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As Damascene says, the humanity of Christ in some sense "was the instrument of the divinity"; and for this reason His actions could be salutary for us. Inasmuch as it was the instrument of the divinity, then, it had to have a special connection will the divinity.
The closer a substance stands to the goodness of God, the more fully it participates in His goodness, as Dionysius makes clear. Consequently the humanity of Christ also, because it is connected will the divinity more closely than the others and in a more special way, has participated in the divine goodness through the gift of grace in a more excellent way.
As a result there was a fitness in this humanity not only to have grace but also to communicate it to other beings, as the most shining bodies transmit the light of the sun to others. And because in some sense Christ communicates the effects of grace to all rational creatures, this is why He is in some sense the source of all grace in His humanity, just as God is the source of all being. Then, as all the perfection of being is united in God, in Christ the fullness of all grace and virtue is found, and because of it He not only is capable of the work of grace Himself but can bring others to grace. For this reason He has the headship.
In a physical head there is not only the power of sensing, in order that it may sense by sight, hearing, and touch and such senses; but this power is in it in such a way that it is the root from which sensation flows into all the other members. In Christ, accordingly, one and the same habitual grace is called the grace of union as befitting a nature united to the divinity, and the grace of headship as the means by which grace is communicated to others for their salvation, and also the grace of an individual person as perfecting Him for meritorious works.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. In Christ two different kinds of fullness are referred to: one, of the divinity, according to which Christ is fully God; and the other, of grace, according to which He is said to be full of grace and truth.
It is of this latter fullness that the Apostle speaks in Colossians r:x8— 20, and of the former in Colossians 2:9. The second is derived from the first and by it the grace of headship is formally constituted.
2. An inanimate instrument such as an ax does not need a habit; but an animate instrument such as a servant does. The human nature in Christ is such an instrument.
3. A minister of the Church does not act in the sacraments by his own power but by the power of another, that is, Christ. The minister accordingly does not need personal grace but only the authority of orders, by which he is constituted the vicar of Christ. But Christ wrought our salvation by His own power. The fullness of grace was therefore necessary in Him.
4. Although Christ’s merit has a certain infinity from the dignity of the person, it gets its meritoriousness from habitual grace, without which there cannot be any merit.
5. Christ is the mediator between God and men even in His human nature, in so far as He has passibility together will men, and justice together will God. But His justice is in Him by means of grace. For this reason besides the union there is required habitual grace in Christ in order that He may be the mediator and the head.
6. One and the same habitual grace is from different points of view the grace of the head, the grace of an individual person, and the grace of union, as was explained above.
7. Although both natures are required in Christ for Him to be the head, from the union of the divine nature will the human there results in the human nature a certain fullness of grace, which issues in an overflow from Christ the head into others.
Parallel readings: III Sentences x8, a. 2; a. sol. 1-3; a. 5; Sum. Theol., III, 59, 3; Comp. Theol., 1, 231.
Difficulties:
It seems that He could not, for
1. All merit proceeds from free choice, which is undetermined will regard to many things. But in Christ free choice is determined to good. He therefore could not merit.
2. The relation of the one meriting to the reward is the same as that of a recipient to the thing received, because a person merits in order to receive what he merits. But "the recipient must be devoid of the thing received," as is made clear in The Soul. Then one who merits must be without reward. But that cannot be said of Christ, since He was a true possessor. It therefore seems that Christ could not merit.
3. Whatever is due to someone does not have to be merited. But because Christ was a possessor, impassibility of mind and body was due Him. He therefore did not merit these.
4. Merit does not have to do will events that occur necessarily as if by a natural sequence, because merit concerns that which is voluntarily given by another in return for something as its recompense. But the glory of the body comes from the glory of the soul by a certain natural sequence, as is seen from Augustine. Since Christ was blessed in His soul, enjoying as He did the possession of the divinity, it seems that He could not merit the glory of the body.
5. The saints who are now in glory have glory of soul and not of body, just as Christ had before His passion. But the saints do not now merit the glory of the body. Then neither did Christ.
