De veritate EN 101

101

REPLY:

Knowledge of habits, as that of the soul, is twofold. One knowledge is that by which one knows whether he has a habit. The other is that by which one knows what a habit is. Nevertheless, these two types of knowledge relate to habits in a way different from that in which they relate to the soul. For the knowledge by which one knows he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what that habit is. For I cannot know that I have chastity unless I know what chastity is. This is not the case will the soul. For many know that they have a soul without knowing what the soul is.

The reason for such diversity is this, that we perceive that habits as well as the soul exist in us only by perceiving acts of which the soul and habits are the principles. And by its essence a habit is the principle of a certain kind of act. Thus, if we know a habit as the principle of such an act, we know what it is. Accordingly, I know what chastity is if I know it is that through which one refrains from illicit thoughts in matters of sex. But the soul is a principle of acts not through its essence, but through its powers. Thus, from a perception of the acts of the soul we perceive that the principle of such acts, for example, of movement and of sense, is in the soul. Nevertheless, we do not know the nature of the soul from this.

Accordingly, in so far as we know that habits exist, there are, then, two things which we have to keep in mind when we speak of them: the apprehension of the habit and the judgment we form about it. For apprehension we must get knowledge of the habits from objects and acts. The habits themselves cannot be grasped through their essence, because the power of any faculty of the soul is limited to its object. For this reason its activity is directed first of all and principally to its object. It extends only through a kind of return to those things by which it is directed to its object. Thus, we see that sight is first directed to colour, but is directed to the act of seeing only through a kind of return, when, in seeing colour, it sees that it sees. But this return is incomplete in sense and complete in understanding which goes back to know its essence by a complete return.

As is said in The Soul, in this life our understanding is related to phantasms as sight is related to colors, not, however, so that it knows phantasms as sight knows colors, but that it knows the things which the phantasms represent. Thus, the activity of our understanding is directed, first, to the things which are grasped through phantasms, then returns to know its act, and then goes further to the species, habits, powers, and the essence of the mind itself. For these are not related to understanding as primary objects, but as those things by which understanding attains its object.

Moreover, we have judgment about each one of these according to that which is its measure. And the measure of any habit is that to which the habit is ordained. This object has a triple relation to our knowledge. For, sometimes, it is obtained from sense, either from sight or hearing, as when we see the usefulness of grammar or medicine, or we hear it from others, and from this usefulness we know what grammar or medicine is. Sometimes it is inherent in natural knowledge, as is abundantly clear in the habits of virtues, whose ends natural reason proposes. Sometimes it is divinely infused, as appears in faith, hope, and other infused habits of this kind. In both of these latter, uncreated truth is taken into account, because even natural knowledge arises in us from divine enlightenment. Hence, the judgment in which knowledge about the nature of a habit is brought to completion takes place either according to that which we receive by sense or according to a comparison will uncreated truth.

There are two things to be considered in the knowledge by which we know whether habits are present in us: habitual knowledge and actual knowledge. From the acts of the habits which we experience within us we actually perceive that we have the habits. For this reason, the Philosopher says that we should take pleasure attendant on a work as a sign of habits.

But, will reference to habitual knowledge, habits of the mind are said to be known through themselves. For the cause of habitual knowledge is that by which someone is rendered capable of entering into the act of knowing the thing which is said to be known habitually. From the very fact that habits are in the mind through their essence, the mind can enter upon actual perception of the existence of the habits within it, in so far as through the habits which it has it can enter upon acts in which the habits are actually perceived.

But, in this, habits of the cognitive and affective parts differ. For a habit of the cognitive part is the source both of the very act by which the habit is received and also of the knowledge by which it is perceived. For the actual knowledge proceeds from the cognitive habit, whereas a habit of the affective part is the source of that act from which the habit can be perceived but not of the knowledge by which it is perceived.

Thus, it is clear that a habit of the cognitive part is the proximate source of knowledge of it because it is present in the mind through its essence. However, a habit of the affective part is, as it were, a re mote source, for such a habit does not have within it the cause of knowledge but of that from which knowledge is received. Therefore, Augustine says that arts are known through their presence, but affections of the soul are known through certain conceptions.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. What is said in the Gloss should be taken as referring to the object of knowledge and not to the means of knowing. For, when we know love, we consider the very essence of love and not some likeness of it, as happens in imagination.

