De veritate EN 199
199
In regard to the object of our will we are in a sense obliged to con form our will to God’s and in a sense we are not. We are obliged to confirm our will to God’s in this respect (as has been said that the divine goodness is the rule and measure of every good will. But since good depends upon the end, a will is called good on the basis of its relation to the reason for willing, which is the end. The reference of the will to the object, however, does not in itself make the act of will good, since the object stands materially, as it were, to the reason for willing, which is an upright end. One and the same object can be desired either rightly or wrongly according as it is referred to different ends; and on the other hand different and even contrary objects can both be willed rightly by being referred to an upright end. There fore, although the will of God cannot be anything but good, and whatever He wills He wills rightly, nevertheless the goodness in the very act of the divine will is viewed from the standpoint of the reason for willing, that is, the end to which God refers whatever He wills, His own goodness.
Thus we are obliged to confirm absolutely to the divine will in regard to the end, but in regard to the object only in so far as it is viewed under the aspect of its relation to the end. This relation must always please us too, though the same object of will can justly displease us under some other aspect, such as its being referable to some contrary end. Hence it is that the human will is found to confirm to the divine will in its object inasmuch as it stands related to the divine will.
The will of the blessed, who are in continuous contemplation of the divine goodness and regulate by it all their affections, knowing fully the relationship to it of each object of their desires, is con formed to the divine will in every one of its objects. For everything that they know God wills, they will absolutely and without any motion to the contrary.
Sinners, however, who are turned away from willing the divine goodness, are at variance in many respects from what God wills, disapproving of it and in no way assenting to it.
Righteous wayfarers, on the other hand, whose will adheres to the divine goodness but who yet do not so perfectly contemplate it that they clearly perceive every relation to it of the things to be willed, confirm to the divine will as regards those objects for which they perceive the reason, though there is in them some affection for the contrary. It is praiseworthy in them, however, because of the other relation Considered in their case. They do not follow this affection obstinately but subject it to the divine will, because it pleases them that the order of the divine will be fulfilled in all things. A man, for instance, who wishes his father to live because of his filial affection while God wishes him to die, if he is saintly, subjects his own will to God’s so as not to bear it impatiently if the will of God contrary to his own will is fulfilled.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Paul desired to be dissolved and to be will Christ as something good in itself. Nonetheless the contrary was pleasing to him will reference to the fruit that God willed to draw from his living. For this reason he said: "But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you" (Philippians I: 24).
2. Although in His absolute power God could reveal to someone his damnation, this can nevertheless not be done in His ordered power, because such a revelation would drive the man to despair. And if such a revelation were made to anyone, it would have to be understood, not as a prophecy of predestination or foreknowledge, but as one of warning, which is based upon the supposition that merits are taken into account. But granted that it were to be understood in the sense of a prophecy of foreknowledge, the one to whom such a revelation were made would still not be obliged to will his own damnation absolutely but only according to the order of justice, in which God wills to damn those who persist in sin. For God does not on His own part will to damn anyone, but only in accordance will what depends upon us, as is clear from what has been said above. To will one’s own damnation absolutely, then, would not be to confirm one’s will to God but to confirm it to the will of sin.
3. The will of the superior is not, like the divine will, the rule of our will; rather his command is. Thus the case is not the same.
4. The passion of Christ could be considered in two ways: (I) in itself, inasmuch as it was an affliction of an innocent person, and (2) in its relation to the fruit to which God ordained it. In this latter sense it was willed by God, not in the former. The will of Christ which could consider that relation, namely, His rational will, there fore willed this passion as God did; but the will of sensuality, which is not capable of comparing but is brought to bear upon something absolutely, did not will this passion. In this respect also it was confirmed to the divine will, in a sense, even as regards the object, be cause even God Himself did not will the passion of Christ taken in itself.
g. The will of the Blessed Virgin was averse to the passion of Christ considered in itself; yet it willed the fruit of salvation which was coming from the passion of Christ. Thus it was confirmed to the divine will both as regards what it was willing and as regards what it was not willing.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
1'. The words of the Gloss are to be understood of the objects of the divine will as they stand under the reference to the end and not absolutely.