6. The same thing cannot be the principle and the term of merit, and so the same thing cannot be the reward and the principle of meriting. But the charity which was found in Christ was a part of His reward, because it belonged to the perfection of His beatitude, since by its means He had enjoyment. It could therefore not be the principle of meriting. But all merit is from charity. Consequently there could not have been any merit in Christ.
7. Do away will what goes before, and you do away will what comes after. But before all else merit refers to the blessedness of the soul, which Christ did not merit, because He had it from the instant of His conception. Then neither could He have merited anything else.
To the Contrary:
1’. On the words of the Psalm (15:1): "Preserve me, O Lord," the Gloss comments: "Behold the reward"; and on the words "for I have put my trust in thee" the comment is: "behold the merit." Christ therefore merited.
2’. Whoever is given any recompense in proportion to his deed, merits. But because of the humility of His passion Christ was given the recompense of exaltation, as is shown in the Epistle to the Philippians (2:9): "For which cause, God also hath exalted him...."There fore Christ merited.
3’. Merit is the act of a wayfarer just as enjoyment is that of a possessor. But as a possessor Christ had enjoyment. Then Fie also merited as a wayfarer.
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Christ merited before His passion when Fie was both a wayfarer and a possessor. This is shown as follows. There are two requisites for merit: the state of one who merits and the ability to merit. For the state of one who merits, the lack of that which is said to be merited is required, though some say that a person can merit what he already has. Thus they say of the angels that they merited their blessedness, which they received simultaneously will grace, by the subsequent actions performed will regard to us.
But this does not seem to be true for two reasons: (1) Because it is contrary to Augustine’s argument by which he proves against the Pelagians that grace cannot fail under merit because before grace there are no deserts except evil, since before receiving grace man is a sinner and not grace but punishment is what sinners deserve. For [if the opinion in question is admitted] it could be said that one merits grace by the deeds which he does after receiving grace. (2) Because it is against the nature of merit; for merit is the cause of reward, not as a final cause (for in this sense the reward is rather the cause of the merit), but rather by reduction to efficient causality, inasmuch as merit makes a man worthy of a reward and in this way disposes him for it. Now anything that is a cause in the line of efficiency can by no means be posterior in time to that of which it is the cause. It is impossible, then, for a person to merit what he already has. If in human affairs someone serves his master in return for a favour received, this is more of the nature of thanksgiving than of merit.
The ability to merit is required both on the part of nature and on that of grace. It is required on the part of nature because no one can merit by his own act unless he has dominion over his act. If he has that dominion he can, as it were, give his act as a price for the reward. Now a man has dominion over his own acts through the power of free choice. The natural ability of free choice is therefore required for meriting. On the part of grace it is required because the reward of blessedness exceeds the capabilities of human nature, and so man is notable to merit it by his unaided natural powers. Grace by which he is enabled to merit is accordingly required.
Now all these conditions for merit were fulfilled in Christ. He was lacking in some of the factors required for perfect blessedness: impassibility of soul and glory of body. By reason of this lack Me was a wayfarer. There was in Him, moreover, the ability of nature by reason of His created will, and the ability of grace because of the fullness of grace. He was therefore able to merit.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. Although in the line of moral conduct the soul of Christ was determined to one course of action, that is, good, it nevertheless was not determined to one in an unqualified sense for it could perform this or that particular act or not perform it. He therefore retained the freedom which is required for meriting.
2. He did not merit blessedness of soul, by reason of which Me was a possessor, but only the blessedness of body and impassibility of soul. These were lacking to Him.
3. Christ did not merit anything not due Him in such a way that it became due, as men merit in their first meritorious act. Nor again did He merit in such a way that what was due Him should become more due, as occurs in those whose grace increases. But Me merited in such a way that what was due Him in one way—by reason of grace—should become due Him in another way by reason of merit.
4. The glory of the body results from the glory of the soul when the soul is glorified in every respect, both in its relation to God and in its relation to the body. It was not in this way that the soul of Christ was glorified, but only in its relation to God. Inasmuch as it was the form of the body, it was passible.
5. The souls of the saints in their heavenly home are entirely out of the state of wayfarers because they are already blessed both by enjoy merit and by impassibility. The soul of Christ was riot. There is there fore no parallel.
