De veritate EN 228



The passions of the soul can stand in either of two relationships to the will, either as preceding it or as consequent upon it: as preceding it, inasmuch as the passions spur the will to will something; as con sequent upon it, inasmuch as the lower appetite is stirred up will these passions as a result of the vehemence of the will through a sort of overflow, or even inasmuch as the vi1l itself brings them about and arouses them of its own accord.

When the passions precede the will they detract from its praise worthiness, because the act of the will is praiseworthy in so far as it is directed by reason to good in due measure and manner. Now this manner and measure is not kept except when the action takes place from discretion; and discretion is not kept when a man is stirred up to will something, even though good, by the onslaught of passion; for then the manner of the action will depend upon whether the onslaught of passion is great or small; and so it will happen only by chance that the due measure is kept.

When the passions are consequent upon the will they do not lessen the praiseworthiness of the act or its goodness, because they will be moderated in conformity will the judgment of reason upon which the act of will follows; but they will rather add to the goodness of the act. This will be done under two aspects:

(1) As a sign, because the passion itself consequent in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a nature subject to passion it is impossible for the will to be strongly moved to anything without some passion following in the lower part. Thus Augustine says: "So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live correctly." And after a few other remarks he adds the cause, saying: "For not to grieve at all while we are in this place of misery... takes place only at the great cost of inhumanity in the soul and stupor in the body."

(2) As a help, because when by a judgment of reason the will chooses anything, it does so more promptly and easily if in addition passion is aroused in the lower part, since the lower appetitive power is closely connected will a change in the body. Thus Augustine says: "The movement of pity is of service to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved." And this is what the Philosopher also says, bringing in the verse of Homer: "Stir up your courage and rage," because when a man is virtuous will the virtue of courage, the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the act. If it preceded, however, it would disturb the manner requisite for virtue.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Praiseworthiness and reprehensibility consist essentially in voluntariness. Consequently whatever detracts from voluntariness diminishes the praiseworthiness in a good and the reprehensibility in an evil. Now a passion which precedes choice diminishes voluntariness, and therefore diminishes the praise of a good act and the blame of a bad one. But a passion which follows is a sign of the greatness of the will, as has been said. Then not only does it add to the praise in the case of a good act, but it also adds to the blame in that of a bad act. A man is said to sin from passion, however, if it is passion which leads Mm to choose sin. But if because of the choice of a sin he falls into the passion connected will that sin, he is said to sin not from passion but will passion. It is true, then, that acting from passion lessens praise and blame, but acting will passion can increase both of them.

2. The movement of virtue, which consists in a perfect act of will, cannot be had without any passion, not because the act of will depends upon the passion, but because in a nature subject to passion a passion necessarily follows upon a perfect act of will.

3. Both choice and execution are necessary in a virtuous deed. Discernment is required for choice. For the execution of what has been decided upon, alacrity is required. It is not, however, highly necessary that a man actually engaged in the execution of the deed deliberate very much about the deed. This would rather stand in the way than be of help, as Avicenna points out. Take the case of a lute player, who would be greatly handicapped if he had to give thought to each touch of the strings; or that of a penman if he had to stop and think in the formation of each letter. This is why a passion which precede choice hinders the act of virtue by hampering the judgment of reason necessary in choosing. But after the choice has already been made purely by a rational judgment, a passion that follows helps more than it hurts, because even if it should disturb rational judgment somewhat, it does make for alacrity in execution.

4. The answer is evident from what has just been said.

5. God and the angels are not susceptible of passions, and so in their case no passion follows upon a perfect act of will, though it would follow if they were capable of passions. Consequently, because of a certain resemblance in the operations, in the usage of human speech the names of passions are applied to the angels; it is not because of any infirmity in their affection.

6. Those who have the virtues of a purified soul are in some sense free from passions that incline us to the contrary of that which virtue chooses, and likewise from passions that influence the will, but not from those consequent upon the will.

7. There is question of the carnality of spiritual affection only if the passion of love precedes the affection of the will, but not if it follows. For in the latter event there would be question of the fervour of charity, which consists in the fact that the spiritual affection, which is in the higher part, by reason of its vehemence overflows to the extent of altering the lower part.

