De veritate EN 214
Some say that man cannot prepare himself to have grace except through a gratuitous grace. But this does not seem to be true if by a gratuitous grace they mean some habitual gift of grace; and this for two reasons: (1) Because the whole reason for speaking of the preparation necessary for grace is to point out some sort of reason on our part why ingratiatory grace is given to some and not w others. Now if there cannot even be this preparation for grace without some habitual grace, either that grace is given to all or it is not. If it is given w all, it does not seem to be any different from a natural gift; for there is no respect in which all men are found to agree except in what is natural; but even natural gifts can be called graces inasmuch as they are given to man by God without any previous merits on man’s part. If they are not given to all, however, we shah have to return to the preparation again and for the same reason posit some other grace, and so on to infinity. And so it is better to stop at the first stage.
(2) Because to prepare oneself for grace is just another way of saying: to do what one is capable of—as it is commonly said that, if man does what he is capable of, God gives him grace. But a man is said w be capable of that which is within his power. If, then, a man is notable by his free choice to prepare himself for grace, to do what one is capable of will not mean to prepare oneself for grace.
If, on the other hand, those who hold this opinion mean by gratuitous grace the divine providence by which a man is mercifully directed to good, then it is true that without grace man cannot prepare himself w have ingratiatory grace. And this is evident for two reasons:
(1) Because it is impossible for a man to begin to will something originally unless there is something to move him. It is as the Philosopher explains when he says that the movements of animals after rest must be preceded by other movements by which the soul is aroused to action. Thus, when a man begins to prepare himself for grace by turning his will to God for the first time, he must be brought to this by some external occasions, such as an external admonition or a bodily sickness or something of the sort, or else by some interior instinct, as God works in the hearts of men, or even in both ways together. All of this, however, is taken care of for man by divine providence; and so it comes about by divine mercy that man prepares himself for grace.
(2) Because not any movement whatsoever of the will is a sufficient preparation for grace, just as not any sorrow whatsoever suffices for the forgiveness of sins, but it must occur in a definite manner. And this cannot be known by man, since even the gift of grace surpasses human knowledge. The manner of preparation for a form cannot be known unless the form itself is known. But whenever a definite manner of acting which is unknown w the agent is required for doing something, he needs someone to govern and direct him.
It is accordingly evident that free choice cannot prepare itself for grace unless it is divinely directed to this end. And because of the two reasons given, God is supplicated in two different ways in the Scriptures w work this preparation for grace in us: (1) By asking that He convert us, turning us from the state in which we were to Himself, as when it is written (Ps 84,5): "Convert us, O God, our salvation." This is because of the first reason. (2) By asking that he direct us, as when it is written (Ps 24,5): "Direct me in thy truth." This is because of the second reason.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. We are told to turn to God because we can do this, but not without divine help. We accordingly beg of Him (Lm 5,21): "Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shah be converted."
2. We can open our hearts to God, but not without His help. For this reason we beg of Him (II Machabees 1:4): "May he open your heart...
3-4. The same is to be said in answer to these; for man can neither prepare nor will unless God brings this about in him, as has been said.
Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 1; Sum. Theol., I, 81, 1.
It seems that it is a cognitive power, for
1. As the Master says, "anything in our soul that is found to be had in common will beasts belongs to sensuality." But the sense cognitive powers are common to us and the beasts. They therefore belong to sensuality.
2. Augustine says: "The movement of the sensual soul, which is directed to the senses of the body, is common to us and beasts and quite outside reason as the principle of wisdom." In expatiating upon this he adds: "Corporeal things are sensed by a sense of the body, whereas eternal and unchangeable things are understood by spiritual reason, the principle of wisdom." But to sense corporeal things is the function of a cognitive power. Consequently sensuality, to which the act of sensual movement belongs, is a cognitive power.
3. The answer was given that Augustine adds this in order to point out the objects of the senses, for die movement of sensuality is attributed to the senses of the body inasmuch as it is concerned will the objects of sense.—On the contrary, Augustine adds this to show in what respect sensuality is discriminated from reason. But reason too is concerned will corporeal things, which Augustine says are the objects of the senses—lower reason by disposing them, and higher reason by judging them. And so sensuality is not by this fact discriminated from reason. Augustine therefore did not have the meaning alleged in the answer.