2. The mind knows nothing better than that which is within it, for this reason, that it does not have within itself something of the things outside of it in order to proceed from this to knowledge of those things. But the mind can issue into actual cognition of those things which are within it from the things which are present to it internally, even though these are known through some other things.

3. Habit is not the cause of knowing other things as something which is the source of knowledge of other things, once it is known itself, as principles are the cause of knowing conclusions. Rather, from a habit the soul acquires a perfection ordered to knowledge of something. Thus, it is not a univocal cause of the things known, as when one thing which is known is the cause of the knowledge of something else which is known, but an equivocal cause, which does not receive the same name. For example, it is like whiteness which makes a thing white although it itself is not white, but that by which something is white. In like manner, a habit, as such, is not the cause of knowledge, as that which is known, but as that by which something is known. There fore, it is not necessary that it be better known than those things which are known through the habit.

4. A habit is not known by the soul through a species of it abstracted from sense, but through the species of those things which are known through the habit. And habits are known as the source of knowledge in the cognition of these other things.

5. Although habit is closer to power than act is, act is closer to the ob which constitutes that which is known. Power, however, constitutes the source of knowing. Therefore, act is known before habit, but habit is more a source of knowing.

6. Art is a habit of the intellective part and, as far as habitual knowledge goes, it is perceived by one who has it just as the mind is perceived, that is, through its presence.

7. Movement or activity of the cognitive part realizes its perfection within the mind itself, and, therefore, for a thing to be known, there must be some likeness in the mind. This is especially true if, as an object of knowledge, it is not joined to the mind through its essence. But movement or activity of the affective part begins from the soul and terminates at things. Therefore, a likeness of die thing by which it is informed is not required in the affection as it is in the understanding.

8. Faith is a habit of the intellective part; hence, from the very fact that it is in the mi, it bends the mind to an act of understanding, in which faith itself is seen. However, this is not the case will other habits, which are in the affective part.

9. Habits of the mind have the greatest proportion to it, as form has a proportion to subject, and perfection to perfectible. However, the proportion is not that of object to power.

10. Understanding does not know the intelligible species through its essence or through any species of the species, but, in knowing the object of which it is the species, it knows the species through a kind of reflection, as has been said.

11. The answer to this can be found above.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. In the passage cited, Augustine distinguishes three ways of knowing. One of these concerns things which are outside the soul, and about which we cannot have knowledge from the things which are within us. To know these things outside, images or likenesses of them must be formed within us.

A second way deals will those things which are in the intellective part. He says that these are known by reason of their presence, be cause it is from them that we enter upon the act of knowing. And in this act those things which are the principles of understanding are known. Therefore, he says that arts are known by reason of their presence.

The third way refers to those things which belong to the affective part, and the reason for knowing these is not in the understanding, but in the affections. Therefore, they are known as through an immediate principle, not by their presence, which is in the affections, but through the knowledge or definition of it which is in the understanding. Yet, by their presence, habits of the affective part are also a remote principle of knowledge in so far as they elicit acts in which understanding knows them. As a result, we can in a sense also say that they are known by reason of their presence.

2’. That species through which justice is known is not something other than the very notion of justice through the privation of which injustice is known. Moreover, this species or notion is not something abstracted from justice, but it is that which, as a specific difference, is the ultimate perfection of its being.

3'. Understanding, properly speaking, is not an activity of the intellect, but of the soul through the intellect, just as to make warm is not an activity of heat, but of fire through heat. Nor again are those two parts, understanding and affection, to be thought of as distinguished according to position, as sight and hearing, which are acts of organs. Therefore, that which is in affection is also present to the understanding soul. For this reason, through understanding, the soul returns to know not only the act of the understanding but also the act of the affections. In a similar way, through the affections it returns to seek and desire not only the act of the affections but also the act of the understanding.

