De veritate EN 174
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There have been various positions concerning this question. Some, induced by trivial reasons, were so foolish as to state that God is a substantial part of all things. Some of these, e.g., David of Dinant, taught that He is the same as prime matter. Some others said that He is the form of all things. Now the falsity of this erroneous opinion is immediately made apparent. For when they speak of God, all men understand that He is the effective principle of all things, since all being must flow from a single first being. The efficient cause, how ever, according to the teaching of the Philosopher, does not coincide will the material cause, since they have contrary characters. For a thing is an agent inasmuch as it is in act; but the characteristic of matter is to be in potency. The efficient cause and the form of the effect are the same in species inasmuch as every agent effects some thing similar to itself; but they are not numerically the same, because the maker and the thing made cannot be identical. It is apparent from this that the divine essence is neither the matter of any creature nor is it its form in such a way that by it the creature can be said to be good formally as by an intrinsic form. But every form is a certain likeness of God.
The Platonists therefore said that all things are formally good by the first goodness, not as by a conjoint form, but as by a separated form. For an understanding of this point it should be noted that Plato held that all things that can be separated in thought are separated in reality. Thus, just as man can be understood apart from Socrates and Plato, he taught that man exists apart from Socrates and Plato. Tins he called "man-in-himself" or "the idea of man," and said that by participation in tins man Socrates and Plato are called men. More over, just as he found man common to Socrates and Plato and all others like them, in the same way he found good to be common to all good things and to be capable of being understood independently of any understanding of tins or that good. Hence he asserted that good is separate from all particular goods, and he called it "good-in itself" or "the idea of good." By participation in it, he said, all things are called good. This is set forth by the Philosopher.
There is this difference between the idea of good and that of man as Plato explained them: the idea of man does not extend to every thing, whereas that of good does, even to the other ideas. For even the very idea of good is a particular good. And so it was necessary to say that the very good-in-itself is the universal principle of all things; and this principle is God. It therefore followed, according to this position, that all things are denominated good by the first goodness, winch is God, just as, according to Plato, Socrates and Plato are called men by participation in separated man, not by any humanity inherent in them.
This Platonic position was in a sense followed by the Porretans. They said that we predicate good of a creature either simply, as when we say, "Mari is good," or will some qualification, as when we say, "Socrates is a good man." A creature is called good simply, they said, not by any inherent goodness but by the first goodness—as if good taken absolutely and in general were the divine goodness; but when a creature is called a good something-or-other, it is so denominated from a created goodness, because particular created goodnesses are like particular ideas for Plato. But this opinion is refuted by the Philosopher in a number of ways. He argues that the quiddities and forms of things are in particular things themselves and not separated from them, and he shows tins in various ways. He also argues more specifically that, granting that there are ideas, that position does not apply to good, since good is not predicated univocally of goods; and where the predication was not univocal, Plato did not assign a single idea. This is how the Philosopher proceeds against him in the Ethics. In particular for the point at issue the falsity of the above-mentioned position appears from the fact that every agent is found to effect something like itself. If, therefore, the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its likeness upon the things produced; and so each thing will be called good by reason of an inherent form because of the likeness of the highest good implanted in it, and also because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of all created goodness. In tins respect the opinion of Plato can be held.
We say, therefore, following the common opinion, that all things are good by a created goodness formally as by an inherent form, but by the uncreated goodness as by an exemplary form.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. As has been touched upon above, the reason why creatures would not be good unless goodness were understood in God is this: the goodness of the creature is modeled upon the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that the creature is called good by the uncreated goodness except as by an exemplary form.
2. A thing is denominated will reference to something else in two ways. (1) Tins occurs when the very reference itself is the meaning of the denomination. Thus urine is called healthy will respect to the health of an animal. For the meaning of healthy as predicated of urine is "serving as a sign of the health of an animal." In such cases what is thus relatively denominated does not get its name from a form inherent in it but from something extrinsic to winch it is referred. (2) A thing is denominated by reference to something else when the reference is not the meaning of the denomination but its cause. For instance, air is said to be bright from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being bright. It is in tins way that the creature is called good will reference to God. Consequently the argument is not valid.
