De veritate EN 78



That which is in potency to many is made determinate to one by act. Consequently, form and act are found to be principles of union, but potency is found to be the principle of multiplicity and division. Now, since the ability of a thing to operate comes from its being in act, the more united a power is, the more it is able to act. Consequently, the higher a power is, the fewer the things it needs for its operation, even though it extends to many things. We see that this is generally true of productive and knowing powers. For, even though a master art, such as architecture, by one form directs all the operations coming within its scope, in these operations the subordinate workmen are directed by diverse arts. The same is true of the cognoscitive powers. A person will a higher intelligence is ready, from a few principles he has within himself, to proceed to various conclusions which those will a less acute intelligence cannot reach without considerable illustrated explanation and without knowing the proximate principles of these conclusions.

Now, since in God there is pure act and a most perfect power, He can do all things, and know all things most perfectly by means of one thing, His own essence. Moreover, as was previously explained, the representations of intelligible things flow from God into the angels, not in order that the angels may cause things, but in order that they may know them. Consequently, the more act and less potency there is in an angel, the fewer are the emanations he receives, and the stronger is his power to know. According to this principle, there fore, the higher angels know through forms more universal than those by which the lower know.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. To know something "by universal knowledge" can be understood in two ways. First, it can refer to what is known. If taken this way, then to know something by universal knowledge means to know the universal nature of an object. In this sense, the argument is true, be cause, if only the universal nature of a thing is known, the thing is known less perfectly than it would be were it known in its individuality. Secondly, the phrase can refer to the medium of cognition. Then to know a thing by universal knowledge, that is, by a medium which is universal, is more perfect, as long as this knowledge extends to the individuality of the thing.

2. These forms are said to be more universal will respect to knowledge, not because they cause the knowledge of more things, but be cause a higher intellect, perfected by a few of them, can nevertheless know the same number of thingsóeven more perfectly. For example, a higher angel might know all species of animals by means of one form of animal, but a lower angel would not know them except through many forms. Besides this, a higher angel can draw out many more intelligible characters from the same things.

3. What is one cannot be the intelligible representation of many in their individuality if it is merely equal to them. However, if it excels them, then it can represent their individual characteristics, because, within its own one form, it contains the individual characteristics of each of the elements which these objects have separately. In a similar manner, Godís essence is the intelligible representation of all things in their individuality, for, as Dionysius says, in this one form there pre exists all that is found separately in creatures.

Similarly, since the forms in the intellects of angels, being closer to God, excel things, it is not inconsistent to say that one form within an angelic intellect is an intelligible representation of many things in their individuality, according as this form has different relationships to different things, just as the divine essence is the proper representation of many things in their individuality according to its different relationships to things; and from these relationships an angel can have many ideas. The forms in our intellects, however, are received from things. Hence, they do not excel things, and are, as it were, equal to them as far as representation goes, even though they may excel them in mode of being because their act of existence is immaterial. Consequently, one form in our intellect cannot be the intelligible representation of many things in their individuality.

4. The answer is the same as for the first difficulty.


Parallel readings: De veritate, 10, 5; 19, 2; Summa Theol., I, g7, 2; 8Á, 4 Il Sentences IV Sentences 50, 1, Contra Gentiles II, 100; Quodibet VII, I, 3; Q. D. De anima, 20; De subst. sep., c. 14 (Perr. I: nn. 81-84).


It seems not, for

1. According to Boethius: "The universal is known in intellection, the singular, in sensation." But angels do not know except through intellection. Therefore, they do not know singulars.

2. But it was said that this statement referred to our intellect, not to that of an angel.óOn the contrary, because it is immaterial, our intellect cannot understand singular things. Consequently, it is our material powers of knowing, such as sense and imagination, that know singulars. But an angelís intellect is more immaterial than manís. Hence, it does not know singulars.

3. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Now, an angelís intellect cannot be assimilated to a singular in its singularity because a singular gets its singularity from matter, and an angelís intellect is entirely removed from matter and from the conditions of matter. Consequently, the intellect of an angel does not know singulars in their singularity.

4. According to the Philosopher, the principle of being and the principle of knowing are one and the same. But the principle of being for a singular is an individuated form. Hence, this is the principle of knowing the singular. An angelic intellect, however, receives (forms] without matter and the conditions of matter which individuate forms. Therefore, it receives only universals, and not singulars.