4’. The distinctness (discretio) which has a bearing on the perfection of knowledge is not the state of being distinct (discretio) by which that which is understood is distinct from that by which it is understood, for, thus, the divine cognition by which God knows Him self would be most imperfect. Rather, it is the discernment (discretio) by which that which is known is [ asj distinct from everything else.

5'. Those who do not have habits of the mind do not know these habits by that knowledge in which one perceives that they exist in himself, but by that in which one knows what they are, or perceives that they exist in others. This is not through presence, but in another way, as has been said.

6’. The eye of reason is said to be blear in relation to created intelligible things in so far as it actually understands nothing without get ting something from sensible things, to which intelligible things are superior. Therefore, it does not have all that is needed to know intelligible things. Nevertheless, nothing prevents those things which are in reason from immediately tending through their essence toward acts in which they are understood, as has been said.

7’. Although God is more present to our mind than habits are, still, from objects which we naturally know, we cannot see the divine essence as perfectly as we see the essence of habits, for habits have a proportion to the objects and acts and are their proximate principles. We cannot say this about God.

8’. Although the presence of a habit in the mind does not make the mind actually know that habit, it does cause the mind to be actually perfected through the habit by which the act is elicited. And the habit is known from this.



ARTICLE X: CAN ONE KNOW THAT HE HAS CHARITY?



Parallel readings: I Sentences i 2, 4; II Sentences 23, 1,, ad r; IV Sentences, r, 3, sol. 2; 21, 2, 2, ad 2 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 2; c. 13, lect. Summa Theol., I—II, 112, 5.



Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. What is seen through its essence is perceived will greatest certainty. But, as Augustine says, charity is seen through its essence by him who has it. Therefore, charity is perceived by him who possesses it.

2. Charity causes pleasure principally in its acts. But habits of the moral virtues are perceived through the pleasures which they cause in acts of the virtues, as is clear from what the Philosopher says. There fore, charity is perceived by one who has it.

3. Augustine says: "One knows the love by which he loves better than the brother whom he loves." But he knows will greatest certainty that the brother whom he loves exists. Therefore, he also knows will greatest certainty that the love will which he loves exists within him.

4. The attraction of charity is stronger than that of any other virtue. But one is certain that he has other virtues in himself because he has an inclination to their acts. For it is hard for one who has the habit of justice to do what is unjust, but easy to do what is just, as is said in the Ethics. And anyone can perceive this facility within him. Therefore, he can also perceive that he has charity.

5. The Philosopher says that it is impossible for us to have the most noble habits and for them to be hidden from us. But charity is the most noble habit. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to say that one who has charity does not know that he has it.

6. Grace is spiritual light. But this light is perceived will greatest certainty by those who are bathed in it. Therefore, those who have grace perceive will greatest certainty that they have it. The same should be said for charity, without which one does not have grace.

7. According to Augustine, no one can love something which he does not know. But one loves the charity within him. Therefore, he knows that charity exists in him.

8. The unction [of God] teaches all that is necessary for salvation. But to have charity is necessary for salvation. Therefore, one who has charity knows that he has it.

9. The Philosopher says: "Virtue is more certain than any art." But one who has an art knows that he has it. So, also, when one has a virtue, and, thus, when one has charity, which is the greatest of the virtues, he knows that he has it.

To the Contrary:

1'. Ecclesiastes (9: 1) reads: "Yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." But he who has charity is worthy of divine love according to Proverbs (8: 17): "I love them that love me." There fore, no one knows that he has charity.

2'. No one can know will certainty when God comes to dwell in him. Job (9: i 1) says: "If he come to me, I shall not see him." But God dwells in man through charity, for the first Epistle of St. John (4:16) says: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God and God in him." Therefore, no one can know will certainty that he has charity.

102

REPLY:

One who has charity can surmise that he has charity from probable signs, as when he sees that he is ready to undertake spiritual works, and that he effectively hates evil, as also through other things of this sort which charity effects in a man. But one cannot know will certainty that he has charity unless it be revealed to him by God.

The reason for this, as is clear from what has been said earlier, is that the knowledge by which one knows that he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what the habit is. What a habit is, however, cannot be known unless one bases his judgment about it upon that to which that habit is ordained, which is the measure of that habit.