3. In many points Augustine follows the opinion of Plato, but just as far as the truth of the faith allows. His words are, consequently, to be interpreted in this way: the divine goodness is called the good of every good in the sense that it is the first efficient and exemplary cause of every good, without excluding a created goodness by winch creatures are denominated good as from an inherent form.
4. The case of general forms is different from that of special forms. Where there is question of special forms, as is clear from Dionysius, the concrete cannot be predicated of the abstract so that we should say: whiteness is white, or heat is hot. But when there is question of general forms, such predication is permitted. 'We say that an essence is a being, goodness is good, oneness is one, and so forth.
The reason for this is that what is first apprehended by the intellect is being. Hence the intellect must attribute this (being) to whatever is apprehended by it. And so when it apprehends the essence of any being, it says that that essence is a being. The same is true of any general or special form; e.g., goodness is a being, whiteness is a being, and so on. And because certain things are inseparably connected will the notion of being, as the one, good, etc., these also must, for the same reason as being, be predicated of anything apprehended. Thus we say that an essence is one and good, and likewise that oneness is one and good; and the same is true of goodness and whiteness and any other general or special form.
The white, however, being special, does not inseparably accompany the notion of being. The form of whiteness can therefore be apprehended without having white attributed to it. Hence we are not forced to say that whiteness is white. White is predicated in a single sense; but being and the one and good and other such attributes winch must necessarily be said of everything apprehended, are predicated in many senses. One thing is called a being because it subsists in itself; another, because it is a principle of subsisting, as a form; another, be cause it is a disposition of a subsisting being, as a quality; another, because it is the privation of a disposition of a subsisting being, as blindness. When, therefore, we say, "An essence is a being," if we go on thus: "Therefore it is a being by something, either by itself or by another," the inference is wrong, because being was not predicated in the sense in which something subsisting will its own existence is a being, but in the sense of that by winch something is. Hence what we should ask is not how an essence is by something else, but how something else is by that essence.
In the same way, when goodness is said to be good, it is not called good in the sense that it is subsisting in goodness, but in the sense in which we eau good that by which something is good. There is, accordingly, no point in inquiring whether goodness is good by its own goodness or by some other, but rather whether by that goodness any thing is good which is distinct from that goodness (as occurs in creatures) or which is identical will that goodness (as is true of God).
5. A similar distinction must be made in regard to truth, namely, that all things are true by the first truth as their first exemplar, even though they are still true by a created truth as their inherent form. There is, nevertheless, a difference between truth and goodness. The essence of truth consists in a certain equation or commensuration. But a thing is designated as measured or commensurate from something extrinsic, as cloth from a forearm or cubit. This is what Anselm meant in saying that all things are true by the first truth; i.e., they are true inasmuch as each is made commensurate to the divine intellect by fulfilling the destiny set for it by divine providence or the foreknowledge had of it. The essence of goodness, however, does not consist in commensuration. Hence there is no parallel here.
6. A creature does not have power over the act of being in the sense that it has being of itself; and yet in some respects it does have power over it, since the creature may be a formal principle of existing. In this way any form has power over the act of being. It is in this way too that created goodness has power over the act of being good as its formal principle.
7. When to be is said to be proper to God, we are not to understand that there is no other act of being than the uncreated one, but only that that act of being is properly said to be inasmuch as, by reason of its immutability, it admits of no has been or will be. But the act of being of a creature is so called by a certain likeness to that first to be, although it has in it an admixture of will be or has been by reason of the mutability of the creature.
Or it can be said that to be is proper to God because only God is His act of being, although others have an act of being, which is, in deed, distinct from the divine act of being.
8. The first goodness does not add anything in reality to goodness taken absolutely, but it does add something conceptually.
