De veritate EN 221



Sensuality cannot be cured in this life except by a miracle. The reason for this is that what is natural cannot be changed except by a supernatural power. But the sort of corruption by which the parts of the soul are said to be corrupt, in some sense follows the inclination of nature.

The gift bestowed upon man in his first state, as a result of which reason kept the lower powers entirely in check, and the soul kept in check the body, was not from the efficacy of any natural principles but from the efficacy of original justice, which was given by divine liberality over and above them. When this justice was removed by sin, man returned to a state which befitted him according t his own natural principles. Dionysius accordingly says that by sin human nature "was deservedly brought to an end befitting its beginning."

Just as man naturally dies and cannot be restored to immortality except miraculously, in the same way the concupiscible power naturally tends to what is pleasurable and the irascible to what is arduous, even outside the order of reason. As a consequence it is not possible for that corruption to be removed unless a supernatural power miraculously brings it about.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The Blessed Virgin was freed from the fuel of sin miraculously.

2. The irascible and the concupiscible powers obey reason inasmuch as their motions are either ordered or restrained by reason, but not so that their inclination is entirely taken away.

3. The virtue which is in the irascible and the concupiscible powers is not opposed to the aforesaid corruption as its contrary. Consequently it is not entirely removed. It is, however, contrarily opposed to any excess in the inclination of the said powers toward their objects; and this is removed by the virtue.

4. In the explanation of the Philosopher the temperate man is not altogether without any movements of concupiscence but without vigorous movements, such as can be in the continent man.

5. The reason why sensuality is not cured in this life is to be found in all four of the factors proposed. For God Himself, though able to cure it, has nevertheless appointed according to the order of His wisdom that it should not be cured in this life. In like manner the gift of grace which has been conferred upon us by Christ, though more efficacious than the sin of the first man, is not ordained to the removal of the corruption in question, which is one of our nature, but to the removal of the guilt of the person. In like manner too, although this corruption is against the state of nature as originally instituted, it is nevertheless a consequence of the principles of nature left to itself; and it is also useful for man in order to avoid the vice of self-exaltation that the infirmity of sensuality remain: "And lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh" (2Co 12,7). Consequently this infirmity remains in man after The Question Is about the Passions of the Soul, and in baptism, just as a will physician discharges a patient without having cured his illness if it could not be cured without the danger of a more the First serious illness.

QUESTION 26: The passions of the soul

Parallel readings: lYSentences «, 3, 3 sol. (cf. a. 2 sol. I-3 47, 2, i sol. z & Contra Gentiles IV, o; Quodibet II, (7), 13 III, (10), 23; VIII, (8), 18; De spir. creat., I ad 20; Sum. Theol., I, 64,4 ad 1; Q.D. de an., 6 ad 1; Comp. theol. I, '80.



It seems that it does not suffer from a corporeal fire, for

1. Augustine says: "An agent is superior to its corresponding patient." But the soul is superior to any body whatsoever. Therefore the soul cannot suffer from corporeal lire.

2. It was said in answer that fire acts upon the soul as an instrument of divine vindictive justice.—On the contrary, an instrument accomplishes its instrumental action only by exercising its natural action, as the water of baptism sanctifies the soul by washing the body, and a saw makes a bench by cutting wood. But lire cannot have any natural action upon the soul. It therefore cannot act upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice.

3. The answer was given that the natural action of fire is to burn up, and so it naturally acts upon the soul in so far as the soul has a complement of combustibles.—On the contrary, the combustibles which are said to form the complement of the soul are sins, to which corporeal fire is not contrary. Since all natural action is by reason of contrariety, it therefore seems that the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire as having a complement of combustibles.

4. Augustine says: "The things by which souls freed of their bodies are affected either for good or for ill are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things." Then the fire by which the separated soul is punished is not corporeal.