But that to which charity is ordained cannot be comprehended, be cause its immediate object and end is God, the highest good, to whom charity unites us. Hence, one cannot know from the act of love which he perceives within him whether he has reached the stage where he is united to God in the way which is needed for the nature of charity.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Charity is seen through its essence, in so far as through its essence it is the source of the act of love, in which both are known. Thus, through its essence, also, it is a source of its knowledge, although a remote source. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be perceived will certainty, for the act of love which we perceive in ourselves, in so far as it is perceptible, is not an adequate indication of charity be cause of the similarity between natural love and infused love.

2. The pleasure which remains in an act by reason of charity can also be caused by some acquired habit. Therefore, it is not a sufficient indication to show that charity is present because we do not perceive a thing will certainty from common marks.

3. Although the mind knows most certainly the love will which it loves a brother, in so far as it is love, it does not know as certainly that it is charity.

4. Although the inclination will which charity tends to action is a source of perceiving charity, it is not enough for perfect perception of charity. For no one can perceive that he has a given habit unless he knows perfectly that to which the habit is ordained, for it is through this that he judges about the habit. In charity this cannot be known.

5. The Philosopher is speaking of habits of the intellective part, which, if they are perfect, cannot be concealed from those who have them, because certainty belongs to their perfection. Hence, anyone who knows, knows that he knows, since to know is to perceive the cause of a thing, that it is the cause of it, and that it cannot be other will. Similarly, one who has the habit of the understanding of principles knows that he has that habit. But the perfection of charity does not consist in certitude of knowledge but in strength of affection. Therefore, the case is not the same.

6. When we are speaking metaphorically, we should not apply the likeness to every detail. Thus, grace is not compared to light in so far as it plainly pours itself out on spiritual vision as physical light does on bodily vision. Rather, the comparison lies in this, that grace is the source of spiritual life as light of the heavenly bodies is a source of bodily life in things here below, as Dionysius says. This holds also for other likenesses.

7. "To have charity" can be understood in two ways. In one it has the force of a statement; in the other, the force of a term. It has the force of a statement, for instance, when one says: "it is true that some one has charity." It is used will the force of a term when we predicate something about the phrase "to have charity" or about its meaning. However, it does not belong to the affections to join or divide, but only to be drawn to things themselves, for good and evil are its conditions. Therefore, when one says: "I love," or "I want to have charity," the phrase "to have charity" is taken in the sense of a term, as though I said: "This is what I want, to have charity." Now, nothing prevents us from this. For I know what it is to have charity, even if I do not have it. Thus, even one who does not have charity desires to have charity. Nevertheless, it does not follow that one knows that he has charity, taking this will the force of a statement, affirming that he does have charity.

8. Although it is necessary to have charity to be saved, it is not necessary to know that one has charity. In fact, it is generally more advantageous not to know, because thus solicitude and humility are pre served. The saying, "The unction of God teaches all that is needed for salvation," should be understood as referring to all that has w be known for salvation.

9. Virtue is more certain than any art will the certainty of tendency to one thing, but not will the certainty of knowledge. For virtue, as Cicero says," tends to one thing in the manner of a nature. But nature reaches a single end more surely and more directly than art does. It is in this sense, too, that virtue is said to be more certain than art, and not in the sense that one perceives virtue in himself more surely than art.



ARTICLE XI: CAN THE MIND IN THIS LIFE SEE GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?



Parallel readings III Sentences 27, 3, 1 35, 2, 2, sol. 2; IV Sentences 49, 2, Quodibet I, 1; Contra Gentiles III, 47; 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 1; Summa Theol., I, 12, II; II—II, 180, 5; 175, 4-5; In Joan., C. 1, lectura II.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. In Numbers (12:8) it is said of Moses: "For I speak to him mouth to mouth: and plainly and not by riddles doth he see the Lord." But to see God without riddles is to see Him through His essence. There fore, since Moses was still a wayfarer, it seems that someone in this life can see God through His essence.