4. In the commission of a sin in progress within us sensuality has the role of the serpent, as Augustine says. Now in the temptation of our first parents the serpent’s role was that of suggesting and proposing the sin. But that is the function of the cognitive, not the appetitive power, because the business of the latter is to be drawn to the sin. Sensuality is therefore a cognitive power.
5. Augustine says again: "Sensuality is very close to reason as the principle of science." it would not be very close to it, however, if it were only an appetitive power, since reason as the principle of science is cognitive; for in that case it would belong to a different genus of the powers of the soul. Consequently sensuality is cognitive, and not only appetitive.
6. According to Augustine6 sensuality is distinguished from both higher reason and lower, in both of which is contained the higher appetite, the will. Otherwise there could not be any mortal sin in them. But the lower appetite is not distinguished from the higher appetite as a different power, as will be proved directly. Therefore sensuality is not the lower appetite. It is, however, some sort of lower power of the soul, as appears from its definition. It is therefore the lower cognitive power.—Proof of the minor: An accidental difference in objects does not indicate a specific difference in powers. Sight, for example, is not divided into different species by the difference between seeing a man and seeing an ass; for man and ass are accidental differences in the object of sight as such. But the object of appetite apprehended by sense and that apprehended by intellect— the difference on which the distinction of higher and lower appetite seems to be based—are accidental to the object of appetite as such, since the appetible as appetible is good, and it is accidental to good to be apprehended by sense or by intellect. The lower appetite is therefore not a power distinct from the higher.
7. The answer was given that the two appetites mentioned are distinguished on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and some thing good here and now.—On the contrary, appetite is related w good as the intellect to truth. But truth in an unqualified sense and something true here and now, which is contingent, do not distinguish the intellect into two powers. Then neither can the appetite be distinguished into two powers on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and something good here and now.
8. Something good here and now is an apparent good, it seems, whereas good in an unqualified sense is the true good. But the higher appetite sometimes consents to an apparent good, and the lower appetite sometimes tends to a true good, such as the necessities of the body. Consequently good here and now and good in an unqualified sense do not distinguish a higher and a lower appetite. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
9. The sensitive power is set over against the appetitive, as is clear from the Philosopher’s distinction of five genera of activities in the soul: to nourish, to sense, to tend appetitively, to be moved locally, and to understand. But sensuality is included in the sensitive power, as even the name shows. Sensuality is therefore not an appetitive but a cognitive power.
10. What is defined corresponds to the same thing as the definition. But the definition of sensuality which the Master gives corresponds to lower reason, which also is sometimes directed to the senses of the body and the body’s concerns. Lower reason and sensuality are there fore the same thing. But reason is a cognitive power; then so too is sensuality.
To the Contrary:
1'. In its definition sensuality is said to be an appetite for things which pertain to the body.
2’. Sin consists in tending by appetite, not in knowing. But in sensuality there is some very slight sin, as Augustine says. Therefore sensuality is an appetitive power.
Sensuality seems to be nothing but the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul, and it is called sensuality as being some thing derived from sense. The movement of the appetitive part arises somehow from apprehension, because every operation of a passive principle takes its origin from an active principle. Now appetite is a passive power, because it is moved by the object of appetite, which is an "unmoved mover," as is said in The Soul. But the object of appetite does not move the appetite unless it is apprehended. inasmuch as the lower appetitive power is moved by the appetible object apprehended by sense, its movement is called sensual, and the power itself is called sensuality.
Now this sense appetite stands midway between natural appetite and the higher, rational appetite, which is called the will. This can be seen from the fact that in any object of appetite there are two aspects which can be considered: the thing itself which is desired, and the reason for its desirability, such as pleasure, utility, or something of the sort.
