De veritate EN 217



Since the acts of the appetitive parts presuppose the act of the apprehensive, the distinction of the appetitive parts from each other is also somewhat similar to the distinction of the apprehensive.

Among the apprehensive faculties we find that the higher apprehensive remains one and undivided will reference to things regarding which the lower apprehensive faculties are distinguished. By one and the same intellective power we come to know as to their natures all sensible things will reference to which the sense powers are distinguished. According to Augustine what a man sees and what he hears is different externally, but internally in the intellect it is the same. And the same is to be said of the appetitive powers: the higher appetitive is one and the same in regard to all the objects of appetite, though the lower appetitive powers are distinguished in regard to all the different appetible objects.

The reason for tins is found in the nature of each. The higher power has a universal object; the lower powers have particular objects. Many things correspond essentially to particulars winch have only an accidental reference to something universal. Since it is not an accidental difference but only an essential one which distinguishes a species, the lower powers are found to be specifically distinct while the higher power remains undivided. It is clear, for example, that the object of the intellect is the what, and that the same faculty of intellect extends to all things that have quiddity and is not distinguished by any differences that do not differentiate the very notion of quiddity. But since the object of sense is a body, which is capable of moving the sense organ, the sensitive powers must be differentiated according to differences in the manner of moving. Sight and hearing are accordingly distinct powers because colour and sound move the sense in different ways.

The same is true of the appetitive powers. For the object of higher appetite is good taken absolutely, as was said above, whereas the object of the lower appetite is a thing in some way advantageous to the animal. But the arduous and the pleasurable are not suited to the animal under the same aspect, as appears from what has been said." Consequently the object of lower appetite is thereby essentially diversified, but not the object of higher appetite, winch tends to what is good absolutely in any way whatever.

It should, however, be borne in mind that, just as the intellect has some of its operations directed to the same things as the senses, but in a higher way, since it knows universally and immaterially what sense knows materially and in particular; in the same way higher appetite has some of its operations directed to the same things as the lower appetites, though in a higher way. For the lower appetites tend to their objects materially and accompanied by a bodily passion; and it is from these passions that the irascible and concupiscible get their names. Now higher appetite has certain acts similar to those of lower appetite, though without any passion. The operations of higher appetite are accordingly sometimes given the names of passions. Thus the will for revenge is called "anger," and the repose of the will in some object of spiritual affection is called "love." By the same process the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called "irascible" or "concupiscible," not properly but by a figure of speech; and even so there is no implication in this that there are in the will two distinct powers corresponding to the irascible and the concupiscible.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though the higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, yet, because it has good in general as its proper object, it is not divided into several powers.

2. That book is not Augustine’s, nor need it be accepted as an authority. We can nevertheless say that it is either speaking of the irascible and concupiscible powers figuratively, or it is speaking of them from the point of view of their source; for all of the powers, even the sensitive, now from the essence of the soul.

3. There are two opinions on the sensitive powers of the soul. Some say that these powers remain in the separated soul essentially; others say that they remain in the essence of the soul radically. And whichever opinion is taken, the irascible and the concupiscible powers do not remain in any other way than the rest of the sensitive powers. Thus it is said in the work mentioned that when withdrawing from the body, the soul takes will it sense and imagination.

4. In his work The Trinity Augustine investigates many sorts of trinities in our soul in which there is some resemblance to the un created Trinity, though the image in the proper sense of the term exists only in the mind. By reason of the resemblance mentioned some place the image in the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, though this is not said in a proper sense.

5. Charity and hope are not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, properly speaking, since the love of charity and the expectation of hope are without any passion. But charity is said to be in the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is in the will, viewed as having acts like those of the concupiscible; and in the same way hope is said w be in the irascible.

6. The irascible and concupiscible powers are said to be human or rational, not by their essence, as if they belonged to the higher part

of the soul, but by participation, inasmuch as they obey reason and participate in its rule, as Damascene again says.

7. Joy and fear, which are passions, do not remain in the separated soul, since they take place will a bodily change. But there remain acts of the will similar to those passions.


Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 3, 1 ad In I Eth., o; Sum. Theol., 1, 81, I-II, 17, Quodibet IV, (II), 21; in III de an., 16.


