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The divine will does not impose necessity upon all things. The reason for this is ascribed by some to the fact that, since this will is the first cause of all things, it produces certain effects through the mediation of secondary causes which are contingent and can f all. Thus the effect follows the contingency of the proximate cause, not the necessity of the first cause. But this seems to be in agreement will those who held that all things proceed from God will natural necessity, just as they held that from the simple One there proceeds immediately a single being having some multiplicity, and through its mediation the whole multitude of things proceeds. In like fashion they say that from a single wholly immobile principle there proceeds something which is immobile in its substance but mobile and undetermined as to position, and through the mediation of this being generation and corruption occur in the things here below. In this line of argument it could not be held that multiplicity and corruptible and contingent things are caused immediately by God. But that position is contrary to the doctrine of the faith, which holds that a multitude even of corruptible things was immediately created by God; for example, the first individuals of trees and brute animals.
It is accordingly necessary to assign a different principal reason for the contingency in things, to which the previously assigned cause will be subordinated. For the patient must be assimilated to the agent; and, if the agent is most powerful, the likeness of the effect to the agent cause will be perfect; but if the agent is weak, the likeness will be imperfect. Thus because of the strength of the formative power in the semen a son is made like his father not only in the nature of the species but also in many accidents. On the other hand, because of the weakness of the power mentioned the aforesaid assimilation is done away will, as is said in Animajs.4 Now the divine will is a most power ful agent. Hence its effect must be made like it in all respects, so that there not only comes about what God wants to come about (a sort of likening in species), but it comes about in the manner in which God wants it to come about necessarily or contingently, quickly or slowly (and this is a sort of likening in its accidents).
The divine will determines this manner for things beforehand in the order of God’s wisdom. According as it arranges for certain things to come into being in this way or in that, it adapts their causes to the manner fixed upon. It could, however, introduce this manner into things even without the mediation of those causes. We accordingly say that some of the divine effects are contingent not merely because of the contingency of secondary causes but rather because of the appointment of the divine will, which saw to such an order for things.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. That argument is applicable in the case of causes acting from the necessity of nature and in regard to their immediate effects; but it is beside the point in the case of voluntary causes, because a thing follows from the will in the way in which the will disposes and not in the way in which the will has existence, as occurs among natural causes in the latter we look to an assimilation as regards the condition of the cause and the thing caused, which is the same in both, whereas in Voluntary causes we look to an assimilation as regards the fulfilment of the will of the agent in the effect, as has been said. And even in regard to natural causes the argument does not apply in the case of their mediate effects.
2. Even though God can remove every hindrance from a secondary cause when Fie SO wills, yet Fie does not always will to remove it. Thu there remains contingency in the secondary cause and, consequently, in the effect.
3. Although the non-existence of an effect of the divine will is in compatible will the divine will, the possibility that the effect should be lacking is given simultaneously will the divine will. God’s willing someone to be saved and the possibility that that person be damned are not incompatible; but God’s willing him to be saved and his actually being damned are incompatible.
4. The same is to be said about the deficiency of the intervening cause.
Parallel readings: No direct parallels; but cf. Contra Gentiles II, 24; Sum. Theol., 1, 21, 2; I-II, 68, ad 2.
Difficulties:
It seems that it does, for
1. Anselm says: "That only is just which You will." Justice there fore depends only upon God’s will.
2. Something is just by reason of its agreement will a law. But a law seems to be nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign, because "what has pleased the prince has the force of law," as the Legislator says. Since the sovereign of all things is the divine will, it therefore seems that the whole character of justice depends upon it alone.
3. Political justice, which is found in human affairs, has its model in natural justice, which consists in the fulfilment of its own nature by anything whatever. But each thing participates in the order of its nature because of the divine will; for Hilary says: "The will of God has conferred upon all creatures their essence." all justice therefore depends merely upon the will of God.
4. Since justice is a certain correctness, it depends upon the imitation of some rule. But the rule of the effect is its due cause. Since the first cause of all things is the divine will, li therefore seems to be the first rule from which everything just is judged.