6. As far as charity itself is concerned, it is always a source of merit; but sometimes it is not in fact a source of merit because of the one who has it, since he is out of the state of meriting. This is seen in the saints in heaven. Christ, however, was not out of the state of meriting, because He was a wayfarer. By the same charity, accordingly, He both enjoyed and merited, as also by the same will. Yet the same thing was not both the source of merit and the reward, because He did not merit glory of soul, to which charity is relevant, but glory of body, as has been said.
7. That argument would prove something if it resulted from any defect on Christ’s part that He could not merit glory of soul. From what has already been said it is clear that that is false.
Parallel readings: De veritate, 26, 6 ans. to Contr. 4; II Sentences 20, 2, 3 ad 3; III Sentences 18, a. 6 sol. 1; Sum. Theol., I-II, 114,6; III, 19,4; 48, 1; a. 6 ad Comp. Theol., I, 231 & 239.
Difficulties:
It seems that He could not, for
1. Christ merited only inasmuch as He was a man. But other men cannot merit for others condignly. Then neither could Christ.
2. Praise as well as merit depends upon an act of virtue. Now no one is praised for the act of someone else but only for his own. Then neither is the act of someone else imputed to anyone for his merit. Christ’s acts are accordingly not meritorious for others.
3. Because He holds the primacy in the Church, Christ is the Church’s head, as is made clear in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:18). But other prelates who have the primacy in the Church cannot merit for their subjects. Then neither could Christ do so.
4. In itself Christ’s merit is related in the same way to all men. If, then, Christ merited salvation for anyone, He merited it for all. But the merit of Christ cannot be frustrated. All therefore obtain salvation. But that obviously is false.
5. Christ is the head not only of men but also of angels. But He did not merit for the angels. Then neither did He do so for men.
6. If Christ could merit for others, then any one of His acts was meritorious for us—and that means for our salvation. His passion was accordingly not necessary for our salvation.
7. Where one means will get results it is superfluous to use two. But the grace which is given to man is sufficient for man to merit eternal life for himself. It would therefore be superfluous for Christ to have merited it for us.
8. Christ merited for us either sufficiently or insufficiently. If sufficiently, then our merit is not required for our salvation. If insufficiently, then His grace was insufficient. But both of these alternatives are inadmissible. Christ therefore did not merit for us.
9. Something necessary for glory is lacking to Christ’s members now as it was before His passion. Since He does not merit for us now, neither did He then.
10. Had Christ merited for us, our condition would have been changed by His merit. But the condition of man seems to be the same after Christ as it was before. Just as the devil could tempt but not force man before, so too now. As punishment was due to sinners, so too now. As meritorious works were required in the just, so too now. Christ therefore did not merit for us.
11. In the Psalms (61:13) it is written: "Thou will render to every man according to his works." But this would not be so if the merits of Christ were imputed to us. Christ therefore did not merit for us.
12. Reward is meted out in proportion to the root of merit. Now if Christ merited for us, the reward of glory will be given to each one of us in proportion to the quantity of Christ’s grace. But that clearly is false.
13. That which is given on the basis of merit is paid rather than gratuitously given. If, then, Christ merited justification for us, it seems that we are not gratuitously justified by God. Then grace will not be grace. Christ therefore did not merit anything for us.
To the Contrary:
1'. That Christ atoned for us is expressly said in the first Epistle of St. John (2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins." But there cannot be atonement without merit. Christ therefore merited for us.
2’. The head in a physical body works not only for itself but also for all the members. Now Christ is the head of His body, the Church. His activity was therefore meritorious for His members.
3’. Christ and the Church are in a sense one person. On the basis of that unity He speaks in the name of the Church in the words of the Psalm (21:1): "O God, my God, look upon me," as the Glass brings out. Consequently Christ could likewise by reason of that same unity merit in the name of others.
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A human action informed by grace has value for obtaining eternal life in two ways that correspond to the two respects in which man falls short of winning glory.
The first respect is the lack of dignity of the person. One who does not have charity, for example, is neither suited nor worthy to have eternal life. In this respect a human action is of value for winning eternal life to the extent that by it a certain dignity and aptness for winning glory is acquired. As an act of sin leads to a certain deformity of the soul, a meritorious act leads to the soul’s adornment and dignity. From this there anises merit that is called condign.
