De veritate EN 5
From our previous discussion it is clear that truth is properly found in the human or divine intellect, as health is found in an animal. In things, however, truth is found because of some relation to intellect just as health is said to be in things other than animals in so far as they bring about or preserve animal health. Truth, therefore, is properly and primarily in the divine intellect. In the human intellect, it exists properly but secondarily, for it exists there only because of a relation to either one of the two truths just mentioned.
In his gloss on these words of Psalm II (v. 2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," Augustine writes that the truth of the divine intellect is one, and from it are drawn the many truths that are in the human intellect—"just as from one man’s face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror." Now, there are many truths in things, just as there are many entities of things. But truth predicated of things because of their relation to the human intellect is, as it were, accidental to those things; for, supposing that the human intellect did not or could not exist, things would still remain essentially the same. But truth predicated of things because of their relation to the divine intellect is inseparably attendant on them, for they cannot exist except by reason of the divine intellect which keeps bringing them into being. Again, truth is primarily in a thing because of its relation to the divine intellect, not to the human intellect, because it is related to the divine intellect as to its cause, but to the human intellect as to its effect in the sense that the latter receives its knowledge from things. For this reason, a thing is said to be true principally be cause of its order to the truth of the divine intellect rather than because of its relation to the truth of a human intellect.
So, if truth in its proper sense be taken as that by which all things are primarily true, then all things are true by means of one truth, the truth of the divine intellect. This is the truth which Anselm writes about. But if truth in its proper sense be taken as that by which things are said to be true secondarily, then there are many truths about many true things, and even many truths in different minds about one true thing. Finally, if truth in its improper sense be taken as that by which all things are said to be true, then there are many truths for many true things, but only one truth for one true thing.
Things are called true from the truth in the divine or human intellect, just as food is called healthy, not because of any inherent form, but because of the health which is in an animal. If, however, a thing is called true because of the truth in the thing, which is simply its entity confirmed will intellect, then it is so called because of something inhering in it after the manner of a form, as food is said to be healthy because of a quality of its own—which is the reason for its being said to be healthy.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Time is related to temporal things as a measure is related to the measured. It is clear, therefore, that Anselm is referring to that truth which is only the measure of all true things. There is only one such truth numerically, just as there is only one time—as the second argument concludes. However, the truth in the human intellect or in things themselves is not related to things as an extrinsic or common measure is related to those it measures. It is related as a measured thing is related to a measure, for such is the relation of truth in a human intellect to things, and it must, as a consequence, vary as things vary. Or, it is related as an intrinsic measure to the thing itself, as is the case will the truth that is in things themselves. Intrinsic measures must be multi plied as the number of things measured is multiplied—just as dimensions must be multiplied will the multiplicity of bodies.
2. We concede the second argument.
3. The truth which remains after things are destroyed is the truth of the divine intellect, and this is numerically one. However, the truth which is in things or in the soul is diversified according to the diversity of things.
4. The proposition "Nothing is its own truth" is understood of things having a complete act of existence in reality. It is likewise said that "Nothing is its own act of existence," yet the act of existence of a thing is, in a sense, something created. In the same way, the truth of a thing is something created.
5. The truth by which the soul passes judgment on all things is the first truth; for, just as from the truth of the divine intellect there flow into the angelic intellects those intelligible species by which angels know all things, so does the truth of the first principles by which we judge everything proceed from the truth of the divine intellect as from its exemplary cause. Since we can judge by means of the truth of these first principles only in so far as this truth is a likeness of the first truth, we are said to judge everything according to the first truth.
6. That immutable truth is the first truth, which is neither perceptible by sense nor something created.
7. Although every creature has some similarity to what is false, created truth itself does not have this similarity. For a creature has some similarity to what is false in so far as it is deficient. Truth, how ever, does not depend on a creature in so far as it is deficient, but in so far as it rises above its deficiency by being confirmed to the first truth.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
1'. Properly speaking, when two things are similar, likeness is found in both. Truth, however, being a certain agreement of intellect and thing, is not, properly speaking, found in both, but only in intellect; and since all things are true and said to be true in so far as they are in conformity will one intellect, the divine intellect, everything must be true according to one truth, even though in many like things there are many different likenesses.
2’. Although intelligible light has the divine light for its exemplary cause, light is nevertheless predicated in the proper sense of created intelligible lights. Truth, however, is not predicated in the proper sense of things having the divine intellect as their exemplary cause.