5. God’s will cannot be anything but just. If the character of justice depended upon anything else besides the divine will, that would re strict and, in a sense, bind the divine will. But that is impossible.
6. Every will which is just by a principle other than itself is such that its principle should be sought. But "the cause of God’s will is not to be sought," as Augustine says. The principle of justice there fore depends upon no other than the divine will.
To, the Contrary:
1’. The works of justice are distinguished from the works of mercy. But the works of divine mercy depend upon God’s will. Hence some thing else besides the mere will of God is demanded for the character of justice.
2'. According to Anselm justice is "correctness of wil1." But correctness of will is distinct from the will. In us it is really distinct, since our will can be correct or not. In God it is distinct at least conceptually or according to our manner of understanding it. Therefore the character of justice does not depend upon the divine will alone.
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Since justice is a certain "correctness," as Anselm says, or "equation," as the Philosopher teaches, the essential character of justice must depend first of all upon that in which there is first found the character of a rule according to which the equality and correctness of justice is established in things. Now the will does not have the character of the first rule; it is rather a rule which has a rule, for it is directed by reason and the intellect. This is true not only in us but also in God, although in us the will is really distinct from the intellect. For this reason the will and its correctness are not the same thing. In God, however the will is really identical will the intellect, and for this reason the correctness of His will is really the same as His will itself. Consequently the first thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes thin in their due proportion both to one another and to their cause. In this proportion the essential character of created justice consists. But to say that justice depends simply upon the will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, and that is blasphemous
Answer to Difficulties:
1. Nothing can be just unless it is willed by God. Yet what is willed by God has the first cause of its justice from the order of divine Wisdom
2. Although the will of the prince, by the fact of its being a will, has the coercive force of law, yet it does not have the character of justice except from being led by reason.
3. God works in natural things in two ways: (1) by establishing the natures themselves, and (2) by providing each thing will what ever belongs to its nature. The essence of justice demands something due. Now, since it is no way due that creatures be brought into being, but purely voluntary, the first operation does not have the note of justice, but it depends simply upon the divine will. It might, however, conceivably be said to have the note of justice because of the ordination of the thing made to the will. For it is of obligation from the very fact that God wills it that everything which God wills be done. But in the fulfilment of this ordination it is wisdom which does the directing as the first rule. In the second sort of operation, however, there is found the character of something due, not on the part of the agent, since God is indebted to no one, but rather on the part of the recipient. It is due to every natural being that it have the things which its nature calls for both in essentials and in accidentals. But what is due depends upon the divine wisdom inasmuch as the natural being should be such as to imitate the idea of it which is in the divine mind. In this way the divine wisdom is found to be the first rule of justice. In all the divine operations, however, by which God bestows upon the creature anything beyond the debt of nature, as in the gifts of grace, the same sort of justice is found as is assigned in the first sort of operation, by which God establishes natures.
4. According to our manner of understanding, the divine will pre supposes wisdom, which first has the character of a rule.
5. Since intellect and will do not really differ in God, by the fact of being directed and determined to something definite the will is not restricted by anything other than itself; but it is moved according to its own nature, since it is natural for that will always to act according to the order of wisdom.
6. On the part of the One willing there cannot be any cause of the divine will other than the will itself as its reason for willing. For in God will, wisdom, and goodness are really identical. But on the part of the thing willed the divine will has a principle, which is that of the thing willed, not that of the One willing, according to which the thing willed is ordained to something else either by desert or by fit ness. This ordination belongs to the divine wisdom. Hence this is the first root of justice.
Parallel readings. / Sentences 48, aa. & Sum. Theol., I-II, 19, 9.
Difficulties:
It seems that we are not, for
1. No one is held to the impossible. But it is impossible for us to confirm our will to the divine will, since the divine will is unknown to us. Therefore we are not held to the conformity mentioned
2. Whoever does not do that to which he is obliged sins. If, then, we are obliged to confirm our will to the divine will, we sin in not confirming it. But whoever sins mortally does not confirm his will to the divine in the matter in which le sins. By that very fact, there fore, he sins. He sins, however, by some other specific sin, such as stealing or fornicating. Hence whoever sins commits two sins. But this seems to be absurd.