2’. Friendship consists in harmony of wills rather as regards the end than as regards the direct objects themselves. A fever patient whose craving for will was denied by his physician because of their common desire for the patient’s health would find in that physician a truer friend than if the latter were willing to satisfy the patient’s desire for a drink of will at the peril of his health.
3'. As was said above, the first object of God’s will and the measure and rule of all its other objects is the end which His will has, His own goodness. All other things He wills only for this end. Thus, as long as our will is confirmed to the divine will in regard to the end, all the objects of our will are regulated by the first object of will.
4’. Choice includes both the judgment of reason and appetitive tendency. If, then, anyone should in a judgment prefer what is less good to what is more good, there will be perversity of choice, but not if he should prefer it in tending appetitively; for a man is not obliged always to carry out in his action what is better unless it is something that he is bound to by a commandment. Otherwise everyone would be obliged to follow the counsels of perfection, which clearly are better.
5'. There are certain respects in which we can admire Christ but not imitate Him. Examples would be whatever pertains to His divinity and to the beatitude which He had while still in this life. An instance of this is the conformity of Christ’s rational will to the divine will even as regards its objects.
Parallel readings. De veritate, 22, 6; il Sentences 25, a. 2; Sum. Theol., I, 3; 83, I-II, 13, 6; De na1o, 6; In I Perihermen., 14, nn. 23 & 24.
Difficulties:
It seems that he is not, for
1. It is written in Jeremias (10:23): "The way of man is not his:
neither is it in a man to walk and to direct his steps." But a man is said to be endowed will free choice inasmuch as he is the master of his own actions Man is therefore not endowed will free choice.
2. The answer was given that the statement of the prophet refers to meritorious acts, which are not in man’s natural power.—On the Contrary, regarding things that are not in our power we do not have free choice. If, then, merits are not in our power, we do not have free choice as to meriting; and so meritorious acts will not proceed from free choice.
3. According to the Philosopher "that is free which is for its own sake." But the human mind has a cause of its own motion other than itself, namely, God. On the words of the Epistle to the Romans (1:24): "Wherefore, God gave them up..."the Gloss comments: "It is evident that God works in the minds of men to turn their wills to whatever He wishes." The human mind therefore is not endowed will free choice.
4. It was answered that the human mind is as the principal cause of its own act and God is as the remote cause, and that this does not prevent the freedom of the mind.—On the contrary, the more a cause influences the effect, the more it stands as the principal cause. But the first cause influences the effect more than the second, as is said in The Causes. Hence the first cause is more the principal cause than the second; and thus our mind is not the principal cause of its own act, but God is.
5. Every mover that is moved, moves as an instrument, as is clear from the Commentator. But an instrument is not free in its action, since it does not act except inasmuch as it is used. Since, then, the human mind operates only when moved by God, it does not seem to be endowed will free choice.
6. Free choice is said to be a capability of the will and reason by which good is chosen will the help of grace or evil is chosen without it. But there are many who do not have grace. Hence they cannot freely choose good; and so they do not have free choice regarding good things.
7. Slavery is opposed to freedom. But in man there is found the slavery of sin because "whoever committed sin is the servant of sin," as is said in John (8:34) In man, then, there is no freedom of choice.
8. Anselm says that if we had the power of sinning and not sinning, we should not need grace. But the power of sinning and not sinning is free choice. Then, since we need grace, we do not have free choice.
9. Each thing is named from the best, as is gathered from the Philosopher. But as applied to human actions "the best" means meritorious acts. Therefore, since man does not have free choice as to these, because "without me you can do nothing," as is said in John (15:5) will reference to meritorious acts, it seems that man should not be said to be endowed will free choice.
10. Augustine says that, because man did not will to abstain from sin when he could have, he has had inflicted upon him the inability to do so when he wishes. It is therefore not in man’s power to sin and not to sin; and so it seems that he is not the master of his own actions and is not endowed will free choice.