9. Pure goodness in itself is made individual and set apart from all other things by the fact that it receives no addition, as the comment in The Causes explains. It does not, however, belong to the notion of goodness taken absolutely to receive an addition or not to receive it. For if it were in its notion to receive an addition, then every good ness would receive an addition, and there would be no pure goodness. Similarly, if it were in its notion not to receive an addition, then no goodness would receive it, and every goodness would be pure good ness. The case is parallel to that of animal, in whose notion is found neither rational for irrational. The very fact of its being unable to receive an addition, therefore, restricts absolute goodness and distinguishes the first goodness, which is pure goodness, from other goodnesses. But the fact of not receiving an addition, being a negation, is a conceptual being, yet founded upon the simplicity of the first goodness. It does not follow, therefore, that this notion is empty and useless.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 21, I ad 1; In De hebdom., 3; Contra Gentiles I, 38 & 70; III, 20; Sum. Theol., 1, 6, Comp. Theol., 1, 109.
Difficulties:
It seems that it is, for
1. That without which a thing cannot be seems to be essential to it. But a creature cannot be without goodness, because nothing can be created by God which is not good. A creature is therefore good by its essence.
2. To be and to be good are had by the creature from the same source, because from the mere fact of having being it is good, as has previously been shown.1 But a creature has being by its essence. By its essence, therefore, it is also good.
3. Whatever belongs to something under the qualification "as such" is essential to it. But good belongs to a creature as existing, because, as Augustine says, "inasmuch as we are, we are good." Hence a creature is good by its own essence.
4. Since goodness is a created form inhering in the creature, as has been shown, it will be either the substantial form or an accidental form. If accidental, the creature will be able sometimes to be without it. But this cannot be said of n creature. It remains, then, that it is the substantial form. But every such form is either the essence of the thing or a part of the essence. A creature is therefore good by its essence.
5. According to Boethius, creatures are good inasmuch as they have emanated from the first good. But they have emanated from the first good essentially. Therefore creatures are essentially good.
6. That which gives its name is always simpler than that which receives the name, or equally simple. But no form added to the essence is simpler than the essence or equally simple. Therefore no other form added to the essence gives its name to the essence; for we cannot say that the essence is white. But the very essence of a thing is named from goodness, for every essence is good. Goodness is therefore not a form added to the essence, and accordingly any creature is essentially good.
7. Just as the one is interchangeable will being, so too is good. But oneness, from which the one which is interchanged will being is designated, does not express a form added to the essence of n thing, as the Commentator says; but everything is one by its essence. So too, then, is everything good by its essence.
8. If a creature is good by a goodness added to its essence, since everything which is, is good, that goodness too, being something real, will be good. But it will not be good by some other goodness —for that would involve an infinite regress— but by its own essence. By the same reasoning, then, it can be asserted that the creature itself is good by its own essence.
To the Contrary:
1'. Nothing which is said of a thing by participation belongs to that thing by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is clear from Augustine. A creature is therefore not good essentially.
2’. Everything that is good by its own essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is clear from Boethius. Creatures, therefore, are not good by their essence.
3’. Whatever has something predicated of it essentially, cannot have its opposite predicated of it. But evil, the opposite of good, is predicated of some creatures. A creature is therefore not good essentially.
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With three authorities we must say that creatures are not good by their essence but by participation. These are Augustine, Boethius, and the author of The Causes, who says that only God is pure good ness. They were, however, brought to the same position by different considerations
For the clarification of this point it should be noted that, as appears from what has been said, goodness is divided into substantial and accidental, just as is the act of being. There is, however, this difference: a thing is called a being in an absolute sense because of its substantial act of existing; but because of its accidental net of existing it is not said to be absolutely. Since generation is n motion toward existence, when someone receives substantial existence, lie is said to be generated without qualification; but when he receives accidental existence, lie is said to be generated in a certain sense. The same also holds for corruption, which is the loss of existence. But just the opposite is true of good. From the point of view of its substantial good ness n thing is said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification. Thus we do not eau an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense— inasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we eau good without further restriction.
