De veritate EN 87
87
Because of His goodness, God communicates His perfections to creatures according to their capacity. Consequently, He shares His goodness will them, not only so that they will be good and perfect themselves, but also so that they can, will God’s help, give perfection to others. Now, to give perfection to other creatures is the most noble way of imitating God. Hence, Dionysius says: "The most God-like of all actions is to cooperate will God." On this principle rests the ordering of angels, according to which some illumine others.
There have, however, been several opinions on this ordering. Some think that this order is so firmly fixed that nothing can happen outside of it, and it is always and in all cases preserved. Others, however, con cede that this ordering is stable, but say that, while events usually hap pen according to it, it is sometimes passed over by the action of necessary causes—as when, by God’s dispensation, even the natural course of things is changed, and a new cause springs into being, as clearly takes place in miracles.
But the first opinion seems to be more logical for three reasons. First, it belongs to the dignity of higher angels that the lower should be illumined through them. It would detract from their dignity if the lower angels were sometimes illumined without their ministry. Second, the closer beings are to God, who is most unchangeable, the more unchangeable should they themselves be. For this reason, bodies here below, standing at a great distance from God, are sometimes defective in their natural action, while celestial bodies always preserve the motion prescribed by their natures. Consequently, it does not seem reasonable that the ordering of celestial spirits, who are closest to God, should sometimes be changed. Third, God does not make any change in the things of nature except for something better, namely, for some thing pertaining to grace or glory. But there is no state higher than the states of glory by which the orders of angels are distinguished from each other. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable that matters concerning the order of angels should sometimes be changed.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. God gives grace and illuminations to angels according to their capacity. this difference, however, that, because grace pertains to the will, He gives grace to all of them directly; for there is no ordering in angels wills whereby one could act upon another. But God’s illuminations descend from Him to the lowest angels by means of the angels standing at the top and middle of the hierarchy.
2. Dionysius gives two answers to this difficulty. First, the angel that was sent to cleanse the lips of the prophet belonged to the inferior angels, but, by equivocation, was called a Seraph since he cleansed the prophet’s lips by burning them will a glowing coal brought from the altar by tongs; hence, he was said to be a Seraph only because he burned or set on fire. Dionysius second answer is that this angel, be longing to a lower order, cleansed the lips of the prophet because he did not intend to summon him to himself but to God and a higher angel since he acted by the power of both. This is why he showed the prophet the higher angel and God. Similarly, a bishop is also said to absolve a person when a priest absolves by the bishop’s authority. Following this interpretation, we need not say that this angel was called a Seraph by equivocation or that a Seraph illumined the prophet directly.
3. The course of nature can have a more noble state; hence, it is proper for it to be changed at times. But there is nothing more noble than the state of glory. Therefore, no parallel can be drawn.
4. It is not because of any defect in God’s power or in that of the higher angels that God and the higher angels illumine the lower through the mediation of angels between them and the lower angels. This order is kept merely to preserve the dignity and perfection of all; and this demands that many co-operate will God in the same action.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 106, 2, ad I; I-II, 112, I, ad 3;ll Sentences 3, 3,2. See also readings given for q. 9, a. s.
Difficulties:
It seems that he does not, for
1. To be cleansed is to be freed from impurity. But there is no impurity in angels; consequently, one angel cannot cleanse another.
2. But it was said that this cleansing is not from sin but from ignorance or kick of knowledge.—On the contrary, since such ignorance cannot be the result of any sin in the beatified angels, for they have no sin, it must be the result of nature. Now, those things that are natural cannot be removed while the nature remains. Consequently, an angel cannot be freed of his ignorance.
3. Illumination dispels darkness. Now, the only darkness which makes sense in regard to angels is the darkness of ignorance or of lack of understanding. Consequently, if their ignorance is removed when they are cleansed, their being cleansed and their being illumined come to the same thing, and the two should not be distinguished.
