De veritate EN 193
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The divine will is fittingly distinguished into antecedent and con sequent. An understanding of this distinction is to be got from the words of Damascene, who introduced it. He says: "Antecedent will is God’s acceptance of something on His own account," whereas "consequent will is a concession on our account."
For the clarification of this point it should be noted that in any action there is something to be considered on the part of the agent and something on the part of the recipient. The agent is prior to the product and more important. Thus what pertains to the maker is naturally prior to what pertains to the thing made. It is evident in the operation of nature, for instance, that the production of a perfect animal depends upon the formative power, which is found in the semen; but it occasionally happens because of the matter receiving it, which is sometimes indisposed, that a perfect animal is not produced. This happens, for example, in the births of monsters. We accordingly say that it is by the primary intention of nature that a perfect animal is produced, but that the production of an imperfect animal is by the secondary intention of nature, which gives to the matter what it is capable of receiving, since it is unable because of the indisposition of the matter to give it the form of the perfect state.
In God’s operation in regard to creatures similar factors must be taken into account. Though in His operation He requires no matter, and created things originally without any pre-existing matter, nevertheless He now works in the things which He first created, governing them in accordance will the nature which He previously gave them.
And although He could remove from His creatures every obstacle by which they are made incapable of perfection, yet in the order of His wisdom He disposes of things conformably to their state, giving to each one in accordance will its own capacity.
That to which God has destined the creature as far as He is concerned is said to be willed by Him in a primary intention or antecedent will. But when the creature is held back from this end because of its own failure, God nonetheless fulfils in it that amount of goodness of which it is capable. This pertains b His secondary intention and is called His consequent will. Because, then, God has made all men for happiness, He is said to will the salvation of all by His antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of His wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, He fulfils in them in another way the demands of His goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the ilrst order of His will, they thus slip into the second. And although they do not do God’s will, His will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God will either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by Him.
It should not, however, be concluded from what has just been said that God’s intention can be frustrated, because from all eternity God has foreseen that the one who is not saved would not be saved. Nor did He ordain that particular one for salvation in the order of pre destination which is the order of His absolute will. But as far as He was concerned He gave that creature a nature intended for happiness.
Answers to Difficulties.
1. In the divine will neither the order nor the distinction is in the act of the will but only in the things willed.
2. The order of the divine will is not based upon the different objects of the will but upon the different factors found in one and the same object. For example, by His antecedent will God wants a certain man to be saved by reason of his human nature, which He made for salvation; but by His consequent will He wishes him to be damned because of the sins which are found in him. Now although the thing to which the act of the will is directed exists will all its conditions, it not necessary that every one of those Conditions which are found in the object should be the reason which moves the will. Wine, for Instance, does not move the appetite of the drinker by reason of its power of inebriating but by reason of its sweetness, although both factors are found together in it.
3. The divine will is the immediate principle of creatures, ordering the divine attributes (as we must conceive the matter) in so far as they are applied to operation; for no power passes into operation un less it is regulated by knowledge and determined by the will to do something. The order of things is accordingly referred to God’s will rather than to His power or knowledge.—Or the answer may be given that the essence of willing consists in a reference of the one willing to things themselves, as has been said. But things are said to be known or possible for a given agent in so far as they are within its knowledge or its power. Things do not have any order as they are in God but as they are in themselves. Thus the order of things is not attributed to His knowledge or to His power but only to His will.
4. Although the divine will is not hindered or changed by anything else, yet in the order of wisdom it is directed to a thing in accordance will its state. In this way something is attributed to the divine will because of us.
5. That difficulty argues from the order of the will on the part of its act. But the order of antecedent and consequent is not found in it from that point of view.
6. The same is to be said here.
7. Although a thing has existence in its own nature after it has it in God, it is not, however, known by God in its own nature after it is known in Him, because by the very fact of knowing His own essence God beholds things both as they are in Himself and as they are in their own nature.
8. Antecedent and consequent are not affirmed of God’s will for the purpose of implying any succession (for that is repugnant to eternity), but to denote a diversity in its reference to the things willed.