Natural appetite tends to the appetible thing itself without any apprehension of the reason for its appetibility; for natural appetite is nothing but an inclination and ordination of the thing to something else which is in keeping will it, like the ordination of a stone to a place below. But because a natural thing is determined in its natural existence, its inclination to some determined thing is a single one. Hence there is not required any apprehension by which an appetible thing is distinguished from one that is not appetible on the basis of the reason for its appetibility. But this apprehension is a prerequisite in the one who established the nature, who gave to each nature its own inclination w a thing in keeping will itself.
The higher appetite, the will, however, tends directly to the very reason for appetibility itself in an absolute way. Thus the will tends primarily and principally to goodness itself, or utility, or something like that. It tends to this or that appetible thing, however, secondarily, inasmuch as it shares in the above reason. This is because a rational nature has a capacity so great that an inclination to one de terminate thing would not be sufficient for it, but it has need of a number of different things. For that reason its inclination is to some thing common found in many things; and so by the apprehension of that common aspect it tends to the appetible thing in which it knows that this aspect is to be sought.
The lower appetite of the sensitive part, called sensuality, tends to the appetible thing itself as containing that which constitutes the reason for its appetibility. It does not tend to the reason for the appetibility in itself because the lower appetite does not tend to goodness or utility or pleasure itself, but to this particular useful or pleasurable thing. In this respect the sense appetite is lower than the rational appetite. But because it does not tend only to this or only to that thing, but to every being which is useful or pleasurable to it, it is higher than natural appetite. For this reason it too has need of an apprehension by which to distinguish the pleasurable from what is not pleasurable.
It is a manifest sign of this distinction that natural appetite is under necessity in regard to the thing to which it tends, as a heavy body necessarily tends to a place downward; whereas sense appetite does not lie under any necessity in regard to any particular thing before it is apprehended under the aspect of the pleasurable or the useful, but of necessity goes out to it once it is apprehended as pleasurable (for a brute animal is unable, while looking at something pleasurable, not to desire it); but the will is under necessity in regard to goodness and utility itself (for man of necessity wills good), but is not under any necessity in regard to this or that particular thing, however much it may be apprehended as good or useful. This is so because each power has some kind of necessary relationship to its proper object.
From this it can be understood that the object of natural appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is of this particular kind; that of sense appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is agreeable or pleasurable (as water inasmuch as it is agreeable to taste, and not inasmuch as it is water); and the proper object of the will is good itself taken absolutely. And the apprehension of sense and that of intellect differ in the same way; for it is the function of sense to apprehend this colored thing, but of intellect to apprehend the very nature of colour.
It is accordingly clear that the will and sensuality are specifically different appetites, just as goodness itself and a particular good thing are tended to in different ways; for goodness is tended to for its own sake, but a particular good thing is tended to as sharing in something. And so, just as things which share are perfected by what they share, as a particular good thing by goodness, in the same way the higher appetite rules the lower, and the intellect likewise judges about the things which sense apprehends. The proper object of sensuality is accordingly a thing which is good or suitable for the one sensing. This comes about in two ways: (1) because it is suitable for the very existence of the one sensing, as food and drink and the like; and (2) be cause it is suitable to our senses for sensing, as a beautiful colour is suitable for sight to see and a modulated sound suitable for hearing to hear, and so on.
The Master thus explains sensuality completely. For in saying that it is "a lower power of the soul," he points out its distinction from the higher appetite; in saying "from which there is a movement which is directed to the senses of the body," he shows ifs relation to the things which are suitable to our senses for sensing; and in saying "and an appetite for the concerns of the body," he shows its relation to the things which are suitable for preserving the existence of the one sensing.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Something belongs f0 sensuality in three ways: (1) As of the essence of sensuality. In this way only the appetitive powers belong to sensuality. (2) As a prerequisite for sensuality. In this way the sense apprehensive powers belong to sensuality. (3) As pursuant to sensuality. In this way the motive and executive powers belong to sensuality. If is accordingly true that everything which is common to us and the beasts belongs in some way to sensuality, though not every thing is of the essence of sensuality.
2. Augustine adds the passage quoted in order to exemplify to what sort of acts the movement of sensuality is directed. He does not mean that sensing corporeal things is itself the movement of sensuality.
