there cannot be a mean between the two terms of a motion or change in any of the ways mentioned, then the passage from one term to the other is not in time but is instantaneous. This occurs whenever the terms of motion or change are affirmation and negation or privation and form. For between affirmation and negation there is no mean in any sense, nor between privation and form will regard to its proper subject. I am speaking here in the sense in which there is a mean of another species between the extremes.

But in the sense in which there is a mean in intensity and slackness, even though there cannot be a mean essentially, there nevertheless can be a mean accidentally. For essentially negation or privation is neither intensified nor abated; but accidentally some intensification or abatement of it can be viewed on the basis of its cause. Thus a man who has his eye gouged out may be said to be more blind than one who has a bandage over his eye, because the cause of blindness is more efficacious.

If, then, we take such changes according to their proper terms and speak essentially, they must be instantaneous and not in time. Examples are illumination, coming to be and perishing, and the like. But if we take them from the point of view of the causes of their terms, we can consider succession in them. This is evident in illumination; for, although the air passes straightway from darkness to light, the cause of darkness is successively removed, that is, the absence of the sun, since by means of local motion the sun becomes successively present. In this way illumination is the term of a local motion and is indivisible, like any term of a continuum.

I say, then, that the extremes of justification are grace and the privation of grace, between which no mean as regards their proper subject intervenes. The passage from the one to the other must accordingly be instantaneous, although the cause of such a privation is removed successively, either inasmuch as by taking thought the man disposes him self for grace, or at least inasmuch as a time passes after which God has preordained that He will give grace. Thus the infusion of grace takes place instantaneously. And because the driving out of guilt is the formal effect of the grace infused, hence it is that the whole justification of sinners is instantaneous; for the form and the disposition for the form and the loss of the other form are all instantaneous.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. When the two motions are altogether different, they cannot co exist in the same power. But if one is the reason for the other, then they can coexist, because they are in some sense a single motion. When, for example, a person desires something for the sake of an end, he at the same time desires the end and the means. In the same way when someone flees from what is repugnant to the end, he at the same time desires the end and flees from the contrary. It is in this way that the will at the same time is moved toward God and hates sin as contrary to God.

2. Such motions of free choice pertain to the will, not to the irascible and the concupiscible power. This is because their object is something intelligible, not something sensible. Yet they are sometimes found to be attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers in so far as the will itself is sometimes called irascible or concupiscible because of the resemblance of its act to theirs. In this case contrition can be attributed both to the concupiscible power inasmuch as the man hates sin, and to the irascible inasmuch as he is worked up against the sin, purposing within himself revenge for it.

3-5. The answers to these are clear from the above.

6. The will is not moved at the same time to pursue contraries, but it can be moved at the same time to flee from one thing and to pursue another, particularly if the pursuit of the one is the reason for the flight from the other.

7. Grace is given to one worthy of it, not in the sense that anyone is sufficiently worthy before he has grace, but in the sense that grace by being given makes the man worthy. Hence he is at the same time worthy of grace and in possession of grace.

8. It is not the intensification or abatement of the form itself in a subject, but rather the intensification or abatement of the contrary form or opposite term, which brings about the successive reception of the form in its subject. Now the privation of grace is not susceptible of more or less except accidentally, by reason of its cause, as has all ready been explained. Consequently it is not necessary for grace to be received successively in its subject. If, however, it did abate in the subject, this could have some influence upon the successive loss of grace; but grace does not abate in the same subject. Therefore it is not successively lost, because it does not abate itself; nor is it successively introduced, because its privation does not abate.

9. The answer is clear from what has been said; for a change is not said to be instantaneous because the two terms coexist at the same instant, as has been explained.