5. Damascene says: "The devil and his demons and his man, the Antichrist, and the wicked and sinners will be given over to eternal fire—not a material one such as is familiar to us but one such as God surely knows." Now all corporeal fire is material. Then the lire from which the separated soul suffers is not corporeal.

6. The answer was offered that such a corporeal fire afflicts the soul inasmuch as it is seen by it, as Gregory says: "The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it"; and so what immediately afflicts the soul is not something corporeal but the apprehended likeness of something corporeal.—On the contrary, the thing seen, by being seen, is the perfection of the seer. Consequently by being seen it does not give pain to the one seeing but rather pleasure. If, then, something that is seen causes pain, this will be because it is harmful in some other way. But fire cannot afflict the soul by acting upon it in some other way, as has been proved. Then neither does the soul suffer from fire simply by seeing it.

7. Between an agent and its patient there is some proportion. But there is no proportion between an incorporeal and a corporeal being. The soul, therefore, being incorporeal, cannot suffer from corporeal fire.

8. If corporeal fire acts upon the soul in a way that is not natural, this action must be due to some superadded power. Now that power is either corporeal or spiritual. But it cannot be spiritual, because corporeal being is not susceptible of a spiritual power. If, on the other hand, it is corporeal, fire will still not be able to act upon the soul by this power, since the soul is superior to every corporeal power. The soul therefore cannot suffer either naturally or supernaturally.

9. It was advanced in answer that by sin the soul is made less noble than a corporeal creature.—On the contrary, Augustine says that a living substance is nobler than any non-living substance. But a rational soul, even after sinning, still remains living by its natural life. It there fore does not become less noble than corporeal lire, which is a non- living substance.

10. If corporeal lire afflicts the soul, it does so only inasmuch as it is apprehended or sensed as harmful. But a thing does harm to another by taking something away from it. Thus Augustine says that evil does harm because it takes good away. Now a corporeal lire cannot take anything away from the soul. Thus it cannot afflict it.

11. It was said that it takes away the glory of the vision of God.— On the contrary, children who are damned for original sin alone are deprived of the vision of God. If, then, corporeal lire does not take away from the damned anything more, the pains of those who are being punished in hell for actual sins will be no greater than those of children who are being punished in limbo. But this is against Augustine’s doctrine.

12. Whatever acts upon another impresses upon it a likeness of the form through which the agent acts. But lire acts through heat. Now since the soul cannot be heated, it therefore seems that it cannot be acted upon by fire.

13. God is more ready to show mercy than to punish. But one who deliberately resists, especially an adult, is not helped through the instruments of divine mercy, the sacraments. Then through the instrument of divine justice, corporeal fire, the soul will not undergo punishment against its will. Obviously it does not undergo it voluntarily. Hence the soul is in no way punished through corporeal fire.

14. Whatever suffers anything from another being is in some way moved by it. But under no species of motion can the soul be moved by corporeal fire, as is clear by induction. Consequently the soul can not suffer anything from corporeal lire.

15. Whatever is made to suffer by another has matter in common will it, as is seen from Boethius.1 But the soul does not have matter in common will corporeal lire. It therefore cannot suffer from corporeal lire.

To the Contrary:

1'. The rich man buried in hell as to his soul only, says: "I am tormented in this name." (Lc 16,24)

2’. Commenting on the words of Job (20:26): "A fire that is not kindled shall devour him," Gregory says: "Though the lire of hell is corporeal and corporeally burns the reprobates cast into it, it is not kindled by any human effort or fed will wood; but once created, it continues inextinguishable without needing kindling or losing its heat."

3'. Cassiodorus says that the soul separated from the body "hears and sees will its senses more keenly" than when it is in the body. But while it is in the body it suffers from something corporeal by sensing it. All the more then does it do so when it is separated from the body.

4'. Like the soul, demons are incorporeal. But demons suffer from corporeal lire, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): "Depart from me, you cursed,.." So too, then, does the separated soul.