The other respect in which man fails short of winning glory is the interposition of an obstacle, will the result that a man who otherwise is worthy does not win glory. This is the debt of some penalty. A man who is justified, for example, is indebted to pay some temporal penalty. In this respect a human action is related to glory much like the price paid to free a man from a penalty due. Under this aspect the human action has the character of atonement.
In both of these respects Christ’s actions were more efficacious than those of other men. By the actions of other men only the one acting is made suited for the reception of glory, because one man cannot exercise a spiritual influence upon another. As a consequence one cannot merit grace or eternal life for another condignly. But Christ in His humanity could exercise spiritual influence upon other men. His actions could accordingly cause in others suitableness for the winning of glory. He could therefore merit condignly for others, just as He could exercise influence upon others, inasmuch as His humanity was "the instrument of His divinity," as Damascene teaches.
In the second respect also we can discover greater efficacy in Christ than in other men. Although one man can atone for another provided that the former is in the state of grace, he cannot atone for the whole nature, because the act of one mere man is not equal in value to the good of the whole nature. But the action of Christ, being that of God and man, had a dignity that made it worth as much as the good of the whole nature, and so could atone for that nature.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. As man Christ is of greater dignity than other men. It is accordingly not necessary to ascribe to other men whatever belonged to Christ as man.
2. An act of virtue is praiseworthy in its relation to the agent, and so one man cannot be praised for the act of another. But it gets its meritoriousness from its relation to the end, for which a person call be made suited by the influence of Christ. Christ could therefore merit for us.
3. Christ holds the primacy in the Church by His own power, but other prelates hold it inasmuch as they represent the person and take the place of Christ. Christ could therefore merit for the faithful as for His own members, but other prelates cannot do so.
4. Christ’s merit bears the same relation to all men in point of sufficiency, not in point of efficacy. This happens partly from men’s free choice, partly from divine election, through which the effect of Christ’s merits is mercifully bestowed upon some but by a just judgment is withdrawn from others.
5. Just as it belongs to a wayfarer to merit, so no one can merit except for a wayfarer, because the one for whom anyone merits must be lacking in some point that fails within the scope of merit. Now angels are not wayfarers will reference to the essential reward, and so Christ did not merit for them in this respect. But they are in some sense wayfarers will reference to the accidental reward in so far as they minister to us. In this respect, then, Christ’s merit is of value to them as well. It is accordingly said in the Epistle to the Ephesians (I:10) that through Him are re-established all things that are in heaven and on earth.
6. Although every one of Christ’s acts was meritorious for us, yet to give satisfaction for the debt of human nature, which was made liable to death by the divine sentence, as is seen in Genesis (2: 17), He had to undergo death in the place of all.
7. The grace which is given to someone personally is sufficient for the needs of that person himself but not for paying the debt of the whole nature. This is evident in the case of the ancient patriarchs, who, though having grace, were unable because of the debt of the nature to arrive at glory. The merit and satisfaction of Christ was accordingly needed to remove that debt. Furthermore, personal grace was never given to anyone after the sin of the first man except through faith, either explicit or implicit, in the Mediator.
8. The merit of Christ is operative will sufficient efficacy as a universal cause of the salvation of men, but this cause must be applied to each by means of the sacraments and of informed faith, which works through love. Thus something else besides Christ’s merit is needed for our salvation, though the merit of Christ is the cause of that other factor as well.
9. [The answer to this difficulty is missing.]
10. After the passion of Christ the condition of mankind has been much changed, because, will the debt of human nature paid, men can fly unrestrained to their heavenly home. Moreover, the eternal punishment due for personal sins is remitted by means of faith in the passion of Christ; and the temporal punishment is reduced by the power of the keys, in which the passion of Christ is operative. Furthermore, the demons are kept in check by the power of Christ’s passion so that they cannot tempt us so violently, and many helps are given to the faithful for resisting temptation. Finally, as a result of Christ’s passion grace will which to merit is given in the sacraments.