Consequently, we do not say that there is one light in the same way that we say that there is one truth.
3’. Our reply given immediately above will answer the argument taken from colors, for visible is properly predicated of colors, also, even though they are not seen except by means of light.
4’-5’. Our answer to the fourth argument (from the nature of power) and to the fifth (from the nature of being) is the same.
6’. Even though things are modeled in different ways upon the divine truth, this does not keep things from being true in the proper sense of the term by a single truth—not by many truths. For that which is received in different ways in the things modeled upon the exemplar is not properly called truth will the same propriety as truth is said to be in the exemplar itself.
7’. Although things differing specifically are not on their own part confirmed will the divine intellect by one conformity, the divine intellect to which all things are confirmed is one, and on its part there is one conformity will all things even though all things are not con formed to it in the same way. The truth of all things, therefore, is one in the manner described.
8’. Augustine is speaking of truth in our mind as it is modeled upon the divine mind as the likeness of a face is reflected in a mirror; and, as we said, there are many reflections of the first truth in our souls. Or one can say that the first truth belongs to the genus of the soul if genus be taken in a broad sense, namely, in so far as everything intelligible or incorporeal is said to belong to one genus. Genus is used in this way in the Acts of the Apostles (17:28) where we read: "For we are also his offspring [genus]."
Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I, i0, 3, ad 3; i6, 7 I Sentences 79, 5, Contra Gentiles II, CC. 36, 83-84; De potentia 3, 17, ad 27-29.
It seems that there is some such truth, for
1. 'When treating the truth of propositions, Anselm says: "Whether truth be said to have, or whether it is understood not to have, a beginning or end, it cannot be circumscribed by a beginning or end." But every truth is understood either to have or not to have a beginning or end. Therefore, no truth is circumscribed by a beginning or end, and, since anything hike this is eternal, every truth is eternal.
2. Anything whose existence is a consequence of the destruction of its existence is eternal; for, whether it is taken as existing or not existing, it follows that it is. Moreover, at any given time each and every thing must be held as either existing or not existing. Now, a consequence of the destruction of truth is that truth is; for, if truth is not, the fact that truth is not is true, and nothing can be true except by truth. Therefore, truth is eternal.
3. If the truth of propositions is not eternal, then a time must be assigned when their truth was not. But at that time it was true to say: "There is no truth of propositions." Therefore, truth of propositions exists—which contradicts the supposition. Therefore, one cannot say that the truth of propositions is not eternal.
4. The Philosopher’s proof that matter is eternal (which is false) rests on the fact that matter remains after its corruption and exists prior to its generation, since, if it corrupts, it corrupts into something, and if it is generated, it is generated out of something. But that from which something is generated and that into which it corrupts is matter. The same would be true of truth if it were said to undergo corruption or generation: it would exist before its generation and after its corruption. If it were generated, it would be changed from non-being to being, and if it corrupted, it would change from being to non-being. However, when truth did not exist, it would have been true that it did not exist—which could not be unless there was truth. Therefore, truth is eternal.
g. Whatever cannot be conceived as not existing is eternal, for what ever is able not to exist can be conceived as not existing. The truth of propositions, however, cannot be conceived as not existing, because the intellect cannot understand anything unless it understands it to be true. Therefore, the truth of propositions is eternal.
6. Anselm argues as follows: "Let him who is able think of when this truth began or when it did not exist."
7. That which is future always was future, and that which is past will always be past. Consequently, a proposition about the future is true since something is future, and a proposition about the past is true since something is past. Therefore, the truth of a future proposition always was, as the truth of a proposition concerning the past always will be. Hence, not only the first truth is eternal, but also many other truths are eternal.
8. St. Augustine says that nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle and that two and three are five. Since these are created truths, some truth besides the first truth is eternal.
9. For a proposition to be true, it is not necessary that something be actually stated. It is sufficient that something exist about which a proposition can be formed. But, even before the world existed, there was something, even apart from God, about which a proposition could be formed. Hence, before the world existed, the truth of propositions existed, and, since what existed before the world is eternal, the truth of propositions is eternal. The minor is proved thus: The world is made from nothing, that is, after nothing. Hence, before the world was, there was its non-existence. But a true proposition is formed not only about that which is, but also about that which is not; for, just as what is, is truly stated to be, so that which is not is truly stated not to be—as is clearly shown in Interpretation. Hence, before the world existed, there was that from which a true proposition could be formed.