5’. For. the soul to be justified is something greater than for it to be punished. But certain corporeal beings act upon the soul for its justification in so far as they are instruments of divine mercy, as is evident in the case of the sacraments of the Church. Some corporeal beings, then, can likewise act upon the soul for its punishment in so far as they are instruments of divine justice.

6’. What is less noble can suffer from what is more noble. But corporeal fire is nobler than the soul of a damned person. Therefore the souls of the damned can suffer from corporeal fire.—Proof of the mi nor: Any being at all is nobler than non-being. But non-existence is nobler than the existence of the souls of the damned, as is clear from Matthew (z6: 24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born." Then any being at all, and therefore corporeal lire, is nobler than a damned soul.



To clear up this issue and those of the following articles we must understand what passion or suffering is in its proper sense. It must therefore be borne in mind that the term passion is taken in two senses: one general and the other proper.

In its general sense passion is the reception of something in any way at all. This usage confirms to the root meaning of the word itself, for passion is derived from the Greek patin, meaning "to receive."

In its proper sense passion is used of motion, since action and passion consist in motion, inasmuch as it is by way of motion that reception in a patient takes place. And because all motion is between contraries, that which the patient receives must be contrary to some thing given up by the patient. Now conformably will what is received the patient is made like the agent; and hence it is that by passion in the proper meaning of the term the agent is opposed to the patient as its contrary, and every passion removes something from the substance of the patient. Passion in this sense, however, is found only in the motion of alteration. For in local motion nothing is received in the mobile, but the mobile itself is received in a place. But in the motion of increase and decrease what is received or given up is not a form but something substantial, like nourishment, on whose addition or subtraction the greatless or smallness of quantity depends. In generation and corruption there is no motion or contrariety except by reason of a previous alteration. Consequently passion is properly found only in alteration, in which one contrary form is received and the other is driven out.

Because passion in its proper sense involves a certain loss, inasmuch as the patient is changed from its former quality to a contrary one, the term passion is broadened in usage, so that whatever is in anyway kept from what belongs to it is said to suffer (pati). Thus we should say that something heavy suffers when prevented from moving down ward, or that a man suffers if prevented from doing his own will.

Taken in the first sense, then, passion is found in the soul and in every creature, because every creature has some potentiality in its composition, and by reason of this every subsistent creature is capable of receiving something. Taken in the second sense, however, passion is found only where there is motion and contrariety. Now motion is found only in bodies, and the contrariety of forms or qualities only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Hence only such beings can properly suffer in this sense. Consequently the soul, being incorporeal, cannot suffer in this sense; for even though it receives something, this does not happen by an exchange of contraries but simply by a communication from the agent, as air is lighted by the sun. But in the third sense, in which the term passion is taken figuratively, the soul can suffer in the sense that its operation can be hampered.

Some, aware that passion in a proper sense cannot be in the soul, have asserted that everything said in the Scriptures about the bodily pains of the damned is to be understood metaphorically. Thus by the bodily pains will which we are familiar there would be indicated the spiritual afflictions by which damned spirits are punished; just as on the other hand, by the bodily delights promised in Scripture we understand the spiritual delights of the blessed. Origen and Algazel seem to have been of this opinion. But because, believing in the resurrection, we believe that there will be suffering not only for spirits but also for bodies, and because bodies cannot be punished except by bodily suffering, and because the same suffering is due both to men after the resurrection and to spirits, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): "Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire...,"it is there fore necessary to say, as Augustine proves, that even spirits are affected in some way by bodily pains. Nor is there a parallel between the glory of the blessed and the pains of the damned, because the blessed are raised up to a state that surpasses their nature and thus are given beatitude through the enjoyment of the divinity, whereas the damned are pushed down to a state that is below them and thus are punished even will bodily torments.