11. Christ and His members are one mystical person. Consequently the works of the head are in some sense the works of the members. Thus, when something is given us on account of Christ’s works, that is not opposed to the statement of the Psalms (61: 3): "Thou will render to every man according to his works." And yet Christ’s merits are of profit to us in such a way that through the sacraments they cause in us grace by which we are bestirred to meritorious works.
12. Christ’s merit is related to our reward as a first and remote cause. Our reward is therefore not commensurate to Christ’s merit but to that merit which is its proximate cause, which derives from the act of the one given the reward.
13. The very fact that any one of us obtains the benefit of Christ’s merit is itself gratuitously conferred upon us by God. Consequently grace is not thereby deprived of its essence.
Parallel readings: III Sentences 18, a. 3; Sum. Theol., III, 34, 3.
Difficulties:
It seems that He could not, for
1. Deliberation is required for merit. But deliberation takes time. Therefore in the first instant of its creation the soul of Christ could not merit.
2. Not only merit but also demerit depends upon an act of free choice. But the angels could not sin in the first instant of their creation, because they would in that case have been evil at the very instant of their creation. But that is false. Then neither could the soul of Christ merit at the first instant of its creation.
3. Whenever there are two movements of which one is subordinated to the other, it is impossible for both to come to an end at the same instant. But the creation of Christ’s soul and the motion of free choice are subordinated movements, because the motion of free choice presupposes its creation. It is therefore impossible for the motion of free choice to come to an end at the very instant at which creation comes to an end, as soon as the soul is created.
4. The answer was given that Christ’s soul was helped by grace to merit at its first instant.—On the contrary, no grace conferred upon a creature carries it beyond the limits of creature hood. But it attaches to the soul inasmuch as it is a creature to be unable to have the motion of its free choice at the first instant in which it is, as is evident from the argument given. It therefore cannot be helped by grace to merit at its first instant.
. Grace perfects the soul after the manner of a habit. Now since a habit presupposes a power, it does not confer upon the soul an un qualified ability to act which it otherwise would not have; it confers rather the ability to act in a given way in which it could not act will out the habit. If, then, Christ’s soul in its own nature could not have the use of free choice at the first instant of its creation, it seems that grace did not confer upon it the ability to merit at its first instant.
6. An instant has the same relation to time as a point to a line. But according to the Philosopher, when a being in motion makes use of one point as two, that is, as the beginning of one line and the end of another, there necessarily intervenes a period of repose, as is shown in a reciprocating motion. Now, since the instant at which Christ’s soul was created is taken as the end of creation and as the beginning of the motion of free choice, and so we use one instant as two, it therefore seems that time intervenes Thus Christ’s soul did not merit at the first instant of its creation.
7. Grace stands to the act of grace as nature to the act of nature. By transposition, then, nature stands to the act of grace as grace to the act of nature. But nature is not capable of an act of grace. Then neither is grace capable of an act of nature. Consequently Christ’s soul at the first instant of its conception could not have had through grace an act winch is within its competence by nature, namely, to choose.
8. A form has three acts: it gives being, it distinguishes, and it orients to an end. Now these acts are related in the same way as being, the one, and the good; for being results from the first act, one from the second, and good from the third. A thing is accordingly a being be fore it is oriented to an end. Now Christ’s soul was oriented to its end by a meritorious act. lt is therefore not possible for it to have merited at the first instant of its creation at which it had being.
9. Merit depends upon an act of virtue, which is brought to completion particularly by choice, as the Philosopher teaches. But Christ’s soul could not have had an act of choice at the first instant of its creation; for choice presupposes deliberation, since it is appetency for what has been previously deliberated, as is pointed out in the Ethics.4 But deliberation takes time, since it is an investigation Christ’s soul could therefore not have merited at the first instant of its creation.
10. Feebleness of our organs prevents the use of free choice, as is seen in newly born infants. But Christ assumed this feebleness, just as He did the rest of our weaknesses The soul of Christ therefore did not merit at the first instant of its creation.
