De veritate EN 53
53
The common intention of all philosophers was to reduce multitude to unity and variety to uniformity as much as possible. Consequently after considering the diversity of actions to be found in bodies here below, the ancient philosophers attempted to reduce these bodies to some fewer and more simple principles, that is, to elements, one or many, and to elementary qualities. But their position is not logical; for, in the actions of natural things, elementary qualities are like instrumental principles. An indication of this is the fact that they do not have the same way of acting in all things, nor do their actions always arrive at the same term. They have different effects in gold, in wood, and in the flesh of an animal. Now, this would not happen unless their actions were controlled by something else. Moreover, the action of the principal agent is not reduced to the action of an instrument as to its principle. Rather, the opposite is true, as, for example, a product of handicraft ought not be attributed to the saw but to the craftsman. Therefore, neither can natural effects be reduced to elementary qualities as to their first principles.
Consequently, others (the Platonists made simple and separated forms the first principles of natural effects. These were the origin, they said, of the existence, generation, and every natural property of bodies here below. This opinion also, however, is false; for, if a cause remains always the same, then the effect is always the same. Now, the forms they posited were immovable. Consequently, any generation resulting from them would always have to happen in bodies here below in a constant manner. But we see will our own eyes that what happens is quite the contrary.
It is therefore necessary to say that in bodies here below the principles of generation, of corruption, and of the other motions that depend upon these do not always remain the same; but they nevertheless al ways remain as the first principles of generation, and thereby make continual generation possible. Moreover, they must be unchangeable in their substance, and subject only to local motion. Consequently, as a result of their approach or withdrawal, they bring about diverse and contrary motions in bodies here below. Now, the heavenly bodies are of just such a nature. Consequently, all material effects should be reduced to them as to their cause.
In this reduction, however, two errors have been made. Some have reduced the bodies here below to heavenly bodies, as though the latter were their absolute first cause, for these philosophers denied that immaterial substances exist. Consequently, they said that what is prior among bodies is first among beings. This, however, is clearly false. Whatever is moved must be reduced to a first immovable principle, since nothing is moved by itself, and one cannot keep going back into infinity. Now, even though a heavenly body does not undergo change by generation or corruption or by a motion which would alter what belongs to its substance, it is nevertheless moved locally. Consequently, the reduction must be made to some prior principle so that things undergoing qualitative change are traced back by a definite order to that which causes this change in other things but is not so changed itself, although it is moved locally; and then further back to that which does not change in any way at all.
Others have asserted that the heavenly bodies cause not only the motion of bodies here below but also their very beginning. For example, Avicenna says that, as a result of what is common to all heavenly bodies, that is, their circular motion, there is caused the common element of bodies here below, namely, first matter; and, as a result of those things which differentiate one heavenly body from an other, there is caused the difference in their forms. Thus, the heavenly bodies are media, to some extent, between God and things here below even in the lime of creation. This position, however, is contrary to faith, which teaches that the whole of nature in its first beginning was created directly by God. But that one creature should be moved by another, presupposing that natural powers of each creature are given it as a result of God’s work, is not contrary to faith. Consequently, we say that the heavenly bodies are the causes of bodies here below merely in the lime of motion. Thus, these heavenly bodies are instruments in the work of governing, but not in the work of creating.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Damascene intends to exclude from heavenly bodies only first causality or any causality which would introduce necessity into bodies here below. For, even if heavenly bodies always act in the same way, their effects are received in lower bodies according to the manner of these lower bodies, which are frequently seen to be in a contrary state. Consequently, the forces exercised by the heavenly bodies are not always able to bring about their effects in the bodies here below, because a contrary disposition prevents them from doing so. This is why the Philosopher says that signs of storms and winds frequently appear, but the storms and winds do not take place because the contrary dispositions are stronger.
2. Those dispositions that resist the force of the celestial bodies are caused in their original creation, not by a heavenly body, but by God’s operation, which has made fire to be hot, water to be cold, and so forth. Consequently, we should not reduce all impediments of this kind to the celestial bodies.