Others have accordingly said that the separated soul will be affected by certain pains, to be sure, which, though not bodily, are nevertheless like bodily pains, something like the pains will which people asleep are afflicted. Augustine seems to have thought this, and also Avicenna. But this also cannot be true. For such likenesses of bodies cannot be intellectual, because intellectual likenesses are universal and attention to them would not cause affliction of the soul but rather pleasure in the contemplation of truth. This expression must therefore be understood of imaginational likenesses, which can exist only in a bodily organ, as is proved by the philosophers. But there is no such organ, of course, in the separated soul and in the spirits of the demons.

Others accordingly say that the separated soul suffers from bodies themselves. How this can be is explained by some in one way and by others in another.

Some say that the separated soul uses its senses, and therefore, by sensing a corporeal fire, is punished by fire. This is what Gregory seems to say when he says: "The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing." But that does not seem to be true; first of all because the acts of the sensitive powers cannot be had except by means of bodily organs, for otherwise the sentient souls of the brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having their operations by them selves; and in the second place because, granted that the separated souls would sense, they could still not be afflicted by sensible things; for the sensible object is the perfection of the sentient being as such, just as the intelligible object is the perfection of the intelligent being.

It is therefore not as sensed or understood that something sensible or intelligible causes pain or sadness, but inasmuch as it is harmful or is so apprehended. Thus it is necessary to find a way in which tire can be harmful to the separated soul.

Nor can it be true, as some say, that, although corporeal tire can not be harmful to a spirit, yet it can be apprehended as harmful. This seems to agree will what Gregory says: "Because the soul sees itself being burned, it is burned." For it is improbable that demons, who enjoy sharpness of perception, do not know their own nature and that of corporeal tire much better than we do, so that they could falsely believe it possible for a corporeal tire to harm them.

It must therefore be said that really, and not only apparently, souls are afflicted by corporeal fire. This is what Gregory says: "We can gather from the statements of the gospels that the soul suffers burning not only by seeing but also by experiencing it.

To assign the way in which this happens some say that as the instrument of divine justice corporeal tire can act upon the soul, even though it cannot do so according to its own nature. For there are many things that are not sufficient of their own nature to accomplish something which they are nonetheless able to accomplish as the instruments of another agent. Thus the element fire is not sufficient for the generation of flesh except as the instrument of the nutritive power. But this solution does not seem to be adequate, for an instrument does not perform an action which surpasses its own nature except by exercising some action natural to it, as was said in the difficulties.

It is therefore necessary to find some other way in which the soul somehow suffers naturally from corporeal tire. This can be under stood as follows. An incorporeal2s substance may be united to a body in two ways: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it vivifies the body; and (2) as a mover is united to the thing moved or as a thing placed is united to its place, namely, by some operation or some relationship. But be cause there is one act of existing for the form and that of which it is the form, the union of a spiritual substance to a corporeal one after the manner of a form is a union in the act of existing. Now the existence of no being lies within its own power; and consequently it is not within the power of a spiritual substance to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a form, but this is accomplished either by a law of nature or by the divine power. But because the operation of a thing which operates voluntarily is within its own power, it is within the power of a spiritual nature, confirm ably to the order of nature, to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a mover or of a thing placed; but that a spiritual substance thus united to a body should be confined and hampered and, as it were, fettered by it, that is above nature. The corporeal tire in question, then, acting as the instrument of divine justice, accomplishes something above the power of nature, that is, to confine or fetter the soul; but the union itself in the manner mentioned is natural.

The soul accordingly suffers from corporeal fire in the third way proposed above, namely, in the sense in which we say that anything suffers winch is obstructed in its proper activity or kept from some— thing winch belongs to it. Augustine affirms tins sort of passion when he says: "Why should we not say that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of corporeal fire in true though wonderful ways if the spirits of men, winch are also unquestionably in corporeal, both could now be enclosed in bodily members and will in the future be able to be indissolubly bound by the chains of their own bodies? The incorporeal spirits of the demons...will therefore ding to corporeal fires to be tormented, not in such a way that the fires themselves to winch they ding will be animated by union will them and become living beings,...but by clinging in marvellous and inexpressible ways they will receive pain from the fires yet not give life to them."

