"Veritatis splendor"

The encyclical Veritatis splendor, published on August 6^th 1993, aims to clarify with precision a number of "fundamental questions concerning the Church’s moral teaching", taking the form of a necessary discernment about issues being debated by ethicists and moral theologians. (5).

For this reason it does not represent a complete teaching of the Christian moral doctrine. It deals with a limited number of problems. The document must therefore be read with reference to the ample synthesis of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. The document finds its meaningful continuation in the encyclicals Evangelium vitae (1995) and Fides et ratio (1998).

The renewal of moral theology wished for by the Second Vatican Council has provided considerable results. But some theologians, founding their thoughts on ethical and anthropological concepts that have not been sufficiently criticized, and have managed to start a systematic debate regarding the moral heritage of the Church.

- The very competence of the teachings of the Church on moral matters has been doubted. This caused a real crisis. It was necessary to face the challenge.

The crisis of theology is the result of the cultural rift, influenced by different schools of thought, between freedom and truth, according to which freedom, in its total autonomy, is the source of values. No theologian defends such an extreme point of view. However some have placed, within the framework of behaviors that they call "innerwordly", an autonomy of reasoning that represents the capacity, by reason itself, to create moral rules concerning "human goodness" independently from the Revelation and the Teachings.

The crisis of the intrinsic link between faith and morals directly concerns theology with obvious pastoral consequences. Once again it is because autonomy is misunderstood – not recognizing that faith also requires a coherent commitment that embraces the whole of life and that, consequently, it implies obeying the commandments.

The first chapter consists in a meditation of the Holy Scriptures. In the young man who approaches Jesus and asks Him "Good Master, what good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?" (Math 19, 16-22), we can recognize each and every man. So as to answer the moral question we must turn our eyes towards Christ.

As the dialogue between Jesus and the young man continues, meditation discovers the essential element of the Revelation of the Ancient and of the New Testament concerning moral action: the subordination of man and his activity to God, to He who "alone is good"; the relation between the moral good of human actions and eternal life; the need to obey the commandments contained in the divine Law and accomplished by Jesus; the sequence of Christ, who shows mankind the perspective of perfect love; and finally the gift of the Holy Spirit, the source and the resource of moral life for the "new creation" (see no. 28). In this manner, beyond all expectations, the deepest aspirations of the human heart for life and for happiness are gratified.

We learn here the importance of the subject of the sequela Cristi which represents without doubt imitation, but also, more radically, participation in His life – a life of freedom in His obedience as an expression of His love for the Father to the point of the gift of Himself on the Cross (see nos. 19-21). In this way attention is drawn to the novelty and originality of Christian morals as the link that unites faith and morals: faith, like the sequela Christi, also has moral contents: "This is not a matter only of disposing oneself to hear a teaching and obediently accepting a commandment. More radically, it involves holding fast to the very person of Jesus, partaking of his life and his destiny, sharing in his free and loving obedience to the will of the Father" (no.19).

It is also possible to observe how the trend to secularize morality can be misleading: Jesus’ answer to the question asked by the young man proves that the moral issue is also at the root of a religious issue (see no. 9). Finally, it is necessary to identify the ecclesial dimension of Christian morals and the mission of the Teaching of the Church (see nos. 25, 26).

The second chapter enunciates a number of principles through which it is possible to judge some of the current trends of moral theology that are in opposition to the "healthy doctrine". It is not a global rejection but a critical examination that allows the indication of the ambiguities, the dangers and the mistakes, the recognition of what there is in these trends that is legitimate, useful and precious (see no.34). The encyclical wishes to be a reminder of a certain number of assumptions of moral Catholic theology.

The fundamental problem lies in the relationship between human freedom and the truth. A number of trends in our culture have managed to weaken or even deny the dependence of freedom on truth (ibid).

Therefore the moral question defers to the anthropological issue and anthropology in turn is illuminated by the light of the mystery of the Word Incarnate, according to the doctrine developed by Gaudium et Spes, n. 22. From this point of view in fact we perceive the entire wealth of the subject regarding the image of God. Morals and its requirements can be understood only by beginning with a vision of mankind as the image of God.

It goes without saying that the way in which the relation between freedom and truth is understood affects directly the manner in which one understands the relation between freedom and the law.

Some schools of thought have even stated the absolute autonomy of freedom: moral autonomy would imply a complete sovereignty. Freedom would then be the creator of truth or of "values" (see no. 35). This sovereignty is often attributed to human reason. The cultural trends discussed have also exercised their influence in the field of Catholic morals: they attribute to mankind the faculty to provide itself with moral laws relative to the correct order of life in this world (see no. 36). A contrasting distinction has been introduced between an ethical order, with only human origins, and a redeeming order, for which only a number of intentions and interior attitudes concerning God and our neighbors would be relevant (see no. 37).