8. The answer to this is clear from the above.


Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, I, 2 sol. 1 ad 2 15, 2, I sol. 3; aa. 2 & 3; 33, expos. text.; in Matt., C. 26, ß 5 (P 10: z 253a, z in ban., C. 12, lectura g, ß r (Pro: 51 C. 13, lectura, ß r (5 Sum. Theol., III, 15, 4-9; Comp. Theol., I, 232.


It seems that there were not, for

1. According to Augustine every agent is nobler than a patient. But nothing created is nobler than the soul of Christ. There would therefore not be any passion in the soul of Christ.

2. According to Macrobius "it is characteristic of the strength of the purified soul to have no experience of passions, not to conquer them." But Christ had the virtues of the purified soul in the highest degree. There were therefore no such passions in Him.

3. According to Damascene passion is "a movement of the appetitive soul because of a surmise about good or evil." But in Christ there was no surmise, for that implies ignorance. There was therefore no passion of soul in Christ.

4. According to Augustine passion is "a movement of the soul against reason." But no movement in Christ was against reason. Consequently there was no passion of soul in Christ.

5. Christ was not made less than the angels as to His soul but only as to the infirmity of His body. But there are no passions in the angels, as Augustine says. Then neither were there any in the soul of Christ.

6. Christ was more perfect in soul than man in the first state. But man in the first state was not subject to these passions, because as Augustine says, "it is a part of the infirmity of our present life to undergo emotion of this kind even in every one of our good works." But there was no infirmity in the first state. Then neither were there such passions in Christ.

7. According to Augustine pain is "the feeling of dissolution and destruction." But in Christ there neither was the feeling of destruction and dissolution (because, as Hilary says, He had "the violence of punishment without the feeling of punishment" nor was there actual dissolution and destruction in Him (because from the highest good there can be no loss). Consequently there was no pain in Christ.

8. Where the cause is the same, the effect is the same. But the cause of the absence of passion in the bodies of the blessed will be that they are purified from the "fuel of sin" and united to glorious souls. Now since this was verified in Christís body, it therefore seems that there could be in Him no pain of a bodily passion.

9. No will man grieves or is saddened except at the loss of his own good. For the reason why evil itself is lamentable is that it takes away good. But manís good is virtue, for only by this is he himself made good. Therefore, since that good was not taken away in Christís case, there was no sadness or grief in Him.

10. According to Augustine "when we refuse consent to what hap pens to us against our will, our state of will is sadness." But in Christ nothing happened that He Himself did not will. The passion of sad ness or grief was therefore not in Christ.

11. No one is reasonably saddened or grieved except for some injury. But, as Chrysostom proves, no one is injured except by him self; and a will man does not do that. Consequently, since Christ was most will, there was no sadness in Him.

To the Contrary:

1í. It is written in Mark (54:33): "(Jesus) began to fear and to be heavy and to be sad."

2'. Augustine says that an upright will "has these movements not only without blame but also laudably." But there was an up right will in Christ. Then these movements were in Him.

3í. In Christ there were the deficiencies of this life which are not inconsistent will the perfection of grace. But such passions are not inconsistent will the perfection of grace but are rather caused by grace, as Augustine brings out: "These movements, these emotions come from the love of good and from holy charity." Such passions were therefore in Christ.



The passions in question are in sinners in one way; in the just, both the perfect and the imperfect, in another way; in Christ as man in another; and in the first man and the blessed in still another. They are not in the angels or in God at all, because in them there is no sense appetite, of which such passions are movements.

For the clarification of the statements quoted it should be borne in mind that such affections of the soul can be distinguished on four different grounds, all concerned will whether these affections have the character of passion more or less properly: (1) According to whether a person is affected will a passion of the soul by something contrary or harmful or by something suited and advantageous. The character of passion or suffering is more fully kept when the affection follows from something harmful than if it should follow from something advantageous, because passion implies an alteration of the patient from its natural state to a contrary one. This is why grief and sadness and fear and other such passions which have to do will evil possess the character of passion or suffering more than do joy and love and other emotions that have to do will good, though in these latter also the character of passion is kept inasmuch as the heart is dilated or stimulated by such things or is in any way modified from its ordinary state, so that it can happen that a man dies from such emotions.