11. Bernard distinguishes a threefold freedom: of choice, of counsel, and of liking. He says that freedom of choice is that by which we decide "what we are permitted to do"; freedom of counsel, that by which we decide "what it is expedient to do"; and freedom of liking, that by which we decide "what it pleases us to do." But human discernment is wounded by ignorance. It therefore seems that freedom of choice, which consists in discernment has not remained in man after his sin.
12. Man does not have freedom concerning those things in regard to which he is under necessity. But in regard to sins man is under necessity, because, according to Augustine, since original sin it has been necessary for man to sin mortally before reparation and at least venially after reparation. Regarding sin, therefore, man does not have free choice.
13. Whatever God foreknows must necessarily come about, Since God’s foreknowledge cannot be in error. But God foreknows all human acts. They therefore come about of necessity, and so man is not endowed will free choice in his action.
14. The nearer a mobile being is to the prime mover, the more uniform it is in its motion. This is apparent in the heavenly bodies, whose motions are always the same. Now, since every creature is moved by God, for "He moves corporeal creatures in time and space, and spiritual creatures in time," as Augustine says, l a rational creature is the mobile being nearest to God, the prime mover of all. It therefore has a motion most uniform; and its capacity accordingly does not extend to many different things so that it can by that fact be said to have free choice.
15. According to the Philosopher, it belongs to the excellence of the highest heaven that it attain its end in a single motion. But the rational soul is more excellent than that heaven, since, according to Augustine, spirit ranks higher than body. The human soul therefore has a single motion, and so it does not seem to be endowed will free choice.
16. It befitted the divine wisdom to place the most sublime creature in the best conditions. But that which immovably adheres to the most excellent being has been placed in the best conditions. It has therefore befitted God to make rational nature, which is the most sublime among creatures such that it adheres to Him immovably. But if that nature were endowed will free choice, it would not have such immovable adherence so it seems. It was therefore fitting that rational nature be made without free choice.
17. The philosophersl3 define free choice as a free judgment of reason. The judgment of reason, however, can be constrained by the force of a demonstration But what is constrained is not free. Man is therefore not endowed will free choice.
18. The reason why the intellect or reason can be constrained is that there is some truth which has no admixture or appearance of falsity. On this account the intellect cannot escape assenting to it. But there is likewise found a good which has no admixture of evil either in fact or in appearance. Now since good is the object of the will as truth is that of the intellect, it therefore seems that the will is constrained just like the intellect. Thus man does not have freedom either as to his will or as to his reason; and so he does not have free choice as a capability of will and reason.
19. According to the Philosopher, "each person judges of the end in accordance will his own character." But it is not in our power to be one kind of person rather than another, since a man’s particular temperament is had from birth and, as some maintain, depends upon the arrangement of the stars. It is therefore not in our power to approve this or that end. But every judgment about a course of action is based upon the end. We are therefore not endowed will free choice.
20. Free choice is opposed to necessity. But in certain respects the will of man is under necessity, for he necessarily wills happiness. He therefore does not have freedom in regard to all things, and so is not endowed will free choice in regard to all.
To the Contrary:
1'. Ecclesiasticus (15:14) says: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the Gloss comments: "That is, in the power of his free choice."
2’. There is found in reality one agent which acts out of nothing and not from necessity. That is God. And there is found another agent which acts out of something and from necessity, namely, natural agents. But according to the Philosopher, when extremes are given in reality, it follows that means are given. But between the above two extremes there can be only two different means, and it is impossible for one of these to exist: namely, an agent acting out of nothing and of necessity; for only God acts out of nothing, and He does not act from necessity but from will. There is left, therefore, only a being which acts out of something and not from necessity. This is a rational nature, which acts upon pre-existing matter and not from necessity but from free choice.
3’. Free choice is a capability of will and reason. But reason and will are found in man. So too, then, is free choice.
4’. According to the Philosopher, "counsel is taken only in regard to the things that are in our power." But men take counsel about their own actions. Men are therefore masters of their own actions, and are accordingly endowed will free choice.