Parallel reasngs: I Sentences 45, a. 4; Sum. Theol., 1, 19, II & 12.
Difficulties:
It seems that it is not, for
2. What is done in creatures is a sign or indication not only of the divine will but also of the divine knowledge and power. But knowledge and power are not distinguished into power and knowledge which are God’s essence and those which are indications of it. Then neither should God’s will be thus distinguished into His embracing will (voluntas beneplaciti) which is the divine essence, and His indicative will (voluntas signi).
2. By the fact that God wishes something by His embracing will it is shown that the act of the divine will is brought to bear upon it will the result that it is pleasing to God. Then that upon which His indicative will is brought to bear is either pleasing to God or not. If it is pleasing to God, then Fie wills it will His embracing will; and in that case I-his indicative will should not be distinguished from His embracing will. If, however, it is not something pleasing to God, it is nevertheless designated as pleasing to Him by His indicative will; and consequently the indication of the divine will is false. And so in the true doctrine such indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.
3. Every will is in the one willing. But whatever is in God is the divine essence. Consequently, if indicative will is attributed to God, it will be the same as the divine essence. In this way it will not be distinguished from His embracing will; for that will is said to be embracing which is the very divine essence, as the Master says.
4. Whatever God wills is good. But the indication of His will ought to Correspond to the divine will. There should therefore not be an indication of His will concerning evil. Since permission concerns evil, and likewise prohibition, it therefore seems that indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.
5. Not only are good and better found but also bad and worse. But on the basis of good and better two Sorts of indicative will are distinguished: precept, which concerns good, and counsel, which concerns a better good. Then two signs or indications of will should be affirmed in regard to bad and worse.
6. God’s will is more inclined to good than to evil. But the indication of will which regards evil, permission, can never be frustrated. Then precept and counsel, too, which are referred to good, should not be subject to frustration. Yet this is evidently false.
7. Things that stand in a sequence of dependence should not be opposed. But God’s embracing will and His operation stand in a sequence of dependence; for God does not do anything which He does not will with His embracing will, and He wills nothing in creatures will His embracing will which He does not do, according to the words of the Psalm (1 13:3): "[The Lord] hath done all things what so ever he would." God’s operation should therefore not be listed under His indicative will, which is opposed to His embracing will.
194
In matters dealing will God there are two different ways of speaking: (1) In proper language. This is found when we attribute to God what pertains to Him in His own nature, although it always pertains to Him in a way that goes beyond what we conceive in our minds or express in speech. For this reason none of our language about God can be proper in the full sense. (2) In figurative, transferred, or symbolic language. Because God, as He is in Himself, exceeds the grasp of our mind, we must speak of Him by means of the things that are found in our world. Thus we apply the names of sensible things to God, calling Him light or a lion or something of the sort. The truth of such expressions is founded on the fact that no creature "is deprived altogether of participation in good," as Dionysius says. In every creature there are to be found certain properties representing the divine goodness in some respect. Thus the name is transferred to God inasmuch as the thing signified by the name is a sign of the divine goodness. Any sign, then, that is used instead of what is signified in speaking of God is a figurative expression.
Both of these two ways of speaking are used in regard to the divine will. There is found in God in a proper sense the formal character of will, as was said above; and so will is properly predicated of God. This is His embracing will (voluntas beneplaciti), which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent, as has been said. Because, however, will in us has some passion of the soul consequent upon it, the name of the will is predicated of God metaphorically like the names of the other passions. The name of anger is applied to God be cause there is found in Him an effect which is commonly that of an angry person among us, namely, punishment. As a consequence the punishment itself which God inflicts is called God’s anger. In like manner whatever is commonly a sign or indication of will among us is called the will of God. For this reason we speak of His indicative will (voluntas signi) because the sign itself which is usually the sign or indication of the will is called will.
