De veritate EN 231

231

REPLY:

In Christ the two dispositions in question, the joy of fruition and the pain of the bodily passion, by no means precluded each other. For the clarification of this matter it should be borne in mind that, in conformity will the order of nature, because of the conjunction of the powers of the soul in one essence and of the soul and body in the one existence of the composite, the higher powers and the lower, and even the body and the soul, let flow from one to the other whatever super abounds in any one of them. And hence it is that because of the soul’s apprehension the body is altered will regard to heat and cold, and sometimes even to the extent of health and sickness and even to death; for it does happen that a person meets will death from joy or sadness or love. For this reason too there occurs an overflow from the very glory of the soul into the body, glorifying it, as is made clear in the passage from Augustine cited above. And contrariwise the alteration of the body overflows into the soul. For a soul joined to a body imitates its make-up in point of insanity or docility and the like, as is said in the work Six Principles.

In the same way too there occurs an overflow from the higher powers into the lower, as when a passion in sense appetite follows upon an intense movement of the will, and the animal powers are withdrawn or barred from their acts by intense contemplation. And conversely there occurs an overflow from the lower powers into the higher, as when a man’s reason is clouded because of the vehemence of passions in sense appetite, will the result that it judges as simply good that to which the man is moved by passion.

In Christ, however, the situation is quite different. Because of the divine power of the Word the order of nature was subject to His will. It was therefore possible that the above-mentioned overflow, whether from the soul into the body or vice versa, or from the higher powers into the lower or vice versa, should not take place; and the 'Word saw to this in order that the genuineness of His human nature in all its parts might be clearly proved and that the mystery of our reparation might be fittingly fulfilled in all respects. Damascene thus says: "He was moved in conformity will this nature, while the Word in the manner of a supervisor so willed and permitted, to suffer and to perform all works proper to it, in order that through its works the nature’s genuineness might be believed."

It is therefore evident that, since there was the most complete joy in His higher reason in view of the fact that by its activity His soul enjoying the possession of God, that joy remained in higher reason and did not flow out to the lower powers of the soul or to the body; otherwise there could not have been any pain or passion in Him. Accordingly too the effect of fruition did not reach to the essence of the soul as the form of the body or as the root of the lower powers. Had it done so it would have reached the body and the lower powers, as happens in the blessed after the resurrection. Conversely also the pain which was in the body itself from the injury of the body and in the essence of the soul as the form of the body and in the lower powers, was notable to reach to higher reason in so far as by its act it turns towards God, in such a way that this turning might thereby be hindered in the least degree.

It therefore remains that the pain itself attained higher reason as rooted in the essence of the soul and that the greatest joy was there inasmuch as reason was enjoying the possession of God by its act. Thus the joy belonged to higher reason directly, because by its proper act, whereas pain was there as if indirectly, because by reason of the essence of the soul in which it was grounded.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Just as God is the good and the life of the soul, so the soul is the good and life of the body, but not contrariwise so that the body should be the good of the soul. Now the ability to suffer is a sort of barrier or harmful factor as regards the union of the soul will the body. Thus the body cannot be blessed in its own way while still able to suffer, having a barrier to participation in its own good. For this reason impassibility is a part of the glory of the body. The soul’s blessed ness, however, consists entirely in the enjoyment of its own good, which is God. Hence the soul which enjoys the possession of God is perfectly happy, even if it happens to be passible from the point of view of its being united to the body, as was the case in Christ.

2. The fact that keen joy drives out all sadness, even that which is not contrary, is due to the overflow of the powers upon one another (which did not take place in Christ), as has been explained. In this way because of the intensity of St. Paul’s contemplation his lower powers were withdrawn from their acts.

3. The answer is clear from that just given.

4. In the same way there results from the operation of the soul some change in the body. From this the answer to this difficulty is obvious.

5. In the same way also Moses suffered from thirst and hunger not at all or littie, because of his contemplation of God even though in a creature serving as a medium. Thus the answer to this difficulty is clear.

6. In Christ there was no mingling of joy and pain. For joy was in His higher reason viewed under the aspect of its being the principle of its own act, for it was in this way that it enjoyed the possession of God. Pain, however, was not in it except in so far as the injuring of the body touched it as the act of the body through the essence in which it was rooted, yet in such a way that the act of higher reason was in no will hampered. Thus there was pure joy and likewise pure pain, and both in the highest degree.