(2) According to whether the passion is entirely from the outside or is from some internal principle. The character of passion is better preserved when it is from without than when it is from within. It is from without when the passion is suddenly stirred up from the chance meeting will something suited or something harmful. It is from will in when the passions are caused by the will itself in the manner explained, in which case they are not sudden, since they follow the judgment of reason.

(3) According to whether a thing is transformed completely or not. We do not so properly say that a thing which is altered to some extent but is not completely transformed suffers, as we say this of one which is completely transformed to the contrary. We more properly say, for example, that a man suffers an illness if his whole body is ill than if a disease attacks some particular part of it. Now a man is completely transformed by such emotions when they do not stay in the lower appetite but carry along the higher appetite as well. When, however, they remain in the lower appetite alone, then the man is changed by them only as it were in part. In this case they are called "propassions," while in the first case "passions."

(4) According to whether the transformation is slight or intense. Slight transformations are less properly called passions. Thus Damascene says: "Not all passive movements are called passion, but those which are more vehement and become sensible; for those which are slight and insensible are not yet passions."

It should therefore be noted that in men in this present life, if they are sinners, there are passions will regard to good and will regard to evil, not only foreseen but also sudden and intense ones and frequently even complete. These men are accordingly called in the Ethics "followers of passion." In the just, on the other hand, the passions are never complete, because in such men reason is never led by passions. In the imperfect they are vehement, whereas in the perfect they are weak, will the lower powers kept in check by the habit of the moral virtues. Yet these do have not only foreseen but also sudden passions, and not only regarding good but also regarding evil.

In the blessed, however, and in man in the first state, and in Christ as subject to our infirmity, such passions are never sudden, seeing that because of the perfect obedience of the lower powers to the higher no movement arises in the lower appetite except at the dictate of reason. Thus Damascene says: "In our Lord natural tendencies did not precede the will; for he hungered willing it, he feared willing it, etc." And the same is to be understood of the blessed after the resurrection and of men in the first state. But there is this difference: in Christ there were not only passions will regard to good but also will regard to evil; for He had a passible body, and therefore from the imagining of something harmful the passion of fear and of sadness and the like could naturally arise in Him. But in the first state and in the blessed there cannot he the apprehension of anything as harmful; and therefore there is in them no passion except will regard to good, as love, joy, and the like, but not sadness or fear or anger or anything of the sort.

W therefore concede that there were true passions in Christ. Hence Augustine says: "For a very definite providential purpose Christ took these movements upon Himself in His human soul when He willed, just as He became man when He willed."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. It is not necessary for the agent to be more noble than the patient absolutely, but it suffices that it be so in a certain respect: in so far as it is an agent. Thus nothing prevents the object of Christís soul from being nobler than His soul in so far as the object is active and the soul of Christ has some passive potentiality.

2. According to Augustine there was a dispute on this question between the Stoics and the Peripatetics which seemed, however, to be more one of words than of fact. The Stoics, who called will a man perfect in virtue, having the virtue of a purified soul, said that such passions were not found in the soul of a will man at al1. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, say that these passions of the soul do occur even in a will man, but under control and subject to reason. Now Augustine proves from the admission of a certain Stoic that even the Stoics held that such emotions were in the soul of a will man, but sudden and without being approved or consented to; and they did not call them passions but appearances or phantasies of the soul. From this it is clear that the Stoics really did not hold anything different from the Peripatetics, but that there was disagreement only in words, be cause what the Peripatetics named passions the Stoics called by an other name.

Following the opinion of the Stoics, Macrobius and Plotinus say that passions are not found together will the virtue of a purified soul, not because there are no sudden movements of passion in those who have this kind of virtue, but because they neither draw reason along will them nor are so vehement as to disturb seriously oneís peace of mind. In agreement will this the Philosopher says that cravings in the temperate are not strong as they are in the selfócon trolled, though in neither is reason drawn to consent.