2. Gregory’s gloss on Exodus (33:20), "For man shah not see me and live," says: "The glory of God everlasting can be seen will the keenness of contemplation by some living in this flesh but growing in priceless virtue." But the glory of God is His essence, as is said in the same gloss. Therefore, one living in this mortal flesh can see God through His essence.

3. Christ’s understanding vas of the same nature as ours. But the conditions of this life did not prevent His understanding from seeing God through His essence. Therefore, we, too can see God in this life through His essence.

4. In this life God is known by means of intellectual sight. Hence, Romans (1:20) says: "For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But the sight of understanding is that through which things are seen in themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, our mind can see God in this life through His essence.

5. The Philosopher says: "Our soul in a certain sense is all things," because sense is all sensible things and understanding is all intelligible things. But the divine essence is most intelligible. Therefore, our understanding even according to the conditions of this life, about which the Philosopher is speaking, can see God through His essence, just as our sense can perceive all sensible things.

6. As there is boundless goodness in God, so, too, there is boundless truth. But the divine goodness, even though it is boundless, can be loved in itself by us in this life. Therefore, the truth of His essence can he seen in itself in this life.

7. Our understanding has been made to see God. If it cannot see God in this life, this is only because of some veil. This is twofold, a veil of guilt and of creaturehood. The veil of guilt did not exist in the state of innocence, and even now is taken away from the saints. The second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) says: "But we all beholding the glory of the Lord w open face..." Now, the veil of creaturehood, as it seems, cannot keep us from seeing the divine essence, because God is deeper within our mind than any creature. Therefore, in this life our mind sees God through His essence.

8. Everything that is in another is there according to the mode of the one receiving. But God is in our mind through His essence. Since, therefore, intelligibility itself is the mode of our mind, it seems that the divine essence is in our mind as intelligible. So, our mind under stands God through His essence in this life.

9. Cassiodorus says: "The soundness of the human mind understands that unapproachable glory." But our mind is made sound through grace. Therefore, the divine essence, which is unapproachable glory, can be seen in this life by one who has grace.

10. As the being which is predicated of all things stands first in universality, so the being by which all things are caused, that is to say, God, stands first in causality. But the being which is first in universality is the first concept of our understanding even in this life. Therefore, in this life we can immediately know through His essence the being which is first in causality.

11. For sight there must be one who sees, something seen, and an intention. But we have these three in our mind will reference to the divine essence. For our mind itself is naturally capable of seeing the divine essence, since it was made for this. And the divine essence is present in our mi. Nor is an intention lacking, for, whenever our mind turns to a creature, it also turns to God, since in the creature there is a likeness of God. Therefore, our mind can see God through His essence in this life.

12. Augustine says: "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Surely, I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds." But the unchangeable truth is the divine essence, in which nothing can be seen unless it itself is seen. Therefore, we see the divine essence in this life, and we see all truth in it.

13. Truth, as such, is knowable. Therefore, the highest truth is most knowable. But this is the divine essence. Therefore, even in the conditions of this life we can know the divine essence as most knowable.

14. Genesis (32:30) says: "I have seen the Lord face to face." And, as the Gloss comments: "The face of God is the form in which the Son did not consider it robbery to be equal to God." But the form is the divine essence. Therefore, Jacob saw God through His essence in this life.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the first Epistle to Timothy (6: r6) we read: "Who inhabited light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen nor can see."

2'. On Exodus ( 3:20), "For a man will not see me and live," the gloss of Gregory says: "God could be seen by those living in this flesh through limited images; He could not be seen through the un limited light of eternity." But this light is the divine essence. There fore, no one living in this life can see God through His essence.

3’. Bernard says that, although God can be entirely loved in this life, He cannot be entirely understood But, if He were seen through His essence, He would be entirely understood Therefore, He is not seen through His essence in this life.

4’. As the Philosopher says, our intellect understands in space and time. But the divine essence transcends all space and time. Therefore, our intellect cannot see God through His essence in this life.

5’. The divine essence is farther away from the gift of it than first act from second act. But, sometimes, when one sees God in contemplation through the gift of understanding or wisdom, the soul is separated from the body will reference to sense activities, which are second acts. Therefore, if the soul would see God through His essence, it must be separated from the body, even in so far as it is the first act of the body. But this does not happen as long as man is in this life. There fore, in this life no one can see God through His essence.

