De veritate EN 46
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Providence is concerned will the direction of things to an end. Therefore, as the Commentator says, whoever denies final causality should also deny providence. Now, those who deny final causality take two positions.
Some of the very ancient philosophers admitted only a material cause. Since they would not admit an efficient cause, they could not affirm the existence of an end, for an end is a cause only in so far as it moves the efficient cause. Other and later philosophers admitted an efficient cause, but said nothing about a final cause. According to both schools, everything was necessarily caused by previously existing causes, material or efficient.
This position, however, was criticized by other philosophers on the following grounds. Material and efficient causes, as such, cause only the existence of their effects. They are not sufficient to produce goodness in them so that they be aptly disposed in themselves, so that they could continue to exist, and toward others so that they could help them. Heat, for example, of its very nature and of itself can break down other things, but this breaking down is good and helpful only if it happens up to a certain point and in a certain way. Consequently, if we do not admit that there exist in nature causes other than heat and similar agents, we cannot give any reason why things happen in a good and orderly way.
Moreover, whatever does not have a determinate cause happens by accident. Consequently, if the position mentioned above were true, all the harmony and usefulness found in things would be the result of chance. This was actually what Empedocles held. He asserted that it was by accident that the parts of animals came together in this way through friendship and this was his explanation of an animal and of a frequent occurrence This explanation, of course, is absurd, for those things that happen by chance, happen only rarely; we know from experience, however, that harmony and usefulness are found in nature either at all times or at least for the most part. This cannot be the result of mere chance; it must be because an end is intended. What lacks intellect or knowledge, however, cannot tend directly toward an end. It can do this only if someone else’s knowledge has established an end for it, and directs it to that end. Consequently, since natural things have no knowledge, there must be some previously existing intelligence directing them to an end, like an archer who gives a definite motion to an arrow so that it will will its way to a determined end. Now, the hit made by the arrow is said to be the work not of the arrow alone but also of the person who shot it. Similarly, philosophers call every work of nature the work of intelligence.
Consequently, the world is ruled by the providence of that intellect which gave this order to nature; and we may compare the providence by which God rules the world to the domestic foresight by which a man rules his family, or to the political foresight by which a ruler governs a city or a kingdom, and directs the acts of others to a definite end. There is no providence, however, in God will respect to Him self, since whatever is in Him is an end, not a means to it.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The metaphor used by Dionysius notes merely that, like the sun which, on its own part, keeps no body from sharing its light, the divine goodness keeps no creature from participating in itself. The metaphor does not mean that providence acts without choice or knowledge.
2. A principle can be said to be multiform in two senses. First, the multiformity can refer to the very essence of the principle—that is, the principle is composite. A principle that is multiform in this sense must be posterior to a principle having but one form. Second, the multiformity may refer to the principle’s relation to its effects, so that a principle is said to be multiform because it extends its influence to many things. A principle that is multiform in this sense precedes one that has but a single form, because the more simple a principle is, the more extensive is its influence. It is in this sense, moreover, that the will is said to be a multiform, and nature, a uniform principle.
3. The argument given is based on the uniformity of a principle ac cording to its essence.
4. God is the cause of things by His essence. Consequently, any plurality in things can be reduced to one simple principle. His essence, however, is the cause of things only in so far as it is known, and con sequently, only in so far as it wills to be com to a creature by the creature’s being made in its likeness. Hence, things proceed from the divine essence through the ordering of knowledge and will, and so through providence.
5. That determination by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action belongs to it, not because of itself, but because of something else. Consequently, the very determination for bringing about the suitable effect is, as has been said, a proof of divine providence.
6. Generation and corruption can be understood in two senses. First, generation and corruption can arise from a contrary being and terminate in a contrary. In this sense, the potency to generation and corruption exists in a thing because its matter is in potency to contrary forms; and in this respect celestial bodies and spiritual substances have no potency to generation or corruption. Second, these terms are commonly used to indicate any coming into or passing out of existence that is found in things. Consequently, even creation, by which a thing is drawn from nothingness into existence, is called generation; and the annihilation of a thing is called corruption.