Now since the will can be considered both as prescribing a course of action and as setting the work in motion, in either sense certain signs are attributed to the will. From the viewpoint of its proposing a course of action regarding flight from evil, its sign is a prohibition. Regarding the pursuit of good there are two signs of the will. If the good is necessary and the will cannot attain its end without it, the sign of the will is a command. If the good is useful and by it the end can be acquired in an easier and more suitable fashion, the sign of the will is a counsel. From the viewpoint of setting the work in motion two signs are attributed to the will. One is express, and this is an operation; for the fact that a person does something indicates that he expressly wills it. The other is an interpretative sign, permission; for anyone who does not forbid what he can prevent, when interpreted seems to consent to it. This is what the name permission implies.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Although God is capable of doing all things and knows all things, yet He does not will all things. Consequently besides the signs found in creatures, by which it is shown that He is knowing, powerful, and willing, certain signs are ascribed to I-his will to show what God wills and not only the fact that He is willing. Or it may be said that knowledge and power are not accompanied by a passion, as the will is in our case. Thus the will comes closer to the things which are said metaphorically of God than do either power or knowledge. And so the signs of will we call will, metaphorically speaking, more than we call the signs of knowledge and power knowledge and power.
2. Although God does not will everything that Fie commands or permits, yet He does will something concerning it. He wills that we be obliged to what He commands and that there be in our power What He permits. It is this divine will which the command or per mission signifies.
Or the answer can be given that His indicative will is not so called because it me that God wills the matter itself, but because what is ordinarily the indication of a will in our case is called will. It is not necessary that what is usually the sign of a certain thing be false when its usual term of reference does not correspond to it, but only when it is used in that signification. Although among us to command some thing is the sign of our willing it, yet is not necessary, whenever either God or man commands something, for him to signify that he wishes it to be. It consequently does not follow that it is a false sign.
That is why there is not always a falsehood in our actions whenever an action which usually signifies something is performed and that signification is not there. But in our words, if what they signify does not underlie them, there is necessarily falsity, because words have been instituted for the very purpose of being signs. Hence, if what is signified does not correspond to them, there is falsity there. Actions, on the other hand, have not been instituted to serve as signs but to get something done. That they signify anything is quite accidental to them. There is consequently not always falsity in them if what is usually signified does not correspond. There can be falsity only when they are made use of by the agent in order to signify something.
3. Indicative will is not in God but is from God; for it is an effect of God such as we usually term, when the effect of a man, that man’s will.
4. Although the will of God does not concern evil will a view to its being done, it nevertheless does concern evil will a view to pre venting it by forbidding it, or will a view to putting it within our power by permitting it.
5. Since everything to which the will tends has a relation to the end which is the reason for willing, but all evils lack a relation to that end, all evils are on the same footing not only in regard to the end but also in regard to the divine will. But to goods, which are referred to the end, the will stands in different relations according to the different relation which they have to the end. For this reason there are different indications for the good and the better, but not for the bad and the worse.
6. God’s indicative will is not opposed to His embracing will on the basis of fulfilment and non-fulfilment. Although His embracing will is always fulfilled, something which is fulfilled can also belong to His indicative will. Hence, even the matters which God commands or counsels He sometimes wills will an embracing will. But His indicative will is distinguished from His embracing will because the one is God Himself, the other is an effect of His, as has already been explained.
It should be noted that God’s indicative will is related to His embracing will in three ways: (1) there is an indicative will which never coincides will an embracing will, as the permission by which God permits evil to be done, since He never wills evil to be done; (2) there is another which always coincides, as an operation; ( there is an other which sometimes coincides, sometimes not, as a precept, a prohibition, or a counsel.
7. This answer is clear from the above.
Parallel readings: Contra Gentiles I, 80-83; 11, 28; III, De potentia I, 5; b, 2 ad 6; Sum. Theol., I, 19, 3 & 10; Comp. Theol., I, 96.
Difficulties:
It seems that He does, for
1. Everything that is eternal is necessary. But from eternity God wills whatever He wills. Therefore of necessity He wills whatever He wills.
2. The answer was given that God’s willing is necessary and eternal on the part of the One willing both from the viewpoint of the act of will, which is the divine essence, and from that of the reason for willing, which is the divine goodness; but not under the aspect of the relation of the will to the thing willed. On the contrary, the very fact of God’s willing anything implies a relationship of the will to the thing willed. But the fact of God’s willing something is eternal. Then the relationship of the will to the thing willed is itself eternal and necessary.