To the Contrary:
1’. At the very instant of His creation Christ was most perfect in soul. But a perfection which is actual as well as habitual is greaten than one which is habitual only. There were therefore virtues in Christ not only habitually but also actually at the first instant of I-his creation. But the acts of the virtues are meritorious Christ therefore merited at the first instant of His creation
2’. At the first instant of His creation Christ had enjoyment as a true possessor. But enjoyment is had by means of an act of charity. He accordingly had an act of charity at the first instant of His creation. But this act of charity was meritorious in Christ. Therefore we must conclude as before.
3'. It was said in answer that the act of charity was not meritorious unless accompanied by deliberation.—On the contrary, deliberation or counsel is not concerned "will the last end, but will the means to it," as is brought out in the Ethics. But the movement of charity is meritorious particularly inasmuch as it tends to the last end. For this act to be meritorious it therefore does not have to involve any comparison or deliberation.
4'. It was said that the motion to the last end is meritorious only in so far as the person relates it to the end. It thus involves a comparison and that cannot take place in an instant.—On the contrary, the intellectual part of the soul is more powerful in its operation than the sensitive. But as soon as anyone senses, he senses that he is sensing. Consequently, as soon as the will is directed toward God there can be a reference of this motion to God Himself; and so this need not take place successively.
5'. Whoever understands anything understands at the same time whatever belongs to its notion; as in understanding man, we under stand at the same time animal. But of two relative terms each is in the notion of the other. Then whoever understands one relative term at the same time understands the other. It is therefore possible for the mind at one and the same instant to relate the motion of charity to God, referring one to the other. Thus no time is needed in that act.
6’. Anselm says that whatever we understand to belong to perfection we must attribute entirely to Christ. But to have a perfect operation at the first instant of one’s creation belongs to perfection. 'We must therefore attribute it to Christ.
7'. As regards the merit of His soul Christ had no room to advance. He would have had, however, if He had not merited at the first instant of His creation. Therefore
8’. The rational power in Christ was no less perfect than the natural power of any other creature. But some of the powers of other creatures can have their operation at the first instant at which they begin to be. A candle, for instance, at the very instant at which it is lighted lights up the air. Consequently Christ’s soul at the first instant of its creation had the act of its rational power, and so it could merit.
9’. Gregory says: "The love of God is not inert. If it exists, it does great deeds. If it ceases to do deeds, it is not love." But Christ had perfect charity at the first instant of His creation. Some act of love was therefore present; and so He had merit at that instant.
10’. Something posterior by nature cannot be prior in time, though it may perhaps be simultaneous. Now merit is prior to reward by nature; but at the first instant of His conception Christ had the reward, because He was a true possessor. He therefore had merit at least at the same instant.
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On this question there are two opinions. Some say that Christ did not have merit at the first instant of His conception, but began to merit immediately after the first instant. Others say that He did merit at the very first instant. This latter opinion is the one which seems to be the more reasonable. For we believe that any spiritual perfection which any other creature can possibly have was conferred in its entirety upon the soul of Christ at the first instant of its creation. Now the impossibility of meriting at a given instant could come from either of two sources: (1) from the agent, or (2) from the act.
This could come from the agent because of a lack of either of two capabilities. One is gratuitous. 'We might, for example, say that in the instant in which someone sins mortally, he cannot merit because he does not have grace. Again it could be because of the lack of a natural capability, as a child at the first instant at which it is conceived cannot merit because it does not have the use of free choice.
Now neither of these reasons is applicable in the matter at hand. For at His first instant Christ had the capability of grace, being full of grace, and also the capability of nature, having the full use of free choice; otherwise He could not have been a possessor. Consequently no impossibility of meriting at the first instant of His conception came from Christ, the agent.
Similarly no such impossibility came from the meritorious act either. That a given act could not be performed at a given instant could come about in two ways: (1) Because that act involves successiveness and so cannot be completed in an instant. Thus local motion cannot take place in an instant. (2) Because the act presupposes certain conditions that cannot precede a definite instant. Thus, if a fire has been kindled out of its proper place, it is impossible for that fire to be in its proper place at the first instant at which it comes into existence, because motion is a prerequisite, and that motion cannot be before the first instant of its existence.