7. It happened by a sort of dispensation that glory of soul, though not that of body, was conferred upon Christ from the first moment of His conception, so that He was confirmed to God by the glory of His soul while by the passibility of His body He was like us. Thus He was a fitting mediator between God and man, leading us to glory and offering His passion to God in our name in accordance will the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews (2: 10): "For it became him...who had brought many children into glory, to be perfected by his passion."

8. The soul of Christ was joined to the Word in two ways: (1) by the act of fruition, and this union made it blessed; (2) by union, and this did not furnish the reason for its blessedness but did account for its being the soul of God. Now if one were to suppose that the soul was assumed in a unity of person without fruition, it would not be blessed properly speaking, because not even God Himself is blessed except by the fact that He enjoys the possession of Himself. The body of Christ is therefore not glorious by reason of being assumed by the Son of God in a unity of person, but only because glory came down into it from the soul; but this was not the case before the passion, because it was not glorious then.

9. It is impossible for contraries to be in the same subject directly; yet it does happen that contrary movements are in the same subject in such a way that one of them belongs to it directly and the other in directly, as when a person walking in a ship is borne in a direction contrary to that in which the ship is moving. So too in the higher reason of Christ’s soul there was joy directly, because by its proper act, but pain indirectly, because through the suffering of the body.—It can also be said that that joy and that pain were not contraries since they were not about the same thing.

10. The intellect cannot understand many things at the same time by means of different species, but it can understand many things at once by means of one species or by understanding in any other way many as one. It is in this way that the intellect of Christ’s soul and of any one of the blessed understands many things at once, since in seeing the divine essence it knows other things.

Yet granted that the soul of Christ could understand only one thing at a time, the possibility is not thereby removed of its understanding one thing and at the same time sensing something else will a bodily sense. And as a matter of fact from those two different objects of apprehension in Christ’s soul there followed joy from the vision of God and the pain of the passion from the feeling of injury.

Granted further that it could not simultaneously understand one thing and sense or imagine another, nonetheless from that one object of understanding higher and lower appetite could be affected in different ways, so that the higher would rejoice and the lower fear or grieve, as happens in one who hopes to get health from some horrible remedy. For considered by reason as health-giving, the remedy begets joy in the will; but because of its horribleness it arouses fear in the lower appetite.

11. That argument proceeds on the assumption of the ordinary course of events. In Christ, however, it occurred by way of exception that there should not take place the overflow from one power into another.

12. The bodies of the three young men were not made impassible in the furnace; but by the divine power it was miraculously brought about that while remaining passible their bodies should not be injured by the fire, as it also could have happened by the divine power that neither Christ’s soul nor His body should suffer anything. But why this was not done has been explained.

13. The turning of a power towards something takes place by means of its act. Thus joy was in Christ’s higher reason by means of it turning to God, to whom it was kept turned entirely, whereas pain was in His higher reason as a result of the inhesion or adherence by which it clung to the essence of the soul as its root.

14. The state of a wayfarer is a state of imperfection, whereas that of a possessor is a state of perfection. Christ therefore had the state of a wayfarer by reason of bearing a body capable of suffering, and likewise such a soul; but He had the state of a possessor by reason of perfectly enjoying the possession of God through the act of higher reason. This was possible in Christ because by the divine power the overflow from one to another was inhibited, as has been said. This is the reason also why joy and sadness could be in Him simultaneous ly. It is accordingly said that these two feelings were in Him in accordance will His two states because His having two states and His simultaneously experiencing pain and joy came from the same cause.

15. Even though the states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are in a sense contrary, they could still be in Christ at the same time, not in the same respect but in different respects. For the state of a possessor was in Him according as He adhered to God by fruition in higher reason; and the state of a wayfarer, according as His soul was joined to a body capable of suffering and His higher reason joined to the soul itself by a sort of natural conjunction. As a result the state of a possessor has reference to the act of higher reason, and that of a way farer to His passible body and its consequent properties.