3. The active powers in these lower bodies are merely instrumental
Consequently, like an instrument which does not move unless it is moved by a first agent, the active powers of inferior bodies cannot operate unless moved by celestial bodies.
4. That objection touches a certain opinion found in The Fount of Life, to the effect that no body acts because of any power that it has as a body, because the quantity found in matter prevents the form from acting. Hence, every action we attribute to a body is really the action of some spiritual power operating in it. According to Rabbi Moses, this opinion was held by certain teachers among the Moors who said that fire does not heat, but God heats in the fire. This position, however, is foolish, since it denies all thing their natural operations. Moreover, it is contrary to what philosophers and saints have said. Consequently, we say that bodies act by means of their material power; nevertheless, God operates in all things as a first cause operating in a second cause.
Therefore, the statement made to the effect that bodies are only acted upon but do not act should be understood in this sense: only that is said to act which has dominion over its action. It was in this sense that Damascene asserted: "Brute animals do not act but are only acted upon." But this does not mean that animals do not act if act is taken to mean simply the performance of an action.
5. As we read in Generation and Corruption, that which is active is always other than or contrary to that which is passive. Consequently, it does not belong to a body to act upon another body will respect to that which it has in common will that body, but only will respect to that in which it is different from it. A body, therefore, does not act in so far as it is a body, but in so far as it is a certain kind of body. For example, no animal reasons inasmuch as it is simply animal, but some animals reason inasmuch as they are also men. Similarly, fire does not heat in so far as it is a body, but in so far as it is hot. The same is true of a celestial body.
6. Before the advent of natural forms, dimensions are presupposed as existing in matter in a state of incomplete act, not of complete act. Consequently, they are first in the lime of matter and of generation. Form, however, is first in the line of completion. Now, a thing acts in so far as it is completed and is an actual being, not in so far as it is in potency. As a being in potency it is merely passive. Hence, it does not follow from the fact that matter or dimensions pre-existing in matter are not active that form is likewise inactive. Instead, the opposite follows. It would follow, however, if these dimensions were not passive, that the form would not be passive. But, as the Commentator says, the form of a heavenly body is not in it through the mediation of dimensions of the sort described.
7. The order of effects should correspond to the order of causes. According to the author of that book, however, the following order of causes exists: first, the first cause, God; second, the intelligence; third, the soul. Consequently, the first effect, the act of existence, is properly attributed to the first cause; the second effect, knowing, is attributed to intelligence; the third effect, moving, is attributed to the soul.
A second cause, however, always acts in virtue of the. first cause, and, consequently, possesses something of its operation (like the lower spheres which possess something of the motion of the highest). Ac cording to the author, however, the intelligence not only knows but also gives existence; and the soul, which he holds to be caused by the intelligence, has not only the motion of the soul, which is to move, but also that of an intellect, which is to understand, and that of God, which is to give existence. I admit these to be the actions of a noble soul, but he understands such a soul to be the soul of a heavenly body or any other rational soul whatsoever.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the divine power be the only one to move all things without any intermediary. The lower causes can also move through their own powers in so far as they participate in the power of superior causes.
8. According to Augustine, seminal principles are all the active and passive powers given to creatures by God; and through their instrumentality natural effects are brought into existence. He writes in The Trinity: "Like a mother pregnant will her unborn infant, the world is pregnant will the causes of unborn things." While explaining what he said above about seminal principles, he also called them "the powers and faculties" that are allotted to things.
Consequently, included in these seminal principles are the active powers of celestial bodies, which are more noble than the active powers of bodies here below and, consequently, able to move them. They are called seminal principles inasmuch as all effects are originally in their active causes in the manner of seeds. But if, as some hold, seminal principles are understood as being the beginnings of forms in first matter, inasmuch as first matter is in potency to all forms, then, even though this does not agree very much will the words of Augustine, it can be said that the simplicity of these principles, like the simplicity of first matter, is caused by their imperfection, and, because of it, they cannot be moved, just as first matter cannot be.