It seems that it does not, for

1. In the Epistle to the Romans (7: 15) it is written: "For [ good) which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do." As a comment in the Gloss explains, this is said because of the motions of sensuality. Sensuality- therefore does not obey the will and reason.

2. In the same Epistle (7:23) It is written: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind..." Now this law is concupiscence. It is therefore fighting against the law of the mi, that is, reason; and so it does not obey it.

3. The relation among the appetitive powers is the same as that among the apprehensive. But the intellect does not have control of the acts of the external senses, for we do not see or hear whatever the intellect decides. Then neither are the motions of sensuality under the control of rational appetite.

4. Natural activities in us are not subject to reason. But sensuality tends to the object of its desire by a natural appetite. Consequently the motions of sensuality are not subject to reason.

5. The motions of sensuality are passions of the soul, for which definite dispositions of the body are required, as Avicenna deter mines. Thus for anger, hot thin blood is needed; and for joy, temper ate blood. But one’s bodily disposition is not subject to reason. Then neither are the motions of sensuality.

To the Contrary:

Damascene says that the irascible and the concupiscible powers participate to some extent in reason. But they are the parts of sensuality. Consequently the motions of sensuality also are under the control of reason. And the same can be gathered from what is said by the Philosopher and by Gregory of Nyssa.



In a series of mobile beings and movers we must arrive at some first being which moves itself and by which is moved whatever is not moved by itself, because everything that exists through another is reduced to that which exists through itself, as is gathered from the Physics. Then, since the will moves itself by reason of its being the master of its own act, the other powers which do not move them selves must somehow be moved by the will. Now the nearer any of the other powers comes to the will, the more it participates in the will’s motion. Consequently the lower appetitive powers obey the will in their principal acts as being nearest to the will; and the other powers farther removed, as the nutritive and generative, are moved by the will in some of their external acts.

Now the lower appetitive powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, are subject to reason in three respects: (1) On the part of reason itself. For since the same thing considered under different conditions can be made either pleasurable or repulsive, by means of the imagination reason lays a particular thing before sensuality under the aspect of the pleasurable or the disagreeable as it appears to reason; and so sensuality is moved to joy or to sorrow. The Philosopher accordingly says that reason persuades "to the best." (2) On the part of the will. For among powers hierarchically connected the situation is such that an intense movement in one, and especially in the higher, overflows into the other. Accordingly, when by a choice the movement of the will is directed to something intensely, even the irascible and the concupiscible powers follow the movement of the will. It is accordingly said in The Soul that appetite moves appetite (that is, the higher moves the lower) as sphere moves sphere among the heavenly bodies.

(3) On the part of the motive power which carries it out. For just as in an army the advance to battle depends upon the command of the general, so in us the motive power moves the members only at the command of that which rules in us, namely reason, whatever sort of movement may occur in the lower powers. Reason therefore holds the irascible and the concupiscible powers in check lest they proceed to an external act. On this account it is said in Genesis (4:7): "The just thereof shah be under thee."

Thus it is clear that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are subject to reason, and likewise sensuality, though the name sensuality does not refer to these powers according to their participation in reason but according to the nature of the sensitive part of the soul. It is consequently not said in as proper a sense that sensuality is subject to reason as that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are so subject.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The statement of the Apostle is to be understood as meaning that it is not in our power universally to prevent all inordinate movements of sensuality, though we can prevent individual ones, as is clear from what has been said.

2. As far as sensuality itself goes, it fights against reason; yet reason can keep it in check, as is clear from what has been said.

3. The lower apprehensive powers also obey the higher, as is clear in the case of the imagination and the other internal senses; but the fact that the external senses do not obey the intellect is due to their need of a sensible thing, and to their inability to sense without it.

4. The lower appetitive power does not naturally tend to anything until after that thing is presented to it under the aspect of its proper object, as is clear from what has been said. Since it is in the power of reason to present one and the same thing under different aspects, a particular sort of food, for instance, as delicious or as deadly, reason is able to move sensuality to different objects.

