De veritate EN 224



Strictly speaking, passion is only in the sense appetitive part, as appears from the definitions of passion quoted from Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa. This is shown as follows.

Passion is used in three senses, as was said above. It is taken first in general, in the sense in winch all receiving is undergoing or suffering. In tins usage passion is in every part of the soul and not only in the sense appetitive part. Understanding passion in this way, the Commentator says that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active; all those of the sensitive soul, passive; and those of the rational soul, partly active (because of the agent intellect) and partly passive (be cause of the possible intellect). Now, although this sort of passion is compatible will both the apprehensive and the appetitive powers, yet it is more proper to the appetitive. The reason for this is that, since the operation of the apprehensive power is directed to the thing apprehended as it is in the one apprehending, whereas the operation of the appetitive power is directed to the thing as it is in itself, there is less of the individuality of the thing apprehended in what is received into the apprehensive power than there is of the specification of the appetible thing in what is received into the appetitive power. Consequently, truth, winch perfects the intellective power, is in the mind, whereas good, which perfects the appetitive, is in things, as is said in the Metaphysics.

In the second sense passion is understood strictly, as consisting in the loss of one contrary and the reception of another by way of a transformation. This sort of passion cannot pertain to the soul except because of the body; and this under two aspects: (1) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. In this respect it suffers along will the body suffering by a bodily passion. (2) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its mover. In this respect a transformation is produced in the body through the operation of the soul. This latter is called a psychical passion, as was said above.

The bodily passion just mentioned reaches to the powers of the soul as rooted in its essence, by reason of the fact that the soul in its essence is the form of the body; and thus it pertains first to the essence of the soul. This sort of passion can, however, be attributed to a power in three ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the soul. Since all powers are rooted in the soul’s essence, the passion in question pertains to all powers in this way. (2) Inasmuch as the acts of the powers are hindered by an injury to the body. Thus the passion in question pertains to all powers using bodily organs, since the acts of all of these are hindered when the organs are injured. But indirectly passion in this sense applies also to the powers which do not use bodily organs, the intellective, in so far as they receive something from powers which do use organs. Thus it happens that when the organ of the imaginative power is injured, the operation of the intellect also is hampered because the intellect has need of phantasms in its own operation. ( it belongs to some power as apprehending it. In this way it properly belongs to the sense of touch; for touch is the sense of the things from which an animal is composed, and likewise of those by which an animal is corrupted.

On the other hand, since by a psychical passion the body is altered because of an operation of the soul, this kind of passion has to be in a power which is joined to a bodily organ and whose business it is to alter the body. As a consequence, such a passion is not in the intellective part, which is not the actuality of any bodily organ. Nor again is it in the sense apprehensive power, because from sense apprehension no movement in the body follows except through the mediation of the appetitive power, which is the immediate mover. According to its manner of operating, then, a bodily organ (the heart) from which motion takes its beginning is at once given a disposition suitable for carrying out that to which the sense appetite inclines. In anger the heart accordingly heats up, and in fear it in a way cools off and tightens up.

Thus psychical passion is properly found only in the sense appetitive faculty. For the powers of the vegetative soul, though using an organ, are clearly not passive but active. Moreover passion more properly attaches to the appetitive power than to the apprehensive, as was said in the beginning of this reply. And this is one reason why the sense appetitive faculty is more properly the subject of passion than the sense apprehensive, just as the higher affective power comes closer to the true character of passion than the intellective.

In the third sense passion was said to be taken more or less figuratively, in so far as a thing is barred in any way whatsoever from what is suited to it. In this sense the powers of the soul suffer in the same way as they are barred from their proper acts. And this occurs in one way or another in all the powers of the soul, as has been said. But we are now speaking of psychical passion properly so called, which is found only in the sense appetitive power, as has been shown.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The whole soul of Christ suffered will a bodily passion; and therefore that passion attached to all the powers, at least inasmuch as they are rooted in the essence of the soul; not, however, in such a way that a psychical passion was in every power of His soul as its proper subject.

2. Augustine is speaking against certain Platonists who said that the starting point of all those passions was in the flesh. Augustine shows, however, that even if the flesh were in no respect corrupted, these passions could take their beginning in the soul. He therefore does not say that such passions are brought about apart from the flesh, but that the soul is not moved by these passions because of the flesh alone.