16. It was something special in Christ, for the reason already explained, that however much one power was intensified in its act, another was not withdrawn from its act or in any way hampered. The joy of higher reason was accordingly hindered neither by the pain which was in sense as a consequence of the act of sensing nor by the pain which was in higher reason itself, because that pain was not in it as a consequence of its act, but it attained it in some manner as a consequence of its being grounded in the essence of the soul.

17. Just as blessed knowledge is principally of the divine essence and secondarily of the things which are known in the divine essence, in the same way the affection and joy of the blessed is principally about God but secondarily about the things that have God as the reason why we rejoice over them. The pain of the passion can accordingly be in some sense material will reference to the joy of fruition, for that joy was principally over God and secondarily over the things which were pleasing to God; and so it was even over the pain in so far as it was acceptable to God as destined for the salvation of the human race.



QUESTION 26: Grace





ARTICLE I: IS GRACE SOMETHING CREATED WHICH IS IN THE SOUL POSITIVELY?



Parallel readings: Il Sentences 26, a. 1; Contra Gentiles III, 150; Sum. Theol., I-II, 110, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. According to Augustine, "just as the soul is the life of the body, God is the life of the soul." But the soul is the life of the body will out any intervening form. Then God is also the life of the soul in the same way. Thus the life which is had through grace is not had through any created form existing in the soul.

2. Ingratiatory grace (gratia gratum faciens), of which we are speaking, seems to be nothing but that according to which a man is in God’s good graces. But a man is said to be in God’s good graces in so far as he has been favorably received by God; and a person is said to be favorably received by God because of God’s acceptance, which is of course in God Himself. It is just as we say that a person is acceptable to a man, not by something which is in the one accepted, but by the acceptance which is in the one accepting. Grace therefore does not imply anything in man but only in God.

3. We come closer to God by the spiritual existence that comes from grace than by natural existence. But God causes natural existence in us without the intervention of any other cause, because He created us immediately. He therefore also causes gratuitous spiritual existence in us without the intervention of anything else; and so the conclusion is the same as before.

4. Grace is a sort of health of the soul. Now health does not seem to imply anything else in the healthy person than balanced humors. Then grace too does not imply any form in the soul, but presupposes that the powers of the soul are balanced in an equality of justice.

5. Grace seems to be nothing but a sort of liberality; for "to give gratuitously" seems to mean the same as "to give liberally." Liberality, however, is not in the recipient but in the giver. Then grace too is in God, who gives us His good things, and not in us.

6. No creature is nobler than the soul of Christ. But grace is nobler, because Christ’s soul is ennobled by grace. Grace is therefore not something created in the soul.

7. Grace bears the same relation to the will as truth to the intellect. But according to Anselm the truth, which all intellects understand, is one. Then the grace by which all wills are perfected is also one. But no one created thing can be in many. Consequently grace is not some thing created.

8. Nothing but a composite is in a genus. Now grace is not a composite but a simple form. It is therefore not in a genus. But everything created is in some genus. Then grace is not something created.

9. If grace is anything in the soul, it seems to be only a habit. "There are three things in the soul," the Philosopher says, "power, habit, and passion." Now grace is not a power, because in that case it would be natural. Nor is it a passion, because then it would be concerned principally will the irrational part of the soul. But it is furthermore not a habit, for a habit is a quality difficult to displace, according to the Philosopher, whereas grace is very easily removed, because this can be done by one act of a mortal sin. Grace is therefore not something in the soul.

10. According to Augustine nothing created intervenes between our soul and God. But grace intervenes between our soul and God, be cause our soul is united to God through grace. Grace is therefore not something created.

11. Man is nobler and more perfect than the other creatures. But in order to make these latter acceptable to Himself God did not confer upon them anything over and above their natural endowments, since they have been approved by Him as they were, according to the words of Genesis (1:31): "And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." Then neither is anything added to man’s natural gifts on the basis of which he is said to be acceptable to God; and so grace is not something positively existing in the soul.

To the Contrary:

1’. Commenting on the words of the Psalm (103:15): "That he may make the face cheerful will oil," the Gloss says: "Grace is a certain splendour of the soul winning holy love." But splendour is something in the soul positively which is created. Then so is grace.

2'. God is said to be in His saints by grace in a special way that distinguishes them from other creatures. Now God is not said to be in anything in a new manner except by reason of some effect. Grace is therefore an effect of God in the soul.

