Summa - Supplement 1945

Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?


Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and "demons, and his men" [*Cf.
2Th 2,3: "And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition."], namely Antichrist, "together with the ungodly and sinners will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but such as God knoweth." Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will not be corporeal.

Objection 2: Further, the souls of the damned when severed from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Gn ad lit. xii, 32): "In my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal." Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake, rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): "There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves." Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.

On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): "I doubt not that the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there."

Further, it is written (Sg 5,21): "The . . . world shall fight . . . against the unwise." But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.

I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they considered it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul's delight after death that seem to denote bodily pleasure---for instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so forth---must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions of the soul's suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment---for instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is suffering various pains on account of such like images being in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (Gn ad lit. xii, 32), as is clear from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body---thus following somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for the present. We have said elsewhere (Question [70], Article [3]) how the souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.

Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books.

Reply to Objection 3: That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art requires.

Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?


Objection 1: It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as the corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): "In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone." But all or nearly all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same species as this.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory commenting on
Jb 10,26, "A fire that is not kindled shall devour him," says (Moral. xv): "Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled by human endeavor, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat." Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see.

Objection 3: Further, the everlasting and the corruptible differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire" (Mt 25,41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of Jb 18,5: "Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?" Therefore . . . as above.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 6), "every water is of the same species as every other water." Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.

Further, it is written (Sg 11,17): "By what things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented." Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those same things.

I answer that, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other bodies for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as in burning coal, or of air as in the flame. Under whatever conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know not. And in this way it may differ specifically from the fire we have, considered materially. It has, however, certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of the fire.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to its matter, and not with regard to its nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30:33): "The breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it."

Reply to Objection 3: Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell whereby those bodies will be punished.

Reply to Objection 4: To give light does not belong to fire according to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light; wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different species.

Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?


Objection 1: It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For it is said of the damned (
Jb 18,18), "And God shall remove him out of the globe [Douay: 'world']." Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.

Objection 2: Further, nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.

Objection 3: Further, after the day of judgment the bodies of all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place. Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding great, for "the number of fools is infinite" (Qo 1,15), the space containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the center. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.

Objection 4: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Sg 11,17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.

On the contrary, It is written (Is 14,9): "Hell below was in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming." Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.

Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): "I see not what hinders us from believing that hell is beneath the earth."

Further, a gloss on Jon 2,4, "Thou hast cast me forth . . . into the heart of the sea," says, "i.e. into hell," and in the Gospel (Mt 12,40) the words "in the heart of the earth" have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), "I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one." Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) having been questioned on this point answers: "About this matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some part of the earth's surface; others think it to be beneath the earth." He shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: "If we call it the nether regions (infernus [*The Latin for 'hell']), for the reason that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth." Secondly, from the words of Apoc. 5:3: "No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book": where the words "in heaven" refer to the angels, "on earth" to men living in the body, and "under the earth" to souls in hell. Augustine too (Gn ad lit. xii, 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that "whereas the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth." The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of body). Wherefore "just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful"; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it signify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) says that "hell is stated or believed to be under the earth," because he withdraws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: "Methinks I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth." However, some philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that "the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments." But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained (Question [91], Article [2]).

Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et Mundo ii). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it is beneath the earth.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Job, "God shall remove him out of the globe," refer to the surface of the earth [*"De orbe terrarum," which might be rendered "from the land of the living."], i.e. from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: "He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness." Nor does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.

Reply to Objection 2: Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things were to remain in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of the earth.

Reply to Objection 3: Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things that "never are satisfied" (Pr 30,15-16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.

Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow of necessity that "by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented," except as regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since "inordinate love is its own punishment," as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).



We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?

(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?

(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?

(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?

(5) Whether the wicked hate God?

(6) Whether they can demerit?

(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?

(8) Whether they ever think of God?

(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?

Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?


Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand." Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is altogether involuntary." Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.

Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.

On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf.
I 64,2]. Further, as the will of the damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.

I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that account.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil circumstances [*Cf. I 64,2, ad 5].

Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.

Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?


Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned ever consent to the evil they have done." Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed.

Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to man what their fall was to the angels." But the angel's will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned [*Cf.
I 64,2]. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.

Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things" (Pr 2,14). Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Sg 5,3): "Repenting within themselves [Vulg.: 'Saying within themselves, repenting']."

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the more.

I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.

Reply to Objection 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the wicked.

Reply to Objection 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely the punishment.

Reply to Objection 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus Augustine says (Questions [83], qu. 36): "We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain."

Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?


Objection 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 7): "Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all."

Objection 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8): "Preference supposes election." But "not to be" is not eligible; since it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more desirable to the damned than "to be."

Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now "not to be" is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore "not to be" is more to be shunned than to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, It is written (
Ap 9,6): "In those days men . . . shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them."

Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Si 41,3-4): "O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg.: 'patience']." Much more, therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the damned according to their deliberate reason.

I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to be" takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of good" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mt 26,24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born," and (Jr 20,14): "Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of Jerome observes: "It is better not to be than to be evilly." In this sense the damned can prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate reason [*Cf. I 5,2, ad 3].

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally, as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be" and "to live" are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but only accidentally, as stated already.

Reply to Objection 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be."

Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned?


Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (
Lc 16,27-28) of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come "into the place of torments." Therefore in like manner the other damned would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be damned in hell.

Objection 2: Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i.e. that they should be damned.

Objection 3: Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are saved.

On the contrary, A gloss on Is 14,9, "are risen up from their thrones," says: "The wicked are comforted by having many companions in their punishment."

Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.

I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate. Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is 26,11): "Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy enemies." Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.

Reply to Objection 1: So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned, and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.

Reply to Objection 2: Love that is not based on virtue is easily voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4). Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.

Reply to Objection 3: Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.

Summa - Supplement 1945