5. A disposition of the body which is in its very constitution is not subject to reason. But that such a disposition be had is a requisite not directly] for the actualization of the passions in question, but for man to be capable of them. The actual modification of the body, how ever, such as the boiling of the blood around the heart, or something of the sort, which actually accompanies passions of this kind, depends upon the imagination, and on that account is subject to reason.


Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 3, 2; De malo, 7, 6; Sum. Theol., I-II, 74, 3 & 4; Quodibet IV, (11), 21 & 22.


It seems that there cannot, for

1. According to Augustine no sin is ever committed except by the will. But sensuality is distinguished from the will. Sin is therefore not in sensuality.

2. [No difficulty is given for this number.]

3. Sins remain in the separated soul. But sensuality does not remain in the separated soul, since it is a power of the composite; for its act is exercised by means of the body. "But the act belongs to the same subject as the power," as the Philosopher says. Consequently there is no sin in sensuality.

4. According to Augustine there is something which acts and is not acted upon, that is, God; and in this there is no sin. There is some thing else which acts and is acted upon, namely, the will; and in this there is clearly sin. And there is something else which is acted upon and does not act, that is, sensuality. Then sin is not in this either.

5. The answer was given that there can be sin in sensuality by the mere fact that reason can prevent its movement.—On the contrary, the fact that reason can prevent it and does not, merely indicates the interpretative consent of reason, which is not sufficient for sin since nothing less than express consent suffices for merit. "For God is more ready to have mercy than to punish," as is said in the Gloss in a com merit upon the beginning of Jeremias. Then not even for this reason can it be said that there is sin in sensuality.

6. No one sins in doing something which he cannot avoid. But we cannot keep the movements of sensuality from being inordinate; for, as Augustine says, because man was unwilling to avoid sin when he was able, there has been inflicted upon him the inability to avoid it when he so wills. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.

7. When the movement of sensuality is to something licit, there is no sin, as when a husband is aroused in regard to his will. But sensuality does not distinguish between what is licit and what is illicit. Then not even when it is moved to something illicit will there be sin in it.

8. Virtue and vice are contraries. But virtue cannot be in sensuality. Then neither can vice.

9. Sin is in that to which it is imputed. But since sensuality does not have control over its own act, sin is not imputed to it, but rather to the will. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.

10. The material element of mortal sin can be in sensuality; and yet we do not say that mortal sin is there, because the formal element of mortal sin is not found in it. But the formal element of venial sin, the privation of due order, is not in sensuality but in reason, whose business it is to put things in order. Consequently venial sin is not found in sensuality.

11. If a blind man being led by one who sees fails into a ditch, it is not the fault of the blind man but of the one who sees. Since sensuality is, so to speak, blind in regard to divine things, should it fail into some thing illicit, that will not be its own sin but that of reason, which is supposed to guide it.

12. Like sensuality, the external members are guided by reason; and yet we do not say that there is sin in them. Then neither is it in sensuality.

13. Disposition and form are in the same subject, because the acts of active principles are in the thing acted upon and disposed. But venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. Therefore, since mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, neither can venial sin.

14. The act of fornication is nearer to sensuality than to reason. If, then, there could be any sin in sensuality, it would be a mental sin, namely, that of fornication. But since that is false, it seems that there cannot be any sin in it.

To the Contrary:

2'. Augustine says: "There is some fault when the flesh lusts against the spirit." Now that just of the flesh belongs to sensuality. There can therefore be some sin in sensuality.

2’. The Master says that there is venial sin in sensuality.



Sin is nothing but an act which lacks the right order which it was supposed to have. It is in this sense that "sin" or defect is taken in matters applying to nature and to art, as the Philosopher says. But there is question of mortal sin only when the defective act is moral.

An act is moral by the fact that it is somehow in our power, for thus it deserves praise or blame. Consequently an act which is completely in our power is completely moral and is capable of verifying the full notion of mortal sin. Such are the acts which the will elicits or commands. The act of sensuality however, is not completely in our power, because it precedes the judgment of reason; yet it is in our power to some extent inasmuch as sensuality is subject to reason, as appears from what has been said. Its act accordingly attains to the genus of moral acts, but incompletely. In sensuality there consequently cannot be mortal sin, which is complete sin, but only venial sin, in which the incomplete character of mortal sin is found.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The subject of a thing is of either of two kinds: it is either first or secondary, as a surface is the first sub of colour, and a body is its secondary sub inasmuch as it is the subject of the surface. Similarly we must say that the first subject of sin is the will, but sensuality is the subject of sin inasmuch as it in some way shares in the will.