3’. Damascene says that grace is the delight of the soul. But delight is something created in the soul. Then so is grace.

4’. Every action is from some form. But a meritorious action is from grace. Grace is therefore a form in the soul.

232

REPLY:

The term grace is wont to be taken in two senses: (1) For some thing which is given gratis, as we are accustomed to say, "I do you this grace or favour." (2) For the favorable reception which one gets from another, as we say, "That fellow is in the king’s good graces" because he is favorably received by the king. And these two senses are related, for nothing is gratuitously given unless the recipient is somehow favorably received.

In divine matters we accordingly speak of two kinds of grace. One is called grace gratuitously given or gratuitous grace, as the gift of prophecy and of wisdom and the like. But this is not in question at present, because it is evident that such gifts are something created in the soul. The other is called grace that makes one pleasing to God or ingratiatory grace, and according to it man is said to be acceptable to God. It is of this that we are now speaking. That this grace implies something in God is obvious, for it implies an act of the divine will welcoming that man. But whether along will this it implies some thing in the man welcomed was doubted by some, since some asserted that this kind of grace was nothing created in the soul, but Was only in God.

But this cannot stand. For God’s accepting or loving someone (for they are the same thing) is nothing else but His willing him some good. Now God wills the good of nature for all creatures; and on this account He is said to love all things: "For thou lovest all things that are..."(Sg 2 i: and to approve all: "And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good" (Gn 1,31). But it is not by reason of this sort of acceptance that we are accustomed to say that someone has the grace of God, but inasmuch as God wills him a certain supernatural good, which is eternal life, as is written in Isaias (64:4): "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things thou has prepared for them that love thee." Hence it is written in the Epistle to the Romans (6:23): "The grace of God [ life everlasting."

God does not, however, will this for anyone unworthy. But from his own nature man is not worthy of so great a good, since it is super natural. Consequently, by the very fact that someone is affirmed to be pleasing to God will reference to this good, it is affirmed that there is in him something by which he is worthy of such a good above his natural endowments. This does not, to be sure, move the divine will to destine the man for that good, but rather the other way about: by the very fact that by His will God destines someone for eternal life, He supplies him will something by which he is worthy of eternal life. This is what is said in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:12): "... who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light." And the reason for this is that, ust as God’s knowledge is the cause of things and is not, like ours, caused by them, in the same way the act of His will is productive of good and not, like that of ours, caused by good.

Man is accordingly said to have the grace of God not only from his being loved by God will a view to eternal life but also from his being given some gift (ingratiatory grace) by which he is worthy of eternal life. Otherwise even a person in the state of mortal sin could be said to be in grace if grace meant only divine acceptance, since it can happen that a particular sinner is predestined to have eternal life. Thus ingratiatory grace can be called gratuitous grace, but not conversely, because not every gratuitous grace makes us worthy of eternal life.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The soul is the formal cause of the life of the body, and for this reason gives life to the body without the intervention of any form. God, however, does not give life to the soul as its formal cause, but as its efficient cause. For this reason a form intervenes, as a painter effectively makes a wall white by means of whiteness, but whiteness makes it white by means of no other form, because it makes it white formally.

2. The very acceptance which is in the divine will regard to an eternal good produces in the man accepted something from which he is worthy to obtain that good, though this does not occur in human acceptance. Ingratiatory grace is accordingly something created in the soul.

3. God causes natural existence in us by creation without the intervention of any agent cause, but nevertheless will the intervention of a formal cause; for a natural form is the principle of natural existence. Similarly God brings about gratuitous spiritual existence in us will out the intervention of any agent, yet will the intervention of a created form, grace.

4. Health is a certain bodily quality caused by balanced humors, for it is listed in the first species of quality. Thus the argument is based upon a false Supposition.

5. From the very liberality of God by which He wills us an eternal good it follows that there is in us something given by Him by which we are made worthy of that good.

6. No creature is simply nobler than the soul of Christ; but in a certain respect every accident of His soul is nobler than it inasmuch as the accident is compared to it as its form.—Or it can be said that grace is nobler than the soul of Christ, not as a creature, but in so far as it is a certain likeness of the divine goodness more explicit than the natural likeness which is in Christ’s soul.