5’. Commands and prohibitions should be imposed only upon one who can do or not do; otherwise they would be imposed in vain. But Prohibitions and commands are divinely imposed upon man. It is therefore in man’s power to do or not to do; and so he is endowed will free choice.
6’. No one should be punished or rewarded for something which it is not in his power to do or not to do. But man is justly punished and rewarded by God for his deeds. Therefore man can do and not do; and so he is endowed will free choice.
7’. A cause must be assigned for everything which happens. But we cannot assign as the cause of human actions God Himself immediately, because the things which are immediately from God cannot be anything but good; and human actions are sometimes good, sometimes bad. It further cannot be said that the cause of human actions is necessity, because there proceed from necessity things which are always the same; but we do not see this verified in human actions. It likewise cannot be said that fate or the arrangement of the stars is the cause of these actions, because human actions would have to come about from necessity, just as their cause is necessary. Nor can nature be their cause, as is shown by the variety of human actions; for nature is determined to one course of action and cannot fail in it except in a minority of cases. Nor can fortune or chance be the cause of human actions, because fortune and chance are the cause of things that hap pen rarely and without being intended, as is said in the Physics; but this is not verified in human actions. Nothing is left, then, but that the man who is doing the acting is himself the principle of his own acts, and consequent has free choice.
200
Without a doubt it must be affirmed that man is endowed will free choice. The faith obliges us to this, since without free choice there cannot be merit and demerit, or just punishment and reward. Clean indications from which it appears that man freely chooses one thing and refuses another, also lead us to this. Evident reasoning also forces us to this conclusion. Tracing out by its means the origin of free choice for the purposes of our investigation, we shall proceed as follows.
Among things which are moved or which act in any way, this difference is found. Some have within themselves the principle of their motion or operation; and some have it outside themselves, as is the case will those which are moved violently, "in which the principle is outside and the being subjected to the violence contributes nothing," as the Philosopher teaches. We cannot hold free choice to be in the latter inasmuch as they are not the cause of their own motion, whereas a free being is "that which is for its own sake," as the Philosopher teaches.
Among the things whose principle of motion is within themselves some are such as to move themselves, as animals; but there are some which do not move themselves even though they do have within themselves some principle of their motion, as heavy and light things. These do not move themselves because they cannot be distinguished into two parts, of which one does the moving and the other is moved. This double principle -is verified in animals. Their motion is consequent upon a principle within them, their form. Because they have this from the being which generated them, they are said to be moved essentially by their genitor and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle, according to the Philosopher. These are moved by means of themselves but not by themselves. Hence free choice is not found in these either, because they are not their own cause of acting and moving but are set to acting or moving by something which they have received from another.
Among those beings which are moved by themselves, the motions of some come from a rational judgment; those of others, from a natural judgment. Men act and are moved by a rational judgment, for they deliberate about what is to be done. But all brutes act and are moved by a natural judgment. This is evident from the fact that all brutes of the same species work in the same way, as all swallows build their nests alike. It is also evident from the fact that they have judgment in regard to some definite action, but not in regard to all. Thus bees have skill at making nothing but honeycombs; and the same is true of other animals.
It is accordingly apparent to anyone who considers the matter aright that judgment about what is to be done is attributed to brute animals in the same way as motion and action are attributed to in animate natural bodies. Just as heavy and light bodies do not move themselves so as to be by that fact the cause of their own motion, so too brutes do not judge about their own judgment but follow the judgment implanted in them by God. Thus they are not the cause of their own decision nor do they have freedom of choice. But man, judging about his course of action by the power of reason, can also judge about his own decision inasmuch as he knows the meaning of an end and of a means to an end, and the relationship of the one will reference to the other. Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed will free choice—that is to say, will a free judgment about acting or not acting.
