De veritate EN 95

95

REPLY:

We must say that the image of the Trinity in the soul can be predicated in two ways: one in which there is perfect imitation of the Trinity, the other in which the imitation is imperfect.

For the mind perfectly imitates the Trinity in this, that it actually remembers, actually understands, and actually wills. This is so because in the uncreated Trinity the middle Person is the Word. Now, there can be a word only will actual cognition. Hence, it is according to this kind of perfect imitation that Augustine puts the image in memory, understanding, and will. In it, memory refers to habitual knowledge, understanding to actual cognition which proceeds from the habitual knowledge of memory, and will to the actual movement of the will which proceeds from thought. This appears expressly from what he says in The Trinity: "Since the word cannot be there," in the mind, "without thought; for everything which we speak we think will that internal word which belongs to the language of no people, the image is found especially in those three: memory, intelligence, and will. Intelligence I now call that by which we understand when thinking; I call that will which joins this offspring [thought] will its parent [intelligence].

We have the image in which there is imperfect imitation when we designate it according to habits and powers. It is thus that Augustine bases the image of the Trinity in the soul upon mi, knowledge, and love. Here, mind means the power; knowledge and love, the habits existing in it. In place of knowledge he could have said habitual intelligence, for both can be taken in the sense of habit. This is clear from The Trinity, where he says: "Can we correctly say that the musician knows music, but he does not now understand it because he is not now thinking about it, or that he now understands geometry because he is now thinking about it? This opinion is obviously absurd." So, in this sense, knowledge and love, taken as habitual, belong only to memory, as is clear from the authoritative citation from Augustine in the objections.

But, since acts have radical existence in powers, as effects in their causes, even perfect imitation according to memory, understanding in act, and will in act can in the first instance be found in the powers through which the soul can remember, actually understand and will, as the citation from Augustine shows. Thus, the image will be based upon the powers, though not in the sense that in the mind memory could be some power besides the understanding. This is clear from what follows.

Diversity of objects is the source of differentiation of powers only when the diversity comes from those things which of themselves be long to the objects, in so far as they are objects of such powers. Thus, hot and cold in something colored do not, as such, differentiate the power of sight. For the same power of sight can see what is colored, whether hot or cold, sweet or bitter. Now, although mind or understanding can in a certain way know what is past, still, since it relates indifferently to knowledge of present, past, and future, the difference of past and present is accidental to what is intelligible, in so far as it is intelligible. For this reason, although memory can be in the mind in a certain way, it cannot be there as a power distinct of itself from other powers in the way in which philosophers speak of the distinction of powers. In this way, memory can be found only in the sensitive part, which is referred to the present as present. For this reason, a higher power than that of sense is needed if it is to relate to the past.

Nevertheless, although memory is not a power distinct from intelligence, taken as a power, the Trinity is still in the soul if we consider those powers in so far as the one power of understanding has an orientation to different things, namely, habitually to keep the knowledge of something, and actually to consider it. It is in this way that Augustine distinguishes lower from higher reason, according to an orientation to different things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although memory as belonging to the mind is not a power distinct from the possible intellect, there is a distinction between memory and possible intellect according to orientation to different things, as we have said.

2. The same answer can be given to the four following difficulties.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. In the passage cited, Augustine is not talking about the image which is in the soul according to perfect imitation. This is present when the soul actually imitates the Trinity- by understanding It.

2’. In the soul there is always an image of the Trinity in some way, but not always according to perfect imitation.

3’. Between power, act, and habit there can be equality inasmuch as they are referred to one object. Thus, the image of the Trinity is in the soul inasmuch as it is directed to God. Still, even in the ordinary way of speaking about power, habit, and act, there is an equally among them. However, this equality does not follow the distinctive character of the nature, because activity, habit, and power have the act of existence in different ways. But it does follow the relation to act according to which we consider the quantity of these three. It is not necessary to consider only one act numerically, or one habit, but habit and act in general.



ARTICLE IV: DOES THE MIND KNOW MATERIAL THINGS?



Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 8 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. The mind knows things only by intellectual cognition. But, ac cording to the Gloss: "Intellectual sight is that which embraces those things which have no likenesses which are not identical will them selves." Since, then, material things cannot exist in the soul of them selves, but on through representations similar to them, yet really different from them, it seems that the mind does not know material things.