Moreover, a thing is said to be in potency to generation in this sense if an agent has the power to produce it; and it is said to be in potency to corruption if an agent has the power to reduce it to nothingness. In this way of speaking, every creature is in potency to corruption; for all that God has brought into existence He can also reduce to nothingness. For, as Augustine says, for creatures to subsist God must constantly work in them. This action of God, however, must not be compared to the action of a craftsman building a house, for, when his action ceases, the house still remains; it should rather be compared to the sun’s lighting up the air. Consequently, when God no longer gives existence to a creature, whose very existence depends on His will, then this creature is reduced to nothingness.
7. The necessity of the principles mentioned depends upon God’s providence and disposition, because the fact that created things have a particular nature and, in this nature, a determined act of existence, makes these things distinct from their negations; and upon this distinction is based the principle that affirmation and negation cannot be true simultaneously. Moreover, on this principle, as we read in the Meta physics, the necessity of all the other principles is founded.
8. An effect cannot be stronger than its cause. It can, however, be weaker than its cause. Now, since body is naturally inferior to spirit, it cannot produce a spirit; but a spirit can produce a body.
9. God is similarly said to be related to all things, because there is no diversity in Him. He is, however, the cause of diversity in things inasmuch as by His knowledge He contains within Himself the intelligible characters of all things.
10. That order which is found in nature is not caused by nature but by something else. Consequently, nature needs providence to implant such an order in it.
11. Creatures f all to represent their creator adequately. Consequently, through them we cannot arrive at a perfect knowledge of God. Another reason for our imperfect knowledge is the weakness of our intellect, which cannot assimilate all the evidence of God that is to be found in creatures. It is for this reason that we are forbidden to scrutinize God’s attributes overzealously in the sense of aiming at the completion of such an inquiry, an aim which is implied in the very notion of overzealous scrutiny. If we were to act thus, we would not believe anything about God unless our intellect could grasp it. We are not, however, kept from humbly investigating God’s attributes, remembering that we are too weak to arrive at a perfect comprehension of Him. Consequently, Hilary writes as follows: "Even if a man who reverently seeks the infinite ways of God never reaches the end of his search, his search will always profit him."
Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.
Difficulties:
It seems that it does not, for
1. A cause and its effects are in the same order. Now, corruptible
creatures are the cause of sin. This is evident. For example, women’s beauty is an incitement to and cause of lust. Moreover, Wisdom (14:11) Says: "The creatures of God have been turned into...a snare for the feet of the unwise." Now, since sin is outside the order of divine providence, it seems that corruptible beings are not subject to this order.
2. Nothing that a will man arranges can destroy his work, be cause he would be contradicting himself were he to build and destroy the same thing. Now, we find among corruptible things some that are contrary to and destructive of others. Consequently, corruptible things were not arranged by God.
3. Damascene speaks as follows: "It must be true that all things happening according to God’s providence take place according to right reason in a way that is best and most fitting in God’s eyes—indeed, in way that is better for them to take place." But corruptible things could become better, for they could become incorruptible. The providence of God, therefore, does not extend to corruptible things.
4. Whatever is corruptible has corruption in it by its very nature; otherwise it would not be necessary for all corruptible things 10 corrupt. But, since corruption is a defect, it is not provided for by God, who cannot be a cause of any defect. Corruptible natures, therefore, do not come under God’s providence.
5. As Dionysius says, providence does not destroy nature but saves it. The role of God’s providence, therefore, is to save things continuaily. But corruptible things are not continually saved. They are not, therefore, subject to God’s providence.
To the Contrary:
1'. Wisdom (14:3) says: "But thy Providence, O Father, governed all things."