Or it can be said (and this is better) that, since these passions arise from good and evil, they should be distinguished on the basis of the difference in goods and evils. For there are certain natural goods and evils, such as food and drink, health or sickness of body, and others of the sort; and some not natural, such as wealth, honours, and the like. With these latter civic life is concerned. Now Plotinus and Macrobius distinguish the virtues of the purified soul from political virtues. From this it appears that they place the virtues of the purified soul in those who are entirely removed from civic affairs, giving their lime exclusively to the contemplation of wisdom. In them, as a consequence, certain passions do not arise from civic goods and evils; yet they are not immune to those passions which arise from natural goods and evils.

3. Whatever is caused by a weak cause can be caused also by a stronger one. Now a certain judgment is a stronger cause for arousing the passions than a surmise. Damascene accordingly set down that minimum which can cause passion, giving us to understand by tins that a stronger passion is caused by a stronger cause.

4. According to Augustine impassibility is spoken of in two ways: (1) as doing away will emotions that occur against reason and disturb the mind, and (2) as excluding all emotion. In the passage quoted passion is understood as opposed to the first sort of impassibility, not as opposed to the second. Only the first sort was found in Christ.

5. In His intellective soul Christ was superior to the angels. Nevertheless He had sensitive appetite, according to winch passions could be in Him, and the angels did not have this.

6. In the first man there were certain passions, such as joy and love, which have to do will good, but not fear or grief, which have to do will evil. The latter are a part of our present infirmity winch Adam did not have but Christ voluntarily assumed.

7. In Christ there was a true injuring of the body arid a true feeling of the injury. In His divinity He is the highest good from which nothing can be taken away, but not in His body. The statement of Hilary, moreover, was afterward (as some say) retracted by him.ó Or it can be said that he asserts that Christ did not have the feeling of punishment, not because He did not feel the pains, but because that feeling did not go so far as to affect His reason.

8. By the very fact that a soul has been glorified, the body united to it in the ordinary course of events is made glorious and incapable of suffering injury. Thus Augustine says: "God made the soul of so potent a nature that from its complete happiness, which is promised to the saints at the end of time, there will overflow into manís lower nature, the body, not the happiness which is proper to one capable of enjoying arid understanding, but the fullness of health, namely, the vigour of incorruptibility."2 But having in His power His own soul and body in virtue of His divinity, by a dispensation Christ had both happiness in His soul and passibility in His body, since the Word al lowed to the body what is proper to it, as Damascene says. It was therefore a singular occurrence in Christ that from the soulís fullness of beatitude glory did not overflow into the body.

9. The Stoics called the good of man only that by winch men are said to be good, the virtues of the soul. Other things, such as those which pertain to the body or to external fortune, they did not call goods but conveniences. These latter the Peripatetics called goods, but the least goods, and virtues they called the greatest goods. The difference was merely one in terminology-. Just as from the "least goods" of the Peripatetics, so also from the "conveniences" of the Stoics there arise certain movements in the soul of the will man, though not such as to disturb reason. It is not true, then, that sadness can arise in the soul of the will man only from the lack of virtue.

10. Although the injuring of His body did not occur in Christ will His reason unwilling, yet it did occur against the appetitive tendency of sensuality. In this way there was sadness there.

11. Chrysostom is speaking of an injury by which someone is made miserable, 1.e., one by which he is deprived of the good of virtue. But the passion of sadness does not arise exclusively from such an injury, as has been said. The conclusion therefore does not follow.


Parallel readings: III Sentences 15, 2, 3 sol. 2; Quodibet VII, (2), 5; Sum. Theol., III, 15, 5; 46, 7; Comp. Theol., I, 232.


It seems that it was not, for

A man is said to be disturbed and to be led by passion when the turmoil of passion reaches all the way to reason. Now it is not the part of a will man to be disturbed and led by passion. Therefore, since Christ was most will, it seems that in His case pain did not reach all the way to higher reason.

2. Every power is said to get pleasure as a result of the appropriate ness of its proper object. Pain should therefore not be attributed to any power except by reason of harm which comes from its object. But in regard to eternal things, which are the objects of higher reason, Christ did not suffer any defect or encumberment. The passion of pain was therefore not in Christís higher reason.