3. Augustine is either taking the term will broadly for any appetite, or he is taking fear and joy and the like as acts of the will similar to passions in the sense appetite. For in some sense joy and sorrow and the like are in the will itself, as was said in the question on sensuality, but not in the sense that they are passions properly so called.—Or it can be said that Augustine calls these passions acts of the will because man is led into these passions by an act of the will inasmuch as the lower appetite follows the inclination of the higher appetite, as was said in the question on sensuality. Thus Augustine himself after wards adds: "Just as the will of man is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned to these affections or those."

4. Sense is not an active but a passive power. Not every power that has an act which is an operation is called active, for then every faculty of the soul would be active; but a faculty that is related to its object as an agent to a patient is called active, and that which is related to its object as a patient to an agent is called passive. Now sense is related to the sensible thing as a patient to an agent, because the sensible thing alters the sense; and if the sensible object is sometimes altered by the sense, this is incidental, inasmuch as the organ of sense has some quality by which it is naturally capable of changing another body. Consequently the ruination in question (by which a menstruating woman damages a mirror or a basilisk kills a man by a look) does not contribute anything to the act of seeing; but the seeing is accomplished by the fact that the visible species is received in sight; and this is a sort of passivity or suffering. Sense is therefore a passive power. And even if it were granted that sense acted upon something actively, it would not follow from this that there is no passivity in sense; for nothing prevents the same thing from being active and passive in different respects. And again if it were granted that sense, which designates an apprehensive power, were incapable of any passion, this would not exclude the possibility of passion being in the sensitive appetite.

5. Although what is active is simply and from the same point of view nobler than what is passive, still nothing prevents something passive from being nobler than something active inasmuch as the passive thing suffers by a passion that is nobler than the action by which the active being acts, as is the case will regard to the passion by which the possible intellect is called a passive power. And even sense by receiving something immaterially is nobler than the action by which the vegetative power acts materially, that is, by means of the qualities of the elements.

6. There is nothing in contrary opposition to that delight which is in the intellective part by reason of its union will a suitable intelligible object, since to have a cause of the contrary passion we should need to have something contrary to that suitable intelligible object. But this is impossible, because nothing is contrary to an intelligible species; for the species of contraries are not contrary in the soul, as is said in the Metaphysics. Man accordingly takes delight not only in understanding good but also in understanding evil, as far as under standing is concerned; for the understanding of evil is a good for the intellect. And so intellectual delight has no contrary. Sadness or pain are nevertheless said to be in the intellective part, broadly speaking, inasmuch as the intellect understands something as harmful to man, to which the will is averse. Because that harmful thing, however, is not harmful to the intellect as understanding it, sadness or pain is not contrarily opposed to the delight of the intellect, which comes from understanding something suitable to the intellect in so far as it under stands.

7. The rational power is capable of contrary determinations in its own way and also in a way common to itself and all other powers.

To be the subject of contrary accidents is common to the rational and the other powers, because all contraries have the same subject. But to be capable of contrary actions is proper to it alone, for natural powers are determined to one course of action. It is in this sense that the Philosopher is speaking when he says that the rational powers are open to opposites.

8. The absence of the pilot is not the cause of the sinking of the ship except indirectly, inasmuch as it takes away the supervision exercised by the pilot which up to then prevented the sinking of the ship. In the same way the removal or absence of the intelligible object is not the cause of sadness but merely of not being delighted. Effects are proportioned to their causes. Then understanding and not understanding, which are contradictorily opposed, are the cause of being de lighted and of not being so, which are likewise contradictories; not of being delighted and of being sad, which are contraries. Further more, if we take the contrary of the understanding of truth, namely, error, this cannot be the cause of sadness; for either error is deemed to be truth, in which case it causes delight just as truth does; or it is recognized as error (which can be done only by coming to know the truth), in which case again error causes delight in understanding.

9. Sadness and pain differ in that sadness is a psychical passion, be ginning will the apprehension of a source of harm and ending in an operation of the appetite and even further in an alteration of the body, whereas pain is dependent upon a bodily passion. Thus Augustine says that "pain is more commonly said of bodies." it begins, then, will an injury to the body and ends in an apprehension by the sense of touch, and on this account pain is in the sense of touch as apprehending it, as has been said.