10. The coming to be of a permanent being can be taken in two senses: (1) Properly. In this sense a thing is said to be coming to be so long as the motion, whose term is the coming of the thing into existence, continues. So what comes to be is not in permanent beings, but the becoming of the thing takes place through a succession. It is in this sense that the Philosopher says that what is in process of be coming was becoming and will become. (2) Improperly, so that a thing is said to come to be at the instant at which it first has become, and this because that instant, inasmuch as it is the term of the previous time in which the thing was becoming, appropriates to itself what rightly belongs to the previous time. In this sense it is not true that what is in process of becoming is not, but rather that it is now for the first time and was not before this. This is the meaning of the statement that in things that become all at once, the becoming and the having become are simultaneous.

i Motion is not taken in the present context as a passage from potency to act (in which sense it is measured by time); but the motion of free choice is taken for its very operation, and this is an "act of a perfect being," as is said in The Soul. It can accordingly be instantaneous, just as to be perfect is also instantaneous.

12 At the instant at which a man is justified it is not required that he have contrition in particular for each one of his sins, but in general for all of them, will particular contrition for each sin either preceding or following.

13. After a man has fallen into sin there cannot be any mean between grace and guilt, because guilt is not taken away except through grace, as is evident from what was said above. Nor is grace destroyed except through guilt, though before guilt there would be a mean between grace and guilt in the opinion of some.

14. We should not take the last instant at which there was guilt, but the last time, as was said above."



QUESTION 29: Grace of Christ





ARTICLE I: IS THERE CREATED GRACE IN CHRIST?



Parallel readings: III Sentences i 1, I; In Joan., C. 3, lectura 6, § (P 'o: 357b- Sum. Theol., III, 7, 1; Comp. Theol., I, 213 & 214.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. By created grace a man is said to be an adopted son of God. But according to the saints Christ was not an adopted son. He therefore did not have created grace.

2. Where there is a union of one thing will another through its essence, there is no need of union through a likeness. Thus for knowledge there is required a union of the knower will the thing known; and yet when things are in the soul through their essence, in order to be known they do not need to be in the soul through a likeness. But God is really united to the soul of Christ by His essence in the unity of the person. There is consequently no need of His being united to it through grace, that is, through a likeness.

3. We do not need grace for actions which we can perform by our natural powers. But Christ was able to attain glory by His natural powers; for He is the natural Son, and if the Son, then the heir also. Now since grace is imparted to minds for the purpose of attaining glory, it therefore seems that Christ had no need of created grace.

4. A subject can be understood without an accident. But if grace was in Christ, it was an accident. Christ can therefore be understood without grace; and when He is so understood, either eternal life is due Him or not. If it is, then grace will be added to no purpose. If not, since eternal life is due to adopted sons because they are sons, it seems that adoptive sonship is worth more than natural sonship. But that is untenable.

5. Whatever is good by its essence does not need participated good ness. But Christ is good by His essence, because He is true God. He therefore does not need grace, which is a participated goodness.

6. Uncreated goodness surpasses the goodness of grace more than the light of the sun surpasses that of a candle. But since uncreated goodness was in Christ through the union, it therefore seems that He did not need grace.

7. The union of the divinity to Christ is either sufficient for Him or not. If it is not, the union in question will be imperfect; but if it is sufficient, the addition of grace would be superfluous. Now nothing superfluous is found in God’s works. Christ therefore did not have created grace.

8. One who knows something will a nobler kind of knowledge, such as that had through a demonstrative medium, does not need to know the same thing will a less noble kind of knowledge, as through a probable medium. But Christ was good will the noblest goodness, which is uncreated goodness. He therefore did not need to be good by a less noble sort of goodness, namely, created goodness.

9. An instrument does not need a habit for its operation, especially if the agent whose instrument it is has perfect power. But the humanity of Christ is a kind of "instrument of the divinity" which is united to it, as Damascene says. Since the divine power is most perfect, it seems that the humanity of Christ did not need grace.

10. It is not necessary for anything to be added to one who has the fullness of all goodness. But Christ’s soul had the fullness of all good ness because the Word, the treasure-house of all goodness, was united to it. It was therefore not necessary for the goodness of grace to be added to it.