Answers to Difficult
1. In man’s activity two elements are to be found: (1) the choice of a course of action; and this is always in a man’s power; and (2) the carrying out or execution of the course of action; and this is not al ways within a man’s power; but under guidance of divine providence the project is sometimes brought to completion, sometimes not. Thus a man is not said w be free in his actions but free in his choice, which is a judgment about what is to be done. This is what the name free choice refers to.—Or we can distinguish Concerning meritorious deeds, as has been done in the objections. The first answer, however, is that of Gregory of Nyssa.
2. A meritorious deed does not differ from an unmeritorious deed by reason of what is done but by reason of how it is done; for there is nothing which one man does meritoriously and from charity which another cannot do or even will without merit. The fact, then, that a man cannot perform meritorious deeds without grace in no way de- tracts from the freedom of his choice, because a man is said to have free choice in so far as he can do this or that, not in so far as he can do it in this way or in that; for even according to the philosophers24 One who does not yet have the habit of a virtue does not have it in his power to act in the same way as a virtuous man acts except in the sense that he can acquire the habit of the virtue.
Although man cannot by his free choice acquire the grace which makes works meritorious, he nevertheless can prepare himself to have grace, which will not be denied him by God if he does what is within his power. Thus it is not altogether outside the power of free choice toper form meritorious works, although the power of free choice does not of itself suffice for this, inasmuch as the manner of operating which is required for merit exceeds the capabilities of nature. The mode which is in works arising from the political virtues, however, does not. But no one would say that man does not have free choice merely because he cannot will or choose in the manner in which God or an angel can.
3. God works in each agent, and in accord will that agent’s manner of acting, just as the first cause operates in the operation of a secondary cause, since the secondary cause cannot become active except by the power of the first cause. By the fact, then, that God is a cause working in the hearts of men, human minds are not kept from being the cause of their own motions themselves. Hence the note of freedom is not taken away.
4. The first cause is called the principal cause, absolutely speaking, because it has the greater influence upon the effect. But the secondary cause is called the principal cause in a certain respect, inasmuch as the effect is more confirmed to it.
5. An instrument is spoken of in two ways: (1) Properly when something is so moved by another that there is not conferred upon it by the mover any principle of such a motion, as a saw is moved by the carpenter. Such an instrument is wholly without freedom. (2) More commonly whatever moves something and is moved by another is called an instrument, whether there is in it the principle of its own motion or not. In this sense it is not necessary for the notion of freedom to be wholly excluded from that of an instrument, because some thing can be moved by another and still move itself. This is the case will the human mind.
6. One who does not have grace can choose good, but not meritoriously. This, however, does not detract from the freedom of choice, as has been said.
7. The slavery of sin does not imply force, but either inclination, inasmuch as a preceding sin in some way leads to following ones, or a deficiency in natural virtue, which is unable to free itself from the stain of sin once it has subjected itself to it. Thus there always remains in man the freedom from force by which he naturally has free choice.
8. In the words quoted Anselm is speaking as an objector. He him self shows later on that the need of grace does not contradict free choice.
9. The power of free choice extends to the very work which is meritorious, although not without God, without whose power nothing in the world can act. But the mode by which a work becomes meritorious exceeds the capabilities of nature, as has been said.
10. On this matter there are two opinions. Some say that a man in the state of mortal sin cannot long avoid sinning mortally, but he can avoid this or that particular mortal sin, as all say itt common concerning venial sins. Thus this necessity does not seem to take away the freedom of choice. There is another opinion holding that a man in the state of mortal sin can avoid all mortal sin but cannot avoid being in the state of sin, because he cannot rise from sin by himself as he can fall into sin by himself. According to this opinion the freedom of choice is more easily upheld. We shah inquire about this be lo when the scope of free choice is treated.
11. Our will is brought to bear upon an end or upon a means to an end. And the end may be honorable useful, or pleasurable in accordance will the threefold division of good into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. In regard to an honorable end Bernard lays down freedom of choice. In regard to a useful good, which is a means, he lays down freedom of counsel. In regard to a pleasurable good he lays down freedom of liking. Now, although our discernment is di minished by ignorance, it is still not altogether taken away. Thus the freedom of choice is indeed weakened by sin but is not wholly lost.