103

REPLY:

An action can belong to someone in two ways. In one way it is such that the principle of that action is in the doer, as we see in all natural actions. In the other way it is such that the principle of that activity or movement is from an extrinsic principle, as happens in forcibly imposed movements and also in miraculous works, such as giving sight to the blind, resuscitation of the dead, and things of this sort which take place only through divine power.

In this life, the vision of God through His essence cannot belong to our mind in the first way. For, in natural knowledge, our mind looks to phantasms as objects from which it receives intelligible species, as is said in The Soul.1s Hence, everything it understands in the present life, it understands through species of this sort abstracted from phantasms. But no species of this sort is sufficient to represent the divine essence or that of any other separated essence. For the quiddities of Sensible things, of winch intelligible species abstracted from phantasms are likenesses are essentially different from the essences of even Created immaterial substances, and much more from the divine essence. Hence, by means of the natural knowledge, which we experience in this life, our mind cannot see either God or angels through their essence. Nevertheless angels can be seen through their essence by means of intelligible species different from their essence, but the divine essence cannot, for it transcends every genus and is outside every genus. As a result, it is impossible to find any created species which is adequate to represent it.

Thus, if God is to be seen through His essence, He must be seen through no created species, but His very essence must become the intelligible form of the understanding which sees Him. This cannot take place unless the created intellect is disposed for it through the light of glory. And in thus seeing God through His essence by reason of the disposition of infused light, the mind reaches the end of its course, which is glory, and so is not in this life.

Moreover, just as bodies are subject to the divine omnipotence, so, too, are minds. Hence, just as it can cause some bodies to produce effects, the dispositions for which they do not have within themselves, as it made Peter walk on water without giving him the gift of agility, so it can bring it about that the mind be united to the divine essence in the present life in the way in which it is united to it in heaven will out being bathed in the light of glory.

When, however, this takes place, the mind must leave off that mode of knowing in which it abstracts from phantasms in the same way that a corruptible body is not actually heavy at the same time that it is miraculously given that act of agility. Therefore, those to whom it is given to see God through His essence in this way are withdrawn completely from activity of the senses, so that the whole soul is concentrated on seeing the divine essence. Hence, they are said to be in a state of rapture, as if by virtue of a higher power they were separated from that which naturally belongs to them.

Therefore, in the ordinary course of events, no one sees God through His essence in this life. And if it is miraculously granted to some to see God through His essence before the soul is completely separated from mortal flesh, such are, nevertheless, not altogether in this life, for they are without the activity of the senses, which we use in the state of mortal existence.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. According to Augustine, from those words Moses is shown to have seen God through His essence in a rapture, as we are told of Paul in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), in order that the law giver of the Jews and the teacher of the Gentiles might be equal in this respect.

2. Gregory is speaking about men who grow in keenness of contemplation to the point that they see the divine essence in rapture. Hence, he adds: "He who sees the wisdom which is God entirely dies to this life."

3. It was unique in Christ that at the same time He was a wayfarer and a possessor [ the beatific vision]. This belonged to Him because He was God and man. As a result, everything which related to human nature was under His control, so that each power of soul and body was affected in the way in which He determined. Hence, bodily pain did not hinder contemplation of the mind, nor did delight of the mind lessen bodily pain. Thus, His understanding, which was illumined by the light of glory, saw God through His essence in such a way that the glory did not affect the lower parts. In this way He was at once a way farer and a possessor of the beatific Vision. This cannot be said of others, in whom there is some necessary diffusion from the higher powers to the lower, and in whom the higher powers are drawn down by the strong passions of the lower powers.

4. In this life God is known by means of intellectual sight, yet not will the result that we know what He is, but only what He is not. To this extent we know His essence, understanding that it stands above everything. Such cognition, however, takes place through certain likenesses. The statement from Augustine should be taken as referring to that which is known and not to that by which it is known, as is clear from what has been said.

5. Even in this life our understanding can in a certain manner know the divine essence, not that it knowledge it is, but only what it is not.