9. Differentiation of the sexes must be attributed to celestial causes. Our reason for saying this is as follows: Every agent tends w form to its own likeness, as far as possible, that which is passive in its respect. Accordingly, the active principle in the male seed always tends toward the generation of a male offspring, which is more perfect than the female. From this it follows that conception of female offspring is something of an accident in the order of nature—in so far, at least, as it is not the result of the natural causality of the particular agent. Therefore, if there were no other natural influence at work tending toward the conception of female off spring, such conception would be wholly outside the design of nature, as is the case will what we call "monstrous" births. And so it is said that, although the conception of female offspring is not the natural result of the efficient causality of the particular nature at work—for which reason the female is some times spoken of as an "accidental male"—nevertheless, the conception of female offspring is the natural result of universal nature; that is, it is due to the influence of a heavenly body, as Avicenna suggests.
Matter, however, can cause an impediment which will prevent both the celestial force and the particular nature from attaining their effect, namely, the production of a male. And so, sometimes, as a result of an improper disposition in matter, a female is conceived even when the celestial influence tends to the contrary; or the opposite may happen, and, despite the influence of the celestial body, a male will sometimes be conceived because the formative influence of the particular agent is strong enough to overcome the defect in the material. In the conception of twins, the matter is separated by the operation of nature; and one part of the matter yields to the active principle more than the other part does because of the latter’s deficiency. Consequently, in one part a female is generated, in the other, a male—independently of the dispositions of the celestial spheres one way or the other. The generation of a female twin, however, happens more often when a celestial body disposes to the female sex.
10. A first cause is said to have more influence than a second cause in so far as its effect is deeper and more permanent in what is caused than the effect of the second cause is. Nevertheless, the effect has more resemblance to the second cause, since the action of the first cause is in some way determined to this particular effect by means of the second cause.
12. Although a movement in the heavens, as it is the act of a movable body, is not a voluntary motion, nevertheless, as it is the act of a mover, it is voluntary; that is to say, it is caused by- a will. And in this respect the things which are caused by this movement may come under providence.
12. An effect does not follow from a first cause unless the second cause has already been placed. Consequently, the necessity of a first cause does not introduce necessity into its effect unless the second cause is also necessary.
13. The celestial bodies are not made for man in the sense that man is their principal end. Their principal end is the divine goodness. More over, that man is nobler than a heavenly body is not due to the nature of his body but to the nature of his rational soul. Besides, even granting that man’s body were, speaking absolutely, nobler than a celestial body, this would not prevent a celestial body from being nobler than a human body under a certain aspect, namely, as it has active power while the latter has merely passive power; and in this respect, a celestial body can act upon the human body. Similarly, fire as it is actually hot can act upon a human body in so far as the latter is potentially hot.
14. The rational soul is a substance as well as the act of a body. As a substance, therefore, it is nobler than the form of a celestial body; but it is not nobler as the act of a body. Or it could be said that the soul is a perfection of the human body both as a form and as a mover. But, since a celestial body is more perfect, it does not need a spiritual sub stance to perfect it as a form, but only to perfect it as a mover. This self sufficiency makes it naturally more noble than [a man who needs] a human soul.
Even though some have asserted that the movers of the heavenly spheres are joined to them as forms, Augustine left the matter in doubt. In his commentary on the words of Ecclesiastes (1:6), "The spirit goeth forward surveying all places round about," Jerome seems to follow the affirmative position; for he says: "He calls the sun a spirit because it breathes and lives like an animal." Damascene, however, holds the contrary: "Let no one think that the heavens or the stars are living. They lack both life and feeling."