3. According to Augustine pain is one of the bodily passions. It therefore does not apply to the soul except in so far as it is joined to the body. But as regards higher reason the soul is not joined to the body, since according to the Philosopher2 the intellect is not the act of any body. Pain therefore cannot be in higher reason.

4. It was said in answer that higher reason is not joined to the body by its operation, but it is joined to it as its form.óon the contrary, according to the Philosopher "power and action belong to the same subject." Consequently, if the action of the intellect belongs to the soul without any participation in it by the body, the intellective power also will belong to the soul independently of its union will the body; and so higher reason will not be joined to the body as its form.

5. According to Damascene passion is a movement of the irrational and appetitive soul. But pain and sadness and the like are passions. They were therefore not in the realm of higher reason in Christ.

6. According to Augustine pain or sadness is among the things which happen to us against our will. But Christ willed His bodily passion in His higher reason, and nothing happened to Him against His will, which was most perfectly confirmed to the divine will. Sadness or pain was therefore not in Christ as regards His higher reason.

7. It was said that His higher reason as reason willed the passion of His body, but not as a nature.óOn the contrary, reason is the same power considered as reason or as a nature, for a different way of looking at it does not differentiate the substance of the thing. Now if higher reason as reason willed anything and as a nature did not will it, the same power at one and the same time willed something and did not will it. But that is impossible.

8. According to the Philosopher there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplation. But higher reason finds its pleasure in contemplating eternal truths. Consequently there cannot be any pain or sadness in it, for this sadness or pain would be opposed to the pleasure of contemplation. Thus there was no passion of pain or sadness in Christís soul as regards higher reason.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is written in the Psalm (87:4): "My soul is filled will evils," which is interpreted in the Gloss: "Not will vices but will pains." Pain was accordingly in every part of Christís soul, and therefore in higher reason.

2í. Atonement corresponds to the fault. But by His passion Christ atoned for the fault of the first man. Now since that fault reached as far as higher reason, the passion of Christ must also have reached to higher reason.

3í. As the Gloss says in comment upon the words "My soul is filled will evils" (Ps 87,4), in feeling pain the soul suffers together will the body to which it is united. But reason as reason implies a reference to the body. This appears from the fact that we do not speak of reason but of intellect in the angels, who do not have a body naturally united to them; whereas we do speak of reason in souls united to bodies. Therefore the pain of Christís passion was in higher reason inasmuch as it is reason.

4í. According to Augustine "the whole soul is in the whole body." Every part of it, then, is united to the body. But higher reason as reason is a part of the soul. It is therefore united to the body, and so suffers pain along will the suffering body.



As is evident from what was said above, there are two kinds of passion by which the soul suffers indirectly, one bodily, which begins will the body and ends in the soul as united to the body, the other psychical, which is caused by the soulís apprehending something by which the appetite is moved, will a resultant bodily alteration.

If we are speaking of the first kind of passion, to which pain belongs according to Augustine, then it must be said that the pain of Christís passion was in some sense in higher reason and in some sense not. For there are two elements in pain: an injury, and the experiential perception of that injury. The injury is principally in the body, but resultantly in the soul as united to the body. Now the soul is united to the body by its essence, and in the essence of the soul all its powers are rooted. In this respect, then, that injury in Christ had reference to the soul and to all its parts, even to higher reason in so far as it is grounded in the essence of the soul. The experiential perception of the injury, however, has reference only to the sense of touch, as was said above.

If, on the other hand, we are speaking of psychical passion, sadness, which is properly a passion of this kind, can be only in that part of the soul whose object, when apprehended and appetitively attained, begets sadness. Now in Christís soul no reason for sadness could derive from the object of higher reason, that is, from the eternal verities of which He was in perfect possession. Consequently psychical sadness could not have been in the higher reason of Christís soul.