5. Whatever is received into another is there after the manner of the recipient. Now, an angelic intellect has a simple and immaterial mode of being. Consequently, the likenesses of particular things existing in an angelís intellect are there immaterially and simply, and therefore universally. Hence, by their means, he does not know singulars.

6. Different kinds of things cannot be distinctly known in their differences by the same medium. They must be known by separate media, because things known by a common medium are known only in so far as they are one. Now, any form abstracted from matter is common to many particular things. Through such a form, therefore, distinct particulars cannot be known distinctly in their individuality. In an angelic intellect, however, there is no form that is not immaterial. Hence, an angel can in no way know singulars.

7. A universal is opposed to a singular for the reason that it is in the intellect while the singular is outside it. Now, a universal is never out side the intellect. Hence, a singular is never inside it, and, consequently, cannot be known by it.

8. No power ever goes beyond its object. Now, as is said in The Soul, the object of the intellect is a quiddity stripped of matter. Therefore, since a singular essence is realized in sensible matter, it cannot be known by the intellect.

9. What is known will certainty cannot change, because intellectual knowledge is the same whether the object be absent or present. But, as is said in the Metaphysics, certitude cannot be had about things that can change, because such things can become absent. Now, singulars can change, for they are subject to motion and variation. Consequently, they cannot be known by the intellect; and the same must be said as previously.

10. The form within the intellect is more simple than the intellect itself, just as a perfection is more simple than what is perfected. Now, an angelic intellect is immaterial. Therefore, its forms are immaterial. But its forms are not individual unless they are material. Consequently, those forms are universal, and not principles for knowing singulars.

11. As is said in the Metaphysics, because it is the principle by which the measured is known, a measure must be homogeneous will the measured. Therefore, a species, which is a principle of knowledge, must be homogeneous will the thing that it makes known. But, being immaterial, the form within an angelic intellect is not homogeneous will a singular. Through such a form, therefore, an angel cannot know a singular.

12. The power had in glory surpasses power had by nature. There

fore, the power of knowing possessed by a glorified human intellect surpasses the natural power had by an angel. But the intellect of a beatified man does not know individual things on earth, for, as Augustine says, the deadóeven the saintsódo not know what the living, even their sons, are doing. Consequently, angels cannot know singulars by means of their natural knowledge.

13. Were an angel to know singulars, he would know them through either singular or universal species. But he cannot know them through singular species, because then he would have to have within himself as many species as there are singulars. Singulars, however, are potentially infinite. This is evident if one grants that the world will continue in the future as it has in the pastóa possibility clearly within Godís power. But then there would be an infinite number of forms in an angelís intellect; and this is impossible. Likewise, an angel cannot know singulars by means of universals, because in that case he would not have distinct knowledge of individuals, and this would mean that he knew them imperfectly. But imperfect knowledge is not to be attributed to angels. Consequently, angels do not know singulars.

To the Contrary:

1'. No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men. This is clear from the Psalms (90: li): "For he hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways." There fore, they know singulars.

2'. As is clear from Augustine, one can love only what he knows. Now, since angels have charity, they love individual menóeven their sensible bodies, for these, too, are to be loved out of charity. There fore, angels also know men.

3í. According to the Philosopher,8 one who knows the universal knows the particular; but the opposite is not true. Now, angels know the universal causes of things. Hence, they also know singulars.

4í. As Boethius says, whatever a lower power can do a higher power can. But manís sensitive and imaginative powers know singulars. Therefore, it is even truer to say that the intellectual power of an angel knows them.



Some have erred in this matter by saying that angels do not know singulars. Such a position is contrary to faith, denying as it does the custody of angels over men, as well as opposed to right reason, be cause, if angels did not know things which we know, their knowledge would, at least in this respect, be less perfect. This would occasion a remark similar to that made by Aristotle, to the effect that God would be most stupid if He were ignorant of disharmony that others knew about.