4. But it was said that illumination is referred to the end-term, while cleansing is referred to the initial term.—On the contrary, in no way of taking them is there found a term that is other than the end-term or the initial term. Consequently, if those two hierarchical actions, purgation and illumination, are distinguished according as one is referred to the initial term and the other to the end-term, a third hierarchical action cannot be posited; but to deny such a third action is to oppose Dionysius, who places the action of perfecting third.
5. As long as a thing is in the state of progression, it is not yet perfect. But, as the Master of the Sentences says, angels knowledge grows in some way until judgment day. Hence, at the present time, one angel cannot perfect another.
6. Illumination is the cause of perfecting, just as it is the cause of cleansing. Now, a cause must be prior to its effect. Therefore, just as illumination precedes perfection, so does it also precede purgation if the purgation be from ignorance.
To the Contrary:
Dionysius distinguishes and orders these actions in this manner, saying: "The hierarchical order is such that some angels are cleansed, others do the cleansing, some are illumined, others illumine, some are perfected, others do the perfecting."
88
In angels those three actions pertain merely to their reception of knowledge; for this reason Dionysius says: "Purgation, perfection, and illumination are the reception of divine knowledge." However, the distinction between them should be understood in the following manner. Two terms can be found in any generation or change, namely, the initial term and the end-term. Both, however, are found in different ways in different changes.
In some changes the initial term is something contrary to the perfection to be acquired. For example, blackness is the contrary of the whiteness acquired when a thing becomes white. On the other hand, sometimes the perfection to be acquired does not have a contrary directly, but the dispositions existing in the subject before the change are contrary to the dispositions ordered to the perfection to be introduced. This condition is found, for example, when a soul is infused into a body. Again, it sometimes happens that nothing is presupposed for the introduction of the form except a privation or negation. For example, in air that is to be illumined only darkness precedes; and this is re moved by the presence of light.
Similarly, there is at times only one end-term. For example, the end term of the process of whitening is whiteness only. At other times, there are two end-terms, one of which is directed to the other. This is clearly the case when elements undergo change: one end-term is a disposition which demands a form, the other is the substantial form itself.
Now, in the reception of knowledge, we find the diversity mentioned above will respect to its initial term, because sometimes, before a person receives knowledge, there exists in him an error contrary to it. Again, at times there are in him beforehand only contrary dispositions, such as impurity of soul, an immoderate occupation will sense objects, or something of this nature. Again, at other times, there may be in him beforehand only a privation or negation of the knowledge, such as exists in us whose knowledge increases from day to day. It is in this last-named sense that we should understand the initial term of illumination in angels.
Moreover, we find that there are two end-terms in the reception of knowledge. The first is that by which the intellect is perfected in order to know something. This end-term may be either an intelligible form, an intelligible light, or any medium of cognition whatsoever. The second end-term is the knowledge itself, which follows; and this is the final term in the reception of knowledge.
In angels, cleansing takes place through the simple removal of ignorance in the manner described; for this reason Dionysius says: "To receive divine knowledge is to be cleansed of ignorance." The illumination, however, takes place in the first end-term. Hence, Dionysius also says that angels are illumined in so far as something is manifested to them "through a higher illumination." Finally, "perfection" takes place in the ultimate end-term; and, for this reason, Dionysius says: "They are perfected by the light of resplendent knowledge." In other words, illumination and perfection are understood to differ as the in forming of the sense of sight by a species of what is seen differs from the knowledge of the thing seen.
Drawing an analogy from the principles laid down above, Dionysius writes that the order of the deacons is to purify neophytes in the faith, that of priests is to illumine them, and that of bishops, to perfect them. He said this because deacons exercise their office over catechumens and those possessed by the devils; and, in these persons, there are dispositions contrary to illumination which are removed by the deacons ministry. The duty of priests, however, is to teach and communicate the mysteries of the faith to the people; for these are, as it were, means for leading us to God. Finally, the duty of bishops is to uncover the spiritual riches that were concealed in the mystical symbols.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. As Dionysius says, the cleansing of angels is to be understood as a cleansing, not from any impurity, but from lack of knowledge.