In Christ, therefore, higher reason suffered will bodily pain in so far as this power is rooted in the essence of the soul, but it did not suffer will psychical sadness in so far as by its proper act it was directed to the contemplation of eternal truths.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. A man is disturbed and led by passion when reason in its own operation follows the inclination of passion by Consenting and choosing. Bodily pain, however, reached the higher reason of Christís soul, not by changing its proper operation, but only in so far as it is rooted in the essence, as has been said. Thus the conclusion does not follow.

2. Although pain was not in the higher reason of Christís soul will relation to its proper object, it was in it nevertheless as referred to its proper root, which is the essence of the soul.

3. A power can be the act of the body in two ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is a power; and thus it is said to be the act of the body as informing some bodily organ in order to carry out its own act. The visual power, for example, perfects the eye in order to carry out the act of seeing. In this sense the intellect is not the act of the body. (2) By reason of the essence in which it is grounded. In this sense the intellect as well as the other powers are joined to the body as its form inasmuch as they are in the soul which by its essence is the form of the body.

4. That difficulty is speaking of a power under the aspect of its being a power, not under that of its being rooted in the essence of the soul.

5. Damascene is speaking of psychical passion, which is in the sense appetitive power as its proper subject, but in the apprehensive power causally, so to speak, inasmuch as the movement of passion arises in the appetitive from the apprehended object. There are, however, in the higher appetite certain operations similar to the passions of the lower appetite, and by reason of this similarity the names of the passions are sometimes attributed to the angels or to God, as Augustine says. In this way too sadness is sometimes said to be in higher reason as regards the apprehensive and the appetitive powers. We do not, however, say that pain was in the higher reason of Christís soul in this way, but in so far as it is rooted in the essence of the soul, as has been said.

6. This difficulty proves that pain was not in higher reason as referred to its object through its own operation. In that sense nothing Occurs against its will.

7. The distinction made between reason as reason and reason as a nature can be understood in two ways: (1) In such a way that "reason as a nature" is used to mean reason in so far as it is the nature of a rational creature, that is, as being grounded in the essence of the soul and giving natural existence to the body; and "reason as reason" is spoken of from the point of view of the distinguishing characteristic of reason inasmuch as it is reason; and that is its act, since powers are defined by their acts. Because, then, pain is not in higher reason as referred to its object on the basis of its proper act but as rooted in the essence of the soul, it is said for this reason that higher reason suffered pain as a nature, not as reason.

It is like the case of sight, which is founded on the sense of touch inasmuch as the organ of sight is also an organ of touch. Sight can accordingly suffer an injury in two different ways: through its proper act, as when sight is blurred by too strong a light, in which case this is a passion of sight as sight; or again as founded upon the sense of touch, as when the eye is punctured or dissolved by heat, in which case the passion is one of sight not as sight but as a sort of sense of touch.

(2) The distinction mentioned can be understood in such a way that we use "reason as a nature" to mean reason as referred to the things which it naturally knows and tends to, and "reason as reason" to mean reason as directed to an object of knowledge or desire by means of a comparison, since it is the proper function of reason to compare. For there are certain things which are to be shunned when considered in themselves, but are sought because of their relation to something else. Thus hunger and thirst considered in themselves are to be shunned, but to the extent that they are considered useful for the health of the soul or body they are sought. Reason as reason accordingly takes pleasure in them, whereas reason as nature is saddened by them. So too the bodily passion of Christ considered in itself was something to be shunned, and reason as nature was as a consequence saddened by it and did not want it. But from the point of view of its being destined for the salvation of the human race it was something good and desirable, and so reason as reason willed it and then rejoiced in it.

This cannot be referred to higher reason, however, but only to lower reason, which directs its attention to the things of the body as its proper object. Hence it can be directed to bodily passions both absolutely and comparatively. But higher reason is not concerned will the things of the body as its objects, for it is directed in this way only to eternal things. It does, however, look at corporeal things to judge them in the light of eternal standards, to which it directs its gaze not only to look upon them but also to consult them. In Christ, accordingly, higher reason did not look at the passion of His body except will reference to the eternal standards, and in the light of them it rejoiced in the passion as pleasing to God. Hence sadness or pain by no means occurred in higher reason in virtue of its proper operation.