3. The answer was given that the relationship to the thing willed u eternal and necessary inasmuch as the thing willed exists in its exemplary idea, not inasmuch as it exists in itself or in its own nature.— On the contrary, a thing is willed by the fact of having the will of God referred to it. Consequently if the will of God were not referred from all eternity to the thing willed as it exists in itself but merely as it exists in its exemplary idea, then a temporal fact, such as the salvation of Peter, would not be willed by God from all eternity as it exists in its own nature; but it would merely be the object of God’s will from all eternity as it exists in God’s eternal ideas. But this is obviously false.
4. Whatever God has willed or wills, after He wills or has willed it, He is unable not to will or not to have willed it. But whatever God wills He never has not willed, because He always and from all eternity has willed whatever He wills. God is therefore unable not to will whatever He wills. 'Whatever Fie wills Fie therefore wills from necessity.
5. The answer was given that the above argument is based upon God’s willing taken from the viewpoint of the One willing or of the act or of the reason for willing, not from that of its relationship to the thing willed.—On the contrary, to create is an act which always implies a relation to its effect, for it connotes a temporal effect. But the above reasoning would be verified concerning creation if it were supposed that God had alwa been creating, because what Fie has created Fie is unable not to have created. It therefore follows will necessity also from the viewpoint of the relation to the thing willed.
6. To be and to will are one and the same for God. But God must necessarily be everything that He is, because "in everlasting beings there is no difference between being and being able to be" in the words of the Philosopher. God must therefore also necessarily will everything that He wills.
7. The answer was given that, although to will and to be are in this case really identical, they nevertheless differ in the manner in which they are expressed, because to will is expressed after the manner of an act that passes over into something else.—On the contrary, even God’s act of being, though really identical will His essence, nevertheless differs in the manner of its expression, because to be is expressed after the manner of an act. There is therefore no difference in this respect between being and willing.
8. Eternity does not admit of succession. But divine willing is measured by eternity. Hence there cannot be any succession in it. But there would be succession in it if God did not will what He has willed from eternity, or if He willed what He has not willed. It is consequently impossible for Him to will what He has not willed or not to will what He has willed. Hence whatever Fie wills He wills from necessity, and whatever He does not will Fie necessarily does not will.
9. It is impossible for anyone who has willed anything not to have willed it, because what has been done is unable not to have been done.
But in God to will and to have willed are identical because the act of His will is not new but is eternal. God is therefore unable not to will what He wills; and so He necessarily wills what Fie wills.
10. The answer was given that He necessarily wills from the point of view of His reason for willing, but not from that of the thing willed.—On the contrary, God’s reason for willing is Himself, because Fie wills for Himself whatever He wills. Then, if Fie necessarily wills Himself, Fie will also necessarily will all other things.
11. The reason for willing is the end. But according to the Philosopher in matters of appetite and operation the end occupies the same place as the principle in matters of demonstration. Now in matters of demonstration if the principles are necessary, a necessary conclusion follows. Hence also in matters of appetite, if a person wills the end, he necessarily wills the means to the end; and so, if the divine act of willing is necessary from the standpoint of the reason for willing, le will also be necessary will reference to the things willed.
12. Whoever can will and not will something can begin to will it. But God cannot begin to will something. Hence He cannot will and not will something; and so Fie necessarily wills whatever He wills.
13. God’s power and knowledge, like His will, imply a relation to creatures. But it is necessary for God to be able to do anything that He is able to do, and it is necessary for Hum to know whatever He knows. It is therefore necessary for Hum to will whatever He wills.
14. Whatever is always the same is necessary. But the relation of the divine will to the things willed is always the same. It is therefore necessary; and so the divine act of willing is also necessary from the standpoint of its relationship to the substance of the thing willed.
15. If God wills that there shah be an Antichrist, le follows will necessity that there will be an Antichrist even though it is not necessary that there should be an Antichrist. Now this would not be the case if there were not a necessary relation or reference of the di vine will to the thing willed. The divine act of willing inasmuch as it implies a relation of the will to the thing willed is therefore itself necessary.