The reason for this difference is this. A thing is called a being inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, but good, as has already been made clear, in relation to other things. Now it is by its essential principles that a thing is fully Constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not so perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation to everything outside itself except by means of accidents added to the essence because the operations by which one thing is in some sense joined to another proceed from the essence through powers distinct from it. Consequently nothing achieves goodness absolutely un it is complete in both its essential and its accidental principles.
Any perfection which n creature has from its essential and accidental principles combined, God has in its entirety by His one simple act of being. His essence is His wisdom, His justice, His power, and so forth-all of which in us are distinct from our essence. In God, accordingly, absolute goodness is itself also the same as His essence; but in us it is taken will reference to things that are added to our essence. Consequently, complete or absolute goodness increases and diminishes and disappears entirely in us, but not in God. Our substantial goodness, however, always remains. It is in this sense, it seems, that Augustine says that God is good essentially, but we, by participation.
Still another difference is found between God’s goodness and ours. Goodness is not taken as essential when a nature is considered absolutely but when it is taken in its act of existence. Humanity, for in stance, does not have the note of good or goodness except by its having existence. The divine nature or essence, however, is itself its act of being, whereas the nature or essence of any created thing is not its act of being but participates in being from another. In God, accordingly, the act of being is pure, because God is His own subsistent act of being; but in the creature the act of being is received or participated. Even granted, therefore, that absolute goodness were attributed to a creature because of its substantial existence, nevertheless the fact would still remain that it has goodness by participation, just as it has a participated existence. But God is goodness essentially inasmuch as His essence is His existence. This seems to be the meaning of the philosopher in The Causes when he says that only the divine good ness is pure goodness.
A still further difference is discovered between the divine goodness and that of creatures. Goodness has the character of a final cause. But God has this, since He is the ultimate end of all beings just as He is their first principle. From this it follows that any other end has the status or character of an end only in relation to the first cause, because a secondary cause does not influence the effect unless the influence of the first cause is presupposed, as is made clear in The Causes. Hence too, good, having the character of an end, cannot be said of a creature unless we presuppose the relation of Creator to creature.
Granted, therefore, that a creature were its own act of being, as God is, the act of being of the creature would still not have the character of good except on the supposition of its relation to its Creator; and it would, by that fact, still be called good by participation and not absolutely in its essential constitution. But the divine act of being, which has the character of good even if nothing else is presupposed, has this character of itself. This is what Boethius seems to have meant.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. A creature cannot f all to be good will essential goodness, which is goodness in a qualified sense; yet it can fail to be good will accidental goodness, which is absolute and unqualified goodness. That goodness, moreover, which is referred to from the viewpoint of the substantial act of being is not the very essence of the thing but is a participated act of being. This is true even if the relation to the first act of being subsisting by itself is presupposed.
2. A thing has from the same source being and goodness in a qualified sense, 1.e., in its substantial existence; but it does not formally have from the same source being without qualification and goodness without qualification, as is clear from what has been said. For this reason the conclusion does not follow.
3-4. The same answer applies.
5. A creature is from God not only in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substantial goodness; and also in its additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness. These are not the essence of the thing. And furthermore, even the relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as its source is distinct from the essence.
6. An essence is denominated good in the same way as it is denominated a being. It is good by participation, then, just as it has existence by participation. Existence and good taken in general are simpler than essence because more general, since these are said not only of essence but also of what subsists by reason of the essence and even, too, of accidents.
7. The predication of the one which is interchanged will being is based upon the note of negation which it adds to being. But good does not add to being a negation but essentially consists in something Positive. There is consequently no parallel.
8. The existence of a thing is called a being, not because it has some existence other than itself, but because by that existence the thing is said to be. In just the same way goodness is called good because by it a thing is said to be good. From the fact that the existence of a thing is not called a being because of an existence distinct from itself it does not follow that the substance of the thing is not said to be by an existence which is distinct from it. In just the same way that conclusion does not follow in regard to goodness. It does, however, apply to oneness (in regard to which the Commentator adduces the argument because it makes no difference to the one whether it be referred to essence or to existence. Hence the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing; and so it is not one by any participation, though it is a being and good in this way.
Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I, 5, 5; I-II, 85, 4.
Difficulties:
It seems that it does not, for
Good, according to the Philosopher, has the character of an end. But the whole character of an end consists in order. The whole character of good, therefore, consists in order; and the other two are superfluous.
2. Being, good, and one differ in meaning. But the notion of being consists in species; that of one, in measure. That of good, therefore, does not consist in species and measure.
3. Species designates a formal cause. But in this respect, according to some, good differs from the true, because the true expresses the notion of a formal cause whereas good expresses that of a final cause. Species therefore does not pertain to the notion of good.
4. Evil and good, being opposites, are applied to the same thing. But as Augustine says, "evil is discovered to consist entirely in the privation of species." The whole notion of good, therefore, consists in the positive presence of species; and so measure and order seem superfluous.
5. Measure pertains to the properties of a thing; but a certain good ness belongs to its essence. Measure is therefore not an essential note of good.
6. What God can do through one thing He does not do through several. But God could have made a creature good through one of those three notes, because each one has some aspect of goodness. All three are not, therefore, to be considered necessary for the formal character of good.
7. If those three notes are essential to goodness, then in every good the three must be found. But each of the three is itself good. In each of them, then, there are all three; and so they should not be distinguished from one another.
8. If those three notes are good, they must have measure, species, and order. There will therefore be a measure of the measure, a species of the species, and SO on to infinity.
9. Measure, species, and order are decreased by sin, according to Augustine. But the substantial goodness of a thing is not decreased by sin. The formal character of good therefore does not consist universally in those three notes.
10. Whatever is essential to good does not have evil predicated of it. But measure, species, and order can have evil predicated of them, according to Augustine; for he speaks of "a bad measure," "a bad species," etc. The character of good therefore does not consist in those three notes.
11. Ambrose says: "The nature of light does not consist in number, weight, and dimension like any other creature." But according to Augustine species, measure, and order are constituted by these three. Since, therefore, light is good, the character of good does not include species, measure, and order.
12. According to Bernard the measure of charity is not to have any measure; and yet charity is good. It does not, then, require the three notes mentioned
To the Contrary:
1'. Augustine says: "Where these three are great, the good is great; where they are small, it is small; where they are not at all, it is not at all. The essence of the good therefore consists in measure, species, and order.
2’. Augustine says again: "Things are called good inasmuch as they are measured, specified, and ordered."
3’. A creature is called good from its relation to God, as Boethius maintains. But God bears to the creature the relation of a threefold cause: efficient, final, and exemplary formal. The creature is therefore said to be good according to its relation to God under the aspect of a threefold c Accordingly, because it is referred to God as its efficient cause, it has the measure set for it by God. Referred to God as its exemplary cause, it has species. Referred to Him as its end, it has order. The good of the creature therefore consists in measure, species, and order.
4’. All creatures are oriented to God through the mediation of a rational creature, which alone is capable of beatitude. And this occurs inasmuch as God is known by the rational creature. Since, then, a creature is good from its orientation to God, three things are required for it to be good: that it be existing, that it be knowable, and that it be oriented. But it is existing by its measure, knowable by its species, and oriented by its order. In these three, therefore, the good of a creature consists.
5’. It is said in Wisdom (1 1:21): "But thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight." But according to Augustine measure sets the limit of each thing; number gives its species; and weight gives order. In these three, then, limit or measure, species, and order, consists the goodness of a creature, since a creature is good in virtue of the disposition given it by God.
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The essence of good consists in the above-mentioned three notes, as Augustine says. For the elucidation of this point it should be noted that a name can imply a relation in two ways. (1) The name is used to signify the relation itself, as father or son or even fatherhood. (2) Some names are said to imply a relation because they signify a thing of a given kind which is accompanied by a relation, although the name is not used to signify the relation itself. Thus the word knowledge is used to signify a certain quality which entails a relation, but not to signify the relation itself.