2. The act of sensuality is in our power in some fashion, not from the nature of sensuality, but in so far as the powers of sensuality are rational by participation.

3. The marks of our sins remain in our conscience, regardless of which faculty it may have been by which they were committed. Granted, then, that sensuality does not remain at all, in the sense explained above, the sin of sensuality can remain. The problem whether sensuality remains, however, is to be discussed elsewhere."

4. Although it is not the function of sensuality considered in itself to act, it is its function in so far as it in some measure participates in reason.

5. The reason why sin is said to be in sensuality is not the interpretative consent of reason. When the movement of sensuality precedes the judgment of reason, there is no consent either interpreted or expressed; but from the very fact that sensuality is able to be subjected to reason its act, even though it precedes reason, has the character of sin. It should, however, be borne in mind that, even though interpreted consent sometimes may suffice for sin, it does not have to suffice for merit. There are more requisites for good than for evil, since evil occurs from individual defects, whereas good depends upon a total situation not vitiated in any particular, as Dionysius says.’

6. We can in fact avoid individual sins of sensuality, though not all, as is clear from what was said in another question.’

7. When a man approaches his will from concupiscence there is venial sin, provided that he does not exceed the bounds of wedded life. It is accordingly clear that the very movement of concupiscence preceding reason in a married person is a venial sin. But when reason determines what one may licitly crave, then even though sensuality goes out to it, there will be no sin.

8. Moral virtue is in the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher makes clear when he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts. But be cause sensuality designates these powers as having an inclination which is natural to sense but to something contrary w reason, and not as participating in reason, on this account vice is more properly said to be in sensuality, and virtue to be in the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The sin which is in sensuality, however, is not opposed to virtue as its contrary. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

9. Every sin is imputed to man inasmuch as he has a will; and yet sin is said to be in some sense in that power whose act happens to be deformed.

10. The material element in mortal sin can be taken in three ways: (1) In so far as the object is the matter of the act. In this sense the matter of mortal sin is sometimes in sensuality, as when a person consents to sensual pleasure. (2) In so far as the external act is called material will reference to the internal act, which is the formal element in mortal sin, since the external and the internal act constitute one sin. In this sense too the act of sensuality can be regarded as the material element in mortal sin. ( In so far as the material element in mortal sin is the turning towards a changeable good as one’s end, whereas the formal element is the turning away from the unchangeable good. In this sense the material element in mortal sin cannot be in sensuality. Nor does it follow (for the reason given above ) that, if mortal sin cannot be found there, then there is no venial sin there either.

11. Sin is said to be in sensuality, not as being imputed to that power, but as being committed through its act. Sin is rather imputed to the man inasmuch as that act is in his power.

12. The external members are merely moved, whereas the lower appetitive powers do the moving somewhat like the will. In so far, then, as they in some sense participate in the will, they can be the subject of sin.

13. Dispositions are of two kinds. There is one by which a patient is disposed to receive a form. Such a disposition is in the same subject as the form. There is another disposition by which an agent is disposed to act. Regarding this kind it is not true that it is in the same subject as the form for which it disposes. Venial sin, which is in sensuality, is this kind of disposition to mortal sin, which is in reason; for sensuality is like an agent in regard to mortal sin, since it inclines reason to sin.

14. Although the act of fornication is closer to the concupiscible power than to reason as regards the nature of the object, it is nonetheless closer to reason as regards the nature of command. The external members are applied to the act only by the command of reason. Mortal sin can accordingly be in them but not in the act of sensuality, which precedes the judgment of reason.


Parallel readings: II Sentences 3l, 2, 2; De malo, 4, 2 ad 12; Sum. Theol., I-II, 83, 4.