16. The relation of the divine will to the reason for willing is the cause of the relation of the divine will to the thing willed, for the will is directed to some object because of the reason for willing. Between the two relations moreover there does not fail any contingent intermediary. When a necessary cause is placed, a necessary effect follows unless there happens to be a Contingent cause between them. Consequently, since the divine act of will is necessary in its relation to the reason for willing, it will also be necessary in its relation to the thing willed; and so God wills necessarily whatever He wills.
To the Contrary:
1'. God’s will is more fully free than our will. But our will does not necessarily will whatever it wills. Then neither does God’s.
2'. Necessity is opposed to gratuitous willing. But God wills the salvation of me will a gratuitous will. He therefore does not will from necessity.
3’. Since nothing extrinsic to God can impose necessity upon Hmm, if He willed anything from necessity, He would will it only from the necessity of His own nature. The same consequence would there fore follow from positing that God acts by His will and from positing that He acts by the necessity of nature. Now since it follows for those who hold that God acts by the necessity of nature that all things have been made by Hmm from all eternity, the same conclusion would follow for us, who hold that He makes all things by His will.
195
It is undoubtedly true that the divine act of willing has necessity from the point of view of the One willing and of the act; for God’s action is His essence, which is clearly eternal. That is accordingly not the question, but rather whether God’s willing has any necessity will respect to the thing willed. It is this respect which is understood when we say that God wills this or that. And this is what we ask about when we ask whether God wills anything from necessity.
It should therefore be noted that the object of any will is twofold: one which is principal and another which is, in a sense, secondary. The principal object is that to which the will is directed of its own nature, since the will is a nature and has a natural ordination to some thing. This is what the will naturally wills, as the human will naturally desires happiness. In regard to this object the will is under necessity, since it tends to it in the manner of a nature. A man, for instance, cannot will to be miserable or not to be happy. Secondary objects of the will are the things which are directed to this principal object as to an end. Now upon these two different sorts of objects the will has a different bearing, just as the intellect has upon the principles which are naturally known and the conclusions which it draws out of these.
The divine will has as its principal object that which it naturally wills and which is a sort of end of its willing, God’s own goodness, on account of which He wills whatever else He wills distinct from Himself. For He makes things on account of His own goodness, as Augustine says; that is to say, He does it in order that His goodness, which cannot be multiplied in its essence, may at least by a certain participation through likeness be poured out upon many recipients. Hence the things which He wills concerning creatures are, as it were, the secondary objects of His will. He wills them on account of His goodness. Thus the divine goodness serves His will as the reason for willing all things, just as his essence is the reason for His knowing all things.
In regard to that principal object, God’s goodness, the divine will is under a necessity, not of force but of natural ordination, which is not incompatible will freedom, according to Augustine. God can not will Himself not to be good, for, consequently not to be intelligent or powerful or anything else which the nature of His goodness includes.
It is not, however, under any necessity in regard to any other object. Since the reason for willing the means is the end, the means stands to the will in the same relation as it stands to the end. Hence if the means is proportioned to the end so that it embraces the end perfectly and without it the end cannot be obtained, the means, like the end, is desired of necessity, and especially by a will which cannot depart from the rule of wisdom. It seems to be all of a piece, for in stance, to desire the continuance of life and the taking of food by which life is sustained arid without which it cannot be preserved.
But just as no effect of God is equal to the power of the cause, so nothing which is directed to God as its end is equal to the end. No creature is made perfectly like God. That is the exclusive property of the uncreated Word. From this it comes about that, no matter how much more nobly any pure creature is related to God, being assimilated to Him in some way, it is still possible for some other creature to be related to God and to represent the divine goodness in a manner equally noble.
It is accordingly clear that from the love which God has for His onw goodness there is no necessity in the divine will for willing this or that concerning a creature. Nor is there any necessity in it as regards the whole of creation, since the divine goodness is perfect in itself, and would be so even though no creature existed, because God has no need of our goods, as is said in the Psalm (15:2). For the divine goodness is not an end of the kind which is produced by the means to the end, but rather one by which the things which are directed to it are produced and perfected. For this reason Avicenna says that only God’s action is purely liberal, because nothing accrues to Him from what He wills or does regarding any creature.