It is necessary to discuss in real terms the moral autonomy of mankind that can be defined participated Thomistic doctrine. Mankind, created to be free, participates in the divine rules, because called upon to govern itself. Mankind’s moral autonomy is therefore a participated autonomy.

The doctrine of natural law explains this important issue. Natural law consists in the participation in eternal law by the reasoning creature, stressing the fundamental subordination of reason and of human law to the Knowledge of God and to His Law (see no. 44).

The encyclical clarifies the misunderstandings caused by the expression: natural law. It concerns a human nature that fundamentally implies reason, and it is reason that, starting with the perception of the objectives of the inclinations that the Creator has inscribed in mankind, notifies the will of the imperatives of the law. Hence there is neither physicalism nor naturalism (see nos. 47-48).

A precise understanding of the natural law leads to the affirmation of its universality and its immutability, unacknowledged by the theories that place freedom and nature in opposition, as well as historical and cultural terms. "This universality does not ignore the individuality of human beings, nor is it opposed to the absolute uniqueness of each person. On the contrary, it embraces at its root each of the person's free acts, which are meant to bear witness to the universality of the true good. By submitting to the common law, our acts build up the true communion of persons..." (no. 51). The encyclical remembers correctly how the idea itself of historicity implies permanent structural elements; the reference made by Jesus to the "beginning", certifies this. Of course mankind is always placed within a particular culture, but mankind does not come to an end within this same culture. "Moreover, the very progress of cultures demonstrates that there is something in man which transcends those cultures." which is exactly the nature of mankind, with which culture is measured and the dignity of the person affirmed (see no. 53).

The theories of a moral conscience in opposition to the tradition of the Teachings are situated in the continuation of the above mentioned concepts concerning the relation truth-freedom, leading to a "creative" interpretation (see no. 54 ss.). This interpretation presents various modalities.

In a negative sense, the theories represent a reaction to the explanations provided by manuals from pre-Council times which define the work of the conscience as a simple application of general moral rules; in addition to this these theories cannot be considered capable of accepting and respecting the entire unrepeatable specificity of each individual action of a person. The law cannot substitute a person in making a decision. In effect, according to this theory, there appears to be a contradiction between the law and a personal decision. Hence the conscience cannot be no longer perceived as a plea for judgment , but as a plea for a decision, therefore become itself the law.

The choice should be made for reasonable reasons. As far as the rules established by the Teachings are concerned they should be considered valid only in virtue of the matters that support them.

More than an objective and a binding criteria, these rules should provide a general perspective for helping mankind in its personal and social life. After all the decision should be reached considering a rational firm belief in the validity of these rules. Hence the belief that the excessively categorical position of the Teachings are an obstacle to the moral maturation of mankind.

According to other theologians, the rules enunciated by the Teachings have a speculative value. The practice should require a more substantial existential consideration that might legitimate the exceptions. The decisive criteria appears to be the coherence of choice with good intentions. A choice that might, contrary to an action qualified as intrinsically evil by the law at an abstract level, become justified at a realistic level. Hence it is the individual conscience that decides between right and wrong. This causes a disastrous separation between law and choice, for so-called "pastoral" reasons. (see nos. 55-56).

The encyclical remembers the main ideas of the Christian doctrine regarding the conscience. The conscience represents mankind’s testimony of his faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the law: the conscience is the only witness of the intimate dialogue between man and himself, and furthermore, of his dialogue with God. The conscience represents practical judgment, that at the end of all reasoning, tells mankind what to do or what not to do, or that evaluates an action already undertaken.

The natural law underlines the objective needs for moral good, the conscience is the application of the law to a particular case; it becomes therefore an interior dictate for mankind, a call to do good hic et nunc in a precise situation. It is the recognition and not the negation of the universal characteristics of the law and of obligations. It constitutes the closest rule for personal morality.

It is necessary to identify the real meaning of the word application, which includes nothing mechanical: it is the interiorization of the law, which with its luminous strength is capable of illuminatiing a singular act, as the act of the person.

The conscience can be mistaken, it is not infallible. The mistake can be invincible or guilty depending on the case. Forming one’s own conscience so that it is capable of providing real judgments is therefore a serious duty for everyone. The Church and its Teachings provide a great help for this formation.

This meditation leads to the theories that are centered on the "fundamental choice". The fundamental choice of a faith "that works through charity" (Gal 5, 6) and obedience to the faith (see Romans 16, 26), qualifies moral life and commits freedom totally to God, is a subject with deep biblical roots. It is therefore a positive matter that theology perceives its importance.