2. A negation or defect is said to be natural in two senses. In the first, it is said to be natural because the presence of such a negation is, as it were, due to nature. For example, not having an intellect is natural to an ass. Now, this kind of natural defect is never removed as long as the nature itself remains. In the second sense, however, a negation is said to be natural because to have some certain perfection is not due to nature. This kind of a negation is found especially when a faculty of the nature is notable to acquire a perfection of the sort mentioned. Such natural defects can be removed. For example, the ignorance boys have is removed, and our lack of glory is removed by the bestowal of glory. Similarly, the ignorance angels have can be removed.
3. Illumination and cleansing are related to each other in the acquisition of knowledge by angels as generation and corruption are related in the acquisition of a natural form. Needless to say, generation and corruption are one in so far as they are in one subject, but they differ in their formal character.
4. The reply is clear from what has been said.
5. In our proposition, perfection is not taken as referring to all the knowledge an angel has, but only to a single act of knowledge; and he is perfected by this when he is led to the knowledge of some particular thing.
6. Just as form is, in some way, the cause of matter inasmuch as it gives matter actual existence, so, in some way, matter is the cause of form inasmuch as it sustains the form. Similarly, the things coming from form are, in a certain sense, prior to those coming from matter, but in the case of some the opposite is true. Now, because privation is related to matter, the removal of the privation is naturally prior to the introduction of the form according to the order in which matter is prior to form, namely, the order of generation. But the introduction of the form is prior according to that order in which the form is prior to matter, namely, the order of perfection. The same argument can be applied to the orders of illumination and perfection.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107, I; io8, 5, ad 5; io8, 6; 109, II Sentences 1, 2, 3; in I Cor., c. 13, lectura 1.
Difficulties:
It seems not, for
1. Commenting on the words of Job (28: 17), "Gold or crystal can not equal it," Gregory says: "In heaven everyone will be seen by others as now he does not even see himself." But while on earth a person does not have to speak to himself in order to know his own idea. Consequently, in heaven it will not be necessary for him to speak to another so that he can know it. Hence, speech is unnecessary for beatified angels.
2. In the same passage, Gregory writes: "When one’s face is seen, in the same instant, his conscience will be penetrated." Therefore, in heaven speech is not required for one person to know another’s concept.
3. Referring to angels, Maximus writes as follows: "When spiritual creatures meet and leave each other, one knows far more clearly what the other wishes to convey than were they to speak to each other. For, in some way, they silently discuss things and communicate their thoughts to each other." Now, since silence is opposed to speech, angels know what other angels want to signify, without having to speak.
4. All speech takes place through signs. Now, a sign must be some thing that can be sensed, because, as is said in the Sentences: "A sign is that which, besides impressing a species upon the senses, makes something else known." Consequently, since angels do not receive their knowledge from sensible things, they do not receive it by means of signs, and, hence, not through speech.
5. A sign seems to be something that is more known to us but less known according to nature. Accordingly, the Commentator distinguishes between a demonstration through a sign and a perfect demonstration, the latter being a demonstration which is causal. Now, angels do not receive their knowledge from things posterior in nature, consequently, not from signs. Hence, they do not receive knowledge by means of speech.
6. In all speech the speaker must arouse his listener to attention to his words, which, in our case, are produced by the voice of the speaker. But to listen to words of this kind is impossible for an angel. Therefore, speech is likewise impossible for him.
7. As Plato says, speech was given to us so we could know signs of others wills. But one angel knows the signs of another angel’s will by knowing himself, because these signs are spiritual, and, by the same knowledge, an angel knows all spiritual things. Hence, since one angel knows the spiritual nature of another angel by knowing himself in the same way he knows his will. Therefore, he has no need of speech.