It is therefore clear from what has been said that whatever God wills to be in His own regard He wills from necessity, but whatever He wills to be concerning creatures He does not will from necessity.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Something is said to be necessary in two ways: (1) absolutely, and (2) conditionally. Something is said to be necessary absolutely because of a necessary relation which the terms used in a proposition have to each other; e.g., "Man is an animal" or "Every whole is greater than its part" and the like. But something is necessary conditionally which is not necessary of itself but only if something else is given; e.g., "Socrates has run." In himself Socrates is no more disposed to this than to its opposite; but on the condition that he has run it is impossible for him not to have run.
I say, therefore, that God’s willing something in creatures, as that Peter be saved, is not necessary absolutely, since the divine will does not have a necessary relation to this, as is evident from what has been said. But on the condition that God wills or has willed it, then it is impossible for Hum not to have willed or not to will it, since His will is unchangeable. Among the theologians such necessity is accordingly called the necessity of unchangeability. Now the fact that God’s act of willing is not absolutely necessary comes from the thing willed, which falls short of a perfect proportion to the end, as has been said. In this respect the answer given above is verified. And eternity is to be distinguished in the same way as necessity.
2. The relationship implied is necessary and eternal conditionally, not absolutely; and this is from the standpoint of its termination in the object, not only as it has its exemplar in the reason for willing, but also as in its own nature it exists in time.
3. This we concede.
4. After God wills or has willed something, that lie wills or has willed it is necessary conditionally, not absolutely; as it is that Socrates has run, after he has run. This is the case will creation or any act of the divine will which terminates in something external.
5. We concede this.
6. Although the divine existence is necessary in itself, yet creatures do not proceed from God through necessity but through a free act of will. Whatever implies a reference of God to the origin of creatures, as to will, to create, etc., is not necessary absolutely, like the predicates which refer to God in Himself, such as to be good, living, will, etc.
7. Te be does not express the kind of act which is an operation passing over into something external to be produced in time, but rather the act that is primary. Te will, however, expresses a secondary act, which is an operation. Thus it is from the different manner of expression that something is attributed to the divine act of being which is not attributed to the divine act of willing.
8. We do not imply succession if we say that God can will or not will something unless this is understood in the sense that, on the condition that He wills something, it is asserted that lie afterward does not will it. But this is excluded by our affirmation that God’s willing something is necessary conditionally.
9. God’s having willed what lie has willed is necessary condition ally, not absolutely. The same is true of God’s willing what He wills.
10. Although God necessarily wills that lie be, it nevertheless does not follow that lie wills other things necessarily. Nothing is said to be necessary by reason of the end except when it is such that without it the end cannot be had, as is evident in the Metaphysjcs8 But that is not the case in the point at issue.
11. If the principle is necessary in syllogisms, it does not follow that the conclusion is necessary unless the relationship of the principle to the Conclusion is also necessary. In the same way, no matter how necessary the end is, unless the means has a necessary relationship to the end so that without it the end cannot exist, there will be no necessity arising from the end in the means; just as, even though the principles may be true, if the conclusion is false because of the lack of a necessary relationship, no necessity on the part of the conclusion follows from the necessity of the principles.
12. If anyone who can will and not will can will after he has been unwilling and can be unwilling after he has willed, he can begin to will. If he wills, he can cease to will and again begin to will. If he does not will, he can immediately begin to will. God cannot will and not will in this way because of the unchangeableness of the divine will. But He can will and no will inasmuch as I-his will is not bound on it part to will or not to will. It remains, then, that God’s willing something is necessary conditionally not absolutely
13. Although knowledge and power imply a relation to creatures, they nevertheless pertain to the very perfection of the divine essence, 1 there can be nothing except what is necessary of itself. A thing is said to have knowledge because the thing known is in the knower. Something is said to have power to do something inasmuch as it is in complete act will respect to that which is to be done. What ever is in God, however, must necessarily be in Him; and whatever God actually is, He must necessarily be actually. But when it is said that God wills something, that something is not designated as being in God, but there is merely implied the relationship of God Himself to the production of that thing in its own nature. From this point of view the condition of absolute necessity is accordingly lacking, as was said above.