But what must be refused is a certain interpretation of the fundamental choice that is based on a mistaken concept of the relation between the person and the actions that lead to the dissociation of the fundamental option and particular choice. This is a fundamental freedom thanks to which the person globally makes decisions, not through a precise, conscious and aware choice, but in a "transcendental" and "athematic" manner. As far as particular choices are concerned, known as "categorial", they appear to be partial and never resolutive attempts to express this option in an adequate manner; they seem only to be "marks" or symptoms of them. Deliberate choices and effective behaviors of "categorial" freedom regarding partial goodness seem to belong to the "innerwordly" ambit.

In this manner, the proposed distinction becomes a dissociation of two types of freedom of choice, marking two levels of morality. When one attributes the distinction between good and evil to the fundamental choice, one qualifies as "right" or "wrong" the "innerwordly" particular choices. It is "on the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the "premoral" or "physical" goods and evils which actually result from the action" (65), that the determined behaviors are judged as morally right or wrong. The moral qualification of a person in a strict sense is reserved to the fundamental option. A scission between the two levels of morality is therefore introduced to the interior of human actions.

As far as the theories we have examined are concerned, one must reply that the fundamental option always takes place through conscious and free choices. Hence this option is withdrawn when mankind commits his freedom to choices that are consciously contrary, in serious moral matters.

The theories we have mentioned imagine a dual anthropology, which does not respect " the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and in his soul. A fundamental option, understood without explicit consideration of the potentialities which it puts into effect and the determinations which express it, does not do justice to the rational finality immanent in man's actions and in each of his deliberate decisions. In point of fact, the morality of human acts is not deduced". The morality of actions cannot only be understood by intentions. "Every choice always implies a reference by the deliberate will to the goods and evils indicated by the natural law as goods to be pursued and evils to be avoided" (no. 67). In realty, mankind chooses the absolute Good as his ultimate destination through the choice of the determined good, in conformity with the order wanted by God.

The encyclical also states that "By virtue of a primordial option for charity, that individual could continue to be morally good, persevere in God's grace and attain salvation, even if certain of his specific kinds of behaviour were deliberately and gravely contrary to God's commandments as set forth by the Church.".

Now, according to the teachings of the Council of Trento (see DS 1544, 1469), "the grace of justification once received is lost not only by apostasy, by which faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin"." (see no. 68).

In fact, there is not only a mortal sin when one consciously refuses God and his love. As the Post-synod Exhortation Reconciliatio e paenitentia quotes: "For mortal sin exists also when a person knowingly and willingly, for whatever reason, chooses something gravely disordered. In fact, such a choice already includes contempt for the divine law, a rejection of God's love for humanity and the whole of creation: the person turns away from God and loses charity. Consequently, the fundamental orientation can be radically changed by particular acts." (no. 70).

All in all it is the nature of human or moral actions that are in play. They are thus "because they express and decide the goodness and the evil of the man who acts in such a manner" (no. 70). One can speak, without forcing the sense of the words, of the personalist concept that is present in the encyclical; this underlines the unity, body and soul, of the moral agent. As far as morality is concerned, it means the rational and voluntary ordination of mankind towards its ultimate destination, God, the real good of mankind. This ordination deliberated by acts to God, leads to the affirmation of the theological characteristics of moral laws.

It is precisely on this point that a certain number of interpretations question the very meaning of morality, valorizing exclusively the subjective intentions and the circumstances (more precisely the consequences) of the moral action excluding its object. Theological ethical theories (proportionality, consequentiality) submit the subject agent, so to speak, to a dual duty, creating a distinction between moral order that would concern values that are effectively moral, such as the love of God, kindness towards our neighbors, justice, and a premoral order capable of evaluating advantages and disadvantages that the subject has brought to others. In other words, "The moral specificity of acts, that is their goodness or evil, would be determined exclusively by the faithfulness of the person to the highest values of charity and prudence, without this faithfulness necessarily being incompatible with choices contrary to certain particular moral precepts." (no. 75). Or, the moral goodness of the action would be considered starting with the subject’s intention referred to moral good, while his "rectitude" would be considered "on the basis of the considerations of the effects or foreseeable consequences and their proportion" (ibid). According to this concept, which is the result of a dual anthropology, the subject could decide the validity of acting against a universal negative rule.

This kind of understanding matters is not compatible with the doctrine of the Church, because it believes that it is possible to justify as acceptable the deliberate choices that are contrary to the commandments of divine Law. "When the apostle Paul summarizes the precept that love therefore is the fulfilling of the law (see Rom 13,8-10), he is not weakening the commandments but reinforcing them, since he is revealing their requirements and their gravity." (no.76).