12. According to one opinion after a sin and before reparation man necessarily sins in the sense of having sin but not in that of using sin. Thus sinning is spoken of in two ways, like seeing, as the Philosopher explains.32 Or, according to another opinion,33 man necessarily sins by some sin, though he is under no necessity in regard to any particular sin.
13. From God’s foreknowledge it cannot be concluded that acts are necessary will absolute necessity, which is called the necessity of the consequent, but merely by a conditioned necessity which is called the necessity of consequence, as Boethius makes clear.
14. Being moved is spoken of in two ways: (1) Properly, as the Philosopher defines motion, saying that it is "the act of a being in potency in so far as it is such." In this sense it is true that the nearer a mobile being is to the prime mover, the greater the uniformity of motion which is found in it, because the nearer it is to the prime mover, the more perfect it is and the more in act and less in potency, and therefore the fewer the motions by which it is movable. (2) Broadly, as applied to any operation, such as to understand or to sense. Taking motion in this sense, the Philosopher says that motion is "the act of what is perfect," because everything acts in so far as it is in act. Thus understood, the statement in question is in some sense true and in some sense is not.
If the uniformity of the motion is considered from the point of view of its effects, the statement is false, because the more powerful and perfect an operator is, the more effects its power extends to. But 1f it is Considered from the point of view of the manner of acting, the statement is true; for the more perfect an operator is, the more it pre serves the same manner in acting, Since it departs less from its nature and disposition, and the manner of acting follow these.
Now rational minds are not called mobile in the first sense of motion, because such motion belongs only to bodies; but rather in the second. It is in this sense that Plato affirmed that the prime mover moves itself inasmuch as it wills and understands itself, as the Commentator points out. It is accordingly not necessary that rational minds be determined to any particular effects. They rather have efficacy in regard to many; and it is by reason of this that freedom be longs to them.
15. It is not always necessary that a thing which can attain its end will fewer motions or operations be nobler, because sometimes one thing attains a more perfect end will many operations than another can attain will a single operation, as the Philosopher says. In this way rational minds are found to be more perfect than the highest heaven, which has only one motion, because they attain a more perfect end, although they do it will many operations.
16. Although a creature would be better if it adhered unchangeably to God, nevertheless that one also is good which can adhere to God or not adhere. And so a universe in which both sorts of creatures are found is better than if only one or the other were found. And this is the answer of Augustine. It can be said, following Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, that it is impossible for any creature to be capable of adhering to God will an unchangeable will by its own nature, because, being from nothing, it is changeable. If however, any creature adheres unchangeably to God, it is not on this account deprived of free choice, because it can do or not do many things while adhering to God.
17. The judgment to which freedom is attributed is a judgment of choice, not a judgment by which a man pronounces upon conclusions in speculative sciences. For choice is a sort of decision about what has been previously deliberated.
18. Not only is there something true which is necessarily accepted by the intellect because of its freedom from any admixture of falsity, as the first principles of demonstration; but there is also a good which is necessarily desired by the will because of its freedom from any ad mixture of evil, namely, happiness itself. Yet it does not follow that the will is constrained by that object, because constraint implies some thing contrary to one’s will, which is the inclination of the one willing. Constraint does not imply anything contrary to the intellect, however, because intellect does not mean an inclination of the one understanding.
From the necessity of that good, moreover, there is not introduced into the will any necessity in regard to other objects, as from the necessity of the first principles there is introduced into the intellect a necessity of assenting to conclusions. This is because to that first object of will other objects do not either really or apparently have a necessary relationship which would make it impossible to have the first object of will without those others; whereas demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relationship to the principles from which they are demonstrated such that, if the conclusions did not turn out to be true, the principles would necessarily not be true.
19. Neither from the heavenly bodies nor from anything else do men acquire from birth immediately in the intellective soul any disposition by which they are inclined will necessity to choose any particular end; except that there is in them from their very nature a necessary appetite for their last end, happiness. But this does not pre vent the freedom of choice, since different ways to attain that end remain open to choice. The reason for this is that the heavenly- bodies do not have any immediate influence upon the rational soul.