10. That joy and sadness follow upon a passion is said by both Damascene and the Philosopher, but by each will a different meaning. Damascene (as also Gregory of Nyssa, who makes the same state merit is speaking of a bodily passion, which causes joy and sadness when apprehended and pain when experienced by sense. But the Philosopher is without any doubt here speaking of psychical passions, maintaining that joy and sadness follow upon all the passions of the soul. The reason for this is that among all the passions of the concupiscible power joy and sadness, which are caused by the attaining of the agreeable or the harmful, hold the last place; and all the passions of the irascible power terminate in passions of the concupiscible, as was said in the question on sensuality. It remains, then, that all the passions of the soul terminate in joy and sadness. In neither meaning of the words quoted, however, does it follow that passions are in the apprehensive power, because bodily passion is in the very nature of the body, and the other psychical passions are in the same appetitive part in which joy and sadness are found, but only will reference to its previous acts. If, on the other hand, there were no order in the acts of the appetitive part, it would follow from the words of the Philosopher that psychical passions are not in the appetitive part, where joy and sadness are found, but in the apprehensive.

1. Neither sense nor any other apprehensive power moves immediately, but only mediately through the appetitive. Consequently, upon the operation of the sense apprehensive power, the body is changed in its material dispositions only if the movement of the appetitive power supervenes. For the alteration of the body disposing itself to obey follows immediately upon this movement. Accordingly, although the sense apprehensive power is changed together will the bodily organ, passion strictly so called is still not in it, because in the operation of sense the bodily organ undergoes, properly speaking, only a spiritual change, inasmuch as the species of the sensible objects are received into the sense organs "without matter," as is said in The Soul.

12. Even though something is lost and something else is received in the intellective part, this does not take place by way of a transformation so that reception and loss occur in a continuous succession. In the case of infused habits it comes about through a simple influx; for in an instant grace is infused and by it guilt is instantly expelled. And even an alteration from vice to virtue or from ignorance to knowledge affects the intellective part only indirectly, while the transformation is directly in the sensitive part, as is made clear in the Ethics. For upon the occurrence of a transformation in the sensitive part there straightway results a perfection in the intellective part, so that the result in the intellective part is the term of the transformation in the sensitive part, just as illumination may be the term of a local motion and generation in an unqualified sense may be the term of an alteration. This is the explanation will regard to acquired habits.

13. From the apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in the lower appetite in two ways: (1) In so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a universal way is represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower appetite. When, for example, the intellect of a believer assents intellectually to future punishment and forms phantasms of the pains, imagining the fire burning and worm gnawing and the like, the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite. (2) In so far as the higher appetite is moved by the intellectual apprehension, will the result that the lower appetite also is stirred up by the higher through a kind of overflow or through a command.

14. The hope which remains in the separated soul is not a passion but either a habit or an act of the will, as is clear from what was said previously.

15. From the bestowal of beatitude or the perfecting of the image nothing can be concluded other than that there is passion in the intellective part in the sense in which every reception is called a passion.

16. Passion is said to be a movement from one thing received to another thing received, not from one thing produced to another thing produced. In the former sense there is movement in the intellect from one thing to another.

17. Understanding is said to be passive in the broad use of the term according to which all reception is passivity or passion.

18. The passion of which Dionysius is speaking is nothing but affection for the things of God, which has more of the character of a passion than mere apprehension, as is clear from what has been said above. For from affection for divine things comes their manifestation, as is written in John (14:21): "And he that loveth me, shah be loved by my Father; and I will love him and will manifest myself to Mm."


Parallel readings: III Sentences 26, 1, 3; in II Eth., 5, 1m. 291-96; Sum. Theol., I—II, q. 23; 46, 1 ad 2.


It seems that it is not on the grounds of good and evil, for

1. Boldness is opposed to fear. But both of these passions regard evil, because boldness tackles the same thing that fear runs away from. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil.

2. Hope is opposed to despair. But both regard good, which hope expects to attain and despair has no confidence of attaining. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil.

. Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa distinguish the passions of the soul on the basis of the present and the future and on that of good and evil. Thus hope and desire have to do will a future good; pleasure, delight, and gladness, will a present good; fear has to do will a future evil; sadness, will a present one. But the present and the future are accidental as regards good and evil. Consequently the difference in the soul’s passions is not of itself based on good and evil.

4. Augustine distinguishes between sadness and pain in that sad ness refers to the soul, pain to the body. But again this distinction is not made on the basis of good and evil. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

5. Exultation, joy, gladness and pleasure, good humor and mirth are somehow different; otherwise it would be useless to couple two of them as is done for example, in Isaias (35: 10): "They shah obtain joy and gladness." Now since all of those terms are used will reference to good, it seems that good and evil do not differentiate the passions of the soul.

6. Damascene distinguishes four kinds of sadness: "boredom, distress, envy, and pity," in addition to which there is also repentance. All of these are used will reference to evil. The same is therefore to be concluded as before.

7. He also distinguishes six species of fear: laziness, bashfulness, shame, awe, astonishment, and anxiety. These again do not involve the difference in question. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

8. Dionysius ranks jealousy will love, but both of these are passions regarding good. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

To the Contrary:

1'. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the passions of the soul are acts of the appetitive power, whose object is good and evil. The passions of the soul are therefore distinguished by good and evil.

2’. According to the Philosopher the passions of the soul are changes from which joy and sadness result. But joy and sadness are distinguished on the basis of good and evil. Good and evil therefore distinguish the passions of the soul.



In the passions of the soul a threefold distinction is found. The first is that by which they differ generically, as belonging to distinct powers of the soul. It is in this way that the passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from those of the irascible. Now the basis of this distinction is taken from the basis for distinguishing the powers. For since the object of the concupiscible power is something sensuously pleasurable and that of the irascible something arduous or lofty, as was said above in the question on sensuality, those passions belong to the concupiscible power in which there is implied a reference to the sensuously pleasurable in an unqualified sense or to its contrary; whereas those belong to the irascible which are referred to something arduous concerning such an object. Thus the difference between de- sire and hope becomes evident; for desire denotes that the appetite is attracted to something pleasurable, whereas hope expresses a certain raising of the appetite to some good which is deemed arduous or difficult. And the same is to be said of the other passions.

The second distinction of the passions of the soul is that by which they are distinguished in species within the same power. In regard to the passions of the concupiscible power this distinction is made on two different grounds: (1) According to the contrariety of objects. In this way joy, which regards good, is distinguished from sadness, which regards evil (2) According as the concupiscible power is referred in different ways to the same object, or in other words according to the different stages that can be considered in the course of an appetitive movement. For the pleasurable object is first united psychically will the man who seeks it, by being apprehended as like him or agreeable to him. From this there follows the passion of love, which is nothing but the specification of the appetite by the form of the appetible object. For that reason love is said to be a sort of union of the lover will the beloved. But what has thus been united psychically is sought further will a view to its being united really, so that the lover enjoys the possession of the behoved. Thus is born the passion of desire, which, when the object has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first stage, then, in the movement of the concupiscible power is love; the second, desire; and the last, joy. And through the contrary to these the passions bearing upon evil are to be distinguished, will hate opposed to love, aversion to desire, sadness to joy.

The passions of the irascible power, as was said in another question, arise from the passions of the concupiscible and end in them. There is accordingly found in them a distinction confirmable to that in the concupiscible power; and there is in them furthermore a distinction proper to them based upon the specific character of their proper object. Deriving from the concupiscible there is the distinction of the passions on the basis of good and evil and on that of the pleasurable and its contrary, and again on that of what is really possessed and what is not really possessed. But proper to the irascible power is the distinction of its passions on the basis of what exceeds the capacity of the one who has the appetite and of what does not exceed it, and this according to his evaluation of the matter. For these grounds seem to distinguish the arduous as essential differences.

A passion in the irascible power can therefore regard either good or evil. If it regards good, this can be a good possessed or one not possessed. Regarding a good possessed there can be no passion in the irascible power, because once a good is possessed it causes no difficulty to the possessor. Consequently the notion of the arduous is not verified in it. But regarding a good not yet possessed, in which the notion of the arduous can be verified because of the difficulty of obtaining it, if that good is judged to exceed the capacity of the one seeking it, despair ensues; but if it is judged not to exceed that capacity, hope arises.