In moral theology the object indicates the limit of deliberate will. Reason presents the will with a number of choices as conforming or contrary to moral law. The will illuminates the compatibility or the incompatibility of the object chosen with the love of God, the ultimate objective. And just as the person realizes his perfection in a union with the love of God thanks to his willpower, free choice commits the person himself. What the law given with reason presents to the will are the characteristics that conform or not do not conform with a given choice or behavior, with the love of God. Therefore "the morality of human acts depends above all and fundamentally on the object reasonably chosen by the free will". In saying that the human act depends on the object one states that: "whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who "alone is good", and thus brings about the perfection of the person. (see no. 78). Morality is therefore the interior reality of a person and cannot, without encountering a duality that is contrary to the nature of things, instill in the object itself a kind of scission between the moral and the "physical" aspect. It is the object, in as much that conforms to the order of reason, that is the cause of the goodness of the will.

The encyclical therefore does not minimize the importance of the intentions and the consequences. These simply cannot eliminate the object or place it within brackets.

It is now possible to understand the doctrine of acts that are intrinsically evil. They are, in their objectivity, acts that are "not capable of being ordered" to God because they contradict the good of the person. If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. (see no. 81). The rules that forbid such acts are valid under all circumstances, semper et pro semper. "As is evident, in the question of the morality of human acts, and in particular the question of whether there exist intrinsically evil acts, we find ourselves faced with the question of man himself, of his truth and of the moral consequences flowing from that truth" (no. 83).

Should mankind wish to decide, according to his intentions, the goodness or the malice of his actions, then mankind would place itself "beyond good and evil", wishing to escape the truth of its condition as a creature. Mankind would present itself as the creator of values based on its subjective intentions and on a calculation, that is also questionable, of the consequences.

The third chapter, in view of all we have mentioned, reaches important pastoral conclusions.

The formation of a moral conscience belongs to the great project of a new evangelization, which must be the work of the entire Church, "a prophetic people". In this framework moralist theologians have their own mission.

The formation of a moral conscience is fundamental for the sanctity of the person (see no. 88-94), it is the condition for a social life worthy of mankind (see no. 95-101).

Christians are invited to rediscover " the newness of the faith and its power to judge a prevalent and all-intrusive culture." (no.88). Faith has a moral content, it involves the acceptance of the divine commandments. In moral life faith becomes "confession", it becomes a witness (see no. 89). It is important to take note of the beautiful reference to Christian martyrdom, which alone confirms the unacceptable characteristics of ethical theories that deny the existence of moral rules that are determined and valid without exception (see no. 90). There are truths and moral values for which one must be ready to sacrifice ones life (see no. 94). Christians however are not the only ones who know this.

"The Church's firmness in defending the universal and unchanging moral norms is not demeaning at all"(no. 96). All men, with no exceptions, are equal when faced with moral laws. These laws constitute a guarantee for the dignity of mankind and for a fair social life, both in financial and political environments.

The teachings of morality are understood in the light if God’s mercy.

It is always possible, with the help of the grace of God and the means for sanctification that are bestowed by the mystery of Redemption, to obey the law of God. The understanding of human weakness must not compromise and falsify the measure of good and evil (no. 104). On the contrary, accepting the disproportion between the law and the capacity of strength alone prepares for the acceptance of grace (see no. 105). When the Church, for the dignity and the real freedom of mankind, announces a moral law, it is looking at Christ on the Cross. Then the Church participates in its mission with the certainty that true freedom lies in the love that one offers.

The example of mercy set by the Mother Mary that is mentioned in the conclusion remind us of the "extraordinary simplicity" of Christian life. This simplicity consists in "following Jesus Christ, in abandoning oneself to him, in letting oneself be transformed by his grace and renewed by his mercy, gifts which come to us in the living communion of his Church." (n. 119).

So as to have a correct concept of moral action one must take into consideration the truth of mankind. This is included in the doctrine of the "image of God": "Mankind’s true freedom is the highest mark of the divine image. God, in fact, wished to leave mankind "in the hands of His Council" See. Sir 15, 14), so that mankind might freely search for its Creator and freely reach, adhering to Him, a full and blessed perfection" (Gaudium et spes, no. 11).

In fact self-awareness as the image of God is the foundation for moral judgment.

We travel towards God, our ultimate destination, through the intercession of singular actions that concern singular good that per se are capable or not to be ordered to the love of God. But there are actions (actions that are intrinsically evil) that are themselves contrary to the love of God. Veritatis splendor, no. 83, can therefore state, as we have already mentioned, that as far as the question is concerned of morality "there exist intrinsically evil acts, we find ourselves faced with the question of man himself, of his truth and of the moral consequences flowing from that truth. (...)".

Father Georges Cottier, O.P.