14. That relationship is always the same because of the immutability of the divine will. The argument is accordingly conclusive only in regard to the necessary which is conditional.
15. The will has a twofold relation to its object: (1) inasmuch as the latter is the object, and (2) inasmuch as it is to be brought into act by the will. The second relation presupposes the first. We first understand that the will wills something. Then, from the fact that it wills it, we understand that it is bringing it forth into reality, if the will is efficacious. The first relation of the divine will to its object is not necessary in an absolute sense because of the Jack of proportion of the object to the end, which is the reason for willing, as has been said. Hence it is not necessary absolutely that God will it. But the second relation is necessary because of the efficacy of the divine will; and for this reason it follows of necessity that if God wills anything will His embracing will, it comes about.
16. Although between the two relations mentioned in the difficulty there intervenes no contingent cause, yet because of the lack of pro portion the necessity of the first relation does not introduce necessity into the second, as is clear from what has been said.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
l’-2’. These we concede.
3'. The difficulty about the freedom of the will has already been solved inasmuch as the necessity of the order of nature is not incompatible will freedom, but only the necessity of force.
Parallel readings Contra Gentiles I, 8 II, 29 & 30; Quodibet XI, (s), 3; XII, (3), 3 ad. 2; Sum. Theol., 1, 19, 8; De male, 16, 7 ad i In I Perihermen., 14; In VI Met., 3.
Difficulties:
It seems that it does, for
1. When a sufficient cause is placed, it is necessary that the effect be placed. Avicenna proves this as follows. If, when the cause is placed, the effect is not necessarily placed, then even after the placing of the cause the effect remains open to the alternatives of either existence or non-existence. But whatever has the potentiality of alter natives is not determined to either one of them unless there is some thing to determine it. Consequently, after the placing of the cause it is still necessary to posit something which will make the effect exist. The cause was accordingly not sufficient. But if the cause is sufficient, when it is placed, the placing of the effect must be necessary. Now the divine will is a sufficient cause, and not a contingent but a necessary cause. The things willed by God are therefore necessary.
2. The answer was given that from a necessary cause there some times follows a contingent effect because of the contingency of an intervening cause; e.g., from a major premise expressing what is necessary a contingent conclusion follows because of a subsumption expressing what is contingent. the contrary, whenever a contingent effect follow from a necessary cause because of the contingency of an intermediate cause, this comes from the deficiency of the second cause. The blossoming of a tree, for example, is contingent and not necessary because of the possible failure of the germinative power, which is the intermediate cause, although the motion of the sun, the first cause, is a necessary cause. But the divine will can remove all deficiency from the second cause, and likewise every hindrance. The Contingency of a second cause, therefore, does not keep the effect from being necessary because of the necessity of the divine will.
3. When the effect is contingent because of the contingency of the second cause, given a necessary first cause, the non-existence of the effect is compatible will the existence of the first cause. Thus the non-blossoming of a tree in spring is compatible will the motion of the sun. But the non-existence of what is willed by God is not compatible will the divine will. For these two things, God’s willing some thing to be and its not being, are irreconcilable. Consequently the contingency of second causes does not prevent the things willed by God from being necessary because of the necessity of the divine will.
4. The answer was given that, although the non-existence of a divine effect is not compatible will the divine will, even so, because the second cause can fail, the effect itself is contingent. On the contrary, the effect does not fail to occur except by the failure of the second cause. But it is impossible that the second cause should fail, given the divine will; for in that case there would simultaneously be verified the existence of the divine will and the non-existence of what is willed by God. But this is manifestly false. Hence the contingency of second causes does not prevent the effect of the divine will from being necessary.
To the Contrary:
All goods come about because God wills them. Now if the divine will imposes necessity upon things, all the goods that there are in the world will therefore exist from necessity; and so free choice and other contingent causes will be eliminated.
De veritate EN 193