In this way the essence of good implies a relation, not because the name good itself signifies only a relation, but because it signifies some thing which has a relation along will the relation itself. The relation implied in the word good is the status of that which perfects. This follows from the fact that a thing is capable of perfecting not only according to its own specific character but also according to the act of being which it has in reality. In this way an end perfects the means to that end. But since creatures are not their own act of existing, they must have a received existence. Thus their existence is limited and determined according to the measure of the thing in which it is received.
Among the three notes which Augustine lays down, the last, order, is the relation which the name good implies; but the other two, species and measure, are causes of that relation. For species belongs to the very specific character which, having existence in a subject, is received in a determined measure, since everything which is in a subject is in it according to the measure of the subject. Thus every good, being perfective in accordance will both its specific character and its act of being, has measure, species, and order: species in its specific character, measure in its act of being, and order in its status as perfective.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. That argument would hold if the name good were used to signify the relation itself; but this is false, as is apparent from what has been said. The reasoning is therefore not consequent.
2. Good does not differ from being and the one because the notions are opposed but because the notion of good includes those of being and the one and adds something to them.
3. According to the Philosopher, just as in regard to numbers the addition or subtraction of one changes the species of the mumber, so also in definitions the addition or subtraction of anything constitutes a different species. Thus from the species alone is constituted the essence of the true inasmuch as the true is perfective according to the specific character alone, as is clear from what has been said; but from the species plus the measure is constituted the essence of good, which is perfective not only in regard to species but also in regard to the act of being.
4. When Augustine says that evil is discovered to consist entirely in the privation of species, he does not exclude the other two because, as he himself says in the very same book, "where there is any species there is necessarily some measure." Order also follows upon species and measure. But he names species a because the other two are consequent upon species.
5. Wherever something has been received, there measure must be found, since what is received is limited in proportion to the recipient. Since a creature’s act of being, both accidental and essential, is received, measure is found not only in accidentals but also in substantials.
6. Since the essence of the good consists in species, measure, and order, even God could not bring it about that anything should be good without having species, measure, and order, just as it would be impossible for I-11m to make a man who was not a rational animal.
7. Measure, species, and order are each good, not in the sense in which something subsisting in goodness is called good, but in the sense in which the principle of goodness is said to be good. Hence it is not necessary that each of them have measure, species, and order, just as it is not necessary that a form have a form, although it is a being and every being is in virtue of a form. This is the explanation of some who say that, when we speak of all things having measure, species, and order, this applies to things created, not to those which are Co-created
8. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
9. Some say that the measure, species, and order which constitute he good of a real being and those which are in the domain of moral good and are decreased by sin are really the same but differ in concept. One and the same will, for instance, can be considered from the point of view of being a certain reality and thus having in it a measure, species, and order which constitute it a good in the real order, and also from the point of view of being specifically a will with an ordination to grace, and thus having attributed to it a measure, species, and orderable to be decreased through sin, which constitute it a moral good.
Or a better answer would be that, in view of the fact that good is consequent upon existence and is constituted by species, measure, and order, just as substantial and accidental existence are distinct, so substantial and accidental form are obviously distinct; and each has its own measure and order.
10. Measure, species, and order, according to Augustine, are not called bad because they are bad in themselves but either because "they are less than they ought to be" or because "they are not adapted to the things to which they should be adapted." It is accordingly from some privation in point of measure, species, or order that they are called bad, not of themselves.
11. Ambrose’s statement is not to be understood in the sense that light is entirely without measure, since it has a limited species and power, but in the sense that it is not determined as regards any particular corporeal beings because it extends to all things corporeal inasmuch as all of them are capable of being illuminated or of receiving the other effects of light, as Dionysius makes clear.
12. Charity has measure arising from the existence which it has in a subject. In this sense it is a creature. But as referred to an infinite object, God, it has no measure beyond which our charity should not
Parallel readings: De veritate, 21, 2; Contra Gentiles III, 16; Sum. Theol., I,, 1; 80, 1.
