Professor Monsignor Antonio Miralles

Pontifical University Santa Croce

The title of the paper I have been requested to present is taken from the Encyclical Fides et ratio, in which it appears as the title of a paragraph in the chapter on "The Magisterium’s interventions in philosophical matters". I will therefore address the Magisterium’s discernment within this framework.

The Magisterium of the Church has an interest philosophy due to the close bond that exists between the faith and reason; a bond simultaneously implying a distinction between exercising the faith and exercising philosophical reason. A person who believes commits his reason in his act of faith. Actually, as the Second Vatican Council teaches: ""The obedience of faith is to be given to God who reveals, an obedience by which man commits his whole self freely to God, offering the full submission of intellect and will to God who reveals," (4) and freely assenting to the truth revealed by Him" (Dei Verbum, 5/1). The intellect would not be fully respected if man should choose not to use it, neglecting to seize the meaning of the faith’s enunciations. Accepting the faith is not at all a blind choice made by the human spirit (see First Vatican Council: DH 3010), but rather, as Saint Thomas Aquinas states: "To believe is an act of the intellect that encouraged by the will moved by God through Grace, provides it’s consent to the divine truth" (see St. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 9 c).

The exercising of the faith is, however, very distinct from the exercising of philosophical reason. Philosophical reason, in fact, searches for evidence and does not stop until it finds it, while faith instead relies on God’s revealing authority and does not claim to find proof for what it knows. This because the mysteries hidden in God cannot be known if not revealed by Him and, "even when past down through a revelation or received through the faith, they remain surrounded by a veil and almost enveloped in a haze" (see First Vatican Council: DH 3016), as long as we are in this mortal life.

The non-claim of proof does not mean that the faith remains intellectually inactive. On the contrary "faith tries to understand", Saint Anselmo wrote (Proslogion). "It is intrinsic to faith that a believer desires to know better the One in whom he has put his faith, and to understand better what He has revealed; a more penetrating knowledge will in turn call forth a greater faith, increasingly set afire by love" (CCC 158). This is not only restricted to theologians, But Saint Paul asked God for this grace for al believers, saying: "a spirit of wisdom and revelation resulting in knowledge of him. May the eyes of (your) hearts be enlightened, that you may know what is the hope that belongs to his call, what are the riches of glory in his inheritance among the holy ones, and what is the surpassing greatness of his power for us who believe, in accord with the exercise of his great might" (Eph 1, 17-19).

An increased knowledge of the faith finds invaluable help in philosophy. This however, proceeds in an exclusively rational manner and this is a good thing. "A philosophy which did not proceed in the light of reason according to its own principles and methods would serve little purpose" (Fides et ratio [= FR], 49/1). It would in fact fail in the search for the truth.

The Pope adds: "At the deepest level, the autonomy which philosophy enjoys is rooted in the fact that reason is by its nature oriented to truth and is equipped moreover with the means necessary to arrive at truth." (FR 49/1). This statement shows faith in the intellect precisely within this cultural period, characterised according to this same Encyclical, by "the deep-seated distrust of reason which has surfaced in the most recent developments of much of philosophical research, to the point where there is talk at times of "the end of metaphysics". Philosophy is expected to rest content with more modest tasks such as the simple interpretation of facts or an enquiry into restricted fields of human knowing or its structures" (FR 55/1).

It is precisely faith that prevents us from allowing ourselves to be overcome by this mistrust. Philosophy is a human activity, more precisely natural reasoning’s highest activity, in which humankind shows its best intellectual qualities and thereby reveals its humanity. Faith therefore allows us greater knowledge regards to what humankind is and which are its best capabilities. As the Second Vatican Council teaches: "The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light […] Christ […]by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their crown" (GS 22/1). Among these truths there is one that addresses the capability of reason: "Man judges rightly that by his intellect he surpasses the material universe, for he shares in the light of the divine mind. […]In our times, he has won superlative victories, especially in his probing of the material world and in subjecting it to himself. Still he has always searched for more penetrating truths, and finds them. For his intelligence is not confined to observable data alone, but can with genuine certitude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin that certitude is partly obscured and weakened" (GS 15/1).

In this discernment undertaken by the Magisterium regards to the human reason’s capability to understand intelligible reality with certainty already provides a great service to the truth. The Magisterium’s intervention on this subject is not only recent, but, as the Pope reminds us in Fides et ratio, in the 19^th Century the Church already had to censor "fideism and radical traditionalism, for their distrust of reason's natural capacities" (FR 52/1); but also had to reject the idea of reducing faith to reason and therefore censored "rationalism and ontologism because they attributed to natural reason a knowledge which only the light of faith could confer." (FR 52/1).