If, on the other hand, the excitation of the irascible power will reference to evil is considered, this will be of two kinds: either will reference to an evil not yet possessed which is regarded as arduous inasmuch as it is difficult to avoid, or will reference to an evil already possessed or joined to oneself, and this again has the character of the arduous inasmuch as it is deemed difficult to get rid of. Now if it is will reference to an evil not yet present, if that evil is regarded as exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of fear; but if it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of boldness. If, however, the evil is present, either it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, and then it arouses the passion of anger; or it is regarded as exceeding that capacity, and then it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, but in the concupiscible power alone there remains the passion of sadness.

The distinction which is based upon the different stages in the appetitive movement is not the cause of any contrariety, because such passions differ as perfect and imperfect, as is seen, for example, in desire and joy. But the distinction which is based on the contrariety of the object properly effects a contrariety in the passions. In the concupiscible power, accordingly, passions are regarded as contrary on the basis of good and evil, as joy and sadness or love and hate. In the irascible power a twofold contrariety can be considered: (1) According to the distinction of the proper object, as exceeding one’s capacity or not. From this point of view hope and despair, boldness and fear are contrary; and this contrariety is the more proper one. (2) According to the difference in the object of the concupiscible power, 1.e., according to good and evil. From this point of view hope and fear seem to be contrarily opposed. From neither point of view, however, can anger have a passion contrary to it—not on the basis of the contrariety of good and evil, because there is no passion in the irascible power regarding a present good; and likewise not on the basis of the contrariety of what exceeds one’s capacity and what does not, be cause an evil which exceeds one’s capacity does not cause any passion in the irascible, as has been said. Hence among the passions anger has as proper to itself that nothing is contrary to it.

There is a third difference of the passions of the soul which is, so to speak, accidental. This can come about in two ways: (1) According to the intensity or mildness of the passion, as jealousy implies an intensity of love, and rage an intensity of anger. (2) According to the material differences of good or evil, like the difference of pity and envy, which are both species of sadness; for envy is sadness about the prosperity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as an evil for oneself, whereas pity is sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil. Certain other passions also can be considered in the same way.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The object of the irascible power is good and evil, not in an un qualified sense, but will the added circumstance of arduousness. There is therefore contrariety in its passions not merely on the basis of good and evil but also on that of the differences which distinguish the arduous both in good and in evil.

2. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

3. Present and future are regarded as differences to distinguish the powers of the soul inasmuch as what is future is not yet really united to the soul and what is present is already united, and the movement of the appetite to what is really united is more perfect than to what is really at a distance. Consequently, although future and present ac count for some distinction in the passions, like the perfect and the imperfect they cause no contrariety.

4. In its strict sense pain should not be numbered among the passions of the soul, because it involves nothing on the part of the soul beyond mere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but the injury itself is in the body. For this reason even Augustine adds in the same place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than pain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself, as appears from what has been said.

5. Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union will some thing agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling of this agreeable ness. Similarly spiritual pleasure involves a certain real union of two things that agree will each other, and the perception of this union. Thus in defining sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in general, said that pleasure is the unhampered operation of a habit confirmable to nature. For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasure of either kind begins will a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins will apprehension and ends in the affections. Thus pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy, just as pain is sometimes the cause of sadness. Joy, on the other hand, differs accidentally from gladness and the rest of the passions mentioned on the basis of intensity or slackness. For the others express a certain intensity of joy. Either this intensity is considered from the viewpoint of one’s interior disposition; and then it is gladness, which implies an interior expansion or dilation of heart; for gladness (laetitia)is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness (latitia). Or the intensity of inner joy is considered from the viewpoint of its bursting forth into certain out ward signs, and then it is exultation; for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy in a way outwardly leaps (exilit). This leaping is noted either in a change of countenance, in which the evidences of emotion first appear because of its nearness to the imaginative power; and then the passion is mirth; or it is noted inasmuch as one’s words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy; and then it is good humor.