15. Even the action of a contrary which resists the active influence of a celestial body has some cause in the heavens; for, as the philosophers say, things here below are sustained in their actions by the first motion. Consequently, a contrary whose action impedes the effect of a celestial body, like the hot remedy which impedes moistening by the moon, nevertheless has a cause in the heavens. Similarly, the health that follows is not entirely contrary to the action of the celestial body but has some roots there.
16. As is said in Generation and Corruption, heavenly bodies contact bodies here below, but are not contacted by them. Moreover, as was mentioned, no heavenly body immediately contacts a body here below. The contact is through a medium.
17. The action of the agent is received in the medium according to the manner of the medium. Consequently, it is sometimes received in a different way in the medium than in the ultimate term. For example, the force of a magnet attracting iron passes to the iron through the medium of air, which is not attracted; and, as the Commentator says, the force of a fish that shocks the hand is transmitted to the hand through a net which is not shocked. Moreover, heavenly bodies do have all the qualities found in bodies below, but in their own way (which is that of a source) and not as in these lower bodies. Consequently, their actions are not received in the intermediate spheres in such a way that these are changed as the lower bodies are.
18. Bodies of this kind here below are ruled by divine providence through the higher bodies, but not in such a way that divine providence is communicated to them. They are made merely the instruments by which God’s providence is carried out just as art is not communicated to a hammer, which is merely an instrument of the art.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 22, 3; 115, 4; I-11,9, 5; II-II, 95, 5; Jl Sentences 15, 1, 3; In Matth., c. z (P. Io:2 Contra Gentiles III, CC. 84-85, 87; III De anima, lectura 4, n. 6zi; I Perihermen., lectura 14, n. 14 seq.; Vl Metaph., lectura 3, nn. 1203-05, 1213-17; Camp. Theol., I, CC. 127-28.
Difficulties:
It seems that they are, for
1. According to Damascene, heavenly bodies "are responsible for our habits, temperament, and disposition." Now, habits and dispositions belong to the intellect and the will, which are the principles of human acts. Consequently, human acts are disposed by God through the mediation of celestial bodies.
2. We read in The Six Principles: "That the soul when joined to a body, imitates the temperament of that body." But, since the celestial bodies leave their impression on a man’s temperament, they thereby influence his soul. Hence, they can cause human acts.
3. Whatever acts upon a prior member of a series also acts upon a subsequent member. Now, the essence of the soul exists before its powers of intellect and will exist, because these have their origin in the essence of the soul. Therefore, since the celestial bodies leave their impression on the essence of the rational soul, which they do inasmuch as the soul is the act of a body a function belonging to it by its very essence, it seems that they leave their impression on the intellect and will, and, consequently, are principles of human acts.
4. An instrument acts, not only because of its own power, but also because of the power of the principal agent. Now, since a heavenly body is a moved mover, it is the instrument of the spiritual substance moving it. Consequently, its motion is not that of a body alone but it is also the act of the spirit moving it. Therefore, its motion takes place, not only by reason of the body moved, but also by reason of the spirit moving it. Now, just as that celestial body is superior to a human body, so is that spiritual substance superior to a human spirit. Consequently, that motion leaves its impression on a man’s soul as well as on his body. It seems, therefore, that they are the principles of his acts of intellect and will.
g. By experience we know that from their birth some men have talents for learning or exercising certain crafts. Hence, some become carpenters, others become doctors, and so forth. Now, this proclivity cannot be reduced to the proximate principles of generation as its cause, for children are often found to have a bent to certain things which their parents did not have. This difference in talent, therefore, should be reduced to the celestial bodies as its cause. Moreover, it can not be said that this sort of talent is in men’s souls through the mediation of their bodies, because the physical qualities of the body do not contribute to these inclinations as they actually do to anger, joy, and similar passions of the soul. Celestial bodies, therefore, leave their impression on men’s souls immediately and directly. Consequently, human acts are disposed through the instrumentality of the celestial bodies.