3. Lower reason has a motion in regard to the senses of the body, but not of the same kind as that by which the senses perceive their objects. For the senses perceive their objects in particular, whereas lower reason has an act concerning sensible things according to a universal intention. But sensuality tends to the object of the senses in the same way as the senses themselves, that is, in particular, as has been said. The conclusion accordingly does not follow.
4. In the temptation of our first parents the serpent not only pro posed something f0 be sought, but by his suggestions he deceived them, Now a man would not be deceived when a pleasurable object of sense is proposed if the judgment of reason were not inhibited by a passion of the appetitive faculty. Sensuality is accordingly an appetitive power.
5. Sensuality is said to be very near reason as the principle of science, not as regards the genus of the power, but as regards ifs objects, because both deal will temporal matters, though in different ways, as has been said.’
6. The difference in the apprehensions would be accidental to the appetitive powers if there were not joined to it a difference of things apprehended. For sense, which attains only particulars, does not apprehend goodness taken absolutely, but a particular good; whereas the intellect, which attains universals apprehends goodness itself taken absolutely. But from this difference the difference of lower and higher appetite is taken, as has been said.
7. The good here and now o which sense appetite is directed is a particular good considered as it is here and now, whether it be necessary or contingent (for "it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun," as is had in Ecclesiastes [11:7]), and also whether it be a true or an apparent good.
8. From the previous answer the answer to this difficulty is clear.
9. The sensitive part is taken in two ways: (1) Sometimes it is taken as opposed to the appetitive power, and then it includes only the apprehensive powers. Thus taken sensuality does not belong to the sensitive part except as to that which is, so to speak, its source. This is enough to justify the name derived from it. (2) It is sometimes taken as including both the appetitive and the motive powers, as is the case when the sensitive soul is opposed to the rational and the vegetative. In this usage sensuality is included in the sensitive part of the soul.
10. Lower reason is directed to the senses of the body and the body’s concerns in a different way from sensuality, as was said above. For this reason the argument is not consequent.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 26, I, 2 Sum. Theol., I, 8i, 2; 82, 5; in III de an., 14; De malo, 8, 3.
It seems that it is one simple power not divided into several, for
1. In its definition sensuality is said to be a lower power of the soul. This would not be said if it contained several powers. It there fore does not seem to be divided into several powers.
2. One and the same power of the soul "is concerned will one contrariety, as sight is concerned will white and black," as is said in The Soul. But agreeable and harmful are contraries. One and the same power of the soul is therefore referred to both. But the concupiscible power is referred to the agreeable, and the irascible to the harmful. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore one and the same power, and sensuality is accordingly not divided into several powers.
3. It is by the same force that a person withdraws from one extreme and approaches the other, as by reason of gravity a stone leaves the top and goes to the bottom. But by the irascible power the soul will draws from the harmful by shunning it; and by the concupiscible power it approaches the agreeable by craving it. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore the same power of the soul. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
4. The proper object of joy is the agreeable. Now joy is found only in the concupiscible power. The proper object of the concupiscible power is therefore the agreeable. But the agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is evident from the definition of sensuality explained above; for the body’s concerns are things agreeing will the body. Consequently the whole of sensuality is nothing but the concupiscible power. Then either the irascible and the concupiscible powers are the same, or the irascible does not belong to sensuality. Whichever of these two is granted, the thesis (that sensuality is one simple power) stands.
5. The answer was given that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or disagreeable, which the irascible power attains.—On the contrary, the harmful or disagreeable is the object of sadness, just as the agreeable is the object of joy. But both joy and sadness are found in the concupiscible power. Consequently both the agreeable and the harmful are the object of the concupiscible. Thus, whatever is the object of sensuality is the object of the concupiscible. And so the same must be concluded as above.
6. Sense appetite presupposes apprehension. But the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power. Then the same appetitive power is concerned will both. Thus the conclusion is the same as above.
7. According to Augustine "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred is in the concupiscible power, as is proved in the Topics, because love is in the same power. But anger is in the irascible. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are one and the same power, for other will anger could not be in both.