8. The forms within an angelic intellect are ordered to the knowledge of things, as in God the intelligible characters of things are ordered to their production, for angels intellectual forms resemble these characters. Now, all things and whatever exists in a thing, whether it be interior or exterior, are produced by means of these intelligible characters. Therefore, when an angel knows another angel by means of the forms within his own intellect, he also knows all that is within that angel; and, as a consequence, he knows that angel’s thought. Hence, the same must be said as before.
9. We have two kinds of speech, namely, internal and external. Now, we do not say that there is external speech in angels, because, if this were true, angels would have to form vocal speech to speak to each other. However, as Anselm and Augustine say, "Internal speech is nothing other than thought." Therefore, it is not necessary to assert that there exists in angels any kind of speech other than thought.
10. Avicenna says that we speak because we have a multitude of desires. This evidently arises from our many needs, because, as Augustine remarks, we desire a thing only if we do not have it. Now, since we cannot say that angels need many things, we cannot say that they speak to one another.
11. One angel cannot know another’s thought through its essence, because it is not present through its essence, to the other’s intellect. Hence, he must know the other’s thought by means of a species. Now, of himself, an angel is able to know, by means of innate species, all that naturally exists in another angel. For the same reason, therefore, through these same species he knows all that takes place by the will of the other angel. Hence, it does not seem necessary to affirm the existence of speech in angels in order that one can make his thought known to another.
12. Signs and nods are directed to the sense of sight, not to that of hearing, but speech is directed to the sense of hearing. Now, angels indicate their thought "by signs and nods," for this is how the Gloss explains that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:1): "If I speak will the tongues of men and of angels..." Therefore, angels do not use speech to communicate.
13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power. Now, the motion of a cognitive power terminates in the soul, not in something outside. Therefore, through speech, an angel is not directed to the manifestation of his thought to another angel.
14. In all speech something unknown should be manifested by means of what is known. For example, we manifest our concepts by means of sensible sounds. Now, we cannot say that this is possible for angels, because, as Dionysius says, the nature of an angel, naturally known by other angels, has no shape. Hence, there is nothing in an angel’s nature that can be used to indicate what is not known about it. Consequently, for angels speech is impossible.
15. Angels are spiritual lights. But when light is seen it totally manifests itself. Therefore, when an angel is seen, whatever is in him is totally known. Consequently, there is no need for speech among angels.
To the Contrary:
1'. We read in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1): "If I speak will the tongues of men and of angels..." Now, tongues would be useless were there not speech. Consequently, angels speak.
2’. As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power also can. Now, men can reveal their thoughts to other men. Therefore, angels can do the same. However, to reveal one’s thought means to speak it. Hence, angels possess speech.
3’. Damascene says: "In their discourses, which are not oral, angels tell each other what their wills are, and also what are their plans and their thoughts." Now, discourse can be had only through speech. Therefore, angels possess the power of speech.
89
There must be some kind of speech among angels, for, as we proved earlier, one angel does not have direct and particular knowledge of what lies hidden in the heart of another; consequently, an angel must have some way of manifesting his thought to another. This way can be called angelic speech, for what we call speech in our own case is simply the manifestation of an interior word, which we mentally conceive.
We can understand how angels manifest their concepts to one an other if we study the resemblance their speech has to things in nature, because, as Boethius says, forms in nature are quasi-images of immaterial things. Now, we find that a form exists in matter in three ways. First, it can exist imperfectly, that is, in a mode halfway between potency and act. This, for example, is how forms exist that are coming into existence. Second, it can exist in perfect act; and I mean a perfection such that the being having it is perfected in itself. Third, it can exist in perfect act in such a way that the being having the form also can communicate this perfection to another. Some things are bright themselves, but cannot illumine other things.