6. of all human acts, the following seem to be superior to all others: ruling, waging wars, and similar actions. But, as Isaac says: "God made a sphere to rule over kingdoms and wars." Much more, then, are other human acts disposed through the mediation of heavenly bodies.
7. It is easier to transfer a part than a whole. But, according to philosophers, the influence of the celestial bodies sometimes moves the entire population of a province to launch a war. Much more, then, can the power of these celestial bodies affect some particular man.
To the Contrary:
1'. Damascene writes of the hea bodies that they never cause our acts: "We have been given free choice by our Maker, and we are the masters of our conduct."
2’. Both Augustine and Gregory support this contrary view.
54
To get a clear understanding of this question, we must first under stand what is meant by human acts. Human acts, properly speaking, are those over which a man is master. A man, however, is the master of his acts through his will or free choice. Consequently, this question is concerned will the acts of the will and of free choice. There are, of course, other acts in man that do not lie under the command of his will, for example, the acts of his nutritive and generative powers. These acts lie under the influence of celestial forces, just as other physical acts do.
There have been many errors regarding human acts. Some have said that human acts do not come under God’s providence and cannot be reduced to any cause other than our own providence. As Augustine says, this seems to have been the position of Cicero. The position, however, is untenable; for, as proved in The Soul, our will is a moved mover. Consequently, its act must be reduced to some first principle that is an unmoved mover.
For this reason, some have reduced all the acts of the will to the celestial bodies; for, since they asserted that our senses and intellect are the same, it followed that all the powers of the soul are material and, therefore, subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. The Philosopher, however, destroys this position by showing that the intellect is an immaterial power and that its action is not material. As he says in The Generation of Animals, if the actions of principles are immaterial, the principles themselves must be immaterial. Consequently, it is impossible for the actions of the will and intellect of themselves to be reduced to any material principles.
Avicenna, therefore, declared that heavenly bodies were made, like man, of a soul and body, and that, just as the actions and motion of a human body are reduced to celestial bodies, so all the actions of the soul are reduced to celestial souls as to their principles. Consequently, whatever will we have is caused by the will of a celestial soul. This position is consistent will his opinion on the end of man, which he holds to be the union of the human soul will a celestial soul or intelligence. For, since the perfection of the will is its end and its good and this is its object, just as the visible is the object of sight— then that which acts upon the will should have the nature of an end, because an efficient cause acts only in so far as it impresses its form on a recipient.
Faith, however, teaches that God is the direct end of man’s life, and that we will be beatified and enjoy the vision of God. Consequently, He alone can leave an impression on our will. Now, the order of what is moved should correspond to the order of the movers. But in our ordination to our end, will which providence is concerned, the first thing that is in us is our will; and the characters of the good and of an end primarily pertain to the will, which uses everything we have as instruments toward achieving our end. However, in a certain respect the intellect precedes the will, and is, moreover, more closely related to it than our bodily powers are. Consequently, God alone, who is the first provider in all respects, leaves His imprint on our will; the angels, who follow Him in the order of causes, leave their imprint on our intellect in so far as we are enlightened, cleansed, and perfected by them, as Dionysius says. But the celestial bodies, which are inferior agents, can leave their imprint only upon our sensible powers and the other powers in our organs. of course, inasmuch as the move merit of one power of the soul flows over into another, it happens that the impression made by a celestial body will, as it were, accidentally flow over into the intellect and finally into the will. Similarly, the impression made by an angel upon our intellect also accidentally flows over into our will.