Gregory also proposes tins sort of passion, saying: "As long as Truth presents the rich sinner as damned in fire, what man of any wisdom will deny that the souls of the reprobate are held by fires?"

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The agent does not have to be superior to the patient in every respect, but merely as agent. And so, inasmuch as fire acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice, it is superior to the soul, though not in every respect.

2. There is something natural in that passion and action, as has been said.

3. That difficulty is speaking about a passion as used in the second sense, which is had through the contrariety of forms; and tins is impossible in the case at hand.

4. On tins matter Augustine does not expressly decide anything in the place cited, but he is speaking there by way of inquiry as if pro posing a difficulty. Hence he does not say absolutely that the things by winch the separated souls are affected are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things, but he is speaking hypothetically: if the things were of this kind, they could still affect the souls will joy or sorrow. In the same way, when he says that the soul is not borne to corporeal places except in company will another body, he says this as part of a disjunction, adding: "or else not locally," that is, by commensuration to a place.

5. In the pain of a separated soul there are two principles to be taken into account: the first afflicting principle, and the proximate one. The first afflicting principle is corporeal fire itself which confines the soul as explained above. But tins would not arouse sadness in the soul unless it were apprehended by the soul. The proximate afflicting principle is therefore the confining lire as apprehended; and tins lire is not material but spiritual. In tins sense Damascene’s statement can be verified.—Or it can be said in answer that he says it is not material because it does not punish the soul by acting materially, as it punishes bodies.

6. That lire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it is confining and fettering. In this sense the sight of it can be the source of affliction.

7. There is no proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal if pro portion is taken in its proper sense, according to a definite relation ship of quantity to quantity, either of dimensive quantity to dimensive quantity or of virtual quantity to virtual quantity, as two bodies are proportioned to each other in dimension and power; for the power of a spiritual substance is not of the same genus as corporeal power. If, however, proportion is taken broadly as meaning any relationship, then there is some proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal through winch the spiritual can naturally act upon the corporeal, though not conversely except by divine power.

8. An instrument performs its instrumental activity inasmuch as it is moved by the principal agent and through tins motion shares in some way in the power of the principal agent, but not so that that power has its complete existence in the instrument, because motion is an incomplete act. The difficulty argues as if a complete power were required in the instrument for the performance of the instrumental action.

9. The soul, even when sinful, is simply nobler than any corporeal power as regards its nature; but as regards guilt it is made less noble than corporeal lire, not simply but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice.

10. That lire harms the soul, not in such a way that it takes away from it some form inhering in it absolutely, but in so far as it prevents its free action, confining it, as has been said.

11. In children because of the lack of grace there is only the privation of the vision of God without anything contrary actively hampering them. But the damned in hell are not only deprived of the Vision of God because of the lack of grade, but are also hampered as by something contrary because they are overwhelmed will bodily pains.

12. The soul does not suffer from fire as if it were altered by it but in the manner explained above.

13. Voluntariness is essential to justice but not to punishment; rather it is contrary to it. Hence the instruments of divine mercy, which are intended to justify, do not act upon a soul which resists; but the instruments of divine justice for punishing do act upon a soul which resists.

14. That difficulty argues on the supposition of a passion properly so called, which consists in motion. But we are not speaking of that now.

15. To have a passion in the proper sense of the term a thing must have matter subject to contrariety, as has been said. Arid for two things to have a reciprocal passion, they must have a common matter. Yet a thing can suffer from another will which it does not have any matter in common, as an inferior body suffers from the sun. And a thing which does not have any matter at all can suffer in some way, as is evident from what was said above.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

Because these in some way come to true conclusions, but not by a true process, they must be answered in order.