6. We can love God directly without having loved anything else first, although sometimes we are drawn to invisible things through love of other things which can be seen. In this life, however, we can not know God directly without first knowing something else. The reason for this is that the activity of affection begins where the activity of understanding ends, since affection follows understanding. But the understanding, going from effects to causes, finally arrives at some sort of knowledge of God, by knowing what He is not. Hence, affection is directed to that which is presented to it through the understanding, without having to go back through all the intermediate things through which the understanding passed.

7. Although our understanding has been made to see God, it cannot see God by its own natural power, but through the light of glory infused into it. Therefore, even though every veil is taken away, it is still not necessary to see God through His essence if the soul is not enlightened will the light of glory. For this lack of glory will be an obstacle to seeing God.

8. Along will intelligibility, which it has as a property, our mind also has existence in common will other things. Hence, although God is in it, it is not necessary that He be there always as an intelligible form, but as giving existence, just as He is in other creatures. More over, although He gives existence to all creatures alike, He gives each creature its own mode of existence. Furthermore, in the sense that He is in all of them through essence, presence, and power, He is seen to exist differently in different things, and in each one according to its own mode.

9. Soundness of mind is twofold. There is one by which the mind is healed from sin through the grace of faith. This soundness makes the mind see that unapproachable glory in a mirror and obscurely. The other, which will come through glory, is a remedy for all sin, punishment, and distress. This soundness makes the mind see God face to face. These two kinds of sight are distinguished in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face."

10. The being which is most extensive in universality does not exceed the proportion of anything, since it is essentially identified will everything. Therefore, it is perceived in the knowledge of anything whatsoever. But the being which is first in causality exceeds all other things and has no proportion to them. Hence, it cannot be known adequately through knowledge of any other thing. Therefore, in this life, in which we understand through species abstracted from things, we have adequate knowledge of being in general, but not of uncreated being.

11. Although the divine essence is present to our understanding, still, as long as our understanding is not made perfect by the light of glory, it is not joined to it as an intelligible form which it can understand. For the mind itself does not have the faculty of seeing God through His essence before it is illumined will the aforesaid light. Thus, the faculty of seeing and the presence of what is seen are lacking. Again, the intention is not always present, for, although some likeness of the Creator is found in creatures, still, whenever we look at a creature, we do not consider it as a likeness of the Creator. Hence, it is not necessary that our intention always reach God.

12. As the Gloss on Psalms (11:2) says: "Truths are decayed.

Many truths are imprinted on human minds," by the one uncreated truth, "just as from one face many faces appear in different mirrors," or in one broken mirror. According to this, we are said to see some thing in uncreated truth when we judge about something through the likeness of uncreated truth reflected in our mind, as when we judge of conclusions through self-evident principles. Hence, it is not necessary that we see uncreated truth through its essence.

13. The highest truth, in so far as it exists in itself, is most knowable. But in our regard it happens to be less knowable to us, as is clear from the Philosopher.18

14. This citation is explained in two ways in the Gloss. In one way it is taken to refer to the sight of imagination. Thus, the interlinear Gloss says: "I have seen the Lord face to face. This does not mean that God can be seen, but that he saw the form in which God spoke to him." It is explained differently in Gregory’s gloss, as referring to intellectual sight, by which saints have seen divine truth in contemplation, not, indeed, knowing what it is, but what it is not. Hence, Gregory says: "He saw by perceiving the truth, for he does not see how great the truth itself is, since the closer he approaches to it, the farther he thinks he is from it. For, unless he saw the truth in some way, he would not perceive that he was notable to see it." And he adds: "This sight, which comes through contemplation, is not firm and permanent, but, as a kind of imitation of sight, is called the face of God. For, since we recognize a person by his face, we eau knowledge of God the face of God."



ARTICLE XII: IS GOD’S EXISTENCE SELF-EVIDENT TO THE HUMAN MIND, JUST AS FIRST PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION, WHICH CANNOT BE THOUGHT NOT TO EXIST?