Intelligible forms exist in the intellect in a similar way. First, they can exist, as it were, halfway between potency and act, as a form possessed habitually. Second, they may exist in perfect act will respect to the knower. This is true when a knower actually thinks according to a form which he has within himself. Third, they may exist will a relation to some other being; and their transition from one being to the other (a transition, as it were, from potency to act) is made through the will. For the will of an angel causes him to turn actually to the forms he possesses, as it were, habitually; and, similarly, it makes his intellect actually more perfect will respect to the form within him, so that the angel is perfected, not only by this intellectual form itself, but also by the relation it has to another angel. When this takes place, his thought is perceived by the other angels; and, in this sense, one angel is said to speak to another.
We would have the same way of speaking if our intellect could be directed to intelligibles without having to have recourse to media; but, because it is the nature of our intelligence to receive from the senses, sensible signs are used to express our interior concepts, and by these signs we manifest our heart’s thoughts.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Gregory’s statement can be understood of both physical and spiritual vision; for in heaven, after the bodies of the saints have been glorified, a saint will be able to see will his physical eyes the interior of another’s body—something which is now impossible. It will be possible then, because glorified bodies will in some way be transparent. For this reason, Gregory compares them to glass. Similarly, one will be able to see will his spiritual eyes whether or not another person has charity, and, if so, how much he possesses—something which is like will impossible now. From this it does not follow, however, that one will be able to know the actual thoughts of another, because these depend on the will.
2. The conscience is said to be penetrated, but this is will respect to its habits, not to its actual thoughts.
3. In this statement, silence is opposed to oral speech such as we have, not to spiritual speech such as angels have.
4. A thing cannot be called a sign in the proper sense unless one can come to know something else as if by reasoning from it. In this sense, signs do not exist among angels, because, as we proved in the previous question, angels knowledge is not discursive. The signs we use are sensible, because our knowledge, which is discursive, has its origin in sense-objects. But we commonly call anything a sign which, being known, leads to the knowledge of something else; and for this reason an intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing which is known by its means. It is in this sense that angels know things through signs; and thus one angel speaks to another by means of signs, that is, through a species which actuates his intellect and puts it perfectly in relation to the other.
5. Although it is true that in natural things, whose effects are more known to us than their causes are, a sign is that which is posterior in nature, the notion of a sign, even properly speaking, is not such that a sign need be prior or posterior in nature, but only that it must be known previously by us. For this reason, at times we take effects as signs of causes, as when we judge health from the pulse, and at other times we take causes as signs of effects, as we take the dispositions of heavenly bodies as signs of stormy weather and rain.
6. When angels turn to others, as long as they put some of their intelligible forms into an actual relation to these others, the angels may be said to be arousing others attention to them.
7. It is true that an angel knows all spiritual things will the same kind of knowledge, that is, intellectually. But whether the knowledge of a thing comes through knowing oneself or through knowing some thing else concerns, not the type of knowledge, but only the manner in which this knowledge has been received. Hence, even if one angel knows the nature of another angel by knowing himself, it does not follow that he also knows the speech of the other in the same manner, because the thought of one angel is not as intelligible to another as his nature is.
8. That reasoning would follow if the intellectual forms in an angel were as efficacious for the knowledge of things as the intelligible characters of things in God are for their production. But this is not true, since a creature is not in any respect equal to God.
9. Although angels do not speak exteriorly as we do, namely, through sensible signs, they do speak exteriorly in another manner. The direction of their thoughts to other angels can be called exterior angelic speech.
10. A multitude of desires is said to be the cause of speech merely because desires give rise to a multitude of concepts and these concepts could be expressed only by signs that differ greatly. Now, animals have just a few concepts, which they can express by a few natural signs. But, since angels have many concepts, they need speech. How ever, their having many concepts is a sign of no desire other than that of one angel’s wanting to communicate his mental conception to an other angel; and this desire is not a sign that he is imperfect.
11. One angel knows the thought of another through the innate species by which he knows that other angel, because through this same species he knows all that he knows about the other angel. Consequently, as soon as one angel relates himself to another angel according to an act of some form, the other angel knows his thought; and this depends on the will of the first angel. But the knowability of the angelic nature does not depend on the will of the angel. Therefore, angels do not need speech to know the nature of other angels but only to know their thoughts.