2. Augustine says: "Through the mind we know things which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies." But material things are bodies and have bodily likenesses. Therefore, they are not known by the mind.

3. The mind, or intellect, is capable of knowing the quiddity of things because the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said in The Sou1. But the quiddity of material things is not corporeity; otherwise, it would be necessary for all things which have quiddities to be corporeal. Therefore, the mind does not know material things.

4. Mental cognition follows upon form which is the principle of knowing. But the intelligible forms in the mind are altogether immaterial. So, through them, the mind is notable to know material things.

5. All cognition takes place through assimilation. But there is no assimilation possible between the mind and material things, because like ness depends on sameness of quality. However, the qualities of material things are bodily accidents which cannot exist in the mind. There fore, the mind cannot know material things.

6. The mind knows nothing except by abstracting from matter and the conditions of matter. But material things, as physical beings, can not be separated from matter even in the mind, because matter is part of their definition. Therefore, the mind cannot know material things.

To the Contrary:

1'. Objects of natural science are known by the mind. But natural science is concerned will material things. Therefore, the mind knows material things.

2’. Each person is a good judge—in fact, as Aristotle says, the best judge—of those things of which he has knowledge. But, as Augustine notes, it is by the mind that these less perfect beings are judged. Therefore, these less perfect beings, which are material, are under stood by the mind.

3’. Through sense we know only material beings. But mental cognition is derived from sense. Therefore, the mind also knows material things.

96

REPLY:

All cognition follows some form which is the principle of cognition in the knower. Such a form can be considered under two aspects: either will relation to the being it has in the knower, or in the reference it has to the thing it represents. Under the first aspect, it causes the knower actually to know. Under the second, it limits the cognition to some definite knowable object. Therefore, the manner of knowing a thing confirms to the state of the knower, which receives the form in its own way. It is not necessary that the thing known exist in the manner of the knower or in the manner in which the form which is the principle of knowing exists in the knower. From this it follows that nothing prevents us from knowing material things through forms which exist immaterially in our minds.

There is a difference on this point between the human mind, which derives forms from things, and the divine or angelic minds, which do not draw their cognition from things. In the mind which depends on things for knowledge, the forms exist because of a certain action of things on the soul. But, since all action is through form, the forms in our minds first and mainly refer to things which exist outside our soul according to their forms. These forms are of two kinds. Some forms involve no determined matter, as line, surface, and so forth. Others do involve a special matter, as all natural forms.

Therefore, knowledge of forms implying no matter does not give knowledge of matter, but the knowledge of natural forms gives some knowledge of matter, in so far as it is correlative to form. For this reason, the Philosopher says that first matter is knowable through analogy, and that the material thing itself is known through the likeness of its form, just as, by the very fact of knowing snubness, snub nose is known. But in the divine mind there are forms of things from which the existence of things flows.

And this existence is common to form and matter. So, those forms are directly related to matter and form without the mediation of one to the other. So, too, angelic intellect has forms similar to the forms of the divine mind, although in angels the forms are not the causes of things. Therefore, our mind has immaterial knowledge of material things, whereas the divine and angelic minds have knowledge of the same material things in a way at once more immaterial and yet more perfect.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The text cited in the first objection can be explained in two ways. In the first place, it can be taken to refer to intellectual sight will reference to all that is included in its scope. Taken in this way, intellectual sight is taken to refer only to those things which have no likenesses which are not identical will themselves. This is not to be under stood of the likenesses by which we see things in intellectual sight, for these are a kind of means of knowing. What is known by intellectual sight is the things themselves, not their representations. This differs from bodily (sensitive) vision and spiritual (imaginative) vision. For the objects of imagination and sense are certain accidents from which the shape or image of a thing is made up. But the object of the intellect is the very essence of the thing, although the intellect knows the essence of the thing through its likeness, as through a cognoscitive medium, and not through an object which is known first.

A second explanation would be that the text cited refers to intellectual sight in so far as it surpasses the imaginative and sensitive powers. Following this lime of thought, Augustine, from whose words the comment in the Gloss is taken, wishes to differentiate three types of sight, designating the higher by that in which it surpasses the lower. Thus it is said that spiritual sight takes place when through certain likenesses we know things which are absent. Spiritual (imaginative) sight can nevertheless relate to things seen as present. But imagination outstrips sense, inasmuch as it can also see things absent. Hence, this is attributed to it as a sort of property. Similarly, intellectual sight surpasses imagination and sense because it can reach things that are essentially intelligible through their essence. So, Augustine makes this a sort of property of intellectual vision, although it can also know material things which are knowable by means of their likenesses. For this reason Augustine says: "Through the mind judgment is passed even upon those lower types of being, and those things which are not bodies and do not have forms of a bodily kind are known."