7. There is one first uncreated truth, from which many truths, likenesses of the first truth, so to speak, are nevertheless caused in created minds, as the Gloss says in comment upon the words of the Psalm (2 1:2): "Truths are decayed from among the children of men." Similarly there is one uncreated good, of which there are many likenesses in created minds through participation in it by means of grace. Yet it should be noted that grace does not bear the same relation to the will as truth to the intellect For truth is related to the intellect as its object, but grace to the will as its informing form. Now distinct beings may have the same object, but not the same form.

8. Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite will a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things will which it agrees in the formal character of its quiddity; for such agreement is required in all things that are directly in a category. Consequently everything that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of the act of being and the subject of being.

Yet there are some things in the category of substance reductively, such as the principles of a subsistent substance, in which the composition in question is not found; for they do not subsist, and therefore do not have their own act of being. In the same way, because accidents do not subsist, they do not properly have existence, but the subject is of a particular sort as a result of them. For this reason they are properly said to be "of a being" rather than beings. For something to be in some category of accident, then, it does not have to be composite will a real composition, but may have only a conceptual composition from genus and differentia. Such composition is found in grace.

9. Even though grace is lost because of one act of mortal sin, it is still not easily lost, because for one who has grace, which confers an inclination to the contrary, it is not easy to perform that act. Thus even the Philosopher says that it is difficult for a just man to act unjustly.

10. Nothing intervenes between our mind and God either as an efficient cause (because our soul is created and justified immediately by God) or as the beatifying object (because the soul is made blessed by enjoying the possession of God Himself). There can nonetheless be a formal medium by which the soul is made like God.

11. Other creatures, which are irrational, are accepted by God only will regard to natural goods. Consequently, in their case divine acceptance does not add anything above the natural condition by which they are made proportionate to such goods. But man is accepted by God will regard to a supernatural good; and so there is required something added to his natural gifts by which he is proportioned to that good.



ARTICLE II: IS INGRATIATORY GRACE THE SAME AS CHARITY?



Parallel readings: II Sentences 26, a. Sum. Theol., I-II, 110, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Ingratiatory grace in us is that gift of God by which we are

acceptable to Him. But we are so by charity, as is written in Proverbs (8:17): "I love them that love me." Ingratiatory grace is therefore the same as charity.

2. Augustine says that the benefit of God by which the will of man is prepared antecedently is faith—not unformed but formed faith, which is achieved by charity. Now since that benefit is antecedent grace, it therefore seems that charity is grace itself.

3. The Holy Spirit is sent invisibly to a person in order to dwell within him. By the same gift, then, He is sent and indwells. Now He is said to be sent by the gift of charity, just as the Son is said to be sent by the gift of wisdom, because of the similarity of these gifts to the divine persons. But the Holy Spirit is said to dwell in the soul by grace. Grace is therefore the same as charity.

4. Grace is that gift of God by which we are made worthy to have eternal life. But man is made worthy of eternal life by charity, as is evident from the words in John (14:21): "If anyone shah love me, he shah be loved of my Father: and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him." Now eternal life consists in that manifestation. Charity is therefore the same as grace.

5. In charity we can distinguish two aspects that are essential to it:

by it man is dear to God, and by it man holds God dear. But man’s being dear to God is essential to charity antecedently to his holding God dear, as is made clear in the first Epistle of St. John (4:10): "Not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us." But this is the essence of grace: by it man is pleasing to God. Now, since it is the same thing to be dear to God and to be pleasing to Him, it therefore seems that grace is the same as charity.

6. Augustine says: "It is only charity which distinguishes between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition," for the rest of God’s gifts are common to the good and the bad alike. But ingratiatory grace distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom and is found only in the good. It is therefore the same as charity.

7. Since ingratiatory grace is an accident, it can only be in the genus of quality, and there only in the first species: habit and disposition. Since it is not knowledge, it does not seem to be anything else than virtue. And no virtue can be called grace except charity, which is the form of the other virtues. Grace is therefore charity.