8. That function of the soul which belongs to every power does not require a definite power distinct from the rest. But to crave (concupiscere) belongs to every power of the soul, as is evident from the fact that every power of the soul delights in its object and craves it. Consequently a power distinct from the rest need not be referred to craving. Thus the concupiscible power is not distinct from the irascible.
9. Powers are distinguished according to their acts. But in any act of the irascible power the act of the concupiscible is included, for anger has a craving for revenge, and so of the others. The concupiscible is therefore not a power distinct from the irascible.
To the Contrary:
1’. Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, and so does Gregory of Nyssa. But the lower appetite is sensuality. Sensuality therefore includes several powers.
2’. In Spirit and Soul these three motive powers are distinguished: "the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible." But the rational power is distinct from the irascible. Then so also is the irascible from the concupiscible.
3'. The Philosopher places in the sensitive appetite "desire and high spirit," that is, the concupiscible and the irascible.
The appetite of sensuality contains these two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible, which are faculties distinct from one another. This can be seen from the following consideration.
Sense appetite has something in common will natural appetite inasmuch as both tend to a thing agreeing will the subject of the tendency. Natural appetite is found to tend to two things in accordance will the two types of operation of a natural being. One of these is that by which the natural being strives to acquire what is capable of preserving its nature, as a heavy body moves downward in order to be preserved there. The other type is that by which the natural being destroys its contraries by an active quality. This is necessary for a corruptible being because, if it did not have the strength to conquer its contrary, it would be destroyed by it.
Natural appetite accordingly has a twofold tendency: to obtain what is suited and favorable to this nature, and to gain, as it were, a victory over whatever is opposed to it. The first is done by way of reception, the second by way of action. They are consequently reduced to different principles, for receiving and acting are not from the same principle, as fire is borne upward by its lightness and by heat destroys things contrary to it.
In sense appetite those same two tendencies are likewise found. For by its appetitive faculty an animal desires what is suited and favorable to it. This is done by the concupiscible power, whose proper object is what is delightful to sense. It also seeks to gain the mastery and victory over things that are contrary to it. This it does by the irascible power. Its object is accordingly said to be something arduous.
From this it is clear that the irascible is a different power from the concupiscible. If something is pleasurable it has a different reason for its appetibility than if it is arduous, since the arduous sometimes keeps us away from pleasure and involves us in affairs that bring sadness, as when an animal leaves the pleasure which he was enjoying and enters a light and is not made to withdraw from it by the pains which he incurs. One of the two, moreover, the concupiscible power, seems to be directed to reception; for it tends in order that the object of its delight may be joined to it. The other, however, the irascible power, is directed to action, because by its action it overcomes something which is contrary or harmful to it, getting the upper hand by victory over it. It is found to be the case among the powers of the soul in general that receiving and acting belong to different powers, as is clear of the agent and possible intellect. It is for this reason too that according to Avicenna courage and faintness of heart pertain to the irascible power as the faculty directed to action, whereas the expansion and contraction of the heart pertain to the concupiscible power as the faculty directed to reception.
It is clear, then, from what has been said that the irascible power is in some sense subordinated to the concupiscible as its defender. For it is necessary for an animal to gain victory over the things contrary to it by means of the irascible power, as has been said, in order that the concupiscible may possess the object of its delight without hindrance. An indication of this is the fact that animals fight among themselves on account of things that give them pleasure, such as copulation and food, as is said in Animals. For this reason all the passions of the irascible power have their beginning and end in the concupiscible. Anger, for instance, begins will some sadness that has been caused (in the concupiscible power) and, after revenge has been got, ends will joy (which is likewise in the concupiscible power). In the same way hope begins will desire or love and ends in enjoyment.
It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance will its own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity will reason at its lowest. There is verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom "joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second."
Thus the imaginative power belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance will its own nature, because forms received from sense are stored up in it; but the estimative power, by which an animal apprehends intentions not received by the senses, such as friendship or hostility, is in the sensitive soul according as it shares somewhat in reason. It is accordingly in virtue of this estimative power that animals are said to have a sort of prudence, as is seen in the beginning of the Metaphysics. A sheep, for example, flees from a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed.