1'. Augustine shows that that proof is invalid: "I should indeed say that spirits without any body are going to burn, just as that rich man was burning in hell when he said, 'I am tormented in this name, if I did not see that it would fittingly be answered that that name was of the same kind as the eyes which he raised to see Lazarus, as the tongue upon which he craved a little water to be poured, as the finger of Lazarus by which he asked that it be done, while they were nevertheless souls without bodies. Thus that name by which he was burning can be understood to have been incorporeal as well." From this it is clear that that passage cited in authority is not effective as a proof of the point at issue unless something else is added to it.

2'. The fire of hell burns incorporeal substances corporeally from the point of view of the agent, not from that of the patient. But the bodies of the damned it will hum corporeally from the latter point of view as well.

3’. The statement of Cassiodorus does not seem to be true if he is speaking of the external senses. For it to be true it must be understood of internal spiritual senses.

4’. An answer to that passage of the gospel could be that the fire is spiritual, except for the fact that the bodies of the damned could not be punished by it. That argument, then, docs not sufficiently prove the point at issue.

5’. The same is to be said of this difficulty, which argues from a parallel.

6’. In so far as a damned soul is a real being it is better than non being. But the words of our Lord that it would be better for it not to be, mean: in so far as it is subject to misery and guilt.


Parallel readings: III Sentences 15, 2, I sol. Sum. Theol., I-II, 22, 1.


It seems that it does not suffer indirectly, for

1. As is said in the work Spirit and Soul, because of the friendship of the body and soul, the soul while joined to the body cannot be free; and though the soul cannot be destroyed, it can nevertheless fear destruction. But to fear is a sort of suffering. Therefore the soul while joined to the body suffers in itself, because the inability to be destroyed belongs to it in itself.

2. Whatever gives perfection to another is superior to it. But the body gives perfection to the soul, for the soul is united to the body that it may be perfected there. The body is therefore superior to the soul; and so the soul can suffer directly from the body to which it is united.

3. The soul is moved in place indirectly because it is indirectly in the place in which the body is directly. But a form or quality which is in the body directly is not said to be in the soul indirectly. Now, since a passion or suffering is concerned will a form or quality, being of the type of motion which is alteration, it therefore seems that the soul in the body cannot suffer indirectly.

4. Being moved indirectly is distinguished from being moved in part, as is made clear in the Physics. But the soul is part of a composite which is moved directly, as appears from The Soul. The soul should therefore not be said to be moved indirectly, but as a part will reference to the movement of the whole.

5. The direct is prior to the indirect. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is prior to that of the body, because the body is transformed by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, as is evident in anger, fear, and so on. It should therefore not be said that by those passions the soul suffers indirectly and the body directly.

6. Whatever is formal in anything is more important than what is material in it. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is formal, and that of the body is material. The formal definition of anger is that it is the desire for revenge; its material definition, that it is the boiling of the blood around the heart. In such passions, then, the role of the soul is more important than that of the body. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Just as joy and sorrow and such passions of the soul do not be long to the soul without the body, neither does sensing. But the soul is not said to sense indirectly. Then neither should it be said to suffer indirectly.

To the Contrary:

1'. Taken strictly passion is a certain motion in the lime of alteration, as has been said. But the soul is not altered except indirectly. Then neither does it suffer except indirectly.

2’. The powers of the soul are not more perfect than the substance of the soul itself. But according to the Philosopher the powers do not grow old directly but only because of the failure of the body. Then neither does the soul suffer directly but only indirectly.

3'. Whatever is moved directly is divisible, as is proved in the Physics. But the soul is indivisible. It therefore is not moved directly, and so neither does it suffer directly.



If passion is taken strictly, it is impossible for anything incorporeal to suffer (pati), as was shown above. Then in a passion properly so called it is the body that suffers directly. Consequently, if such a passion belongs in any way to the soul, this is only inasmuch as it is united to the body, and therefore indirectly.

Now the soul is united to the body in two respects: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body, vivifying it; (2) as a mover, inasmuch as it exercises its operations through the body. And in both respects the soul suffers indirectly, but differently. For anything that

is composed of matter and form suffers by reason of its matter just as it acts by reason of its form. Thus the passion begins will the matter and in a certain sense indirectly belongs to the form. But the passion of the patient is derived from the agent, because passion is the effect of action.