Once we have excluded this error, we find there are four ways proposed by different philosophers to explain how angels know singulars. Some say that angels know singulars by abstracting species of singulars from things, just as we know singulars by means of our senses. But this position is utterly irrational. First of all, as is clear from Dionysius and Augustine, as well as from what has been said above, angels do not receive their knowledge from things. Second, even granting that they do receive it from things, the forms received would be in an angelic intellect immaterially according to the manner of the intellect receiving them. Consequently, the same difficulty would remain: How could they, by these forms, know singular things, which are individuated by matter?

Avicenna proposed another theory and said that God and angels know singulars universally, not individually meaning that a thing is known individually when it is known as it is here and now, and under all its individuating conditions, and universally, when it is known merely according to its universal principles and universal causes. For example, one knows this eclipse individually when he perceives it will his senses, universally when he foretells it from the motions of the heavens. According to this theory, angels would know singulars universally in a similar fashion; and, because they knew all the universal causes, they would be ignorant of nothing in individual effects. This manner of knowing, however, does not seem to be sufficient; for we assert that angels know singulars even will respect to those things which belong to their singularity, just as they also know menís individual actions and other things of this sort that pertain to the care of a guardian.

Hence, a third theory has been proposed by others, namely, those who say that angels have within themselves universal forms of the entire order of the universe. These forms were given angels at the moment of creation, and they apply them to this or to that singular. In this way, they know singulars by means of universal forms. But this theory also seems to be inconsistent, because one thing cannot be applied to another unless that other has been already known previously in some way. For example, we can apply our universal knowledge to singulars which pre exist in our sensitive knowledge. In angels, how ever, there is no knowledge other than intellectual in which the knowledge of singulars could pre-exist and so make it possible for the universal forms of their intellect to be applied to singulars. From this it is clear that the application of the universal to the particular demands intellectual knowledge of singulars in angels as a prerequisite; it can not cause such knowledge.

Hence, it is more probable to say will the fourth theory that the forms within the intellects of angels can cause knowledge, not only of universals, but also of particulars, without there being any need of such application. This, however, is not true of our intellectual forms, which are related to things in two ways: first, as the cause of things, like the forms of the practical intellect; second, as caused by things, like the forms of the speculative intellect, by which we speculate about natural things. By means of the forms of the practical intellect, how ever, an artisan makes only a form. Hence, the forms of the practical intellect are likenesses merely of forms; and because every form as a form is universal, an artisan can have only universal knowledge of his product by means of the form of his artistic conception. Knowledge of it as a singular he acquires by means of his senses, just as anyone else does. But were he to make both the matter and the form by means of the forms of his artistic conception, then the latter would be an archetype of both form and matter, and, by its means, he could know the products of his art, not only universally, but also individually, because matter is the principle of individuation.

Forms in the speculative intellect, however, arise in us to some extent as the result of the action of things. Now, all action comes from the form. Hence, as far as the power of the agent is concerned, the form that comes to us from things is a likeness only of the form. True, it is also a likeness of material conditions, but this is because it is received in a material organ, which receives in a material way; consequently, it retains some conditions of matter. This is why sense and imagination know singulars. But, since the intellect receives in a manner that is entirely immaterial, the forms within the speculative intellect are likenesses of things only will respect to their forms.

However, the intelligible archetypes existing in God have a causal relation not only to things forms but also to their matter. Hence, they are likenesses of things in both respects. For this reason, God knows a thing through them not only in its universal nature by knowing the form, but also in its singularity by knowing its matter. Moreover, just as natural things come from the divine intellect according to both their form and matter, which constitute them in being, so do the forms within the angelic intellects come from God in order that angels might know both. Consequently, angels know things both in their singularity and universality by means of innate forms since these are similar to the creative forms, namely, the archetypes existing in the divine mind; yet these innate ideas do not create things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The statement of Boethius refers to our intellect, which receives forms from things, not to the angelic intellect, which receives forms immediately from God. The reason for this has already been given.

2. Because the forms received in an angelic intellect are more immaterial than those in our intellect, they are by that very fact more powerful. Consequently, they represent a thing not only according to its formal, but also according to its material, principles.

3. Between the knower and the known there is needed a community, not of nature, but of representation. It is evident that that form of a stone existing within the soul has a far different nature from the form of a stone existing in matter, but, inasmuch as it represents the stone, it is a principle which can lead to knowledge of it. Hence, even though the forms within an angelic intellect are immaterial by their own nature, nothing prevents that intellect from being assimilated by means of them to things in regard to their matter as well as in regard to their forms.

