Taiwan
27 September 2006
Before starting this discussion it
is necessary to emphasize that the Magisterium is crystal clear that the
embryo, whatever its ontological status, must be treated as a person with the
full rights we give to persons from the moment of conception. Especially
the embryo is to be protected by the absolute moral norm: we may never, for any
reason, directly kill an innocent human being. While the Magisterium has
not made a definitive final judgment about the ontological status of the
embryo, it has come infinitesimal close to declaring unequivocally
that the embryo is a human person. "Even if the presence of a spiritual
soul cannot be ascertained by empirical data, the results themselves of scientific
research on the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by
the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of
a human life: how could a human individual not be a human person?" (Gospel
of Life, 60)
Given the present state of the
science in genetics, biology and embryology, there are only two consistent
theories concerning the moral or personal status of the human embryo. The
first position is based on function: meaning only those beings who actually
possess the functions of personhood, however they are defined, are
persons. The second position is that those beings who actually possess a
rational nature are persons. Both of these theories are about actual
possession, not potentiality to later possession. Those who promote the
actual possession of function are usually using it to support abortion,
embryonic stem cell research and various other forms of research that involve
killing or experimenting on embryos or fetuses. They are very adept at
destroying arguments based on potentiality that come from a "more
moderate" pro-abortion position: so-called moderate positions hold
that even if the embryo is not yet a person it has a special status as
potential person. The actual possession of function position answers that
the rights of an actual person always take precedence, an absolute precedence,
over a potential person. The actual possession of function position,
however, has one overwhelming weakness: the same arguments that deny personhood
to the embryo also deny it to just born children, children up to perhaps the
age of five, severely retarded adults, adults in comas, etc.; because none of
these, like the embryo, are in actual possession of the functions associated
with personhood. To get around the accusation of justifying infanticide,
various supplementary arguments are presented, such as that children have a
special utilitarian value to society or parents have a special love for their
children or that the social group can define them as persons even if they
intrinsically are not. Yet because all of these same arguments can be
applied to the embryo, the actual function position becomes inconsistent with
regards to distinguishing abortion and infanticide. Peter Singer, who has
been criticized by pro-abortion colleagues for advocating infanticide for
retarded or handicapped just born children, has pointed out that ethically
there is no difference between the moral status of the embryo, fetus or new
born: according to Singer, those who can justify abortion, if they apply their
principles consistently, must also justify infanticide. This is, of
course, what the pro-life advocates have been pointing out since the beginning
of the abortion debate.
The alternative consistent position
on the moral status of the embryo states that any being who possesses a
rational nature is a person. With regard to the personal status of the
human embryo the argument moves in three steps. First, by induction and
formal abstraction it is established that rationality is an essential characteristic
of human beings; therefore, who ever is a member of the human species is a
person. Second, using science and common observation we can establish
just born infants, because they are born of human parents, because despite the
fact their bodies and brains are in many different than those of adults, still
they have human bodies, and because if given time to develop, they will develop
the functions associated with personhood, children belong to the human species:
hence have a rational nature and hence are persons. Third, the sciences
also prove that because the zygote is conceived from human parents, because its
small one cell body is genetically a human organism and because given time to
develop it will show the functions associated with personhood, the embryo
belongs to the human species: hence has a rational nature, hence is a
person. This position has no inconsistencies, it protects the new born,
the embryo, the retarded adult, the adult in coma, etc. equally as
members of the human species and therefore persons. It also forbids a set
of so called contraceptives, which actually cause abortions by killing the
already existing embryo. The Magisterium has not fully committed to the
position that the zygote is a human person. For this author, given
the present state of empirical science, there exists more than sufficient
evidence to definitively declare that since the zygote is a member of the human
race, he or she therefore is also a human person.