It seems that it is not, for

1. The corruption and infection of human nature comes from original sin. But original sin is in the essence of the soul as its subject, as some say, because the soul contracts it from its union will the body, to which it is joined by its essence. Since all the powers of the soul are equally close to its essence, being rooted in it, the infection and corruption does not seem to be any more in the concupiscible than in the irascible and other powers.

2. From the corruption of our nature there is in us a certain inclination to sin. But the sins of the irascible power are more serious than those of the concupiscible, because according to Gregory spiritual sins are more culpable than carnal sins. The irascible power is there fore more corrupt than the concupiscible.

3. Sudden movements of the soul occur in us because of the corruption of our nature. But the movements of the irascible power seem to be more sudden than those of the concupiscible. For the irascible is moved will a certain virility of spirit, whereas the concupiscible is moved will a certain effeminacy. The irascible is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.

4. The sort of corruption and infection of which we are speaking is a corruption of nature handed on by generation. But the sins of the irascible power are "more natural" and are handed on from parents to children more than sins of the concupiscible, as the Philosopher says. The irascible is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.

5. Corruption in us comes from the sin of our first parent. But the first sin of our first parent was one of pride or self-exaltation, which is in the irascible power. Consequently the irascible power is more corrupt and infected in us than is the concupiscible.

To the Contrary:

1’. Where there is greater foulness there is greater corruption and infection. But according to the Philosopher a man unable to control his concupiscence is fouler than one unable to control his anger. Then the concupiscible power is more corrupt and infected than the irascible.

2’. We are more corrupt where we resist will greater difficulty. But it is more difficult to fight against sensual pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible power, than against anger, as the Philosopher makes clear. We are therefore more corrupt in the concupiscible power than in the irascible.



The corruption and the infection of original sin differ in this respect, that infection refers to guilt, corruption to penalty.

Now original guilt is said to be in a power of the soul in two different ways: essentially and causally. Essentially it is either in the very essence of the soul or in the intellectual part, formerly the seat of original justice, which is taken away by original sin. Causally it is in the powers concerned in the act of human generation, by which original sin is handed on: the generative power, which carries it out, the concupiscible power, which commands it for the sake of pleasure, and the sense of touch, which perceives the pleasure. That infection is accordingly attributed to touch among the senses, to the concupiscible among the appetitive powers, and among the faculties of the soul in general to the generative power, which is said to be infected and corrupted.

The corruption of the soul of which we are speaking is to be viewed after the manner of bodily corruption. The latter comes about from the fact that, when the principle which holds the individual contrary parts together is removed, they tend to whatever agrees will them individually according to their own natures, and so the dissolution of the body takes place. So too since the loss of original justice, through which reason held the lower powers altogether subject to itself in the state of innocence, each of the lower powers tends to what is proper to it: the concupiscible to pleasure, the irascible to anger, and so on. The Philosopher accordingly compares these parts of the soul to palsied members of the body.

Now the corruption of the body is not said to be in the soul, whose withdrawal occasions the body’s dissolution, but rather in the body, which is dissolved. In the same way the corruption spoken of is in the sensitive powers inasmuch as they are deprived of the unifying control exercised by reason and go out in all directions; but it is not in reason itself except to the extent that it is deprived of its own proper perfection when separated from God. On this account the more one of the lower powers gets away from reason, the more corrupt it is; and consequently since the irascible power is closer to reason as participating to some extent in reason in its own movement, as the Philosopher teaches, the irascible power will be less corrupt than the concupiscible.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though all the powers are rooted in the essence of the soul, some flow from that essence more immediately than the others and have a different relationship to the cause of original sin. The corruption and infection of original sin are accordingly not in all in the same way.

2. From the fact that the irascible power shares in the movement of reason more than the concupiscible it results that the sins of the irascible power are more serious but those of the concupiscible more shameful. The very discernment of reason increases the guilt, just as ignorance lessens it. But because the whole human dignity consists in reason, withdrawal from it entails shamefulness. It is accordingly clear from this that the concupiscible power is more corrupt as will drawing farther from reason.