4. A form is a principle of a thingís being. But it need not be substantially present in an intellect in order to be a principle for knowing the thing; its similitude in the intellect would suffice. For in the soul there is not the form by which a stone exists but only a likeness of that form. Hence, what is necessary is not that the form by which an angelic intellect knows a singular be individuated, but that it be a likeness of the form that is individuated.

5. Forms in an angelic intellect are immaterial; yet they are likenesses of material things, just as are the ideas existing in God, which are much more immaterial. Thus, by their means, singulars can be known.

6. One species can be an intelligible representation of different things in their individuality if it excels them. This is clear from what has been said. Through a medium that is merely equal, however, distinct things cannot be known distinctly.

7. Although it is true that the universal has its act of existence in the intellect, the universal is not the only thing that exists in the intellect. Hence, in this reasoning, the fallacy of the consequent occurs.

8. By means of that species stripped of matter, which the angelic intellect has within itself, it can also understand the material conditions of a thing. This is clear from what has been said.

9. By means of the species which it has within itself, an angelic intellect knows a singular, not only according to its substance, but also according to all its accidents. Therefore, it can know a singular no matter how many its accidental variations may be. Consequently, the fact that a singular may vary does not take certitude away from angelic cognition.

10. Our answer to this can be taken from our replies above.

11. In so far as a measure is a principle for knowing the thing measured, it must belong to the same genus as the latter does, but not in all respects. It is evident, for example, that an elbow length is a measure for cloth, but all it has in common will the cloth is quantity; however, this is enough for it to be a measure for cloth. Similarly, the form in an angelic intellect need not have the same mode of existence that a singular existing outside the soul has, since the singular has a material existence, and the afore-mentioned form is immaterial.

12. Saints in glory know in the Word the things that are happening here. This is very clear from what Gregory has written. Moreover, this statement of Augustine should be taken as referring to the natural state. Nor is there any parallel between an angel and a soul, because an angel naturally has forms given to Mm at creation, and, by means of these, he knows singulars.

13. Forms in an angelic intellect are neither singular, like the forms in imagination or sense, because they are entirely separated from matter, nor universal, as our intellectual forms are, which can represent only a universal nature. Although they exist immaterially in them selves, they nevertheless indicate and express a universal nature and particular conditions.


Parallel readings; Summa Theol., 1,57,3; 86,4; II-II, 95, '; I Sentences 38, 1,5; II Sentences 7, 2, 2; in Isaiam, c. 3 (P. 14:445a); Contra Gentiles III, 154; Quolibet VII, I, 3, ad 1; De spir. creat., a. g, ad Q. D. De anima, 20, ad De malo, 6, 7; Comp. Theol., I, C. 134.


It seems that they do, for

1. Angels know things by means of innate forms. Now, these forms are related equally to the present and future. Consequently, since angels know present things by their means, they also will know the future.

2. Boethius says that God is able to foreknow future contingent events infallibly, because His vision, being measured by eternity, is entirely simultaneous. But the beatific vision is likewise entirely simultaneous, since it is measured by participated eternity. Consequently, beatified angels know future contingent events.

3. According to Gregory, when the soul severs its connection will the body, it knows the future by means of its own subtle nature. Now, an angel is completely free of any connection will a body, and its nature is most subtle. Therefore, they can know the future.

4. The possible intellect in our soul is in potency to the knowledge of all things, and hence to the knowledge of the future. Now, as was said above, the potentialities of an angelic intellect are completely actuated by means of innate forms. Angels, therefore, have knowledge about future events.

5. Those who have providence over a person should also have fore knowledge of the things affecting that person. But, as our guardians, the angels have been entrusted will our providence and care. Consequently, they must know things in the future that affect us.

6. The angelic intellect excels the human. Now, a human intellect can know future events which have determined causes in nature. Therefore, an angelic intellect can know even those future contingent events which, not having any determined causes, can happen in either of two ways.

7. We are differently related to knowing the future than we are to knowing the present, because we receive our knowledge from things, and, consequently, things must exist before we can know them. An gels, however, do not receive their knowledge from things. Therefore, they are equally related to knowing the future and the present. Consequently, our original thesis stands.