Now li is not out of keeping for one and the same power to will in relation to something else the same thing that it does not will in itself, for it is possible for something which is not good in itself to take on a certain goodness from its relation to something else. This did not take place, however, in higher reason in Christ will regard to the passion of His body; for it is not directed to such a passion except as willed [of God], as is apparent from what has just been said.

8. Contemplation can cause pleasure in two different ways: (1) From the standpoint of the operation, that is, contemplating. In this sense there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplating, because opposed to this contemplation which is the cause of pleasure there is no contrary contemplation which would be the cause of sadness; for all contemplation is pleasurable. This is not the case, however, on the part of sense, because from the point of view of its operation sense can be both saddened and pained; for example, we take pleasure in touching something suited to the sense, but we experience pain from touching something harmful. (2) Contemplation causes pleasure from the standpoint of the thing contemplated; that is, according as the object is considered as good or as evil. Thus either pleasure or contrary sadness can arise from contemplation; for even failure to understand causes sadness when considered as an evil, though in itself it does not cause anything but the negation of pleasure. Nevertheless it is not in this way that we say that pain was in the higher reason of Christís soul, but as being rooted in the essence of the soul.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

Ií. The Gloss does not say that the soul of Christ was filled will sadness but that it was filled will pains in the sense that it was suffering along will the body. It is accordingly not necessary for the suffering of pain to be ascribed to higher reason except in so far as it is in the essence of the soul; for in that way it is united to the body.

2í. Christís passion would not have atoned except in so far as it was undertaken voluntarily and from charity. It is accordingly not necessary that, just because the fault was in Adam through the operation of higher reason, pain be in the higher part of Christís reason as regards its proper operation; for the suffererís movement of charity, which is in the higher part of reason, corresponds for the purpose of atonement to whatever was in the fault from higher reason.

3'. In reason there are two aspects to be kept in mind: a certain participation in the power of understanding, and also the clouding or defectiveness of understanding. The defectiveness of the power of understanding is a consequence of the soulís ordination to union will a body, but the power of understanding is in the soul inasmuch as it is not immersed in the body like other material forms. Consequently, since the operation of reason is in the soul as participating in the power of understanding, such an operation is not exercised by means of the body.

4í. "Reason as reason" does not designate a power distinct from "reason as a nature," but it designates a way of looking at that power. Now even though, in one way of looking at it, suffering does not apply to some particular power of the soul, that does not prevent the whole soul from suffering.


Parallel readings: De veritate, 10, 1 ad III Sentences 15, 2, 3 sol. 2 ad Quodibet VII, (2), 5; Sum. Theol., III, 46, 8; Comp. Theol., I, 232.


It seems that it did, for

1. Blessedness is more properly in the soul than in the body. But the body cannot be said to be blessed and glorious while it is suffering, because impassibility belongs to the glory of the body. Then neither could there at the same time be the suffering of pain and the joy of blessed fruition in Christís higher reason.

2. The Philosopher says that any pleasure drives out the sadness which is contrary to it, and if it is keen it drives out all sadness. But the pleasure will which higher reason in the soul of Christ enjoyed the divinity, was most keen. It therefore drove from Christ all sadness and pain.

3. Christís higher reason was engaged in a more vivid contemplation than Paul in his rapture. But by the force of his contemplation Paulís soul was carried out of his body not only as regards the operation of reason but also as regards sense operations. Then Christ too did not experience any pain either in reason or in sense.

4. From a strong cause there comes a strong effect. Now the operation of the soul is the cause of bodily change; for example, when terrors or delights are represented in imagination, the body is made cold or hot. Consequently, since there was the keenest joy in Christís soul as to His higher reason, it seems that even His body was changed by this joy; and so pain could not have been either in His body or in His higher reason under the aspect of its being united to the body.

5. The vision of God in His essence is more effective than the vision of God in a creature serving as a medium. But the vision by which Moses saw God in a creature resulted in his not suffering from hunger during his fast of forty days. With all the more reason, then, did the vision of God in His essence, which belonged to Christ in His higher reason, remove all bodily affliction. And so the conclusion is the same as before.