To the Contrary:

1. Nothing precedes itself. But "grace precedes charity," as Augustine says. Grace is therefore not the same as charity.

2’. It is written in the Epistle to the Romans (5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us." Then the giving of the Holy Ghost precedes charity as a cause its effect. But the Holy Ghost is given to us as a result of a particular gift of His. Then there is a particular gift in us which precedes charity, and this does not seem to be anything but grace. Consequently grace is something other than charity.

3’. Grace is always in its act, because it always ingratiates man will God. But charity is not always in its act; for a man who has charity does not always actually love. Charity is therefore not grace.

4’. Charity is a type of love. Now it is on the basis of love that we are loving. It is therefore on the basis of charity that we are loving. But we are not acceptable to God inasmuch as we are loving, but rather the other way about; for our acts are not the cause of grace, but vice versa. Consequently the grace by which we are made acceptable to God is something other than charity.

5’. Whatever is common to many is not in any one of them by reason of anything that is proper to that one. But to produce a meritorious act is common to all virtue. It therefore belongs to no particular virtue on the basis of anything proper to it, and so not to charity either. It belongs to charity, then, on the basis of something common to it and all the virtues. But a meritorious act is from grace. Grace therefore expresses something common to charity and the other virtues. But it is apparently not common just predicatively, because then there would be as many graces as there are virtues. It is therefore common causally; and so grace is essentially distinct from charity.

6’. Charity perfects the soul in relation to a lovable object. But grace does not imply a relation to any object, because it does not imply a relation to an act but to a particular way of being, namely, being pleasing to God. Therefore grace is not charity.

233

REPLY:

Some say that grace is essentially the same as virtue in reality, though it differs conceptually, so that virtue is spoken of in so far as it perfects an act, and grace in so far as it makes man and his act acceptable to God. And among the virtues charity especially is grace according to these men. Others, on the contrary, say that charity and grace differ essentially, and that no virtue is essentially grace. This latter opinion seems the more reasonable.

Since different natures have different ends, there are three pre requisites for obtaining any end among natural things: a nature proportioned to that end, an inclination which is a natural appetite for that end, and a movement toward the end. Thus it is clear that in the element earth there is a certain nature by which being in the center is characteristic of it, and consequent upon this nature there is an inclination to the center according to which earth naturally tends to such a place even when it is violently kept away from it; and so when the obstacle is removed it always moves downward.

Now in his nature man is proportioned to a certain end for which he has a natural appetite and for the obtaining of which he can work by his natural powers. That end is a contemplation of divine things such as is possible to man according to the capabilities of his nature; and hi this contemplation philosophers have placed man’s ultimate happiness.

But there is an end for which man is prepared by God which surpasses the proportion of human nature, that is, eternal life, which consists in the vision of God by His essence. That vision is not proportionate to any creature whatsoever, being connatural only to God. It is therefore necessary that there be given to man not only something by which he can work toward that end or by which his appetite should be inclined to that end, but also something by which man’s very nature should be raised to a dignity which would make such an end suited to him. For this, grace is given. But to incline his will to this end charity is given; and for carrying out the works by which that end is acquired, the other virtues are given.

Accordingly, just as in natural things the nature itself is distinct from the inclination of the nature and its motion or operation, in the same way in man’s gratuitous gifts grace is distinct from charity and the other virtues. And that this comparison is nightly taken can be seen from Dionysius where he says that no one can have a spiritual operation unless he first receives a spiritual existence, just as he can not have the operation of a particular nature unless he first has existence in that nature.

Answers to Difficulties:

2. God loves those who love him, yet not in such a way that the love of those who love him is the reason why He Himself loves, but rather the other way about.

2. Faith is said to be an antecedent grace inasmuch as there appears in the first movement of faith the effect of antecedent grace.

3. The whole Trinity dwells in us by means of grace; but indwelling can be appropriated specially to one person because of some other special gift which bears a resemblance to that person and provides the basis for saying that that person is sent.

4. Charity would not suffice for meriting eternal life unless it pre supposed the fitness of the one meriting, and this is had by means of grace. Otherwise our love would not be deserving of so great a reward.

5. It is not out of keeping that something which is prior in reality should only posteriorly fulfil the notion of a particular name. Thus the cause of health is prior to health itself in the subject of health, and yet the term healthy signifies the one having health before it signifies the cause of health. In the same way, even though the divine love by which God loves us is prior to the love by which we love Him, yet charity implies in its notion that it makes God dear to us before it implies that it makes us dear to God. For the first belongs to love inasmuch as it is love, but not the Second.