8. Intellectual knowledge does not include time, because it abstracts from the "here and now," and so is equally related to all time. Now, the only knowledge an angel has is intellectual. Consequently, an angel is equally related to knowing the present, past, and future. Hence, we conclude as before.

9. An angel knows more than a man does. But in the state of innocence man knew future events. This is clear from Genesis (2: 24): "Adam said... 'Wherefore a man shah leave father and mother...í"

Therefore, angels also know the future.

To the Contrary:

1'. In Isaias (41:23) we read: "Shew the things that are to come hereafter: and we shah know that ye are gods." Thus, knowledge of the future is a sign of divinity. However, angels are not gods. There fore, they do not know the future.

2'. Knowledge will certitude can be had only of those things which have determinate truth. But, as is clear from interpretation, future contingent events do not belong to this class of things. Consequently, they are not known by angels.

3í. Future events can be known only through a species of an artistic conception like that by which an artist knows the things he is going to make, or in their causes, as a future cold spell is known in the signs and positions of the stars. But angels do not know the future by means of artistic conceptions, because they do not make anything, nor do they know future things in their causes, since future contingent events are not determined in their causes. If they were, they would be necessary. There are no means, therefore, by which angels know future contingent events.

4í. Hugh of St. Victor says that angels were shown what they should do, not what would happen to them in the future. It is even less true, therefore, to say that they know other future events.



Anything that is known in another thing is known according to the manner in which it exists in that other. Now, some future events are determined in their proximate causes in such a way as to happen necessarily from them, for example, tomorrowís rising of the sun. Future effects of this sort can be known in their causes. Other future effects, however, do not exist so determinately in their causes that something else might not happen; their causes are merely disposed more to one effect than to another; and these effects are contingent events, which happen more or less often as the case may be. As a consequence, effects of this type cannot be known in their causes will infallibility, but only will conjectural certitude. Moreover, other future effects come from causes that are indifferently related to opposite effects; and these effects, especially those that depend upon free choice, are called "contingent to opposites."

Now, as the Commentator proves, an effect cannot come from a cause indifferent to opposites and in a certain respect in potency, unless this cause is determined to one effect more than to another by means of another cause. Consequently, an effect of this sort cannot be known in any way through causes indifferent to opposites if these causes be taken merely by themselves. Yet, if we consider these causes, which are indifferent to opposites, together will those things that in cline them more to one effect than to another, we can get some conjectural certitude about their effects. For example, we can conjecture about future effects depending upon free choice by considering menís habits and temperaments, which incline them to one course of action.

But all these future effects, no matter what their proximate causes may be, exist determinately in the first cause, which by its presence sees them all, and by its providence gives a determinate character to each. Now, the angels see the divine essence and, by means of innate forms, know all things and all natural causes. By their natural knowledge, therefore, they can foreknow by their innate forms only those future events which have determinate existence in a natural cause, whether this cause be merely one thing or a collection of many things ófor an effect may be contingent will respect to one cause but necessary will respect to a concurrence of many. And since angels know all natural causes, some effects that seem contingent w us, who consider only a few causes, are known as necessary by the angels, who consider all their causes. Indeed, if angels could comprehend Godís providence, they would know all future events will certainty. None of them, however, comprehends His providence perfectly; but be cause some of them see it more perfectly than others do, they know more future events in the Word, even those coming from causes in different to opposites, than others know.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Species within an angelic intellect are not related equally to the present and future, because things that are present are actually similar to the forms existing within the angels and, consequently, can be known by their means. Things that are future, however, are not yet similar to these forms and thus, as explained earlier, cannot be known through them.

2. Angels are related indifferently to the knowledge of the present and future as far as the vision by which they see things in the Word is concerned. Yet it does not follow that they know all future events in the Word, because they do not comprehend the Word.

3. As Augustine tells us, some asserted that "the soul has powers of divination in itself." He refuted this opinion on the grounds that, if the soul could foretell the future by its own means, it would always know future events; but we know that, even if the soul does have fore knowledge at some times, it is unable to know the future whenever it wishes. Consequently, it must need some help in order to know the future. It can be helped by a higher spirit, created or uncreated, good or evil. Moreover, while it is burdened will the weight of a body and fixes its attention on sense-objects, it is less capable of receiving such thoughts. Hence, when it withdraws from the senses, either in sleep or in sickness or by any other way, it thereby becomes more susceptible to the influence of the higher spirit. So, being severed in this manner from its physical connections, the soul foreknows the future will the heip of a revelation by a higher spirit, who can reveal these future things, because, as has been said, he knows them either by his natural knowledge or in the Word.