10. Whatever is known is true while it is known. But from all eternity God knew all possible propositions. Therefore, from all eternity the truth of all propositions has existed, and so there are many eternal truths.
11. It was said, however, that from this it follows that those propositions are true in the divine intellect—not in themselves.—On the contrary, things must be true in the way in which they are known. But from eternity all things are known by God not only in so far as they are in His mind, but also as they exist in their proper nature; for Ecclesiasticus (23:29) says: "all things were known to the Lord God before they were created: so also after they were perfected, he be holdeth all things." He accordingly knows things in no other way after they are perfected than He did from eternity. Therefore, from eternity there were many truths existing not only in the divine intellect but in themselves.
12. A thing is said to exist simply in so far as it is in that which gives it its formal perfection. But the character of truth finds its formal perfection in the intellect. Hence, if from eternity there were many things simply true in the divine intellect, it must be granted that there are many eternal truths.
13. Wisdom (I: 15) states: "For justice is perpetual and immortal." As Cicero says, however, truth is a part of justice. Hence, truth is perpetual and immortal.
14. Universals are perpetual and immortal. But the true is most universal, for it is interchangeable will being. Therefore, truth is perpetual and immortal.
15. It was said, however, that, although a universal does not cease of itself, it may cease accidentally.—On the contrary, a thing ought to be denominated by that which belongs to it essentially rather than by that which belongs to it accidentally. Therefore, if truth taken essentially is perpetual and incorruptible, and does not cease or begin to be except accidentally, truth taken universally must be eternal.
16. Since from eternity God was prior to the world, this relation of priority in God was eternal. But when one member of a relation is posited, the other must also be posited. Therefore, from eternity the posteriority of the world will respect to God existed; consequently, there was from all eternity something outside of God to which truth belonged in some way. Hence, our original position stands.
17. It must be said that that relation of before and after is not some thing in nature but merely a rational relation.—On the contrary, as Boethius says, God is by nature prior to the world, even if the world had always existed. Therefore, that relation of priority is a relation of nature and not of reason alone.
18. The truth of signification is correctness of signification. But from eternity it was correct that something is signified. Therefore, the — truth of signification was from eternity.
19. From eternity it was true that the Father generates the Son, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. Since these are a number of truths, a number of truths exist from eternity.
20. It was said, however, that these are true by one truth; hence, it does not follow that several truths existed from eternity.—On the contrary, that by which the Father is Father and generates the Son is not that by which the Son is Son and breathes the Holy Spirit. But by that by which the Father is Father it is true that the Father generates the Son, or that the Father is the Father; and by that by which the Son is the Son it is true that the Son is generated by the Father. Hence, propositions of this kind are not true by one truth.
21. Although man and capable of laughter are interchangeable, the truth is not found in each of the two following propositions: "Man is man" and "Man is capable of laughter"; for the property which the word man predicates is not the same as that predicated by capable of laughter. Similarly, the property implied in the word Father is not that implied in the word Son. Therefore, the truth is not the in the propositions mentioned above.
22. It was said, however, that those propositions were not from eternity-.---On the contrary, whenever there is an intellect able to make a proposition, there can be a proposition. But from eternity the divine intellect existed, understanding the Father to be the Father, and the Son to be the Son, and thus forming propositions or speaking—since, according to Anselm, "for the most high Spirit to speak is the same as to understand." Therefore, the propositions previously mentioned existed from eternity-.
To the Contrary:
1'. No creature is eternal, and every truth, except the first, is created. Therefore, only the first truth is eternal.
2’. Being and the true are interchangeable. But only one being is eternal. Therefore, only one truth is eternal.
As mentioned previously, truth means a proportion and commensuration. Hence, something is said to be true just as something is said to be commensurate. A body, however, is measured both by an intrinsic measure, such as a line, surface, or depth, and by an extrinsic measure, such as happens when a located body is measured by place, or when motion is measured by time, or a piece of cloth by an elbow length. Similarly, a thing can receive the name true in two ways: by its inherent truth or by an extrinsic truth. In this latter way, all things receive the name true from the first truth; and since truth in the intellect is measured by things themselves, it follows that not only the truth of things, but also the truth of the intellect or of a proposition signifying what is understood, gets its name from the first truth.