The same principle is verified also in regard to the appetitive power. The fact that an animal seeks what is pleasurable to its senses (the business of the concupiscible power) is in accordance will the sensitive soul’s own nature; but that it should leave what is pleasurable and seek something for the sake of a victory which it will pain (the business of the irascible), this belongs to it according as it in some measure reaches up to the higher appetite. The irascible power, there fore, is closer to reason and the will than the concupiscible. On this account a man unable to control his anger is less base than one unable to control his concupiscence, being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says.
It is therefore clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are distinct powers, and also what is the object of each and how the irascible power helps the concupiscible and is higher and nobler than it, like the estimative among the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Sensuality is called a power in the singular because it is one in genus although it is divided into different species or parts.
2. Both the agreeable object of delight and the harmful object of sadness belong to the concupiscible inasmuch as one is to be fled, the other to be pursued. But to get the upper hand over both of them, so as to be able to overcome the harmful and possess will some security the pleasurable, belongs to the irascible power.
3. To draw away from the harmful and to draw near to the pleasurable are both the business of the concupiscible power. But to fight against and overcome what can be harmful pertains to the irascible.
From the above answer the answer w these also is clear, be cause the agreeable is the object of the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is pleasurable, but it is the object of the whole of sensuality inasmuch as it is in any way advantageous to the animal, either by way of the arduous or by way of the pleasurable.
6. The same concupiscible appetitive power pursues the agreeable and flees the disagreeable. Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers are not distinguished on the basis of the agreeable and the harmful, as appears from what has been said.
7. The statement that "hatred is inveterate anger" is a predication by cause, not by essence; for the passions of the irascible power end in the passions of the concupiscible, as has been said.
8. To crave (concupiscere) will an animal appetite belongs to the concupiscible power alone; but to crave will natural appetite belongs to every power, for every power of the soul is a nature and naturally inclines to something. And the same distinction is to be applied to love and pleasure and the like.
9. In the definition of the passions of the irascible power there is placed the common act of the appetitive power, to tend, but not any thing that belongs to the concupiscible except as the beginning or the end, as would be the case if one were to say that anger is the desire for revenge because of n previous saddening.
Parallel readings: III Sentences i a. i sol. 3; Sum. Theol., I, S In III de an., 14.
It seems that they are also in the higher, for
1. The higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, since it is concerned will both corporeal and spiritual things. Now if the lower appetite is divided into two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, then all the more should the higher be so divided.
2. To the higher part of the soul pertain those powers which belong to it alone, for the lower powers are common to the soul and the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible are powers of the soul alone. Thus it is said in Spirit and Soul: "The soul has these powers before being commingled will the body, since they are natural to it and are nothing but the soul itself as a whole. For the full and complete substance of the soul consists in these three: rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility." Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers pertain to the higher appetite.
3. According to the Philosopher only the rational part of the soul is separable from the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, as is said in Spirit and Soul. They therefore belong to the rational part.
4. The image of the Trinity is to be sought in the higher part of the soul. But according to some the image is ascribed to the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible powers. Hence the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the higher part of the soul.
5. Charity is said to be in the concupiscible power; hope, in the irascible. But charity and hope are not found in the sensitive appetite, which cannot extend to immaterial things. The irascible and the concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher.
6. Those powers are called human winch man has beyond the other animals and winch belong to the higher part of the soul. But two kinds of irascible powers are distinguished by the masters: one human and another not human; and the same is done will the concupiscible. The powers in question are therefore not only in the lower appetite but are also in the higher.
7. The operations of the sensitive powers, both apprehensive and appetitive, do not remain in the separated soul because they are exercised through organs of the body; otherwise the sensitive soul in brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having its operation by itself. But in the separated soul there remain joy and sadness, love and fear, and the like, which are attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The irascible and concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the sensitive part but also in the intellective.
To the Contrary:
Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Philosopher hold that they are in sense appetite only.
De veritate EN 214