Difficulties:
It seems that they do not, for
1. Being is re to the true and to good in the same way since it is interchanged will either one. Furthermore, tendency is related to good as cognition is to the true. But not every being knows the true. Neither, then, does every being tend to good.
2. When the prior is removed the posterior also is removed. But in an animal cognition precedes appetitive tendency. Cognition, how ever, in no sense extends to inanimate things so that we could say that they know naturally. Neither, then, does appetitive tendency extend to them so that we could say that they naturally tend to good.
3. According to Boethius a thing is said to tend to something else inasmuch as it is like it. if, then, something tends to good, it must be like good. But since things are alike which have the same quality or form, the form of good must be in whatever tends to good. Now it cannot be there according to the thing’s real existence, because it would then no longer tend; for what someone has he does not seek. The form of good must therefore pre-exist intentionally in the being which tends to good. But anything which has something else in it in this manner is cognitive. Only in cognitive beings, therefore, can there be a tendency to good; and so the conclusion is the same as before.
4. If all things tend to good, this must be understood of a good which all can have, because nothing tends either naturally or ration ally to what is impossible for it to have. But the only good extending to all beings is existence. It is therefore the same to say that all things tend to good as that they tend to existence. Now not all things tend to existence; in fact it seems that none do, because all have existence and nothing tends except to what it does not have, as is made clear by Augustine and the Philosopher. Not all things, therefore, tend to good.
6. The one, the true, and the good are all equally interchanged will being. But not all beings tend to the one and the true. Neither, then, do they tend to the good.
6. Some people who know the right thing to do act contrary to this knowledge, according to the Philosopher. Now they would not so act if they did not desire or will to do so. But what is against reason is evil. Some people therefore tend to evil, and so not all tend to good.
7. The good which all things are said to tend to, as the Commentator says, is to be. But some people do not seek to be but rather not to be—the damned in hell, for instance, who desire even the death of the soul so that they should not exist at all. Not everything, there fore, seeks good.
8. The appetitive powers stand to their objects in just the same relation as the apprehensive to theirs. But an apprehensive power has to be devoid of the species of its object in order to be able to know, as the pupil of the eye must be without colour. Hence whatever tends to good must also be devoid of the species of good. But everything has the species of good. Therefore nothing tends to good.
9. To work for an end belongs to the Creator, to nature, and to an agent who acts will a purpose. But the Creator and a created agent will a purpose, such as man, in working for an end and desiring and loving good, have knowledge of the end or good. Then since nature is in a sense intermediate between the two, presupposing the work of creation and being presupposed in the work of art, if it takes pleasure in seeking the end for which it works, it too must know that end. But it does not have knowledge. Then the things of nature also do not tend to good.
10. Whatever is tended to is sought. But according to Plato6 nothing of which knowledge is not had can be sought. Thus if anyone were to seek a runaway slave without having any knowledge of his appearance, upon finding him he would not know that he had done so. Hence things which do not have knowledge of good do not tend to it.
11. To strive for an end belongs to what is directed to an end. But the last end, God, is not directed to an end. He does not, then, strive for an end or good; and so not everything tends to good.
12. A nature is determined to one thing. Then if things naturally tend to good, they should not naturally tend to anything else. But all things seek peace, as Augustine and Dionysiuss explain, and also the beautiful, as Dionysius also says. Consequently not all things naturally tend to good.
13. Just as a person strives for an end when he does not have it, he also takes pleasure in it when he has it. But we do not say that in animate things take pleasure in good. Neither, then, should we say that they tend to good.
To the Contrary
1'. Dionysius says: "Existents desire the beautiful and the good; and whatever they do, they do because it seems good. The intention of all existents has as its principle and term the good."
2’. The Philosopher says that some have defined good well by saying that it is "what all things tend to."
3’. Whatever acts, acts for an end, as is made clear by the Philosopher. But whatever acts for something tends to it. Therefore every thing tends to an end and to good, which has the character of an end.
4’. Everything seeks its own perfection. But by the fact that a thing is perfect it is good. Everything therefore seeks good.
De veritate EN 174