2. The answer to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.

3. If corporeity is taken of body in so far as it is in the category of quantity, it is not the quiddity of a physical thing, but an accident of it; namely, triple dimension. But, if it is taken of body in so far as it is in the category of substance, then corporeity designates the essence of a physical thing. Nevertheless, it will not follow from this that every quiddity is corporeity, unless one would say that quiddity, by its very nature as quiddity, has the same meaning as corporeity.

4. Although in the mind there are only immaterial forms, these can be likenesses of material things. For it is not necessary that the like ness and that of which it is the likeness have the same manner of existing, but only that they agree in intelligible character, just as the form of man in a golden statue need not have the same kind of existence as the form of man in bones and flesh.

5. Although bodily qualities cannot exist in the mind, their representations can, and through these the mind is made like bodily things.

6. Intellect knows by abstracting from particular matter and its conditions, as from this flesh and these bones. It does not have to abstract from common matter. Hence, it can study the physical form in flesh and bones, although not in this flesh and these bones.



ARTICLE V: CAN OUR MIND KNOW MATERIAL THINGS IN THEIR SINGULARITY?



Parallel readings: De veritate, 2, 5-6; I Sentences 36, 1, 1; II Sentences, 3, 3, ad 1; 1V Sentences 50, I, 3; Quolibet VII, 1, 3; XII, 8, li; Contra Gentiles I, 63 & 65; Summa Theol., I, 14, 11, ad 1; 86, x; Q. D. de anima, 20; 11l de anima, 8, nn. 705-719; De princ. individ., nn. 3-4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. Since the singular has existence through matter, things are called physical which have matter in their definition. But the mind, even though it is immaterial, can know physical things. For the same reason it can know singular things.

2. No one can correctly decide about things and use them properly unless he knows them. But the will man through his mind decides correctly about singular things and uses them properly; for example, his family and his possessions. Therefore, we know singular things will our mind.

3. No one knows a composition unless he knows the components. But the mind makes this conjunction: "Socrates is man." No sense would be able to do so, since it does not perceive man in general. Therefore, the mind knows singular things.

4. No one can command any act without knowing the object of that act. But the mind, or reason, commands acts of the concupiscible power and the irascible power, as is clear in the Ethics. Therefore, since the objects of these are singular things, the mind can know singular things.

5. According to Boethius, a higher power can do anything the lower power can. But the sensitive powers, which are lower than the mind, know singulars. Therefore, the mind can know singulars much more fully.

6. The higher a mind is, the more general is its knowledge, as is clear from Dionysius. But the angelic mind, though higher than the human mind, knows singulars. So, the human mind knows them much more fully.

To the Contrary:

We understand the universal, but sense the singular, as Boethius says.

97

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said, human and angelic minds know material things in different ways. For the cognition of the human mind is directed, first, to material things according to their form, and, second, to matter in so far as it is correlative to form. However, just as every form is of itself universal, so correlation to form makes us know matter only by universal knowledge. Matter thus considered is not the principle of individuation. Designated matter, existing under definite dimensions and considered as singular, is, rather, that principle because form receives its individuation from such matter. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "The parts of man are matter and form taken generally, whereas the parts of Socrates are this form and this matter."

From this it is clear that our mind is notable directly to know singulars, for we know singulars directly through our sensitive powers which receive forms from things into a bodily organ. In this way, our senses receive them under determined dimensions and as a source of knowledge of the material singular. For, just as a universal form leads to the knowledge of matter in general, so an individual form leads to the knowledge of designated matter which is the principle of individuation.

Nevertheless, the mind has contact will singulars by reason of something else in so far as it has continuity will the sensitive powers which have particulars for their object. This conjunction comes about in two ways. First, the movement of the sensitive part terminates in the mind, as happens in the movement that goes from things to the soul. Thus, the mind knows singulars through a certain kind of reflection, as when the mind, in knowing its object, which is some universal nature, returns to knowledge of its own act, then to the species which is the principle of its act, and, finally, to the phantasm from which it has abstracted the species. In this way, it attains to some knowledge about singulars.