2’. Wisdom (12: 13) also says that it is God who "hast care of all things." Therefore, corruptible as well as incorruptible things fail under His providence.
3’. As Damascene says, it is illogical to hold that one being creates things and another exercises providence over them. Now, God is the efficient cause of all corruptible things. Consequently, He also provides for them.
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As we said above, the providence by which God rules things is similar to the providence by which the father of a family rules his household or a king rules a city or kingdom. The common element in these rules is the primacy of the common good over the good of the individual; for, as we read in the Ethics, the good of the nation is more divine than that of the city, family, or person. Consequently, whoever is supervising must —if he is to rule wisely pay more attention to what is good for the community than to what is good merely for an individual.
Some have not kept this point in mind, but considering only that there are corruptible things which, if taken in themselves, could be better, and not considering the order of the universe in which each and every thing is excellently arranged—some, I say, have said that those corruptible things are therefore not ruled by God but that only incorruptible things are. These persons are represented in Job (22: 14) by the man who says: "The clouds are God’s covert, and he doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven." More over, they assert that corruptible things act necessarily and without any ruler at all or are ruled by an opposing principle. The Philosopher, however, has refuted this position by taking an army as an example. In an army we find two orders, one by which the parts of the army are related to each other, and a second by which the army is directed to an external good, namely, the good of its leader. That order by which the parts of the army are related to each other exists for the sake of the order by which the entire army is subordinated to its leader. Consequently, if the subordination to the leader did not exist, the ordering of the parts of the army to each other would not exist. Consequently, whenever we find a group whose members are ordered to each other, that group must necessarily be ordered to some external principle.
Now, the corruptible and incorruptible parts of the universe are related to each other essentially, not accidentally. For we see that corruptible bodies benefit from celestial bodies, and always, or at least ordinarily, in the same manner. Consequently, alt things, corruptible and incorruptible, must be in one order under the providence of an external principle outside the universe. For this reason, the Philosopher concluded that it was necessary to affirm the existence of a single rule over the universe, and of not more than one.
It must be noted, however, that a thing is provided for in two ways: for itself, Or for other things. For example, in a home, care is taken of some things on their own account, namely, those things that constitute the essential goods of a household, such as sons, possessions, and the like; and other things, such as utensils, animals, and the like are cared for so that the essential things can use them. Similarly, in the universe, the things in which the essential perfection of the universe consists are provided for on their own account, and like the universe itself, these things stay in existence. But the things that do not endure are provided for, not for their own sake, but for the sake of other things. Consequently, spiritual substances and heavenly bodies, which are perpetual both as species and as individuals, are provided for on their own account both as species and as individuals. Corruptible things, however, are perpetual only as a species; hence, these species are looked after for their own sake, but the individual members of these Species are not provided for except for this reason: to keep the species in perpetual existence.
If we thus understand the opinion of those who say that divine providence does not extend to corruptible things of this kind, except as they participate in the nature of a species, it need not be rejected; for this opinion is true if it is understood as referring to the providence of things by which they are provided for on their own account.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Of themselves, corruptible creatures do not cause sin. They are only its occasion and accidental cause. Now, an accidental cause and its effect do not have to belong to the same order.
2. A will provider does not consider what is good for merely one of the things that fall under his providence. He is concerned rather will what is better for all. Consequently, even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universe essentially consists.
3. Although a corruptible thing would be better if it possessed in corruptibility, it is better for the universe to be made of both corruptible and incorruptible things than to be made merely of the latter, because the nature of the corruptible thing, as well as that of the in corruptible, is good, and it is better to have two goods than merely one. Moreover, multiplication of individuals in one nature is of less value than a variety of natures, since the good found in a nature, being communicable, is superior to the good found in an individual, which is incommunicable.
4. Darkness is brought about by the sun, not because of any action of the sun, but because the sun does not send out light. Similarly, corruption comes from God, not because of any positive action by Him, but because He does not give the thing permanency.