12. According to Augustine, sight and hearing differ only exteriorly. Interiorly, in the mind, they are one and the same, because, in the mind, seeing and hearing do not differ. They differ only as they are in the external senses. Consequently, in angels, who have only minds, there is no difference between seeing and hearing. However, angelic speech gets its name from its resemblance to what takes place in us, for we receive our knowledge from others through our sense of hearing. Moreover, we can distinguish between angelic nods and signs in the following way: the species may be called signs, and the reference of the species to others, nods. But the very ability to do this is called their speech.
13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power; however, the motion is not in the cognition but in the manifestation of the cognition. Hence, this motion must have an order to another being. For this reason, the Philosopher also says: "Speech exists in order that one can signify something to another."
14. The essence of an angel does not have a material shape, but his intellect is, as it were, shaped by its intelligible forms.
15. Physical light manifests itself because of a natural necessity. Consequently, it manifests itself in the same way in regard to everything it contains. An angel, however, possesses a will; and his concepts can not be manifested unless his will commands that they be manifested. This is why an angel needs speech.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107, aa. 2-3; In I Cor., C. 13, lectura 1.
Difficulties:
It seems not, for
1. In its explanation of that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 1), "If I speak will the tongues of men and of angels," the Gloss reads as follows: "These tongues are the means by which the superior angels tell the inferior angels what they are first to learn about the will of God." Consequently, speech, an act of the tongue, belongs only to the higher angels.
2. Whenever anyone speaks, something takes place in his listener. Now, in the higher angels, nothing can take place that is caused by the lower, because the higher are not in potency will respect to the lower; rather, the opposite is true, since the superior angels have more act and less potency. Consequently, the lower angels cannot speak to the higher.
3. To the notion of thought speech adds that of infusing knowledge. But the lower angels cannot infuse anything into the higher angels, because in that case they would be acting upon them, and this is impossible. Therefore, the lower do not speak to the higher angels.
4. To illumine is simply to manifest something unknown. Now, angelic speech is for the manifestation of something unknown. There fore, angelic speech is an illumination. Hence, since inferior angels do not illumine superior angels, it would seem that they also do not speak to them.
5. The angel to whom another angel speaks is in potency to knowing what is expressed in the speech, and, by means of this speech, he comes to know it actually. Consequently, the angel speaking reduces the one spoken to from potency to act. Now, this is not possible for inferior angels will respect to superior angels, because in that case the inferior angels would be more noble. Hence, inferior angels do not speak to superior angels.
6. One person teaches another if he tells him something that he did not know. Consequently, if inferior angels speak to superior angels about their concepts, which the superior are ignorant of, it would seem that they teach the superior angels, and thus perfect them, since, as Dionysius says, to teach is to perfect. But this would be contrary to the hierarchical order, according to which inferior angels are perfected by superior.
To the Contrary:
Gregory says: "God speaks to angels, and angels speak to God." On the same principle, therefore, superior angels can talk to the inferior, and inferior to the superior.
90
To resolve this question satisfactorily, we must consider how, in angels, illumination differs from speech; and this can be done in the following way. An intellect falls short of knowing something for two reasons. First, the knowable object may be absent. For example, we do not know what has happened in past times or in remote places, if these happenings have not come to our attention. Second, there may be a defect in the intellect. That is, the intellect may not be strong enough to arrive at those truths which it already has in its possession, as, for instance, the intellect has all conclusions within itself in possessing first principles naturally known, but it does not know those conclusions unless it is strengthened by exercise or instruction. Properly speaking, therefore, speech is that by which a person is led to the knowledge of the unknown, because, through speech, something becomes present to him that would otherwise be absent. We have an evident example of this in our own case when one person shows another what the other did not see, and thus, in some sense, makes this thing present to him by means of speech. On the other hand, illumination takes place when the intellect is merely strengthened to know something above that which it already knew. We have explained this previously.