Rational knowledge and the philosophy are important for understanding the faith. In fact, as the First Vatican Council teaches, "correct reasoning roves the foundations of the faith" (see DH 3019) and, on this subject the Magisterium has stated that "reasoning can certainly prove God’s existence, the spirituality of the soul and humankind’s freedom" (see DH 2812). The same Council teaches that "reason, enlightened by faith […] as a gift from God achieves an extremely fecund level of knowledge of the mysteries thanks to analogies with what is naturally known" (see DH 3016). The more philosophy progresses in natural knowledge the more it is easy to undertake an in-depth analysis of mysteries through analogy.

Hence, it is easy to understand that the Magisterium cannot avoid taking an interest in philosophy. "Many philosophical opinions—concerning God, the human being, human freedom and ethical behaviour— engage the Church directly, because they touch on the revealed truth of which she is the guardian " (FR 50/2). In fact, "Sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture form one sacred deposit of the word of God, committed to the Church. […] the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, […]This teaching office is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as divinely revealed." (Dei Verbum, 10).

The Magisterium encourages philosophical activities without proposing a philosophy of its own. "The Magisterium's interventions are intended above all to prompt, promote and encourage philosophical enquiry" (FR 51/1). A history of philosophy, developed with methodological rigour and authentic objectivity cannot help acknowledging that a considerable part of the higher and more pressing philosophical issues arise from faith. The encouragement provided by John Paul II to philosophers is not simply a speech for a specific occasion, but a sincere exhortation by a man who adds to his faith a lively passion for philosophy, experienced well before he rose to his position within the episcopate and the seat of Peter. "it is necessary not to abandon the passion for ultimate truth, the eagerness to search for it or the audacity to forge new paths in the search. It is faith that stirs reason to move beyond all isolation and willingly to run risks so that it may attain whatever is beautiful, good and true. Faith thus becomes the convinced and convincing advocate of reason" (FR 56).

The Magisterium’s discernment also extends to the teaching of philosophy in view of later studies concerning theology, especially to those who are preparing to receive Holy Orders. On this subject, prudence is added to the criteria of truth. Leo XIII distinguished himself in this work of discernment, when in his encyclical Aeterni Patris he strongly exhorts the spreading of Saint Thomas Aquinas’ excellent philosophical wisdom and specifically warns professors that they should ensure his doctrine penetrates the souls of disciples. In the decree on priestly formation, the Second Vatican Council has provided precise criteria: "The philosophical disciplines are to be taught in such a way that the students are first of all led to acquire a solid and coherent knowledge of man, the world, and of God, relying on a philosophical patrimony which is perennially valid and taking into account the philosophical investigations of later ages" (Optatam totius, 15/1). An the Pope has recently confirmed the importance of such studies: "I wish to repeat clearly that the study of philosophy is fundamental and indispensable to the structure of theological studies and to the formation of candidates for the priesthood" (FR 62/1). And on this subject he reminds us that "If it has been necessary from time to time to intervene on this question, to reiterate the value of the Angelic Doctor's insights and insist on the study of his thought, this has been because the Magisterium's directives have not always been followed with the readiness one would wish" (FR 61/1).

The Magisterium’s discernment in serving the truth also takes place through reporting the errors that are incompatible with the faith. On this subject, John Paul II specifies that: "It is neither the task nor the competence of the Magisterium to intervene in order to make good the lacunas of deficient philosophical discourse" (FR 49/2). The Magisterium in fact does not replace the philosophers, who through their studies, their dialogue and debates are instead responsible for their work. The Pope however does add that: "Rather, it is the Magisterium's duty to respond clearly and strongly when controversial philosophical opinions threaten right understanding of what has been revealed, and when false and partial theories which sow the seed of serious error, confusing the pure and simple faith of the People of God, begin to spread more widely" (ibidem). I previously mentioned censorship of fideism, radical traditionalism and ontologism. The encyclical also mentions other interventions such as those by Saint Pius X, who emphasised the phenomenalist, agnostic and immanentist aspects of philosophical statements at the basis of modernism and that by Pius XII, who "warned against mistaken interpretations linked to evolutionism, existentialism and historicism" (FR 54/2); and, recently, by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which once again emphasised "the danger of an uncritical adoption by some liberation theologians of opinions and methods drawn from Marxism" (FR 54/3).

With its discerning work the Magisterium follows faithfully the warning Saint Paul addressed at Timothy, about "imparting the word of truth without deviation" (2 Tim 2, 15).