6. The fact that charity alone distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom belongs to it inasmuch as it cannot be unformed like the other virtues. Hence grace, by which charity itself is formed, is not thereby excluded.

7. Grace is in the first species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit because it is not immediately directed to an act but to a certain spiritual existence which it causes in the soul; and it is like disposition in regard to glory, which is consummated grace. Yet nothing like grace is found among the accidents which the philosophers knew, because the philosophers knew only those accidents of the soul which are directed w acts proportioned to human nature.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

We concede these even though some of them do not arrive at their conclusions correctly.



ARTICLE III: CAN ANY CREATURE BE THE CAUSE OF GRACE?



Parallel readings: I Sentences 14, q. 3; 40, 4, 2 ad II Sentences 26, a. IV Sentences 5, 1, sol. 1; Sum. Theol., I-II, 112, 1; III, 62, 1; 64, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. In John (20:23) our Lord says to His disciples: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." From this it is evident that men can forgive sins. But S are forgiven only by means of grace. Then men can confer grace.

2. Dionysius says that, just as the spheres closer to the sun receive light from it and transmit it to other spheres, in the same way the sub stances that come close to God receive His light more fully and hand it on to others. But divine light is grace. Consequently certain creatures that more fully receive grace can hand it on to others.

3. According to Dionysius good tends to pour itself out. Then anything that has goodness in greater measure also has diffusiveness in greater measure. But spiritual forms have more goodness than bodily forms, being closer to the highest good. Now, since bodily forms existing in some creatures are the principle of their sharing in the like ness of the species, all the more then can one who has grace cause grace in another.

4. The intellect is perfected by the light of truth just as the will is perfected by the divine light of grace. But one creature can furnish another will the light of the intellect. This is evident from the fact that according to Dionysius the higher angels enlighten the lower, and according to him that enlightenment is "the assumption of divine knowledge." A rational creature can therefore also furnish another will grace.

5. Christ is our head in His human nature. But it is the function of the head to send forth feeling and movement into the members. Then Christ too in His human nature sends forth into the members of the Mystical Body spiritual feelings and movements, which mean graces according w Augustine.

6. It was said in answer that by His ministry Christ in His human nature poured out grace upon men.—On the contrary, Christ all alone and in preference w all others is the head of the Church. But to work for the confirming of grace by way of the ministry is attributable to other ministers of the Church as well. It therefore does not suffice for the character of the head that He imparts grace by way of the ministry.

7. The death and resurrection of Christ belong to Him according to His human nature. But in commenting upon the words of the Psalm (29:6): "In the evening weeping shah have place," the Gloss says: "Christ’s resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of the soul in the present time and of the body in the future." Now the resurrection of the soul in the present is through grace. In His human nature therefore Christ is the cause of grace.

8. A substantial form, which gives existence and life, is nobler than any accidental form. But a created agent has power over a substantial form which gives existence and life, that is, a vegetative and sensitive form. With all the more reason, then, does it have power over an accidental form, grace.

9. It was said that the reason why a creature cannot cause grace is that, since it is not drawn out of the potentiality of matter, it does not come into being except through creation, whereas an infinite power is needed to create because of the infinite distance between being and nothing; and so it cannot be within the competence of any creature.— On the contrary, it is impossible to traverse infinite distances. But the distance from being to nothing is in fact traversed, since a creature would of itself faii into nothingness "unless sustained by the hand of its Creator" according to Gregory. The distance between being and nothing is therefore not infinite.

10. The ability to cause grace does not imply a power that is in finite simply but only in a certain respect. That can be seen from this:

if we said that God could not make anything but grace, we should not be saying that He has a power simply infinite. But it is not in congruous for a power that is infinite in a certain respect to be conferred upon a creature; for grace itself has a power which is in some sense infinite, inasmuch as it joins one to the infinite good. Consequently nothing prevents a creature from having the power of causing grace.

x It is a part of the glory of a king to have under him powerful and valorous soldiers. Then it is a part of God’s glory that the saints who are subject to Him should be of great power. If, then, it is held that a saint is able to confer grace, the divine glory will not be prejudiced at all.