6. The various species of sadness which Damascene lays down are types of sadness which add to it certain accidental differences. These may be regarded from the viewpoint of the intensity of the move merit. In that case in so far as the intensity consists in an interior disposition, it is called boredom, which is sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything; or, in so far as the bile proceeds to an external disposition, the passion is distress, which is sadness that takes the voice away. The differences may, on the other hand, be regarded from the viewpoint of the object inasmuch as what is in another is looked upon as one’s own evil. Then if another’s good is considered one’s own evil, the passion will be envy; but if another’s evil is considered one’s own evil, it will be pity. Repentance, however, does not add to sadness in general any specific note, since it concerns one’s own evil taken absolutely. For this reason it is omitted by Damascene. Yet many different types of sadness can be listed if everything that has any accidental bearing upon the evil which causes sadness is taken into account.

7. Since fear is a passion coming from something harmful apprehended as exceeding one’s capacity, the types of fear will be differentiated according to the difference in such harmful things. Now what is harmful can be referred to the one affected in three different respects: (1) With regard to one’s own operation. In this case inasmuch as one’s own operation is feared as laborious, the passion is laziness; and inasmuch as it is feared as disgraceful, the passion is shame, which is fear in a disgraceful action. (2) With regard to knowledge, according as some object of knowledge is apprehended as altogether exceeding cognition. In that case the study of it is looked upon as fruitless and so as harmful. Now its exceeding cognition either is due to its greatness, and then the passion is awe, which is fear from the imagining of something great; or it is due to its unusualness, and then the passion is astonishment, which is "fear from the imagining of something unusual," as Damascene defines it.12 ( With regard to suffering that comes from another. That suffering can be feared either under the aspect of disgrace, and then the passion is bashfulness, which is fear in anticipation of ridicule; or under the aspect of injury, and then the passion is anxiety, by which a man is afraid that some misfortune will befall him.

8. Jealousy adds to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one’s beloved.


Parallel readings: III Sentences 26, 1, 4; Sum. Theol., I-II 25,4 (cf. aa. 1-3); I-II 84,2; II-II 141,7 ad 3.


It seems that they are not, for

1. In enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts cupidity in place of hope. And the same, it seems, can be gathered from the words of Vergil in which he designates the main passions: "Hence men crave and fear, rejoice and sorrow."

2. The more perfect a thing is, the more important it seems to be. But the movement of boldness is more perfect than that of hope, since it tends to its object will greater intensity. Boldness is therefore a more important passion than hope.

3. Everything takes its name from the most important in its lime. But the irascible power gets its name from anger. Anger should there fore be numbered among the principal passions.

4. There is a passion that looks to the future not only in the irascible power but also in the concupiscible. But the passion looking to the future which is in the concupiscible power, desire, is not included as one of the principal passions. Then neither are fear and hope, which in the irascible similarly look to the future.

5. Principal means coming before the rest; for according to Gregory "to be prince (principiari)means to come before the others." But love comes before the rest of the passions; for from love all the other passions are born. Love should therefore be placed as one of the principal passions.

6. Those passions seem to be the principal ones upon which the others depend. But all the others seem to depend upon joy and sad ness; for a passion of the soul is that from which joy or sadness follows, according to the Philosopher. These two passions, joy and sadness, then, are the only principal passions.

. It was said in answer that joy and sadness are the principal ones in the concupiscible power, but that hope and fear are the principal ones in the irascible.—On the contrary, it is said in Spirit and Soul: "From concupiscibility joy and hope arise; from irascibility, pain and dread."

8. In accord will the special character of the irascible power hope is opposed to despair, fear to boldness. But on the part of the concupiscible power are listed two chief passions which are contrary on the basis of the special character of the concupiscible power, namely, joy and sadness. Then on the part of the irascible there should be listed as principal passions either hope and despair or fear and bold mess.

To the Contrary:

1'. In Spirit and Soul it is said: "Emotion is distinguished into four kinds, since we already take joy in what we love, or we hope for it as something that will be enjoyed; and we already grieve over what we hate or we dread it as something to make us grieve." Consequently these four are the principal passions: joy, pain or sadness, hope, and fear.

2’. Enumerating the main passions, Boethius says: Drive away joy, and drive away fear. Hope put to flight; let grief not stay near. And so the conclusion is the same as above.

De veritate EN 224