It should be noted, however, that both angels and men can have speech without illumination, because sometimes a thing is shown to us through speech only, and this does not strengthen our intellect in any way for knowing more. For example, one can recite to me merely a historical narrative, or one angel can reveal merely his thought to another angel; such matters can be equally known or not known by one having a strong intellect as well as by one having a weak intellect. But illumination in angels and men always has speech joined to it. For we illumine another person inasmuch as we give him some means by which his intellect is strengthened to know something, and this strengthening takes place through speech. In angels, this must also take place through speech, because the superior angel has his knowledge about things through forms that are more universal. Consequently, the inferior angel is not proportioned to receive knowledge from the superior unless the latter in some way distinguishes and divides his knowledge by conceiving within himself that about which he wishes to illumine in such a way that it will be comprehensible to the lower angel, and by manifesting this concept to him when he illumines him.
Consequently, Dionysius says: "In its providence, every intellectual essence divides and multiplies what it understands by one form, given to it by a godlike being, so that these divisions may act as guiding analogies for those below." The same is true of the teacher who, seeing that his pupil cannot grasp things which he himself knows in the same way in which he knows them, makes a special effort to distinguish and multiply his knowledge by means of examples, so that his pupil will grasp his knowledge in this manner.
Hence, we must admit that angelic speech joined will illumination is found only when superior angels speak to inferior; but the other type of angelic speech is used both when inferior angels speak to superior and when superior speak to inferior.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The Gloss is referring here to angelic speech joined will an illumination.
2. The angel who speaks causes nothing in the angel to whom he is speaking. A change does take place, however, in himself; and, by reason of this change, he is known in the manner described above. Hence, there is no necessity for the angel speaking to infuse something into the one he is addressing.
3. The answer just given also solves the third difficulty.
4. The reply is evident from what has been said.
5. It is true that the angel to whom another angel speaks becomes an actual knower from being a potential knower; however, this takes place, not because he is reduced from potency to act, but because the angel who is speaking reduces himself from potency to act by making himself, will respect to some form, in perfect act according to an ordering to the other angel.
6. Properly speaking, teaching is applied only to those things which perfect an intellect. However, the fact that one angel knows the thoughts of another does not pertain to his intellectual perfection, just as it does not pertain to the perfection of my intellect if I learn about things that are not present to me and in no way concern me.
Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107,4; Il Sentences I 2, 3, ad 3.
Difficulties:
It seems that it is, for
1. Whenever arrival and departure are involved, there is necessarily a determinate distance. But, as Maximus says, angels see each other’s thoughts as they approach and depart from one another. Therefore.
2. According to Damascene, an angel is where he operates. Consequently, if he speaks to another angel, he must be where his listener is; hence, some determinate distance is involved.
3. We read in Isaias (6:3): "They cried one to another." Now, the only reason for making cries is that a distance separates us from the one to whom we are speaking. Therefore, it seems that distance impedes the speech of angels.
4. Speech must be carried from the one speaking to the one listening. Now, this is not possible unless local distance separates the angel speaking from the one listening, because spiritual speech cannot be carried by a material medium. Therefore, local distance impedes the speech of angels.
5. If Peter’s soul were on earth, it would know the events taking place here; but, since it is in heaven, it does not. Hence, the gloss of Augustine on Isaias (63: i6), "Abraham hath not known us," says: "The dead"—even the saints— "do not know what the living are doing" their own sons. Consequently, local distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul, and, by the same reasoning, that of angels, and also their speech.
To the Contrary:
The greatest possible distance separates paradise from hell; but the blessed and the damned can see each other, especially before the day of final judgment. This is clear from Luke’s account of Lazarus and the rich man (Lc 16,19-31). Consequently, no local distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul or that of an angel. By the same reasoning, it does not impede angels speech.
De veritate EN 87