In the other way, this conjunction is found in the movement from the soul w things, which begins from the mind and moves forward to the sensitive part in the mind’s control over the lower powers. Here, the mind has contact will singulars through the mediation of particular reason, a power of the sensitive part, which joins and divides individual intentional likenesses, which is also known as the cogitative power, and which has a definite bodily organ, a cell in the center of the head. The mind’s universal judgment about things to be done can not be applied w a particular act except through the mediation of some intermediate power which perceives the singular. In this way, there is framed a kind of syllogism whose major premise is universal, the decision of the mind, and whose minor premise is singular, a perception of the particular reason. The conclusion is the choice of the singular work, as is clear in The Soul.

The angelic mind, since it knows material things through forms that immediately refer to matter as well as to form, knows by direct vision not only matter in general, but also matter as singular. So, also, does the divine mind.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The operation by which we know matter through the analogy which it has to form is sufficient for knowledge of physical reality, but not for knowledge of the singular thing, as is clear from what has been said.

2. The will man arranges singulars by the mind only through the mediation of the cogitative power whose function it is to know particular intentions, as is clear from what has been said.

3. The intellect makes a proposition of a singular and a universal term since it knows the singular through a certain reflection, as was said.

4. The intellect or reason knows universally the end to which it directs the act of the concupiscible power and the act of the irascible power when it commands them. It applies this universal knowledge to singulars through the mediation of the cogitative power, as has been said.

j The higher power can do what the lower power can, but not al ways in the same way. Sometimes it acts in a higher way. Thus, intellect can know what sense knows, but in a way that is superior. For sense knows these things according to their material dispositions and external accidents, but intellect penetrates to the intimate nature of the species which is in these individuals.

6. Cognition of the angelic mind is more universal than cognition of the human mind, because, by the use of fewer media, it reaches more things. Nevertheless, it is more effective than the human mind for knowing singulars, as is clear from what has been said.



ARTICLE VI: DOES THE HUMAN MIND RECEIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLE THINGS?



Parallel readings: De Ver., 19, 1; Quodibet VIII, 2,3; Summa Theol., 1, 84,6; Q. D. de anima, I Comp. Theol., cc. 81-82.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. Action and passion cannot take place between things unless both are material, as is clear from Boethius, and also from the Philosopher. But our mind does not share in matter will sensible things. Therefore, sensible things cannot act on our mind to imprint knowledge on it.

2. What a thing is, is the object of intellect, as is said in The Soul. But the quiddity of a thing is not perceived by any sense. Therefore, mental cognition is not received from sense.

3. When speaking of the way in which we acquire cognition of intelligible things, Augustine says: "They were there" that is, intelligibles in our mind, "before I learned them, but they were not in my memory." Therefore, it seems that intelligible species are not received in the mind from the senses.

4. Augustine proves that the soul can love only what it knows. But one loves a science before he learns it, as is clear from the eagerness will which he seeks this knowledge. Therefore, before he learns such a science, he has some acquaintance will it. So, it seems that the mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.

5. Augustine says: "The body does not make the image of the body in the spirit. Rather, the spirit itself will a wonderful swiftness which is ineffably far from the slowness of the body makes in itself the image of the body." Therefore, it seems that the mind does not receive intelligible species from sensible things but constructs them in itself.

6. Augustine says that our mind judges about bodily things through non-bodily and eternal principles. But principles received from the senses are not of this kind. Therefore, it seems that the human mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.

7. If the mind receives knowledge from sensible things, it must do so because the species received from sensible things set the possible intellect in motion. But such species cannot influence the possible intellect. For, when they are in the imagination, they are not intelligible actually, but only potentially, and so cannot set the possible intellect in motion. The intellect, however, is moved only by something actually intelligible, just as the power of sight is moved only by something actually visible. Similarly, something existing in the agent intellect can not move the possible intellect, because the agent intellect does not receive species. If it did, it would not differ from the possible intellect. Again, these representations do not actuate the possible intellect by existing in it, for a form already adhering in a subject does not set the subject in motion, but is, as it were, at rest in it. Finally, they do not cause movement in the possible intellect by existing of themselves, for intelligible species are not substances, but belong to the class of accidents, as Avicenna says. Therefore, in no way can our mind receive knowledge from sensible things.