A passion of the body is therefore attributed to the soul indirectly in two ways: (1) In such a way that the passion begins will the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. This is a bodily passion. Thus, when the body is injured, the union of the body will the soul is weakened; and so the soul, which is united to the body in its act of existing, suffers indirectly. (2) In such a way that the passion begins will the soul inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, and ends in the body. This is called a psychical passion. An example is seen in anger and fear and the like; for passions of this kind are aroused by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, and a bodily transformation follows upon them, just as the transformation of a mobile being follows from the operation of the mover in any one of the ways in which the mobile being is disposed to obey the motion of the mover. Thus, when the body is transformed by an alteration, the soul itself also is said to suffer indirectly.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The soul does not fear destruction as if it would be destroyed in itself, but it fears the destruction of the composite through the separation of itself from the body. And even if it should fear its own destruction, this would be only in so far as there is some doubt whether upon the destruction of the body the soul is corrupted indirectly. Not even destruction, then, is compatible will the soul directly, and even the passion of fear is not attributable to it apart from its union will the body.

2. Even though the soul is perfected in the body, it is not perfected by the body, Augustine proves. But either it is perfected by God or it perfects itself will the assistance of the body working at its command, just as the possible intellect is perfected by the power of the agent intellect will the help of phantasms which are made actually intelligible by this power.

3. Although a quality of the body by no means belongs to the soul, yet the act of being of the composite is common to soul and body, and likewise the operation. The passion of the body therefore overflows into the soul indirectly.

4. A passion happens to the composite of body and soul only by reason of the body. It therefore happens to the soul only indirectly. The argument proceeds, however, as if the passion belonged to the whole composite by reason of the whole and not by reason of one of the two parts.

5. Anger, and any passion of the soul for that matter, can be viewed in two ways: (1) According to the specific characteristic of anger. From this point of view it is primarily in the soul rather than in the body. (2) Inasmuch as it is a passion. From this point of view it is primarily in the body, for there it first gets the character of a passion. We accordingly do not say that the soul becomes angry indirectly, but that it suffers indirectly.

6. The answer to this difficulty is clear from what has just been said.

7. The soul is not said to sense indirectly any more than to rejoice, though it is said to suffer indirectly.


Parallel readings: III Sentences 15, 2, I sol. 2; IV Sentences 49, 3, i sol. z ad x; In De div. nom., C. 2, lectura 4, n. 1 in II Eth. 5; Sum. Theol., I, 20, i ad i & 2; Si, I; I-II, 22, 2 & 3.


It seems not, for

1. Christ suffered in His whole soul, as appears from the words of the Psalm (87:4): "For my soul is filled will evils," which are referred to the sufferings of His passion in the explanation given in the Gloss. But totality as applied to the soul refers to powers. Consequently there can be passion in any power of the soul, and therefore not only in the sense appetitive power.

2. Every movement or operation which belongs to the soul in itself independently of the body is a function of the intellective, not the sensitive, part. But, as Augustine says, "the soul is not influenced by flesh alone to crave, fear, rejoice, or be distressed; but it can also be stirred up will these movements by itself." Such passions are there fore not only in the sense appetitive part.

3. The will belongs to the intellective part, as is made clear in The

Soul. But Augustine says: "There is will in al1 of these (that is, fear, joy, and the like). They are all, in fact, nothing but acts of the will. For what is craving and joy but the wil1 in its acceptance of the things which we will? And what is fear and sorrow but the will in its rejection of the things which we do not will?" Passions of this kind are therefore also in the intellective part.

4. It is not the function of the same power to act and to be acted upon or suffer. But sense seems to be an active power; for the basilisk is said to kill by its gaze, and a menstruating woman ruins a mirror by looking into it, as is explained in the work Sleep and Wakefulness. Hence the passion of the soul is not to be placed in the sensitive part.