In this commensuration or conformity of intellect and thing it is not necessary that each of the two actually exist. Our intellect can be in conformity will things that, although not existing now, will exist in the future. Otherwise, it would not be true to say that "the Antichrist will be born." Hence, a proposition is said to be true because of the truth that is in the intellect alone even when the thing stated does not exist. Similarly, the divine intellect can be in conformity will things that did not exist eternally but were created in time; thus, those in time can be said to be true from eternity because of the eternal truth.
If we take truth, therefore, as meaning the inherent truth of true created things—the truth we find in things and in a created intellect— then truth is not eternal whether it be that of things or that of propositions; for neither the things themselves nor the intellect in which these truths inhere exists from all eternity. On the other hand, if we take it to mean the truth of true created things, by which all are said to be true—their extrinsic measure, as it were, which is the first truth— then the truth of everything—of things, propositions, and intellects— is eternal. Both Augustine and Anselm search for an eternal truth of this sort; the latter writes: "You can understand how I have proved in my Monologion that the highest truth does not have a beginning or end from the truth that is in speech."
This first truth must be one for all things. For in our intellect truth is multiplied in only two ways: first, by the multiplicity of the things known, for this results in a multiplicity of conceptions upon which there follows a multiplicity of truths in our soul; second, by the multiplicity of our ways of knowing, for even though Socrates running is one thing, the soul understands time along will it by joining and separating—as it is said in The Soul. Consequently, the soul knows his running as present, as past, and as future—each in a different way. Accordingly, it forms separate conceptions in which separate truths are found. In divine knowledge, however, neither of these two kinds of diversity can be found. For God does not have separate acts of knowing for separate things, but by one act He knows all, since He knows all by a single principle, that is, by His essence, as Dionysius points out, and He does not direct His act of knowing toward things one by one. Similarly, too, His own act of knowing does not involve time, since it is measured by eternity, which abstracts from all time inasmuch as it embraces all. It remains, therefore, that there are not many truths from eternity, but one alone.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. As Anselm explains his meaning in another place, he said that the truth of statements is not circumscribed by a beginning or end, "not because the statement itself has no beginning but because no time can be conceived at which the statement could exist and truth be absent from it." The statement referred to here is one discussed previously, namely, one by which it is truly signified that something will take place in the future. Hence, it is quite clear that Anselm did not want to imply that either the truth inherent in a created thing or a proposition itself is without a beginning and end. He held simply that the first truth by which a proposition is said to be true by a sort of extrinsic measure is without beginning or end.
2. Outside the mind we find two things: the thing itself, and its privations and negations. These two are not related to truth in the same way, for they do not have the same relation to intellect. Because of the species it possesses, the thing itself is proportioned to the divine intellect as a product of art is to art. Because of the same species, more over, the thing is able to confirm our intellect to it, in so far as its likeness, being received into the soul, causes the thing itself to be known. But non-being, considered outside the soul, has nothing by which it can be proportioned to the divine intellect or cause itself to be known in our intellects. Hence, if non-being is in conformity will any intellect, it is not because of itself but because of the intellect which forms within itself the notion of non-being.
Anything existing positively outside the soul has something in itself by which it can be called true; but this is not the case will the non- existence of a thing: whatever truth is attributed to it comes from the intellect. When it is said, therefore, "It is true that truth does not exist," the truth here signified has no reality except in the intellect, since it is about a non-being. Hence, from the fact that the truth in a thing is destroyed nothing follows except that there is a truth which is in the intellect. And so it is clear that from this argument we can conclude only that the truth which is in the intellect is eternal. This truth must, of course, be in an eternal intellect, and it is the first truth. Consequently, from the argument given only the first truth is shown to be eternal.
3-4. The explanation just given also makes clear the solution to the third and fourth arguments.
5. Truth, taken without any qualification, cannot be understood as not existing; but all created truth can be conceived as not existing, just as it can be conceived that no creature exists. For the intellect can conceive itself as not existing and not understanding, even though it can never conceive without existing or understanding. It is not necessary, however, that, in its act of understanding, the intellect understand everything that it has in its act of understanding, because it does not always reflect upon itself. Hence, there is no contradiction if it under stands created truth as not existing, even though, without it, it cannot understand.
6. [No solution is given for the sixth difficulty.]
7. Since the future as such is not, and the past as such is not, the same reasoning holds for the truth of the past and future as for the truth of non-being. From this, as has been said, the eternity of no truth other than the first can be concluded.
8. The words of Augustine must be understood in the sense that the truths mentioned are eternal in so far as they are in the divine mind. Or Augustine takes eternal in the sense of perpetual.