8. The agent is more noble than the patient, as is clear from Augustine and from the Philosopher. But the receiver is related to that which it receives, as a patient is related to the agent. Since, therefore, the mind is much more noble than sensible things and the senses them selves, it cannot receive knowledge from them.

9. The Philosopher says that the soul comes to acquire knowledge and prudence by coming to rest. But the soul cannot receive knowledge from sensible things unless it be somehow set in motion by them. Therefore, the soul does not receive knowledge from sensible things.

To the Contrary:

1'. As the Philosopher says, and as experience proves, one who lacks a sense is deprived of one kind of knowledge, as the blind have no knowledge of colors. This would not happen if the soul received knowledge from a source other than the senses. Therefore, the soul receives knowledge from sensible objects through the senses.

2’. At first, all our cognition consists in the knowledge of first un deducible principles. But the cognition of these arises in us from sense, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, all our knowledge arises from sense.

3’. Nature does nothing to no purpose and does not fail in necessary matters. But senses would have been given to the soul to no purpose unless the soul received cognition from things through them. There fore, our mind receives knowledge from sensible things.

98

REPLY:

The views of the ancients on this question are manifold. Some held that our knowledge derived completely from an external cause separated from matter. There are two explanations of this position.

Some, as the Platonists, held that the forms of sensible things existed apart from matter and so were actually intelligible. According to them, real individuals come about through the participation by sensible matter in these forms, and the human mind has know]edge by sharing in them. Thus, these forms are the principle of generation and knowledge, as the Philosopher says. But the Philosopher has adequately confuted this position by showing that sensible forms must exist in sensible matter, and that sensible matter in general is necessary for the understanding of physical forms, just as there is no snub will out nose.

For this reason, others, bypassing separated forms of sensible things, demanded only intelligences, which we call angels, and made separated substances of this sort the sole source of our knowledge. Accordingly, Avicenna holds that just as sensible forms are not received into sensible matter except through the influence of the agent intelligence, so, too, intelligible forms are not imprinted on human minds except by the agent intelligence, which for him is not a part of the soul, but a separated substance. However, the soul needs the senses to prepare the way and stimulate it to knowledge, just as the lower 2gents prepare matter to receive form from the agent intelligence.

But this opinion does not seem reasonable, because, according to it, there is no necessary interdependence of the human mind and the sensitive powers. The opposite seems quite clear both from the fact that, when a given sense is missing, we have no knowledge of its sensible objects, and from the fact that our mind cannot actually consider even those things which it knows habitually unless it forms some phantasms. Thus, an injury to the organ of imagination hinders consideration. Furthermore, the explanation just given does away will the proximate principles of things, inasmuch as all lower things would derive their intelligible and sensible forms immediately from a separated substance.

A second explanation has been given by those who make an inferior cause the complete source of our knowledge. There are also two explanations of this position. Some held that human souls had within themselves knowledge of all things, but that this cognition was darkened by union will the body. Therefore, they said that we need assiduous use of the senses to remove the hindrance to knowledge. Learning, they said, is nothing but remembering, as is abundantly clear from the way in which those things which we have seen and heard make us remember what we formerly knew. But this position does not seem reasonable. For, if the union of soul and body is natural, it cannot wholly hinder natural knowledge. And if this opinion were true, we would not be subject to the complete ignorance of those objects which demand a sense faculty of which one is deprived. This Opinion would fit in will the theory that holds that souls were created before bodies and later united to them. Then, the conjunction of body and soul would not be natural, but only an accidental accretion to the soul. This opinion must be rejected on the score both of faith2t and philosophic tenets.

Other proponents of this second opinion said that the soul is the cause of its own knowledge. For it does not receive knowledge from sensible things as if likenesses of things somehow reached the soul be cause of the activity of sensible things, but the soul itself, in the presence of sensible things, constructs in itself the likenesses of sensible things. But this statement does not seem altogether reasonable. For no agent acts except in so far as it is in act. Thus, if the soul formed the likenesses of all things in itself, it would be necessary for the soul to have those likenesses of things actually within itself. This would be a return to the previous opinion which held that the knowledge of all things is naturally present in the human soul.