Now in neither of these two ways was Christ prevented from meriting at His first instant. Not in the first, because the motion of free choice upon which merit depends is not successive but simple and instantaneous. Not in the second, because nothing is prerequisite for the motion of the will except the act of the apprehensive power; and that motion is at the same instant as the act of the will, because the apprehended good moves the will; for the mover moves and the being in motion is moved at the same time and will the same motion. In Christ, moreover, the apprehension of the good does not need any previous inquiry in order to reach a certain judgment about the good, because Christ immediately had a true judgment about everything will certitude.
It is evident, then, that there was nothing to keep Christ from meriting at the first instant. It must therefore be granted that at the first instant of His conception He merited.
Answers to Difficulties:
1. The term deliberation can imply either of two meanings. The first is the perception by reason in a certain judgment of the matter about which the deliberation is being carried on. From this point of view it can take place in an instant in one devoid of any perplexity about what is to be done. in this sense deliberation found place in Christ. The term can also mean an inquiry or investigation. Then it implies a discourse and cannot take place in an instant. Christ needed no such deliberation, because He was not in doubt about what was to be done.
2. The will of a rational nature is naturally oriented to good, not to evil. It can accordingly at the first instant of its creation, unless prevented, be attracted to good, but not to evil; for it is attracted to evil only through an error which occurs in comparing and investigating. Time for comparing is accordingly needed for evil, but not for good.
3. That argument is valid for successive but not for instantaneous movements. The reason for this is that, when two movements are in sequence, the same instant which is the end of the first movement can be the beginning of the second. Thus at the same instant at which the coming into existence of fire is completed outside its natural place, the local motion of the fine begins, unless there is some impediment.
If the beginning of the second movement and the end of the same movement are the same, as happens in the instantaneous movements, then the end of the second movement occurs at the same instant as the end of the first illumination and vision, for example, terminate at the same instant. But if the end of the second movement cannot be at the same instant will the beginning of that movement, as happens in all successive movements then it will be impossible for the end of the second movement to be at the same instant as the end of the first movement Now since the motion of free choice is instantaneous, nothing prevents its end from being at the same instant as the end of the creation of Christ’s soul.
4. The answer to this is clean from what has just been said, for it is not beyond the capabilities of a creature that its instantaneous move merit should be completed at the first instant.
5. Although the rational power can have its operation at the first instant of its creation as far as it is concerned, yet, if le is taken as coupled will an organ which is not yet suited to a perfection, it is prevented by the defect of the organ from being able to have its operation at that time. But that obstacle was removed from Christ’s soul by grace. On this score it enjoyed through grace the ability to ace at its first instant.
6. An instant in time and a point in space are not alike as regards the matter at hand. For a being in motion cannot use as two the same point in space except in the same species of motion; but a being in motion can use as two the same instant of time even as regards different species of motion.
In the same species of motion it is not possible to have continuity of motion if one movement actually ends and the other actually be gins, because in this case repose intervenes, and consequently a time. In specifically different motions, however, it is possible for the end of one movement and the beginning of another to coincide, because between them no continuity or order is needed since both can exist together. For instance, while a thing is being moved it can at the same time be whitened, and at the instant at which it begins to be come white the local motion ends. Between the parts of the same motion, however, there sometimes is an order, will the result that the two parts cannot exist together. In that case the end of one part does not coincide will the beginning of the other part if both are taken as actual. It is evident, then, that the use of one instant as two does not demand an intervening time, as does the use of one point as two in local motion.
7. Since grace perfects nature it does not have the same relation to nature as nature to grace. When a proportion is transposed it does not hold good in all matters but only in continuous and discrete measure.
8. That argument holds for the order of nature, not for the order of time. This is clearly shown from the fact that at the very same instant the form gives being, orients, and distinguishes.
9. Deliberation is required for choice when the person is not certain in regard to the things to be done. But that does not apply to Christ.
10. Christ did not assume any defects that could result in the imperfection of grace and of knowledge. Such a defect is the unsuitability of one’s organs for the activity of the soul. Christ therefore did not assume this defect, but His organs were strengthened by grace so that they were suited for the operation of the soul, as would per haps also have happened in the state of innocence.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties:
We concede these arguments because they arrive at true conclusions even though some of them do not do so by adequate reasons.
THE 29 QUESTIONS ON TRUTH
De veritate EN 252