11. That by which something is made better is nobler than the thing itself. But no creature is nobler than the soul united to the Word. Then Christ’s soul cannot be made better by any created grace; and so created grace would be useless in it.

12. The image of God in us is twofold, as is gathered from the Gloss in its comment upon the words of the Psalm (4:7): "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." One is that of creation, which consists in the mind considered as one essence will three powers. The other is that of re-creation, viewed from the standpoint of the light of grace. Now either the image of grace is more like God than the image of Christ’s mind, or not. If it is more like God, then grace is a nobler creature than Christ’s soul. If it is not more like God, then by its means the mind of Christ would not come any closer to conformity will God—which is the purpose for which grace is in fused into the mind. Grace would therefore be held to be in the soul of Christ in vain.

13. If effects are incompatible, they will have incompatible causes. Just as the unifying and the breaking up of a field of vision, for in stance, are mutually incompatible, so also are white and black. But natural sonship, whose principle is eternal birth, is incompatible will adoptive sonship, whose principle is the infusion of grace. Then in fused grace is also incompatible will eternal birth; and since eternal birth applies to Christ, it therefore seems that He did not have infused grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is written in John (1:14): "We saw... [him] full of grace and truth." But in Christ there was created knowledge, to which truth refers. Then there was also created grace.

2'. Merit requires grace. But Christ merited for Himself and us, as the saints say. Christ therefore had created grace, for it is not attributable to the Creator to merit.

3’. Christ was at the same time a wayfarer and a possessor. But the perfection of a wayfarer is created grace. Christ therefore had created grace.

4’. No perfection found in other souls was missing from Christ’s, since it is the most perfect of all. But the souls of saints have not only the perfection of nature but also that of grace. Both kinds of perfection were therefore found in Christ.

5'. The relation of grace to the wayfarer is the same as that of glory to the possessor. But in Christ, who was both wayfarer and possessor, there was created glory, because He enjoyed the divinity by a created act. Consequently there was created grace in Him.

248

REPLY:

It is necessary to hold that there was created grace in Christ. The reason for this necessity- can be gathered from the two different kinds of union will God which a soul can have: one consequent upon existence within a single person, which belongs uniquely to the soul of Christ; and another consequent upon an operation, which is common to all who know and love God.

The first kind of union is not sufficient for beatitude without the second, because not even God Himself would be blessed if He did not know and love Himself; for He would not take pleasure in Himself, as is required for beatitude. For the soul of Christ to be blessed, then, ix requires besides its personal union will the Word also a union through its operation, that it may see God by His essence and, seeing Him, rejoice. Now this surpasses the natural ability of any creature and is proper to God alone according to His own nature. Something must therefore be added to the nature of Christ’s soul by which it is ordained to the beatitude in question. 'We call this grace. It is there fore necessary to hold that there was created grace in Christ’s soul.

This shows the inanity of a certain opinions which affirmed that the higher part of Christ’s soul did not have habitual grace but was united immediately to the Word and from this union grace flowed into the lower powers. For if it refers to personal union, then not only the higher part of Christ’s soul but the whole soul is united to the Word. But if ix refers to union by operation, then habitual grace is required for this kind of union, as has been said.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Attributes of such a kind as to belong to a person by reason of personality itself cannot be predicated of Christ if they are incompatible will the properties of an eternal person, which is the only kind of person in Him. An example would be the name creature. But things which belong to a person only by reason of his nature or a part of his nature can be predicated of Christ, even though they imply some incompatibility will an eternal person. This is because of the duality of natures. Examples would be to suffer, to die, and the like. Now sonship refers primarily to the person, whereas grace refers to the person only by reason of the mind, which is a part of the nature. Thus adoptive sonship by no means applies to Christ, though having grace does.

2. That argument is valid when union by essence and union by like ness are ordained to the same end. But that is not true in the matter at hand. The real union of the divinity will Christ’s soul is ordained to personal unity, whereas the union by the likeness of grace is ordained to the enjoyment of beatitude.