Therefore, the opinion of the Philosopher is more reasonable than any of the foregoing positions. He attributes the knowledge of our mind partly to intrinsic, partly to extrinsic, influence. Not only things separated from matter, but also sensible things themselves, play their part. For, when our mind is considered in relation to sensible things outside the soul, it is found to be related to them in a twofold manner. In one way, it is related as act to potency, to the extent that things outside the mind are only potentially intelligible. The mind itself, however, is intelligible in act, and it is on this basis that the agent intellect, which makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible, is held to be included in the soul. In another way, it is related to things as potency to act, inasmuch as determined forms of things are only potentially in our mind, but actually in things outside the soul. In this respect our soul includes the possible intellect, whose function it is to receive forms abstracted from sensible things and made actually intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. This light of the agent intellect comes to the soul from the separated substances and especially from God as from its first source.

Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things; nevertheless, the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that they may be received in the possible intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a certain sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of the agent intellect) through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which we judge about other things, and in which we foreknow these others. In this respect, that opinion is true which holds that we previously had in our knowledge those things which we learn.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Sensible forms, those, namely, which are abstracted from sensible things, cannot act on our mind unless they are rendered immaterial through the light of the agent intellect, and thus in some way are made homogenous will the possible intellect on which they must act.

2. A higher and lower power do not operate in the same way even in respect to the same thing, but the higher power acts more nobly. Thus, when sense knows a thing through a form received from things, it does not know it so effectively as the intellect. Sense is led through it to a knowledge of the external accidents; the intellect reaches to the bare quiddity of the thing, distinguishing it from all material dispositions. Thus, when the mental knowing is said to take its origin from sense, this does not mean that sense apprehends all that the mind knows, but that, from those things which sense apprehends, the mind is led on to something more, just as the intellectual knowledge of sensible things leads to knowledge of divine things.

3. The statement from Augustine refers to that precognition by which we know particulars in universal principles. In this sense it is true that what we learn is already in our soul.

4. One can love scientific knowledge before he acquires it in so far as he has some general acquaintance will it by sight, or by knowing its usefulness, or in some other way.

5. The soul is to be understood to fashion itself in this sense, that the forms which arise from the activity of the agent intellect deter mine the possible intellect, as has been said. And in this sense, too, the imaginative power can fashion the forms of different sensible objects, as especially appears when we imagine things which we have never perceived by sense.

6. The first principles of which we have innate cognition are certain likenesses of uncreated truth. When we judge about other things through these likenesses, we are said to judge about things through unchangeable principles or through uncreated truth. Nevertheless, we should refer this statement of Augustine to higher reason, which con fines itself to the contemplation of eternal truths. Although this higher reason is first in dignity, its operation is subsequent in time: "For the invisible things of him [God]... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rm 1,20).

7. In the reception through which the possible intellect receives species from phantasms, the phantasms act as instrumental and secondary agents. The agent intellect acts as the principal and first agent. Therefore, the effect of the action is received in the possible intellect according to the condition of both, and not according to the condition of either one alone. Therefore, the possible intellect receives forms whose actual intelligibility is due to the power of the agent intellect, but whose determinate likeness to things is due to cognition of the phantasms. These actually intelligible forms do not, of themselves, exist either in the imagination or the agent intellect, but only in the possible intellect.

8. Although the possible intellect is simply more noble than the phantasm, nothing prevents the phantasm from being more noble in a certain respect, namely, that it is actually the likeness of such a thing, whereas this likeness belongs to the possible intellect only potentially. Thus, in a certain sense, we can say that the phantasm acts on the possible intellect in virtue of the light of the agent intellect, just as colour can act on sight in virtue of bodily light.

9. The rest in which knowledge is achieved eliminates the movement of material passions. It does not eliminate movement and passion in general sense, inasmuch as all receiving is called passion and move merit. In accord will this, the Philosopher says in The Soul: "Intellection is a kind of passion."



ARTICLE VII: IS THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN THE MIND AS IT KNOWS MATERIAL THINGS OR ONLY AS IT KNOWS ETERNAL THINGS?



Parallel readings: I Sentences 3, 4, Summa Theol., I, 8.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not only as the mind knows eternal things, for

1. As Augustine says: "When we look for the Trinity in our soul, we look for It in the whole soul without separating the activity of reason concerning temporal things from the contemplation of things eternal." But mind has the character of image only as it has the Trinity in it. Therefore, the mind has the character of image not only in so far as it applies itself to the contemplation of eternal things, but also in so far as it engages in activity concerning temporal things.