But the relation of the intellect and of the will to the sensitive powers is different in the following respect: the intellect is naturally moved by the sensitive apprehension in the way in which a potency is moved by an object, because, as is said in The Soul, the phantasm is related to the possible intellect as colour is to sight. Consequently, whenever an interior sensitive power is disturbed, the intellect is necessarily also disturbed. We see, for example, that when the organ of the imagination is injured the action of the intellect is necessarily impeded. By this means, therefore, the action or influence of a celestial body can flow over into the intellect will a kind of necessity; but this influence is accidental, because what it directly influences is the body. I say "necessity" flows over—unless there is a contrary disposition in what
is affected. But the sensitive appetite is not the natural mover of the will. Instead, the opposite is true, because, as is said in The Soul, a higher appetite moves a lower "as one sphere" moves another. And no matter how much a lower appetite is troubled by the passion, as of anger or of concupiscence, the will need not be disturbed. Indeed, the will has the power to repel a disturbance of this kind; for, as we read in Genesis (4:7): "The lust thereof shall be under thee." Consequently, no necessity is introduced into human acts by the influence of celestial bodies, either by the celestial bodies themselves or by those things which receive their influence. The celestial bodies introduce only an inclination, which the will can resist by means of an acquired or infused power.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Damascene is thinking of bodily habits and dispositions.
2. From what was said above, it is clear that an act of the will in the soul does not necessarily follow the disposition of the body. From the temperament of the body, only an inclination arises to those things which are the object of the will.
3. That argument would proceed correctly if a heavenly body could leave its impression on the essence of the soul directly. But the influence of a heavenly body reaches to the essence of the soul only in directly, that is, only in so far as the soul is united to a body, whose act the soul is. The will, however, does not have its origin in the essence of the soul in so far as the soul is joined to a body. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.
4. An instrument of a spiritual agent acts through a spiritual power only as it acts through its own material power. Because of its material power, however, a heavenly body can act upon our bodies only. Consequently, the action that arises from its spiritual power can arrive at the soul only indirectly, that is, through the mediation of man’s body. However, the material and spiritual power of a heavenly body can influence man’s body directly. Because of its material power it moves elementary qualities, such as hot, cold, and so forth; and because of its spiritual power it moves to species and to those effects following the entire species which cannot be reduced to elementary qualities.
5. There are in those bodies some effects of the heavenly bodies which are not caused by heat or cold, such as the attraction of iron by a magnet. In this way some disposition is left in a human body by celestial body; and by reason of this disposition the soul that is joined to such a body is inclined to this or that craft.
6. If we must "save" the words of Isaac, we have to understand them to mean merely an inclination in the manner described above.
7. For the most part, a large group follows its natural inclinations, for, as members of a group, men give in to the passions of the group.
But by using their intelligence will men overcome these passions and inclinations. Consequently, it is more probable that a large group will do what a celestial body inclines it to do than that one individual will; for he may use his reason to overcome this inclination. Similarly, if there is a large group of hot tempered men, it is unlikely that they will not be angered, although it is more likely that an individual will not.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 2 aa. I, 3-4;l Sentences 40, 1, 2; Contra Gentiles III, 163; In Rom., C. 1, lectura (P. 13:7a, 8a).
Difficulties:
It seems that it has will as its genus, for
1. As Augustine says, predestination is the intention of being merciful. But intention belongs to the will. Consequently, predestination also belongs to the will.
2. Predestination seems to be the same as the eternal election referred to in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:4): "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world"—because the chosen are the same as the predestined. Now, according to the Philosopher, choice belongs rather to appetite than to intellect. Hence, predestination belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
3. But it was said that election comes before predestination and is not the same as it.—On the contrary, will comes after knowledge, not before it. But choice pertains to the will. If, therefore, choice comes before predestination, then predestination cannot belong to knowledge.
4. If predestination belonged to knowledge, then it would seem to be the same as foreknowledge; and thus whoever foreknew the salvation of a person would predestine him. Now, this is false; for the prophets foreknew the salvation of the Gentiles; yet they did not predestine it. Therefore.
5. Predestination implies causality. Now, causality does not have the nature of knowledge, but rather the nature of will. Consequently, pre destination belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
6. The will differs from a passive potency in this respect, that the latter refers only to effects taking place in the future, for we cannot speak of passive potency in relation to things that are or have been, whereas the will extends equally to both present and future effects. Now, predestination has both present and future effects; for, as Augustine says: "Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future." Therefore, it belongs to the will.