5. The things that are provided for by God on their own account last forever. But this permanency is not necessary for those things that are not provided for on their own account. These need remain only so long as they are needed by the things for which they are provided. Consequently, as is clear from the previous discussion, certain things corrupt because they are not looked after for their own sakes.
Parallel readings: See readings given for q. 5, a. 2.
Difficulties:
It seems that they are not, for
1. God does not provide for a thing if He is not its author, because, as Damascene says, it is illogical to say that one person makes a thing and another provides for it. Now, God is not the author of evil, for to the extent that things come from Him they are good. Therefore, since many evil things happen in the actions and motions of creatures here below, it does not seem that all of their motions fail under His divine providence.
2. Motions that are contrary do not seem to belong to the same order. Now, in creatures here below there are contrary motions arid actions. Consequently, it is impossible that they all fall under the order of divine providence.
3. A thing falls under divine providence only inasmuch as it is directed to an end. But evil is not ordered to an end. On the contrary, it is a privation of order. Consequently, evil does not fail under providence. In creatures here below, however, many evils occur. Therefore.
4. A man is not prudent if he allows something evil to occur in those things whose actions fail under his providence when he can prevent that evil from taking place. Now, God is most prudent arid powerful. Hence, since many evils occur in creatures here below, it seems that certain of their acts do not fail under divine providence.
5. It was said, however, that God permits these evils to happen be- cause He can draw good from them.—On the contrary, good is more powerful than evil, so it is casier to draw good from good than good from evil. Consequently, it is not necessary for God to permit evil to happen in order to draw good from it.
6. As Boethius says, just as God creates all things through His goodness, so does He also govern all things by His goodness. But His divine goodness does not permit Him to make anything evil. Consequently, His goodness does not permit anything evil from coming under His providence.
7. If a thing is arranged, it does not happen by chance. Therefore, if all the motions of creatures here below were arranged, nothing would happen by chance, but everything would happen by necessity. This, however, is impossible.
8. As the Commentator says, if everything happened in creatures here below because of the necessity of matter, they would not be ruled by providence. But many things in creatures here below happen be cause of the necessity of matter. At least these events, then, are not ruled by providence.
9. No prudent man permits a good so that evil will result. For the reason, therefore, no prudent man permits an evil that good will result. Since God is prudent, He will therefore not permit evils in order that good will result. Consequently, it seems that the evils occurring in creatures here below are not allowed by providence.
10. What is blameworthy in a man should by no means be attributed to God. But a man is blamed if he does wrong in order to get some thing good. This is clear from the Epistle to the Romans (3:8): "As we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say: 'Let us do evil, that there may come good. "Consequently, it is contrary to God’s nature for evil to come under His providence in order that good may be drawn from it.
11. If the acts of bodies here below were subject to God’s providence, they would act in harmony will God’s justice. But the lower elements do not act in this way: fire burns the homes of the just as well as those of the unjust. Consequently, acts of lower bodies do not fall under God’s providence.
To the Contrary:
1'. In the Gospel according to Matthew (10:29), we read: "Arc not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them shah fall on the ground without your Father." On this, the Gloss reads: "Great is the providence of God. Not even the smallest things escape it." Consequently, even the smallest movement of things here below comes under God’s providence.
2’. Augustine writes as follows: "it is because of God’s providence that we see celestial bodies ordered from on high, stars and planets of the earth shining down on us below, the regular alternation of night and day, the rugged earth being cleansed by surrounding waves of water, air gushing out in the heavens, shrubs and animals being conceived and born, growing, wasting away, and killing, and all things else that happen by interior, natural motion." Consequently, all motions of lower bodies fail under God’s providence.
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Since the first principle of things is the same as their final end, things come from their first principle and are ordered to their ultimate end in the same manner. Studying things as they come from their principle, however, we find that those which are close to their principle have an unfailing act of existence, but, as is said in Generation and Corruption, those that are remote from their principle have a corruptible act of existence. Consequently, will respect to their relation to an end, those things that are closest to their ultimate end unfailingly keep their direction to their end, but those that are remote from their ultimate end sometimes diverge from their direction to it.