3. The answer was given that the commandment about the conformity of our will to the divine, being affirmative, does not bind to constant compliance though it constantly binds. Thus it is not necessary that whenever conformity is lakcing there is sin.—On the contrary, although a person not observing an affirmative commandment does not sin at every moment in which he is not observing it, yet he does sin whenever le acts contrary to it. Thus a person sins whenever he dishonors his parents, although lie does not always sin when he is not actually honoring them. But lie who sins mortally acts contrary to the conformity in question. It is therefore by this fact that he sins.
4. Whoever does not observe that to which he is obliged is a transgressor. But one who sins venially does not confirm his will to the divine will. If he is obliged to confirm to it, le will be a transgressor and so will sin mortally.
5. The answer was given that le is not obliged at that moment in which he is Sinning venially, because affirmative commandments do not oblige us to comply always. the contrary, whoever does not comply with an affirmative commandment at the place and time at which it binds, is adjudged a transgressor. But it seems that no other time for confirming our will to the divine will can be determined upon than that at which the will passes into act. Hence, whenever the will passes into act, unless it is confirmed to the divine will, there seems to be a sin; and so when a person sins venially, the sin seems to be mortal.
6. No one is held to the impossible. But the obstinate cannot con form their will to the divine. They are therefore not held to this conformity. And so neither are others; otherwise the obstinate would draw an advantage from their obstinacy.
7. Since God wills from charity whatever He wills, being charity Himself, if we are obliged to confirm our will to God’s, we are obliged to have charity. But a person who does not have charity can not obtain it unless he carefully prepares himself for it. One not having charity is therefore obliged to prepare himself continuously to have it. Thus at every instant at which he does not have charity he sins, since his not having it comes from a lack of preparation.
8. Since the form of an act consists especially in the manner of acting, if we are held to conformity will the divine will, we must will a thing in the same manner in which God wills it. Now a person can imitate the manner of the divine will after a fashion both by natural love and by gratuitous love. The conformity of which we speak, how ever, cannot be taken will reference to natural love, because even infidels and sinners confirm their will to God’s in this manner as long as the natural love of good is alive within them. Similarly it cannot be taken will reference to gratuitous love, that is, charity. In that case we should be obliged to will from charity whatever we will. But this is contrary to the opinion of many, who say that the manner does not fall within the scope of the commandment. It therefore seems that we are not obliged to confirm our will to the divine will.
9. Commenting on the words of the Psalm (32:l): "Praise becometh the upright," the Gloss says: "The distance between God’s will and man’s is just as great as that between God and man." But God is so distant from man that man cannot be confirmed to Him. Since man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be any proportion between hmm and God. Then neither can man’s will be confirmed to God’s.
10. Those things are said to be confirmed which agree in some one form. Consequently, if our will can be confirmed to the divine, there must be some one form in which the two wills agree. Then there would be something simpler than the divine will. But that is impossible.
11. Conformity is a reciprocal relation. In such relations each one of the extremes is referred to the other by the same relation. Thus a friend is said to be a friend to his friend, and a brother, a brother to his brother. If, then, our will can confirm to the divine will, and as a result we are held to the Conformity in question, the divine will can confirm to ours. But that seems unacceptable.
12. Things that we are able to do or not do fall within the scope of commandments, and we are held to them. But we cannot help but confirm our will to God’s, because, as Anselm says, whoever departs from God’s will in some particular fulfils the divine will in another, just as the more distant something that is within a spherical body gets from one part of the circumference, the more it draws near to some other part. We are therefore not bound to the conformity in question as we are bound to the matters which fail under a commandment
To the Contrary
1’. Regarding the words of the Psalm (32: 1): 'Praise becometh the upright," the Gloss says: "The upright are those who direct their hearts according to the will of God." But everyone is obliged to be upright. Hence everyone is obliged to the above-mentioned conformity.
2’. Every being should confirm to its rule. But the divine will is the rule of ours, since correctness of will is found first in God. Our will should therefore confirm to the divine will.