3. The movement of the irascible and of the concupiscible powers can be considered in two respects: in desiring and in executing. In desiring, the movement of the concupiscible power is more sudden than that of the irascible, because the irascible is moved by deliberating and comparing, as it were, the intended revenge will the insult received, as if syllogizing, as is said in the Ethics. But the concupiscible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the pleasurable object, as is said in the same place. But in executing, the movement of the irascible is more sudden than that of the concupiscible, because the irascible power acts will a certain courage and confidence, whereas the concupiscible will a certain pusillanimity tends to the attainment of its purposes by wiles. The Philosopher accordingly says that "the wrathful man does not lay snares but works out in the open, whereas concupiscence lays snares." And he alludes to the verse of Homer who said that Venus is guileful and her seducing girdle is cunningly adorned, thereby conveying the deception by which Venus snatches away the understanding even of a very will man.

4. Something is said to be natural in either of two senses: from the point of view of the nature of the species or from that of the nature of the individual. From the point of view of the nature of the species sins of the concupiscible power are more natural than those of the irascible. Thus the Philosopher says that sensual pleasure "grows up will all of US from our infancy," as if it were contemporary will life. But from the point of view of the nature of the individual the sins of the irascible power are more natural.

The reason for this is that, if the motion of the sensible appetite is viewed from the standpoint of the soul, the concupiscible power tends more naturally to its object as being more natural and better suited to it in itself; for this power is concerned will food and drink and other things of the sort by which nature is preserved. But if this sort of motion is viewed from the standpoint of the body, a greater alteration and commotion of the body is brought about by the motion of anger than by that of concupiscence, commonly and proportionately speaking.

For this reason the bodily make-up, in which children are for the most part like their parents, has more influence in the control of anger than in that of concupiscence. Consequently children imitate their parents more in sins of anger than in those of concupiscence. For what depends upon the soul relates to the species, but what depends upon a definite make-up of the body relates more to the individual. Original sin, however, is a sin of the whole of human nature. Hence it is clear that the argument proves nothing.

5. Corruption occurs in us in an order the inverse of that in Adam, because in Adam the soul corrupts the body, and the person the nature, whereas in us it is the other way about. Consequently, although the sin of Adam belonged first to the irascible power, yet in us corruption belongs more to the concupiscible.


Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I-II, 74, ad 2.


It seems that it can, for

1. The aforesaid corruption is called the "fuel of sin." But it is said of the Blessed Virgin that even in this life she was entirely freed from the fuel of sin, especially after the conception of the Son of God. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.

2. Whatever obeys reason is susceptible of the rectitude of reason. But the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible obey reason, as was made clear above. Sensuality is therefore susceptible of the rectitude of reason, and so can be cured of the contrary corruption.

3. Virtue is opposed to sin. But there can be virtue in sensuality; for, as the Philosopher says, temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. Sensuality can therefore be cured in this life of the corruption of sin.

4. It is a part of the corruption of sensuality that there proceed from it inordinate movements of depraved concupiscence. But "the temperate man does not have movements of concupiscence of this sort" and consequently differs in this respect from the continent man, who has them but does not follow them, as is explained in the Ethics. Sensuality can therefore be entirely cured in this life.

5. If this corruption is incurable, the reason is to be found either in the physician, or in the medicine, or in the sickness, or in the nature to be healed. Now it is not to be found in the physician that is, God, because Fie is omnipotent; nor in the medicine, because, as the Epistle to the Romans (5: I 5) makes clear, Christ’s gift is more potent than Adam’s sin by which this corruption was brought on; nor in the sick ness, because it is against nature, since it was not in nature as instituted; nor in the nature to be healed, for it would be useful to have this infirmity removed, since because of it man is prone to evil and sluggish in good. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.

To the Contrary:

1’. The necessity of sinning, at least venially, is a consequence of the necessity of dying. But in this life the necessity of dying is not taken away. Then neither is the necessity of sinning, and therefore neither is the corruption of sensuality from which the said necessity comes.

2’. If sensuality- were curable in this life, it would be cured particularly through the sacraments of the Church, which are spiritual medicines. But it still remains even after the reception of the sacraments, as is evident from experience. Sensuality is therefore not curable in this life.

De veritate EN 217