2. We consider the image of the Trinity in the soul in so far as the equality and origin of the persons are represented there. But the equality of the persons is better represented in the mind as knowing things of time than as knowing eternal things, since the latter are infinitely above the mind, whereas the mind is not infinitely above things of time. The origin of the persons, too, is displayed in cognition of things of time as well as in cognition of things eternal, for in both instances knowledge proceeds from the mind and love proceeds from knowledge. Therefore, it has the character of image of the Trinity not only in so far as it knows eternal things, but also in so far as it knows temporal things.

3. Likeness is in the power of loving, but the image is in the power of knowing, as is said in the Sentences. But our mind knows material things before it knows things eternal, since it goes from material things to eternal things. It also knows material things more perfectly, since it has a comprehensive grasp of temporal things, but not of things eternal. Therefore, the image is in the mind more according to temporal things than according to eternal things.

4. The image of the Trinity in the soul somehow follows its powers, as has been said above. But the powers are related indifferently to all the objects to which they are directed. Therefore, the image of God is in the mind will reference to any of its objects.

5. Something seen in itself is seen more perfectly than something seen in its likeness. But the soul sees itself in itself; whereas in this life it sees God only in a likeness. Therefore, it knows itself more perfectly than it knows God. So, we should look for the image of the Trinity in the soul rather as it knows itself than as it knows God, since the image of the Trinity is in us according to that which is most perfect in our nature, as Augustine says.

6. The equality of the persons is represented in our mind in this, that memory, understanding, and the whole will each grasp the others, as is clear from Augustine. But this mutual comprehension shows forth the equality only in so far as they grasp themselves will reference to all objects. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is in the powers of the mind by reason of all their objects.

7. As the image is in the power of knowing, so charity is in the power of loving. But charity looks not only to God, but also to the neighbour. Thus, there is a double act of charity: love of God and love of the neighbour. Therefore, the image, also, is in the mind not only as it knows God, but also as it knows creatures.

8. The powers of the mind in which the image resides are made perfect by certain habits, according to which the deformed image is said to be re-formed and made perfect. But the powers of the mind do not need habits inasmuch as they are related to things eternal, but only to things temporal. For we have habits in order that powers may be regulated according to them. But there can be no error in things eternal to need regulation, but only in temporal things. Therefore, the image is more in the mind as it knows temporal things than as it knows eternal things.

9. The uncreated Trinity is represented in the image of the mind especially according to consubstantiality and equality. But these two are also found in the sensitive power, because the sensible thing and sense are made actually one, and the sensible species is received in the senses only according to their capacity. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is in the sensitive power, and so, a fortiori, it is in the mind as it knows temporal things.

Metaphorical expressions are accepted according to certain likenesses, for, according to the Philosopher, every term used figuratively is applied according to some likeness. But the application to God through metaphor is taken rather from certain sensible creatures than from the mind itself. This is evidently what Dionysius does when speaking of the rays of the sun. Therefore, some sensible creatures can be said to have the character of image more than the mi. And so, there seems to be nothing to prevent the mind, as knowing temporal things, from having the character of image.

11. Boethius says that forms which exist in matter are images of those things which exist without matter. But forms existing in matter are sensible forms. Therefore, sensible forms are images of God Him self. Thus, the mind, as knowing them, seems to have the character of image of God.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "The trinity which is found in a lower science should not be called or be thought to be the image of God, although it does belong to the inner man." But a lower science is that according to which the mind considers temporal things, and is thus distinguished from wisdom, which refers to eternal things. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is not to be found in the mind according to its knowledge of temporal things.

2'. The parts of the image, considered according to their order, should correspond to the three persons. But the order of the persons does not appear in the mind as it knows temporal things. For, in knowing temporal things, understanding does not proceed from memory, as the Word from the Father, but memory rather proceeds from understanding, for we remember those things which we have previously understood. Therefore, the image is not in the mind as it knows things of time.

3'. Augustine, having given that division of the mind (into contemplation of things eternal and activity concerning temporal things), says: "Not only the Trinity, but also the image of God, exists only in that part which is concerned will contemplation of eternal things. Even if we could find a trinity in that which is derived from activity about things of time, we still would not find the image of God there." Thus, we conclude as before.

4’. The image of the Trinity always exists in the soul, but knowledge of temporal things does not, since it is acquired. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is not in the soul as it knows temporal things.


De veritate EN 95