Moreover, the same things that are close to their principle are close to their end, and those that are remote from their principle are re mote from their end. Consequently, not only have incorruptible sub stances an unfailing act of existence, but also their actions never fail to keep their direction to an end. For example, there are heavenly bodies whose motions never leave their natural orbit. However, be cause corruptible bodies have defective natures, many of their movements diverge from their proper order. It is for this reason that, in regard to the order of the universe, the Philosopher compares incorruptible bodies to children in a household who always do what is good for the home, and corruptible bodies to domestic animals and slaves whose actions frequently violate the order laid down by the one in charge of the household. This is the reason, too, why Avicenna says that nothing evil lies beyond the moon and that there is evil only in creatures here below.
It should not be thought, however, that those acts of things here below which are outside their proper course are entirely outside the order of providence. For a thing comes under God’s providence in two ways: it can be something to which something else is ordered or it can be something that is ordered to something else. Now, as said in the Physics and in the Metaphysics, in an order of means to an end, all the intermediate members are ends as well as means to an end. Consequently, whatever is rightly ordered by providence comes under providence not only as something that is referred to something else, but also as something to which another thing is referred. However, a thing which leaves the right order comes under providence only as something referred, to something else, not as something to which an other thing has been referred. For example, the act of the generative powers by which one man generates another complete in his nature is directed by God to a particular thing, namely, a human form; and to the act itself something else is directed, namely, the generative power. A defective act which results occasionally in the generation of natural monstrosities is, of course, directed by God to some useful purpose; but to this defective act itself nothing else was directed. It happened merely on account of the failure of some cause. With regard to the first-named act of generation, the providence is one of approval; will regard to the second, it is one of permission. These two kinds of providence are discussed by Damascene.
It should be noted, however, that some have restricted God’s providence to only the species of natural things, and have excluded it from individuals except as they participate in a common nature. They did this because they did not admit that God knows singulars, but said that God directs the nature of a species in such a way that the resultant power of a species can bring about a certain action, and, if this should fail at times, the failure itself is directed to something useful—just as the corruption of one thing is directed to the generation of another. They denied, however, that a particular force is directed to a particular act and that this particular failure is directed to this particular use. But since we say that God knows all particular things perfectly, we assert that all individual things, even as individuals, fall under God’s providence.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. That argument touches only the providence of approval. It is true, however, that God does not provide for a thing unless He is in some way its author. Consequently, since evil does not come from God, it does not fall under His providence of approval, but falls only under His providence of permission.
2. Although contrary motions do not belong to the same specific order, they do belong to one general order, as do even the different orders of different crafts which are subordinated to the order of a city.
3. Even though evil inasmuch as it issues from its own cause is will out order and, for this reason, is defined as a privation of order, there is nothing that keeps a higher cause from ordering it. In this way evil comes under providence.
4. Any prudent man will endure a small evil in order that a great good will not be prevented. Any particular good, moreover, is trifling in comparison will the good of a universal nature. Again, evil cannot be kept from certain things without taking away their nature, which is such that it may or may not fail; and, while this nature may harm something in particular, it nevertheless gives some added beauty to the universe. Consequently, since God is most prudent, His providence does not prevent evil, but allows each thing to act as its nature requires it to act. For, as Dionysius says, the role of providence is to save, not to destroy, nature.
5. There are certain goods which can be drawn only from certain evils; for example, the good of patience can be drawn only from the evil of persecution, and the good of penitence only from the evil of sin. This, however, is not to deny that evil is weak in comparison will good, because things of this sort are drawn out of evil, not as from an essential cause, but, as it were, accidentally and materially.