9. Although a true proposition can be made about being and non being, being and non-being are not similarly related to truth, as is clear from what was said above. From it, also, the solution to this difficulty is clear.
10. Although God knew many propositions from eternity, He knew them by one act of knowing. Hence, from eternity there was only one truth by which the divine cognition was true of many things that would come about in time.
11. As is clear from our previous discussion, intellect is in conformity not only will things actually existing but also will those not actually existing—especially the divine intellect to which the past and the future are the same. Hence, although things did not exist from eternity in their own proper nature, the divine intellect was con formed will things in their proper nature even though they would come into being in time. In this way, from eternity, God had true knowledge of things, even in their proper natures, although the truths of things did not exist from eternity.
12. Truth finds its formal perfection in the intellect, but a thing does not. Hence, although we must concede without qualification that the — truth of all things was from eternity, since it was in the divine intellect, cannot concede without qualification that there were true things from eternity merely because they existed in the divine intellect.
13. The definition refers to divine justice; or, if it refers to human justice, then it is said to be perpetual in the way in which natural things are said to be perpetual. For example, we say that fire always moves upwards, unless impeded, because of its natural inclination. Now, be cause a virtue is, as Cicero says, "a habit resembling a nature and in harmony will reason," in so far as the nature of the virtue goes, it has an unfailing inclination to its act, even though this is sometimes impeded. Hence, in the Digest one reads that justice is: "the constant and perpetual will to give each one his due." However, the truth which is a part of justice is found in the testimony of legal trials. But we are not now discussing that kind of truth.
14. The statement that a universal is perpetual and incorruptible is explained by Avicenna in two ways. First, a universal is said to be incorruptible and perpetual because, according to those who hold the eternity of the world, particulars had no beginning and will have no end. For, according to the philosophers, generation is for the purpose of conserving the perpetual existence of the species—since it cannot be preserved by the individual. Second, a universal is said to be perpetual in so far as it does not cease of itself but accidentally—because of the corruption of the individual.
15. A thing is predicated of another essentially in two ways. First, it is done positively, as when we say of fire that it is carried upwards. A thing gets its name from this kind of essential predicate rather than from an accidental predicate; for we say rather that it is carried up wards and belongs to the class of things carried upwards than that it belongs to the class of those that are carried downwards, even though it may happen, accidentally, that fire is carried downwards—as would evidently be the case of red-hot iron.
The second type of essential predication is by "removal"—when there is removed from a thing those things which bring on a contrary disposition. If one of those things should happen to be present, the contrary disposition will be predicated absolutely. For example, unity is predicated essentially of first matter, not by positing some unifying form, but by removing diversifying forms. Hence, when forms occur which differentiate matter, we say, without qualification, that there are several matters rather than that there is only one. Such is the case in the difficulty; for a universal is said to be incorruptible, not because it possesses some form giving it incorruptibility, but because those material qualities which cause corruption in individuals do not belong to it as a universal. Hence, a universal existing in particular things is said, without qualification, to be corrupted in this or that individual.
16. All genera as such, will the exception of relation, posit some thing in reality. For example, quantity by its very nature posits some thing. But relation, alone, because of what it is, does not posit anything in reality, for what it predicates is not something but to something. Hence, there are certain relations which posit nothing in reality, but only in reason. This occurs in four ways, as can be seen in the writings of the Philosopher and Avicenna.
First, there occurs a relation merely in reason when a thing is referred to itself; for example, when we say that a thing is identical will itself. If this relation posited something in reality in addition to the thing which is declared to be identical will itself, we should have an infinite process in relations; for the very relation by which something is said to be identical will itself would also be identical will itself through an added relation, and so on to infinity. Second, a relation existing only in reason occurs when the relation itself is referred to some thing. For example, one cannot say that paternity is referred to its subject by some intermediate relation; for that mediate relation would need another intermediate relation, and so on to infinity. Consequently, the relation signified when paternity is compared to its subject is not real but only rational. Third, a relation existing in reason alone occurs when one of the related things depends on the other and not conversely. For example, knowledge depends on the thing known but not the other way about. Hence, the relation of knowledge to a thing known is something real, but the relation of the thing known to knowledge is merely rational. Fourth, a rational relation occurs when a being is compared will a non-being. For example, we say that we are prior to those who are to come after us. If this were a real relation, it would follow (if future generations were infinite) that there could be an infinite number of relations in the same thing.