Parallel readings: I Sentences 3, 1,z; In Boet. de Trinit., 1, 3, ad 6; Contra Gentiles I, w- III, 38; Q. D. de pot., 7, 2, ad 11; Summa Theol., 1, 2, 1; In Psalm., 8.



Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Those things which it is given us to know naturally are self -evident. But "knowledge of God’s existence is naturally given to every body," as Damascene says. Therefore, it is self-evident that God exists.

2. "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought," as Anselm says. But that which cannot be thought not to exist is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to exist.

3. God is truth itself. But no one can think that truth does not exist, because, if it is declared not to exist, it follows that it exists. For, if truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not exist. Therefore, no one can think that God does not exist.

4. God is His own existence. But it is impossible to think that a thing is not predicated of itself, for example, that man is not man. Therefore, it is impossible to think that God does not exist.

5. All things desire the highest good, as Boethius says. But only God is the highest good. Therefore, all things desire God. But what is not known cannot be desired. Therefore, that God exists is a notion common to all. Therefore, He cannot be thought not to exist.

6. First truth surpasses all created truth. But some created truth is so evidefit that it is impossible to think that it does not exist, as for instance, the truth of the proposition that affirmation and denial can not both be true at the same time. Therefore, much less can it be thought that uncreated truth, which is God, does not exist.

7. God has existence more truly than the human soul has. But the soul cannot think that it does not exist. Therefore, much less can it think that God does not exist.

8. Before anything existed it was true that it would exist. But truth exists. Therefore, before it existed it was true that it would exist. But this is true only because of truth. Therefore, it is impossible to think that truth did not always exist. But God is truth. Therefore, it cannot be thought that God does not exist or has not always existed.

9. It was said that there is a fallacy in this argument, will an equivocation on "simply" and "in some respect." For that truth would exist before it did exist does not state a truth simply, but only in some respect. Thus, we cannot conclude that truth exists simply.—On the contrary, there is the fact that everything which is true in some respect is reduced to something which is true simply, just as every imperfect thing is reduced to something perfect. Therefore, if the fact that truth would exist was true in some respect, something had to be true simply. Thus, it was simply true to say that truth existed.

10. God’s proper name is He Who Is, as is clear from Exodus (3:14).

But it is impossible to think that being is not. Therefore, it is also impossible to think that God is not.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Psalmist says (Ps 13,1): "The fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God.’"

2’. It was said that the fact that God exists is self-evident habitually to the mind, but it is possible actually to think that He does not exist.— On the contrary, in our inner reason we cannot hold the opposite about those things which we know by a natural habit, such as first principles of demonstration. If, therefore, the contrary of the proposition, God exists, could actually be held, that God does exist would not be habitually self-evident.

3’. Those things which are self-evident are known without passing from things which are caused to their causes. For they are known as soon as the terms are known, as is said in the Posterior Analytics. But we know God only by looking at what He has made, according to Romans (1:20): "For the invisible things of him,... by the things that are made..." Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

4’. We cannot know the existence of a thing without knowing what it is. But in this life we cannot know what God is. Therefore, that He exists is not evident to us, much less self-evident.

5'. That God exists is an article of faith. But an article of faith is something that faith supplies and reason contradicts. But things which reason contradicts are not self-evident. Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

6’. There is nothing more certain for a man than his faith, as Augustine says. But doubt can arise in us about matters of faith and, so, about anything else. Thus, it can be thought that God does not exist.

7’. Knowledge of God belongs to wisdom. But not everybody has wisdom. Therefore, it is not evident to everybody that God exists. Therefore, it is not self-evident.

8’. Augustine says: "The highest good is discerned only by the most purified minds." But not everybody has a most purified mind. There fore, all do not know the highest good, namely, that God exists.

9’. It is possible to think of one of the things between which reason distinguishes without the other. Thus, we can think that God exists without thinking that He is good, as is clear from Boethius. But, in God, existence and essence differ in reason. Therefore, we can think of His essence without thinking of His existence. We conclude as before.

10’. It is the same thing for God to be God and to be just. But some are of the opinion that God is not just and say that evil pleases God. Therefore, some can think that God does not exist. Thus, that God exists is not self-evident.


De veritate EN 101