6. Inasmuch as it has an act of existence, whatever is made must have the form of the one who makes it, because the making of a thing terminates in its act of existence. Consequently, an evil cannot be produced by a cause that is good. Now, providence directs a thing to an end, and this direction to an end follows upon the act of existence of the thing. It is not impossible, therefore, for something evil to be directed to a good by one who is good, but it is impossible for one who is good to direct something to an evil. For, just as the goodness of a maker puts the form of goodness in the things he makes, so also does the goodness of one who is provident put a direction to good in the things that are subject to his providence.
7. Effects happening accidentally in creatures here below can be considered in two ways: in their relation to proximate causes—and, in this sense, many things happen by chance—or in their relation to the first cause—and, in this sense, nothing in the world happens by chance. It does not follow, therefore, that all things happen necessarily, because in necessity and contingency effects do not follow first causes but proximate causes.
8. Those things resulting from the necessity of matter are them selves determined by natures ordered to an end, and for this reason can also fall under divine providence. This would not be possible if everything resulted from the necessity of matter.
9. Evil is the contrary of good. Now, of itself no contrary brings about its contrary, but every contrary brings its contrary to that which is similar to itself. For example, heat does not bring a thing to coldness, except accidentally. Instead, it reduces cold w warmth. Similarly, no good person directs a thing to evil; instead, he directs it to good.
10. As is clear from the above discussion, to do evil is in no way proper to those who are good. To do evil for the sake of a good is blameworthy in a man, and cannot be attributed to God. On the other hand, to direct evil to a good is not opposed to one’s goodness. Hence, permitting evil in order to draw some good from it can be attributed to God.
11. [The answer is given to the eleventh difficulty. See the answer to the sixth difficulty of the following article.]
Parallel readings: De veritate, 24, aa. 1-2 II Sentences 39, 1, 1; IV Sentences ç, t, 3, ad r; Summa Theol., I, 2; 2, ad 4; 22,4; 59, 3; 83, 1; I-II, 9, 6, ad 3; 10,4; 13, aa. 1, 6; Contra Gentiles I, 68; III, De malo, 3, 2, ad 3, 3, ad 6, r (P. 8:3 De potentia 3, 7, ad 12-14; In RM c 9,3; De rationibus fidei, c 10.
Difficulties:
It seems that they are not, for
1. As Damascene says: "What is in us is the work not of providence but of ourown free choice." What is in us means our human actions. Consequently, these do not fall under God’s providence.
2. of the things coming under God’s providence, the more noble a thing is, the more elaborately is it provided for. Now, man is more noble than those creatures that lack sensation and, never departing from their course, rarely, if ever, deviate from the right order. Men’s actions, however, frequently deviate from the right order. Hence, they are not ruled by providence.
3. The evil of sin is very hateful to God. But no one who is provident permits what is most displeasing to him to happen for the sake of something else, because this would mean that the absence of the latter would be even more displeasing to him. Consequently, since God permits the evil of sin to occur in human acts, it seems that they are not ruled by His providence.
4. What is abandoned does not fail under the rule of providence. But, as we read in Ecclesiasticus (15: 14): "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Human acts, therefore, are not ruled by providence.
5. In Ecclesiastes (9:11) we read: "I saw that... the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong... but time and chance in all." Since the author is speaking about human acts, it seems that men’s actions are subject to the whims of chance and are not ruled by providence.
6. By the rule of providence, different allotments are made to different things. But in human affairs the same things happen to the good and to the evil; for, as we read in Ecclesiastes (9: 2): "all things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil." Consequently, human affairs are not ruled by providence.
To the Contrary:
1'. In the Gospel according to Matthew (10: 30) is written: "The very hairs of your.head are all numbered." Even the least of human acts, therefore, is directed by God’s providence.
2’. To punish, reward, and issue commands are acts of providence, because it is through acts of this kind that every provider governs his subjects. Now, God does all these things in connection will human acts. Consequently, all human acts are ruled by His providence.
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