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Everyone is obliged to confirm his will to God’s. The reason for this can be taken from the fact that in every genus there is some one thing which is primary and is the measure of all the other things which are in that genus, for in it the nature of the genus is most perfectly found. This is verified of the nature of colour, for example, in white ness, which is called the measure of all colors because the extent to which each colour shares in the nature of the genus is known from its nearness to whiteness or its remoteness from it, as is said in the Meta Pbysics.6 In this way God Himself is the measure of all beings, as can be gathered from the words of the Commentator.
Every being has the act of existing in the proportion in which it approaches God by likeness. But according as it is found to be unlike Hmm, it approximates non-existence And the same must be said of all the attributes which are found both in God and in creatures. Hence His intellect is the measure of all knowledge; His goodness, of all goodness; and, to speak more to the point, His good will, of every good will. Every good will is therefore good by reason of its being confirmed to the divine good will. Accordingly, since everyone is obliged to have a good will, he is likewise obliged to have a will con formed to the divine will.
But it should be noted that this conformity can be taken in many senses. We are speaking here of will in the sense of the volitional act. Our conformity to God on the part of the will as a faculty is natural, belonging to the image. It accordingly does not fall under any commandment. But the act of the divine will has not only this characteristic, that it is an act of will, but at the same time this also, that it is the cause of all things that are acts. The act of our will can therefore con form to the divine will either as an effect to its cause or as a will to a will.
Now the conformity of an effect to its cause is found in a different way among natural and among voluntary causes. In the case of natural causes the conformity is to be found according to a likeness in nature. For example, man begets a man, and fire begets lire. But in the case of voluntary causes the effect is said to confirm to the cause by reason of the fact that the cause is fulfilled in the effect. Thus a product of art is likened to its cause, not because it is of the same nature as the art which is in the mind of the artist, but because the form of the art is fulfilled in the product. It is in this way that an effect of the will is confirmed to the will when what the will disposes comes about. And so an act of our will confirms to the divine will by reason of the fact that we will what God wants us to will.
The conformity of one will to another in its act, however, can be taken in two ways: (1) according to the form of a species, as man is like man, and (2) according to an added form, as a will man is like a will man.
One will is like another in species, I say, when the two have in common the same object; for from the object the act draws its species. But in the object of the will two aspects are to be taken into account: one which is, as it were, material—the thing willed; another which is, as it were, formal—the reason for willing, which is the end. It is like the case of the object of sight, in which colour is in effect material, and light is formal, because by light the colour is made actually visible. Thus on the part of the object two sorts of conformity can be found. One derives from the thing willed. A man, for instance, wills some thing that God wills. This conformity is, in a sense, based upon the material cause; for the object is, as it were, the matter of the act. It is accordingly the least among the types of conformity. The other sort of conformity derives from the reason for willing or the end. This is had when someone wills something for the same reason for Which God wills it. Conformity of this kind is based upon the final cause.
A form added to an act, however, is the mode which it gets from the habit which elicits it. It is in this way that our will is said to be confirmed to the divine when a person wills something from charity just as God does. This is, in a sense, based upon the formal cause.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The will of God cannot be fully known to us. Hence, neither can we ful confirm our will to His. But we can confirm it in pro portion to the knowledge which we have, and we are held to this.
2. A man does not commit two sins in one act, since the essence of sin is an act. There can, however, be two deformities of sin in one act. This is the case when there is joined to the act of some particular sin a circumstance which transmits to it the deformity of another sin. When a man steals the goods of another in order to spend them upon harlots, for instance, the act of theft takes on the deformity of lust from the circumstance of the reason why.
When, however, there is found in the ace of some sin, over and above the specific deformity of that sin, some element of deformity which is common to every sin, by that fact neither the sin nor the deformity of the sin is doubled. For such things as are to be found in all sins in common are, as it were, the essential principles of sin as such; and they are included in the deformity of any specific sin just as the principles of a genus are included in the formal character of the species. Not being distinct from the specific deformity of the sin, they do not add to it numerically. Such things are turning away from God, not obeying the divine law, and others, among which must be accounted the lack of conformity of which we are speaking. Hence it is not necessary that such a defect should double the sin or the deformity of the sin.