From the last two types it is clear that that relation of priority posits nothing in reality but only in the intellect, because God does not depend on creatures and because such a priority is a relation. of being to non-being. From. this argument, therefore, it does not follow that there is an eternal truth except in the divine intellect, which alone is eternal. This is the first truth.
17. Although God is prior by nature to created beings, it does not follow that this relation is real. Since it arises merely from a consideration of what is naturally prior and what is naturally posterior—in the ay in which a thing known is said w be naturally prior to knowledge —the relation of the thing known to knowledge is not a real relation.
18. The statement that, even when signification does not exist, it is nevertheless correct that something is signified, is taken will respect to the order of things existing in the divine intellect. For example, even when a trunk does not exist, it is correct to say that a trunk has a lid according to the plan conceived by the craftsman. Consequently, this argument also does not prove that there is an eternal truth other than the first.
19. The intelligible character of the true is based upon being. Al though several persons and properties are posited in God, only one act of being is posited in Him, for the act of being is predicated essentially of Him; so, all those propositions, such as that the Father is or generates, and. that the Son is or is generated, and so on,—in so far as they are related to the divine essence—all have one truth, the first and eternal truth.
20. Although that by which the Father is Father, and that by which the Son is Son, are different, since one is paternity, the other, filiation, that by which the Father is, and that by which the Son is, is the same. For each is because of the divine essence, which is one. Moreover, the intelligible character of truth is not based upon the character of paternity and sonship as such, but upon the character of being. Here, moreover, paternity and sonship are the one essence. Therefore, there is one truth for both.
21. The property predicated by man and capable of laughter is not the same essentially, nor does it have one act of existence, as is the case of paternity and sonship. Hence, there is no analogy.
22. The divine intellect knows things, no matter how diverse they be, by one act of knowing, even if they have different truths considered in themselves. Hence, He knows will only one act of knowing all the various propositions about the persons even to a greater degree. Consequently, there is only one truth for these, also.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 16, 8; I Sentences 19, 5, 3; Quolibet X,, 7.
It seems that it is, for
1. Anselm says: "By this argument, I see that truth persists immutable." The argument he refers to is that taken from the truth of signification, which we discussed earlier. Hence, the truth of propositions is immutable; for the same reason, so is the truth of the thing which it signifies.
2. If the truth of a proposition changes, it changes especially when a thing changes. But when a thing has been changed, the truth of the proposition remains. Therefore, the truth of a proposition is immutable. Proof of the minor: Truth according to Anselm is "a certain correctness" as the thing fulfils that which it receives in the divine mind. But the fact that the proposition, "Socrates is sitting," signifies the sitting of Socrates comes from the divine mind, and this proposition will signify his sitting even when Socrates does not sit. Therefore, even when Socrates does not sit, truth remains in that proposition. Consequently, the truth of the proposition is not changed, even if the thing be changed.
3. If truth is changed, this can be only because the subjects in which truth inheres have previously been changed—just as certain forms can not be said to be changed unless their subjects have changed. But truth is not changed will the change of true things; for, as both Augustine and Anselm prove, when true things have been destroyed, truth still remains. Therefore, truth is entirely immutable.
4. The truth of a thing is the cause of the truth of a proposition, for a statement is said to be true or false in so far as a thing exists or does not exist. But the truth of a thing is immutable. Therefore, the truth of a proposition is also immutable. Proof of the minor: Anselm proves that the truth of a proposition remains fixed to the extent that it fulfils that which it has received in the divine mind. But each thing like will fulfils that which it has been ordained in the divine mind to have. Therefore, the truth of each and every thing is immutable.
5. That which always remains when every change has been made is never changed. For example, when colors are changed, we do not say that the surface is changed, for it remains no matter what change of colors is made. Now, truth remains in a thing, no matter what change a thing undergoes, for being and the true are interchangeable. There fore, truth is immutable.
6. Where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of these three propositions: "Soc rates sits," "Socrates will sit," and "Socrates sat"—namely, the sitting of Socrates. Therefore, the truth of each is the same. Now, if one of these three propositions is true, one of the other two must always be true; for, if at some time it is true that Socrates sits, it always was true and will be true that Socrates sat or will sit. Therefore, one truth re mains constant for the three propositions, and, consequently, is immutable. For the same reason, any other truth is immutable.
To the Contrary:
Effects are changed when their causes are changed. But things, which cause the truth of a proposition, undergo changes. Therefore, the truth of propositions changes.
De veritate EN 5