6. Whatever exists in the highest degree of anything but yet can fall off, does not admit of any admixture of the contrary. Thus the heat of fire, which stands at the highest degree of heat, does not admit of any admixture of cold, though that heat is exchangeable. But the joy of fruition was in Christís higher reason in the highest degree and un changeably. There was therefore no pain mixed will it.

7. Man is made blessed in both his soul and his body, and he lost both kinds of blessedness by sin. In Christ, however, human nature was re-established in blessedness of soul, which consists in the enjoyment of the divinity by higher reason. All the more, then, was it re-established in blessedness of body, which is something less; and consequently there was no pain in Him even as to His body, and so neither was there in higher reason in virtue of its union will the body.

8. Not only Christís soul but also His flesh was united to the Word. But if His flesh were glorified through union will the Word, there could not be any pain in it. Therefore, since His higher reason is made blessed through union will the Word, there can be no pain in it.

9. According to Augustine joy and pain are in the soul essentially. But joy and pain are contraries. Since contraries cannot be in the same subject essentially, it therefore seems that the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion could not have been in the higher part of Christís reason at the same time.

10. Pain follows from the apprehension of something harmful; joy, from the apprehension of something agreeable. But it is not possible to apprehend simultaneously something harmful and something agreeable, because according to the Philosopher it is possible to understand only one thing. Pain and joy could therefore not have been in Christís higher reason at the same time.

11. In uncorrupted nature reason has more power over sensuality than sensuality has over reason in corrupted nature. But in corrupted nature sensuality draws reason along will it. All the more surely, then, in the case of Christ, in whom human nature was uncorrupted, does reason draw sensuality along will it. Thus sensuality shared in the of fruition which was in reason. From this it seems that the soul of Christ was altogether free from pain.

12. An infirmity contracted is greater than one assumed; and similarly union in person is stronger than union by grace. But in the three young men, whose infirmity was contracted, union will God by grace kept their bodies incapable of suffering injury from fire. All the more, then, in the case of Christ, who had only an assumed infirmity, did union will God in the person of the Word and fruition of Him keep His reason free from the pain of the passion.

i 3. The joy of fruition is in higher reason from its being turned to God, and the pain of suffering from its being turned to the body. But reason, being simple, cannot at the same time be turned to God and to the body, because when anything simple turns to something, it turns as a whole. In Christís higher reason, then, there could not have been at the same time the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion.

14. It was said in answer that there was a twofold state in Christ, that of a wayfarer and that of a possessor, and that on the basis of these two states there could be in Him both the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion. On the contrary, the duality of states in Christ neither removes the contrariety between joy and pain nor differentiates the subject of the joy and of the pain. Now contraries can not be in the same subject. The duality of states in Christ therefore does not make it possible for pain and joy to be in Him as regards higher reason at the same time.

15. The states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are either contrary or not. If they are contrary, they cannot be in Christ at the same time. If, on the other hand, they are not contrary, seeing that contraries have contrary causes, it seems that the duality of states cannot be the cause by which the contraries, joy and pain, were in Christ at the same time.

16. When one power becomes intense in its act, another is will drawn from its act. With all the more reason, then, when one power is intense in one act, is the very same power withdrawn from an other act. But in higher reason there was intense joy. By this fact, then, it was altogether withdrawn from pain.

17. It was said that pain was material will reference to joy, and for this reason joy was not prevented by pain.óOn the contrary, the pain was from the suffering of the body, the joy, from the vision of God. The pain of the passion was therefore not material will reference to the joy of fruition. Then pain and joy could not be in Christís higher reason at the same time.

To the Contrary:

1'. There is a proportion among effects similar to that among their causes. But the union of Christís soul will His body was the cause of pain, whereas its union will the divinity was the cause of joy. But these two unions do not preclude each other. Then neither do pain and joy preclude each other.

2í. At the same instant Christ was a true wayfarer and a true possessor. He therefore had the attributes of each. But it is proper to a possessor to rejoice intensely from the divine fruition, and of a way farer to feel bodily pains. Therefore in Christ there were at the same time the pain of the passion and the joy of fruition.

De veritate EN 228