7. Knowledge is not related to things in so far as they are made or to be made but in so far as they are known or to be known. Now, pre destination is related to a thing as something that must be effected. Consequently, it does not belong to knowledge.
8. An effect receives its name from its proximate cause rather than from its remote cause. For example, we say that a man is begotten by a man, instead of saying by the sun, which also begets him. Now, preparation is the effect of both knowledge and will, but knowledge is prior to the will and more remote than it. Consequently, preparation belongs more to the will than to knowledge. But, as Augustine says: "Predestination is the preparation of someone for glory." There fore, predestination pertains rather to the will than to knowledge.
9. When many motions are ordered w only one term, then the en- tire co-ordinated complex of motions takes the name of the last motion. For example, in the drawing out of a substantial form from the potency of matter, the following order is had: first, alteration, then generation. But the whole is called generation. Now, when something is prepared, this order is had: first, movements of knowledge, then movements of the will. Consequently, the whole should be attributed to the will; therefore, predestination seems to be especially in the will.
10. If one of two contraries is appropriated to something, then the other contrary is removed from it in the highest possible degree. Now, evil is appropriated especially to God’s foreknowledge, for we say that the damned are known beforehand. Consequently, His fore knowledge does not have good things as its object. Predestination, however, is concerned only will those good things that lead to salvation. Therefore, predestination is not related to foreknowledge.
11. When a word is used in its proper sense, it does not need a gloss. But whenever the sacred Scripture speaks of knowledge of good, a gloss is added saying that this means approval. This is evident from the Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (8:3): "'If any man love God, the same is known by him’—that is, he is approved by God"; and from the Gloss on the second Epistle to Timothy (2:19): "'The Lord knoweth who are his—that is, God approves him." In its proper sense, therefore, knowledge is not related to good things. But predestination is related to good things. Therefore.
12. To prepare belongs to a power that moves, for preparation is related to some work. But, as has been said, predestination is a preparation. Therefore, it belongs w a moving power and so to the will, not w knowledge.
13. A reasoning power modeled upon another reasoning power imitates it. Now, in the case of the human reason, which is modeled upon the divine, we see that preparation belongs to the will, not to knowledge. Consequently, divine preparation is similar; and the conclusion is the same as before.
14. Although the divine attributes are one reality, the difference between them is manifested in the difference in their effects. Consequently, something said of God should be reduced to that attribute to which this effect is appropriated. Now, grace and glory are the effects of predestination, and they are appropriated either to His will or His goodness. Therefore, predestination also belongs w His will, not w His knowledge.
To the Contrary:
1'. The Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans (8:29), "For whom he foreknew, he also predestinates," says: "Predestination is God’s fore knowledge and preparation of benefits.
2’. Whatever is predestined is known, but the opposite is not true. Consequently, what is predestined belongs to the class of things that are known; hence, it is included in the genus of knowledge.
3'. A thing should be placed in the genus to which it always belongs, rather than in a genus which is not always proper w it. Now, the element of knowledge always belongs to predestination, because fore knowledge always accompanies it. The granting of grace, however, which takes place through the will, does not always accompany pre destination, since predestination is eternal while the bestowal of grace takes place in time. Predestination, therefore, should be placed in the genus of knowledge rather than in that of will acts.
4'. The Philosopher places habits of knowing and doing among the intellectual virtues, for they belong more to reason than to appetite. This is clearly what he does in the case of art and prudence, as can be seen in his Ethics. Now, predestination implies a principle of doing and of knowing, since, as is evident from the definition given, pre destination is both foreknowledge and preparation. Predestination, therefore, belongs more to knowledge than it does to the will.
5'. Contraries belong to the same genus. But predestination is the contrary of reprobation. Now, since reprobation belongs to the genus of knowledge, because God foreknows the malice of the damned but does not cause it, it seems that predestination also belongs to the genus of knowledge.
De veritate EN 53