3. Although one who acts contrary to conformity sins by this very fact, yet by reason of what is generic he does not add anything numerically to what is specific.
4. Although one who sins venially does not in this act confirm his will to the divine, yet he does confirm it habitually. Nor is he obliged always to go into act, but on according to the place and time. Me is, however, obliged never to do anything contrary. But one who sins venially does not act contrary to the conformity in question but rather beyond its scope. Hence it does not follow that he sins mortally.
5. The commandment about the conformity of will does not bind every time our will passes into act but just when we are obliged to think about the state of our salvation, as when we are obliged to con fess or receive the sacraments or do something of the sort.
6. A person is said to be obstinate in two senses: (1) This is said absolutely, when he has a will irreversibly adhering to evil. In this sense those who are in hell are obstinate, but not anyone in this life. Those who are in hell are still held to the conformity of which we are treating. Although they cannot attain it, nevertheless they were themselves the cause of their own impotence. They accordingly sin in not confirming their wills, although it happens that they do not incur demerit because they are not wayfarers. (2) A person is said to be obstinate in a certain respect, when, namely, he has a will adhering to evil which is not altogether irreversible but reversible only will great difficulty. It is in this sense that some are said to be obstinate in this life. These are able to confirm their will to God’s. Hence in not confirming they not only sin but also incur demerit.
7. Everyone is obliged, as far as depends upon him, to have charity; and whoever does not sins by a sin of omission. Still he does not necessarily sin at every moment in which he does not have it, but at the time at which he was bound to have it, as when it was incumbent upon him to do something which cannot be done without charity, such as to receive the sacraments.
8. We are said to be obliged to something in two ways: (1) We are obliged in such a way that, if we do not do it, we incur a penalty. And this is the proper sense of being obliged. According to the more common opinion we are not obliged in this way to do anything from charity; but we are so obliged to do something from natural love, and without at least this whatever is done is badly done. By natural love I mean not only that which is implanted in us by nature and is common to all, as all desire happiness, but also that to which n person can attain by natural principles. It is found in actions that are good by reason of their genus, and also in the political virtues. (2) We are said to be obliged to something because without it we are unable to attain our end, beatitude. In this way we are obliged to do something from charity, without which nothing that merits eternal life can be done. It is accordingly clear how the mode of charity in one way fails within the scope of commandment and in another does not.
9. Man is confirmed to God since he is made to God’s image and likeness. It is true that, because man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be a proportion between hmm and God in the proper sense of proportion as found among quantities, Consisting of a certain measure of two quantities compared to each other. Nevertheless in the sense in which the term proportion is transferred to signify any relationship of one thing to another (as we say that there is n likeness of proportions in this instance: the pilot is to his ship as the ruler to the commonwealth), nothing prevents our saying that there is a proportion of man to God, since man stands in a certain relation ship to Him inasmuch as he is made by God and subject to Him.
Or the answer could be given that, although there cannot be between the finite and the infinite a proportion properly so called, yet there can be a proportiona1j or the likeness of two proportions. We say that four is proportioned to two because it is the double; but we say that four is proportionable to six because four is to two as six is to three. In the same way, although the finite and the infinite cannot be proportioned they can be proportionable, because the finite is equal to the finite just as the infinite is to the infinite. In this way there is a likeness of the creature to God, because the creature stands to the things which are its own as God does to those which belong to Him.
io. The creature is not said to be confirmed to God as to one who shares in the same form in which it shares, but because God is substantially the very form in which the creature participates by a sort of imitation. It is as if lire were likened to a separate subsistent heat.