12. In the Epistle to the Romans (3:22) it is written: "Even the justice of God, by faith of Jesus Christ." And again in the same Epistle (10:17) we read: "Faith then cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of Christ." Now since the word of Christ comes from a preacher, it therefore seems that grace or justice is from the preacher of the faith.

13. Anyone can give to another what is his own. But grace or the Holy Spirit belongs to a man because it is given to him. A person can therefore give another grace or the Holy Spirit.

14. No one has to give an account of what is not under his control. But the prelates of the Church are to give an account of the souls of their subjects; for we read in the Epistle to the Hebrews (13:17): "For they watch as being to render an account of your souls." The souls of the subjects are therefore under the control of the prelates so that the latter can justify them by grace.

15. God’s ministers are more acceptable to Him than are the ministers of a temporal king to that king. But the ministers of a king can bestow upon someone the king’s grace or favour. Then God’s ministers too can bestow the grace of God.

16. Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the effect. But a priest is the cause of the imposition of hands, which in turn is the cause of the Holy Spirit’s being given, according to the Acts of the Apostles (8:17): "They laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost." The priest is therefore the cause of grace in which the Holy Spirit is given.

17. All power that is communicable to creatures has been communicated to them, because, if God could have communicated it and was unwilling to, He was jealous, as Augustine argues to prove the equality of the Son. But the power of conferring grace was communicable to creatures, as the Master says. Therefore the power of conferring grace has been communicated to some creature.

18. According to Dionysius it is a law of the godhead to lead the last things back to God through intermediate things. But the leading of rational creatures back to God is accomplished especially by means of grace. By means of the higher rational creatures, then, the lower obtain grace.

19. To drive out something principal is more than to drive out some thing accessory. But the power of driving out demons, the cause of our wickedness, has been given to men, as is evident from Luke (10:17) and Matthew. Then there is also given to men the power of driving out sins, and therefore of conferring grace.

20. It was answered that a man does this only through his ministry.— On the contrary, the priest of the gospel is more powerful than the priest of the Law. But the priest of the Law works by way of ministry. The priest of the gospel therefore has something more than ministry.

21. The soul lives by the life of nature and by the life of grace. But it communicates the life of nature to another, the body. Then it can also communicate to another the life of grace.

22. Guilt and grace are contraries. But the soul can be the cause of its own guilt. Consequently it can be the cause of its own grace.

23. Man is called a microcosm inasmuch as he bears within him self the likeness of the macrocosm. But in the macrocosm a spiritual effect, the sentient and vegetative soul, is from a creature. Then in the microcosm too, that is, in man, the spiritual effect of grace is from a creature.

24. According to the Philosopher anything is perfect when it can make another like itself; and he is speaking of the perfection of nature. But the perfection of grace is greater than that of nature. Therefore one who has the perfection of grace can establish another in grace.

25. The action of a form is attributed to the one having the form, as heating, which is the act of heat, is attributed to fire. But to justify is the act of justice. It is therefore attributed to a just person. But justification is effected only through grace. Therefore a just man can give grace.

To the Contrary:

1’. Augustine says that holy men cannot give the Holy Spirit. But in the gift of grace the Holy Spirit is given. A holy man therefore cannot give grace.

2’. If one who has grace can give it to another, he does not do so by creating grace in him from nothing, because creating is the work of God alone. Nor again does he do so by bestowing some of the grace which he himself has, because then his own grace would be diminished and he would become less acceptable to God by doing a work acceptable to God. But that is unreasonable. In no way, then, can a man give grace to another.

3'. Anselm proves" that the reparation of the human race could not have been done by an angel, because then the human race would have been indebted to the angel for its salvation, and it could by no means attain equality will the angel. But the salvation of man is by grace. The same difficulty would therefore follow if an angel were to give man grace. But much less can a man give man grace. No creature, therefore, can give grace.

4'. According to Augustine "to justify a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth." But a sinner is justified through grace. Consequently, since no creature can create heaven and earth, neither can it confer grace.

5’. Every action takes place through some connection of the agent will the patient. But no creature insinuates itself into the mind, in which grace is found. Therefore no creature can confer grace.


De veritate EN 231