There is acquired from birth, however, in the body of the child a certain disposition both from the power of the heavenly bodies and from inferior causes, which are the semen and the matter of the one conceived; and by it the soul is in some sense made prone to choose something inasmuch as the choice of the rational soul is inclined by the passions, which are in the sense appetite, a bodily power dependent upon the dispositions of the body. But no necessity in choosing is thereby introduced into it, since it is within the power of the rational soul to admit or to repress the passions which arise. Later on, however, a man is made to be of a certain sort by a habit—either an acquired habit, of which we are the cause, or an infused habit, which is not given without our consent even though we are not the cause of it. From this habit it results that the man efficaciously tends to an end consonant will that habit. And yet that habit does not introduce any necessity or take away the freedom of choice.
20. Since choice is a judgment about what is to be done or follows such a judgment, there can be choice only about what falls under our judgment. But in matters of action our judgment is drawn from the end, just as our judgment about conclusions is drawn from principles. We do not, however, judge about first principles, examining them, but naturally assent to them and examine all other things in their light. In the same way, then, when there is question of the objects of ap petite, we do not judge about the last end by any judgment involving discussion and examination but we naturally approve of it. Concerning it there is, accordingly, no choice, but there is will. We have in its regard, therefore, a free will, since according to Augustine the necessity of natural inclination is not repugnant to freedom; but not a free judgment, properly speaking, since it does not fail under choice.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 23, i C; II Sentences 25, 1, I ad 7; Contra Gentiles II, 48; Sum. Theol., I, 59, 3 C; 83, I C; I—II, 13, 2.
Difficulties:
It seems that there is, for
1. We are said to have free choice in so far as our acts are voluntary. But according to the Philosopher "children and brutes share in the voluntary." Then there is free choice in brutes.
2. According to the Philosopher in everything which moves itself there is the ability to be moved and not be moved. But brutes move themselves. There is in them, therefore, the ability to be moved and not be moved. But we are said to be endowed will free choice from the fact that there is in us the ability to do something, as is clear from Gregory of Nyssa and from Damascene. There is, therefore, free choice in brutes.
3. Free choice implies two things, judgment and freedom, both of which are to be found in brutes. They have some judgment about what is to be done, as appears from the fact that they go after one thing and run from another. They have freedom, since they can be moved or net. Hence there is in them free choice.
4. When a cause is placed, the effect is placed. But Damascene gives as the cause of free choice the fact that our soul begins will a change; because it is from nothing, it is changeable, and stands in potency to many different things. But the soul of a brute also begins will a change. Hence in it also there is free choice.
5. That is said to be free which is not obliged to anything. But the soul of a brute is not obliged to either of two opposites, because its power is not determined to one course of action, like the power of natural things, which always act in the same way. The soul of a brute therefore has free choice.
6. Punishment is not due to anyone unless he has free choice. But in the Old Law punishment is found to be inflicted upon brutes, as appears in Exodus 19: i 3 in the case of the beast touching the mountain, in Exodus 21:28 in the case of the goring ox, and in Leviticus 20:16 in the case of the beast of burden will which a woman has intercourse. Brutes therefore seem to have free choice.
7. As the saint so point out, it is a sign that man has free choice that he is instigated to good and withdrawn from evil by commands. But we see brutes enticed by favors, moved by precepta, or made afraid by threats w do something or w let it alone. Brutes therefore have free choice.
8. A divine command is given only w someone that has free choice. But a divine command is given to brutes. In Jonas (4:7) according to one version it is said: "God commanded a worm... and it struck the ivy." Brutes therefore have free choice.
To the Contrary:
1’. Man is seen to be made to the image of God from the fact that lie has free choice, as Damascenes and Bernard both say. But brutes are not made to the image of God. Therefore they are not endowed will free choice.
2’. Whatever is endowed will free choice acts and is not merely acted upon. But "brutes do not act but are acted upon," as Damascene says. Brutes therefore do not have free choice.
De veritate EN 199