11. Although likeness and conformity are reciprocal relations, these terms do not always designate indifferently the reference of either one of the related members to the other. It is only when the form on which the likeness or conformity is based is in each of the extremes in the same way, as whiteness is in two men. In that case either one can aptly be said to have the form of the other; and this is what is meant when something is said to be like another. But when the form is in one principally and in the other in n secondary way, reciprocity of the likeness is not had. Thus we say that the statue of Hercules is like Hercules, but not the other way about; for it cannot be said that Hercules has the form of the statue, but only that the statue has the form of Hercules. In this way creatures are said to be similar and Conformed to God but not God to creatures. But since confirmation is a motion toward conformity, it does not imply a reciprocal relation but presupposes one of the related members and denotes that something else is moving toward conformity will it. Succeeding things are confirmed to preceding, but not conversely.
12. The statement of Anselm is w be understood as meaning, not that man always does the will of God as far as he can, but that the divine will is always fulfilled in his regard whether he wills it or not.
Parallel readings: I Sentences 48, aa. 2 & 4; Sum. Theol., I-II, 19, 10.
Difficulties:
It seems that we are not, for
1. Paul desired "to be dissolved and to be will Christ," as is said in the Epistle to the Philippians (j: 23). But God did not want this. Hence Paul adds: "I know that I shah abide" (1:25) for your sake. If, then, we are obliged to will what God wills, in desiring to be dissolved and to be will Christ, Paul sinned. But that is absurd.
2. What God knows can be revealed to someone else. Now God knows that a certain person is reprobated. He can therefore reveal to someone his reprobation. On the supposition that He reveals this to someone, it therefore follows that this person is bound to will his own damnation if we are bound to will what we know God wills. To will one’s own damnation, however, is contrary to charity, by which each one loves himself even to eternal life. A person would therefore be bound to will something against charity. But that is not befitting.
3. We are obliged to obey a superior as God Himself since we obey him in God’s stead. But a subject is not obliged to do and to will whatever he knows his superior wishes, even if he knows that the superior wishes him to do it, unless the superior expressly commands it. We are therefore not obliged to will whatever God wills or what ever He wishes us to will.
4. Whatever is praiseworthy and honorable is found in Christ most perfectly and without the admixture of anything contrary. But will some will Christ willed the Contrary of what He knew God wished; for will some kind of will he willed not to suffer, as the prayer He prayed shows: "My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me" (Matthew z6: even though God wished Him to suffer. To will whatever God wills is therefore not praiseworthy, nor are we held to it.
5. According to Augustine sadness is had regarding the things which have happened to us against our will. But the Blessed Virgin felt sorrow at the death of her son, as is indicated in the words of Simeon; "Thy own soul a sword shall pierce" (Lc 2,35). The Blessed Virgin therefore did not will Christ to suffer, but God wished it. Now if we are obliged to will what God wills, the Blessed Virgin sinned in this instance. But that cannot be granted. Thus it is seen that we are not obliged to confirm our will to God’s as to the object.
To the Contrary:
1'. Concerning the words of the Psalm (100:4): "The perverse heart did not cleave to me," the Gloss says: "He who does not will whatever God wills has a twisted heart." But everyone is obliged to avoid having a twisted heart. Therefore everyone is obliged to will what God wills.
2’. According to Tully friendship is willing and not willing the same thing. But everyone is obliged to have friendship for God. Hence everyone is obliged to will what God wills and not to will what He does not will.
3’. We should confirm our will to God’s for the reason that the will of God is the rule of our will, as the Gloss says, commenting on the words of the Psalm (32:l): "Praise becometh the upright." But the object of the divine will, too, is the rule of every other object, Since it is the first thing willed, and the first in each genus is the measure of the things that come after, as is said in the Metaphysics. We are therefore obliged to confirm the objects of our will to the object of the divine will.
4’. Sin consists principally in perversity of choice. But there is perversity of choice when the lesser good is preferred to the greater. Now whoever docs not will what God wills does this, Since it is evident that what God wills is best. Hence, whoever does not will what God Wills Sins.
5’. According to the Philosopher the virtuous man is "the rule and measure" for all human acts. But Christ is most virtuous. We should therefore most of all confirm ourselves to Christ as our rule and measure. Now Christ confirmed his will to the divine will even as regards its objects; and all the blessed do the same. Therefore we too are obliged to confirm our will to the divine even as regards its objects.
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