3. Beatitude is natural to Christ according to His divine nature, but not according to His human nature. For this reason He has need of grace.

4. Should it be asserted that Christ’s soul did not have grace, then uncreated beatitude wil1 belong to Christ inasmuch as He is the natural Son, but not the created beatitude which is due to adopted Sons.

5. Christ is good by His essence in His divine nature but not in His human nature. It is will reference to the latter that He needs the participation of grace.

6. The light of the sun and of a candle are ordained to the same end, but not the union of the divinity to the soul of Christ by nature and that by grace. Thus there is no parallel.

7. The union of the divinity will Christ’s soul is sufficient for its purpose. It does not follow, however, that the union of grace is superfluous, because it is ordained to something else.

8. Both the nobler and the less noble knowledge are ordained to the same end, the cognition of a thing. But that is not the case in the question at issue. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

9. An instrument can be of either of two kinds: one inanimate, which is acted upon and does not act, such as an ax, and such an instrument does not need a habit; the other animate, as a slave, which acts and is acted upon, and this kind needs a habit. Christ’s humanity is the latter kind of instrument of the divinity.

10. The fullness of all goodness was, by reason of its personal union will the Word, united to Christ’s soul, not formally but personally. For this reason it needed to be informed by grace.

11. No creature is better, simply speaking, than the soul united personally to the Word; but if we speak in a qualified way, nothing pre vents it. Colour was nobler than His body in a certain respect, namely, as being its act. In the same way Christ’s grace is better than His soul inasmuch as it is its perfection.

12. Grace is more like God in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is related to Christ’s soul as act to potency. From this point of view Christ’s soul was confirmed to God through grace. But in other respects His mind itself is more like God, that is, from the standpoint of natural properties, in which it imitates God.

13. This is to be answered in the same way as the first difficulty.



ARTICLE II: FOR CHRIST’S ITUMAN NATURE TO BE UNITED PERSONALLY TO THE WORD IS HABITUAL GRACE REQUIRED?



Parallel readings: III Sentences 2, 2, 2 sol. 1; 13, 3, s; Quodibet IX, (2), 2 ad 3; in Coloss., c. 2, lectura 2; Sum. Theol., III, 2, 10; 6, 6; Comp. Theol., 1, 214.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Before we can understand an accident inhering in a substance, we must understand the substance in the existence of a supposite. But by the union of the human nature will the Word the human nature is established in the existence of a supposite. Since grace is an accident, it seems that the union of the human nature will the Word must be understood before grace. Thus grace is not required for the union.

2. Human nature is capable of being assumed by the Word inasmuch as it is rational. And it does not get this from grace. Then it is not disposed for the union by grace.

3. The soul is infused into the body in order that in it the soul may be perfected will knowledge and virtues, as the Master makes clear. But Christ’s soul is united to the Word before it is to the body; other will it would follow that a supposite was assumed, for from the union of the soul will the body a supposite is constituted. The union of Christ’s soul will the Word must therefore be understood before we understand grace in it. Thus grace does not dispose for the union in question.

4. Between the nature and the supposite no accident intervenes. But the human nature is united to the Word as to a supposite. Grace therefore does not intervene there as a disposition.

5. The human nature is united to the Word not only as regards the soul but also as regards the body. Now the body is not capable of receiving grace. Consequently for the union of human nature to the Word grace is not needed as an intervening disposition.

6. As Augustine says, in miraculous occurrences "the whole reason for the miracle is the power of the miracle-worker." But the union of human nature to the divine is a miraculous occurrence above all others. It is therefore not necessary to posit a disposition on the part of the miracle, but the power of the miracle-worker suffices. Thus no intervening grace is required.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of Man by grace. But it belongs to the Son of God by nature to be God. This also belongs to the Son of Man, then, by grace. But this belongs to Him through the union. Therefore grace is required for the union.

2’. Union in person is more excellent than union through fruition. But grace is required for the latter union. Then so is it for the former.


De veritate EN 246