5. An active power is nobler than a passive one. But the vegetative powers are active, and the sensitive powers are nobler than they. Therefore the sensitive powers are also active. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

6. The rational powers are capable of opposite determinations ac cording to the Philosopher. But delight is opposed to sadness. Now, since delight is properly in the intellective part, as is made clear in the Ethics, it seems that sadness is also there. And so passions cnn be in the intellective part.

7. The answer was advanced that the Philosopher’s statement refers to opposite acts.—On the contrary, knowledge and ignorance, which are opposites, are in the intellective part of the soul, and yet they are not acts. The Philosopher’s statement therefore does not refer only to acts.

8. According to the Philosopher the same thing by its absence and by its presence is the cause of contraries, as the pilot is the cause of both the saving and the sinking of the ship. But the intelligible object when present causes delight in the intellective part. When absent, therefore, it causes sadness in the same part. Thus the same is to be concluded as before.

9. Damascene says: "Pain is not n passion but the sensing of a passion." It is therefore in the sensitive power and not in the appetitive; and, for the same reason, so are pleasure and the other things winch are called passions of the soul.

10. According to Damascene and the Philosopher a passion is that winch is followed by joy and sadness. The passions of the soul therefore precede joy and sadness. But joy and sadness are in the appetitive part. Then the passions of the soul are in the part which pre cedes the appetitive. Since it is the apprehensive part which precedes the appetitive, they are therefore in the apprehensive part.

11. The body undergoes change in the operations of the sense apprehensive power just as it does in those of the sense appetitive power. Passions are therefore not only in the appetitive but also in the apprehensive.

12. A passion strictly so called is had through the loss of something and the reception of its contrary. But this happens in the intellective part; for guilt is lost and grace is received, and the habit of lust is lost and the habit of chastity is introduced. Passion is therefore properly in the higher part of the soul.

13. The movement of the sense appetitive power follows the apprehension of sense. But sometimes such passions of the soul are aroused in us by objects winch cannot be apprehended by sense, such as shame for a disgraceful action or fear for the future. Such passions therefore cannot be in the sense appetitive part, and so we are left will the conclusion that they are in the rational appetitive part, the will.

14. Hope is listed among the passions of the soul. But hope is in the intellective part of the soul, because the holy fathers while in limbo had hope, and the movement of the sensitive part does not remain in the separated soul. Passions are therefore also in the intellective part.

15. The image [of the Trinity] is in the intellective part. But the soul suffers in the powers of the image, since the powers of the image which are now perfected by grace will be perfected by the glory of enjoyment in the state of glory. Consequently passions are not only in the sense appetitive part of the soul.

16. According to Damascene "passion is a movement from one thing to another." Now the intellect moves from one thing to another by proceeding from principles to conclusions. Therefore passion is in the intellect. And so the same is to be concluded as before.

17. The Philosopher says that "to understand is in a way to be passive (pati)." But understanding is in the intellect. Hence there is passion in the intellect.

18. Dionysius says of Hierotheus that "by suffering divine things" he learned divine truths. But he could not undergo or suffer divine things in the sensitive part, which is not proportionate to divine things. Then passion is not only in the sensitive part.

19. No definite power of the soul has to be allotted to that winch is in the soul accidentally; for there is neither science of things that exist accidentally nor a definite power for them. But the soul does not suffer except accidentally or indirectly. Passion is therefore not in any definite power of the soul, and so not in the sensitive appetite alone.

To the Contrary:

u’. Damascene says: "A passion is a movement of the appetitive power in imagining good or evil"; and again: "A passion is a move merit of the non-rational soul due to the apprehension of good or evil."16 Passion is therefore only in the non-rational appetitive part.

2’. In the strict sense passion is taken according to the movement of alteration, as has been said. But there is alteration only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the Physics.18 Therefore passion is only in the sensitive part.

De veritate EN 221