4. There are two kinds of potency. One is natural and can be reduced to act by a natural agent. This potency in angels is completely actuated by innate forms. It is not according to this kind of potency, however, that our possible intellect is in potency to knowing all future things. But there is another potency, obediential potency, according w which the Creator can cause whatever He wants to cause in a creature. The possible intellect is in this kind of potency to the knowledge of all future things, that is, all things can be divinely revealed to it. However, the obediential potency of the angelic intellect is not totally actuated by means of innate forms.

5. It is not necessary for one who has providence over some persons to foreknow future events. It is enough for him to foresee what might happen so he can take proper steps against it.

6. An angelic intellect surpasses a human intellect inasmuch as it knows more contingent effects that exist determined in their causes and these will greater certitude. It does not necessarily surpass it in the respect touched upon in the objection.

7. The reply here should be the same as that given to the first difficulty.

8. By means of his intellectual knowledge, an angel knows things which are here and now, even though he himself is free from space and time. This is clear from what has been said. Hence, it should not occasion surprise if he should know the present in a mariner different from that by which he knows the future. For he knows them differently, not because he has a different relation to them, but because, as explained previously, they are differently related to him.

9. In his state of innocence, man did not know future contingent events except in their causes or in the Word, just as angels know them. This is clear from what has been said.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

To the extent that these difficulties are contrary to the truth, an answer will be found in what has been said in this article.


Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, a. Resp. de art. (Declar. XLII quaest.), a. 38 (P. 16:163); Resp. de art. 36 (Declar. XXXVI quaest.), a. 36 (P. 16:175); De malo, 16, 8; in I Cor., c. 2, lectura 2 (P. 13:


It seems that they can, for

1. To cleanse is the duty of angels. But the impurity from which we are cleansed is in our conscience. Therefore, angels know our con sciences.

2. As the body receives its shape from its figure, so does the intellect receive its shape from the species of that which it actually thinks about. Now, when the eye sees a body, it simultaneously sees the bodyís shape. Therefore, when an angel sees another angelís intellect, he sees its thought.

3. Since the species in an intellect are actually intelligible, they are more intelligible than the forms existing in material things, which are merely potentially intelligible. Now, angels understand the forms of material things by means of forms which they have within themselves. Consequently, it is even truer that they understand the forms within our intellect; hence, they know our thoughts.

4. Man never knows without a phantasm. But angels know the phantasms in our imagination. Consequently, Augustine says: "The spiritual likenesses of material things existing within our soul are known to spirits, even to unclean spirits." Therefore, angels know our thoughts.

5. By means of the forms he has within himself an angel can know whatever he can do by these forms. Now, an angel can make an impression on our intellect by enlightening and cleansing us. Therefore, it is even truer that he can know our thoughts.

6. Augustine says: "Demons sometimes learn menís dispositions will the greatest case, not only when they are expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought and expressed by the soul through certain signs in the body." Now, there is no thought that does not leave a trace on the body. Consequently, the demons know all our thoughts, and much more so do the angels.

7. Commenting on that verse in the Epistle to the Romans (2: 15), "...their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another," Origen says that this passage should be understood as referring to thoughts which, during their existence, left marks on those who had them. Consequently, every thought leaves some mark on the soul. Now, this mark cannot be unknown to an angel, because he sees the whole soul. Hence, angels know our thoughts.

8. Angels know effects in their causes. Now, as Augustine says, knowledge proceeds from the mind, and actual understanding proceeds from habitual knowledge. Consequently, since angels know our mind, they know what we know and what we are actually thinking.

To the Contrary:

1'. 'We read the following in Jeremias (17:9-10): "The heart is per verse... and unsearchable. Who can know it? I... the Lord...

Therefore, it belongs to God alone to know the heartís secrets.

2í. The following is found in the Psalms (7: 10): "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." It seems, therefore, that God alone can search our hearts.

De veritate EN 78